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AN ANALYSIS OF MERGER WAVES AND HOSTILE TAKEOVERS
The number of mergers between large companies has been low, and hostile takeover
cases have been rare in post-war Japan. Since the 1990s, however, total M&A activity has
been increasing in number of cases and in value. Coinciding with this trend, hostile tender
offer attempts are also more frequent. Previous research argues that the low level of
merger and hostile takeover activity is caused by three institutional elements within the
Japanese society: the main bank system, the horizontal keiretsu, and the specific Japanese
culture.
With reference to hostile takeovers we show that it is important to make a distinction
between greenmail and hostile tender offers. We build an institutional model that
emphasizes the necessity to consider institutional elements from a historical and context-
specific perspective. Our model indicates that the vertical keiretsu and the trade association
have an important impact on hostile tender offers in Japan. 
Regarding mergers, we examine whether the main bank system influences merger
activity of companies. By using two event studies we show that involvement of a main
bank does not create shareholder wealth in mergers. The main bank appears to act in
order to protect its own interests as creditor.
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1
Introduction, Findings and
Overview
The number of mergers between large companies has been low, and hostile takeover cases
have been rare in post-war Japan. Since the 1990s, however, total merger and acquisition
(“M&A”) activity is increasing in both number of cases and in value. Coinciding with the
trend in total M&A activity, hostile tender offer attempts are also more frequent with
thirteen cases in the period from 1999 to July 2007. The collapse of the bubble economy
and the subsequent recession in the 1990s forced Japanese companies to question the
efficiency of the traditional Japanese system of corporate governance, which was
characterized by an important role for main banks. Although this corporate governance
may have been beneficial for the production needs and technology of Japanese companies
up to the 1990s, “those needs have changed and the main bank has largely ceased to
function” (Milhaupt and West 2001, p.12). Deregulation of financial markets has reduced
the influence of the main bank, and the banking crisis and new accounting rules in the
latter half of the 1990s have resulted in unwinding of stable and cross-shareholdings.
Specific Japanese cultural characteristics that are claimed to have limited M&A have
changed as well, and major legislative amendments regarding M&A were announced and
implemented from the late 1990s onward. Lin (2005) notes that the lifetime employment
system has become increasingly difficult to sustain for Japanese companies, and “the
keiretsu relationships in Japan were drifting away from the keiretsu governance modes
towards the American style of arms-length contracting and top-down administration”
(p.98). These factors have made it easier for companies to engage in M&A activity and
created various incentives to restructure operations. This thesis examines how and why
M&A activity in Japan has changed over time.
Previous research argues that the low level of merger and hostile takeover activity is
caused by three institutional elements within the Japanese society: the main bank system,
the horizontal keiretsu, and the specific Japanese culture. 1 Two other important
1 These two post-war characteristics will be discussed in detail in Chapter 5 and 6.
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institutional elements, the vertical keiretsu and trade association, have not been included in
the M&A discussion. This thesis shows that these two latter institutional elements need to
be considered, as specifically these factors may have played an important role in hostile
takeover activity in Japan.
The main bank system defines the special relationship that exists between a company
and its most important (main) bank. The involvement of the main bank in the operations of
the company is through bank loans, cross-shareholdings, payment settlement accounts,
information services, supply of management resources, and bond-issue related services
(Aoki et al. 1994). Through the special relationship with companies, the main bank has a
lot of information about its customers and also functions as monitor and advisor of the
company. Aoki et al. (1994) argue that corporate monitoring by the main bank substitutes
the market for corporate mergers and takeovers in post-war Japan.
The horizontal keiretsu (kigyǀ shǌdan) is a horizontally diversified industrial group in
which companies have ties with banks, trading companies, customers, and other affiliated
companies. The ties in the industrial group are characterized by the stable and cross-
shareholdings and implicit contracts (Sheard 1989; Aoki and Patrick 1994; Nakatani
1984).2 Hostile takeovers are argued to be prevented by stable and cross-shareholdings
within the horizontal keiretsu (Morck and Nakamura 2003; Sheard 1989; Aoki and Patrick
1994; Nakatani 1984).
According to the Japanese cultural characteristics explanation, the Japanese have a
unique capacity to cooperate with each other in harmony and they put high emphasis on
trust (Johnson 1982). Merger and hostile takeover activity is argued to be low because
Japanese companies are unwilling to do so. This unwillingness derives from various
characteristics within the Japanese (corporate) culture. Most important is that a Japanese
company is regarded as a community that workers identify their interests with, as a place
to both work and live. This resulted in cultural characteristics such as lifetime employment,
internal promotion, restricted labour mobility, seniority-based wages, and company unions
that are organized within and oriented to the company (Pettway and Yamada 1986; Odagiri
and Hase 1989; Abegglen 1983). Because the employees are most important in Japanese
companies, a company’s management is unwilling to accept a merger, and hostile
takeovers will be strongly resisted. The importance of the employees is further reflected in
the preference for growth through internal corporate growth over M&A as this can
contribute to the use and enrichment of existing human resources and create promotion
opportunities for employees. Odagiri and Hase (1989) point out that Japanese companies
prefer capital participation and acquisitions to mergers. They argue that two different
companies have to be unified in a merger, and this is rather avoided because it could cause
various labour-related problems.
Based on the above-mentioned arguments, we conclude that in order to understand
merger and hostile takeover activity in Japan, we need to (i) be aware of the ownership
structure and group structure of Japanese companies, and (ii) comprehend how Japan’s
informal and formal institutions influence the ownership structure, group structure, and
M&A activity. Regarding hostile takeovers we argue that it is necessary to make a
distinction between hostile tender offers and greenmail. The difference between these two
activities is the motivation of the bidder (raider). In a hostile tender offer the bidder wants
2 Aoki et al. (1994) indicates that although not all companies are part of a kigyǀ shǌdan, almost every Japanese
company has a main bank.
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to attain operational control over the target company. He tries to obtain an ownership
percentage that is sufficient to exercise influence over managerial and financial decisions.
The strength of the bidder’s influence depends on the actual ownership percentage he
obtains. In greenmail, on the other hand, the bidder does not have the intention to gain
control. Greenmail is the practice of a target company buying back its own shares from a
hostile bidder at a substantial premium, herewith getting rid of the hostile threat.
1-1 Research question
In the M&A process the most important directly involved actors are the management,
shareholders, board of directors, and creditors. Their relative influence primarily depends
on the company’s financing decision: the management’s choice between internal, debt, and
equity financing. The financing decision results in a company’s capital structure and has a
determining effect on the ownership structure3 and corporate governance structure. Other
actors, with an indirect effect on M&A, are the government, employees, and other
stakeholders. There are various factors that influence M&A activity, such as problems
and/or opportunities caused by alterations in economic conditions, efficiency conditions,
and/or technology. It can also be related to industrial development, government policy and
regulations, or (international) competition.
The financing decision of companies depends on informal and formal institutions, and is
influenced by the historical and context-specific background of managers and companies.
In this thesis we therefore look into the economic development as of 1868, when the Meiji
government was established. 4 We examine how changes in laws and regulations, in
relation to both the economic development and informal institutions, influence the
financing decision, ownership structure, corporate governance structure, and M&A activity.
Including the pre-war period and post-war period in the analysis is interesting because
Japan faced new formal institutions in both periods. In the pre-war period these were
implemented after she opened her ports and had to implement her first constitution and
various laws to modernize the country. The second exogenous change in formal
institutions was when U.S. occupation forces designed and implemented a new
constitution and various new laws and regulations after the Second World War (“WWII”).
Especially the new laws after WWII had a large effect on the financial markets, formation
of corporate groups, and companies’ financing decision, ownership structure, and
corporate governance structure. This thesis investigates these effects and subsequently
looks into their influence on M&A activity. We pay special attention to the changes in
ownership and group structures between the pre-war period and post-war period. With
reference to the post-war period we examine the role of the main bank in detail.
3 The influence of the financing decision on the ownership structure is through private placement of shares.
4 Meiji period starts in 1868 en ends in 1912.
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Central question
What are the determinants of M&A activity and merger waves in Japan over time?
Sub-question I
Is hostility in M&A activity increasing, and which actors initiate hostile takeover activity?
Sub-question II
What motivates Japanese companies to engage in mergers, which actors play a role, what
are the profitability drivers, and is shareholder wealth created?
The thesis looks into M&A activity in Japan over time, examining the pre-war period and
post-war period. M&A generally refers to a broad range of M&A structures including
capital participations, business tie-ups, divestures, and other forms of restructuring. We
primarily focus on mergers and hostile takeovers, the latter defined as greenmail and
hostile tender offers. We attempt to find the motives for companies to engage in mergers,
and the drivers for Japanese merger waves during the period under study. After a general
overview of M&A activity, we describe aspects in the Japanese economy that (can) play an
important role in M&A. Subsequently, we build an institutional model that integrates these
aspects and indicates their interrelations and influence on M&A activity.
Our approach to sub-question I is to analyze hostility in M&A activity with a qualitative
study. Our decision for a qualitative study is based on the number of hostile takeover cases,
the state of current knowledge in the field of hostile takeovers in Japan, and the objective
of our thesis. We use the theory of social ontology that “indicates the lines of inquiry
required to produce a complete description. If we start research by describing the nature of
social phenomena as they are experienced, it will make a difference in structuring data
gathering; in developing a research craft capable of seeing practice, interaction manouvres,
and tacit embodiment; in shaping a research agenda; and, ultimately, in where we end
substantively” (Katz 2002, p.255). Previous research on hostile takeovers in Japan is
limited, and the existing literature provides only two explanations for the low number of
cases: stable and cross-shareholdings and the specific Japanese culture. At this stage the
issues that influence hostile tender offers and greenmail in Japan have not been clearly
identified. By using an inductive and hypothesis-generating methodology, we aim at
gaining a clearer picture and understanding.
We adopt an interpretive research paradigm and, following an inductive research path,
we build a model inspired on insights from institutional economics. The interpretive
methodology can be beneficial in identifying unknown variables, themes and processes
that may be valuable in developing an explanatory theory in the area under study.
Institutional economics is particularly applicable as it provides a holistic research approach,
and allows an inductive generation of a theory from the available empirical data. The
model puts the emphasis on the historical and context-specific background, which allows
us a dynamic investigation of institutional elements. According to institutional economics,
the historical development of institutions and the context-specific background have an
important effect on new institutions. Our analysis therefore includes the cultural and social
world that members of a society share and internalize.
The model combines the various elements that influence M&A activity, by integrating
the informal and formal institutions, ownership structure, and group structure of companies.
We not only look into the main bank system, horizontal keiretsu and Japanese culture, but
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also the vertical keiretsu and the trade association. The vertical keiretsu is a group of
companies comprising of a parent company and subsidiaries; the subsidiaries take part in
the production process of the parent company. A trade association is a group formed by
companies with a common business interest. In our institutional analysis we examine the
historical development of the corporate groups and analyze their influence on hostile
takeover activity.
Regarding sub-question II, we follow a deductive research path and empirically test
whether domestic mergers in Japan create shareholder wealth. We conduct two event
studies to examine the explanatory power of the previously mentioned institutional
elements within the Japanese economy, such as the main bank, horizontal keiretsu, and
vertical keiretsu.
1-2 Findings
We assemble a unique data-set on M&A activity in pre-war and post-war Japan. For the
pre-war period we examine 537 companies listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange and find
that M&A activity is very low in the period 1906-37. We do not find evidence that a lot of
hostile takeovers occurred, and companies related to a zaibatsu group were not more active
in M&A than companies without relations with a zaibatsu group. In the post-war period we
find two merger waves; the first wave occurs in the period 1963-72, and the second wave
starts in 1991 and continues up to present. The first merger wave coincides with trade
liberalization and removal of controls on capital transactions in 1964. These mergers were
aimed at preventing excessive competition between domestic companies and increasing
their international competitiveness. The second wave starts after the collapse of the bubble
economy and is related to corporate restructurings. After the regulatory changes in the
latter half of the 1990s, the number and size of total M&A activity increases considerably,
but the number of mergers remains relatively low and stable in the period 1999-2006. In
contrast to the pro-cyclical merger waves in the United States, we find that mergers in
Japan tend to be counter-cyclical, both with respect to the general economy as well as with
respect to stock market valuations. With reference to hostile takeovers in the post-war
period, we indicate that it is important to make a distinction between greenmail and hostile
tender offers. For both types of hostile takeovers we discuss some cases and we show that
the first hostile tender offer was initiated in 1999.
With our institutional model we look into detail in hostile takeovers in post-war Japan.
Previous research argues that the low level of hostile takeover activity is primarily caused
by two institutional elements in the Japanese society. The first is the horizontal keiretsu,
which is argued to have prevented hostile takeovers with stable and cross-shareholdings
between companies. The second is the specific Japanese culture that is said to be
characterized by the pursuit of harmony. Above we indicated that cross-shareholdings are
unwinding and Japanese cultural characteristics changing. Although we see a higher level
of hostile tender offers, there was only one initiated by a Japanese blue-chip company.
This raises the question whether the said institutional elements are indeed changing, or
whether they do not have the influence as claimed in previous research. This thesis
provides evidence that the influence of the vertical keiretsu and trade associations can also
be important. These two institutional elements have been neglected in the hostile takeover
discussion, but could be indispensable to understanding it and making predictions on its
development in the future.
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We show that the claim that horizontal keiretsu is the most important prevention
measure against hostile takeovers is doubtful. New laws implemented after WWII created
the possibility to engage in greenmail and, as companies could not repurchase their own
shares prior to 2001, companies that were part of a horizontal keiretsu were targeted.
Rather than preventing hostile takeovers, the horizontal keiretsu appear to have caused
greenmail in the post-war period.
The argument that the Japanese, as a people, put high emphasis on harmony and trust
implies that Japanese would not undertake hostile actions. Informal institutions change
slowly and we do not find evidence that these have changed to a high degree in recent
years. We show that trust needs to be divided into general trust and particularistic trust.
General trust is trust between individuals that do not have a particular relationship, and
particularistic trust involves trust in groups of mutually dependent individuals. The
Japanese society is characterized by low general trust and high particularistic trust. The
low general trust can be seen in the greenmail practices towards companies, and the high
particularistic trust in, for example, trade associations.
According to our institutional model we conclude that the nature of hostile takeovers in
Japan is not changing, as the recent hostile tender offer attempts can (also) be interpreted
as greenmail. This, combined with the fact that attempts remain at a very low level, leads
us to question the generally accepted above-described explanations and the influence of the
unwinding of cross-shareholdings and changes in Japanese cultural characteristics. With
our model we therefore propose the trade association and vertical keiretsu as explanations
why Japanese blue-chip companies do not initiate hostile tender offers.
Trade associations are formed by companies in the same industrial sector, characterized
by information exchange and strong relationships. We show that because of the
relationships in these groups, companies built a high level of particularistic trust,
preventing these companies to engage in hostile takeovers against each other.
The vertical keiretsu is another important impediment to hostile takeovers, functioning
in three ways. The first characteristic is that a large Japanese company is not the same as a
large U.S. company. Whereas U.S. companies tend to produce most products in-house, the
Japanese company uses a wide subcontracting system that makes it a difficult target for a
hostile takeover. The second characteristic of the vertical keiretsu is that supply from the
subsidiaries is indispensable in the production process of the parent company. The majority
of its important subsidiaries is already fully owned, but if an important partially owned
subsidiary is attacked with a hostile takeover, the parent company will intervene to secure
its own production process. The third aspect is the question whether it would be beneficial
for a hostile bidder to attempt a hostile tender offer of an unwilling subsidiary company.
Even if the hostile bidder would succeed, it is very likely it will lose the subsidiary’s
suppliers and customers in the process. All these factors have limited hostile takeover
attempts to a high degree.
Regarding the mergers in the second wave we investigate whether shareholder wealth is
created. We conduct two event studies and examine the influence of some institutional
elements, specifically the main bank, horizontal keiretsu and presence of a parent company,
and also include company-related data such as profitability and financial distress. In our
first event study we examine the announcement returns of listed bidder companies, but we
do not find a positive association with these returns and the bidder’s affiliation with a main
bank or horizontal keiretsu. When the bidder and target company have the same main bank,
its involvement does not create shareholder wealth, but is motivated to protect its own
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interests as creditor; same main bank mergers are not between two weak companies, but at
least one of the merging companies is financially strong. In the early 1990s most mergers
occur between a weak target company and strong bidder company.
1-3 Overview
This thesis consists of 10 chapters, divided into 4 parts. Chapter 1, as an introductory
chapter, explains the research question and provides the findings and structure of the thesis.
Part I consists of chapter 2 and presents an overview of M&A activity in Japan over time.
Chapters 3 through 5 form Part II and provide background information for interpretation of
M&A activity in the pre-war period and post-war period. Part III, chapters 6 and 7,
introduces our institutional model and examines hostile takeover activity, and Part IV,
consisting of chapters 8 and 9, focuses on mergers. Chapter 10 summarizes and concludes
the thesis.
Part I
In Chapter 2 we start with a description of M&A activity in Japan during the pre-war and
post-war period. In particular, we examine whether merger waves occurred and start the
analysis of both periods at a macro-level. If we find a period with increased merger activity,
we turn the analysis to the meso-level. In this chapter we also discuss hostile takeovers in
the post-war period and describe the most important greenmail cases and hostile tender
offer attempts.
Part II
Chapter 3 discusses informal institutions, political development, and formal institutions.
Informal institutions are traced back to the origins of Shinto, Buddhism, and Confucianism.
Their influence on the (moral) Constitution of Seventeen Articles and the ie system is also
investigated. We look into political development as of 1639, when Japan implemented a
political system that banned almost all foreign contact, and we describe laws related to
financial markets and M&A activity.
In Chapter 4 we examine the influence of the informal and formal institutions on the
financing decision, ownership structure, and corporate governance structure of Japanese
companies. After a brief economic overview of the pre-war and post-war periods, in which
special attention is given to the role of the government and trade associations, we look into
the financing decision in these periods with aggregate data. Next, we look into the
ownership structure and corporate governance structure. We also examine corporate
groups: (i) zaibatsu for the pre-war period, and (ii) the horizontal keiretsu, main bank
system, and vertical keiretsu for the post-war period.
Chapter 5 presents a case study of the Mitsubishi groups. Mitsubishi is taken as an
example because it originated at the start of the Meiji period (1868-1912) and became the
second largest zaibatsu. In the pre-war period we look into the Mitsubishi zaibatsu group,
and in the post-war period the Mitsubishi horizontal keiretsu, the Mitsubishi vertical
keiretsu, and the main bank system with the Mitsubishi Bank at the apex. We pay special
attention to the financing decision and resulting ownership structure and corporate
governance structure in the two periods. In chapter 7 we revisit these findings and examine
the transformation from Mitsubishi zaibatsu to Mitsubishi horizontal keiretsu with our
institutional model in order to interpret their influence on hostile takeovers.
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Part III
Chapter 6 introduces the institutional model that we build to analyze M&A activity in
Japan. Our model is based on the Williamson models and uses insights from North and
Greif. The model emphasizes the importance of motivation of actors and the historical and
context-specific background of institutional elements. Regarding the governance structure
of companies, we pay special attention to transaction cost economics and institutional
change. M&A activity is a strategic decision by individual actors and influenced by all
levels of the model and the governance structure. At the same time, M&A activity has an
important impact on individual actors and governance structure as well.
Chapter 7 analyzes hostile takeovers in Japan according to our institutional model. We
examine the influence of changes in the legal system and specific cultural characteristics,
such as trust. As corporate groups are important in the Japanese economy, we first use the
model to analyze the following corporate groups: horizontal keiretsu, vertical keiretsu, and
trade association. Next, we use our findings on the corporate groups and trust to explain
why the number of hostile takeovers has been low in post-war Japan.
Part IV
Chapter 8 provides an overview of the various types of M&A and explains merger motives
and drivers for merger waves. We discuss mergers and other types of M&A activity.
Regarding hostile tender offer bids, we indicate some available defensive measures. The
chapter concludes with an overview of the five merger waves that occurred in the United
States.
In Chapter 9 we interpret the merger activity and merger waves as discussed in chapter 2.
We look at the merger motives and drivers for merger waves, and integrate political and
economic development. Results from previous studies on mergers and the monitoring role
of the main bank are discussed as well. We execute two event studies and examine whether
shareholder wealth is created around the announcement date of a merger. In this analysis
we look into the influence of various institutional elements in Japan, such as the main bank,
the horizontal keiretsu, (changes in) laws, and economic development. In the first research
we look into shareholder wealth of bidder companies between 1993 and 2003 in 136
domestic mergers between non-financial companies. The sample includes listed target
companies as well as unlisted target companies. In the second research we examine the
abnormal return of listed bidder companies and listed target companies in 91 mergers
between non-financial companies in the period 1981 to 2003.
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2
M&A activity in Japan
This chapter describes M&A activity in Japan over time, covering the pre-war period and
post-war period. We compile a database that, to our knowledge, contains the most
extensive information on Japanese M&A activity in these periods compared to previous
research. Section 2-1 presents M&A activity of 537 companies listed on the Tokyo Stock
Exchange in 1937. In section 2-2 we present domestic merger data from the annual reports
of the Japanese Fair Trade Commission for the period 1949-97, and we use information
from Recof5, a company that collects data on M&A transactions since 1985, for the period
1998-2006. Hostile takeover activity in the post-war period, defined as greenmail and
hostile tender offers, is discussed in sections 2-3 and 2-4. The final section summarizes and
concludes the chapter.
5 http://www.recof.co.jp/english/
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2-1 Pre-war mergers
R M&A activity is low in the pre-war period.
R Most M&A transactions occur in the 1920s, and they are concentrated in the electricity
sector.
R Companies affiliated with a zaibatsu group are not more active in M&A activity than
companies that are not affiliated with a zaibatsu group.
In this section and section 2-2 we begin with a discussion of merger activity at a macro-
level and investigate whether there are periods with increased merger activity. If we find a
higher level of merger activity in a particular period, we look into the meso-level and
investigate if the period can be termed as a merger wave. We use the term ‘merger wave’
according to Nelson’s definition of ‘merger movement’. Nelson (1959) argues that “[I]f
between two successive periods in time, merger activity in a number of different industries
changes in the same direction, we have a sound basis for characterizing the more active
period as what is usually called a merger movement” (p.38). The period of increased
merger activity is particularly interesting to examine in comparison with the preceding
period of lower merger activity. This provides an ideal situation to investigate the merger
wave drivers. We subsequently look into the influence of various factors that can influence
mergers such as problems and/or opportunities caused by alterations in economic
conditions, efficiency conditions, and/or technology. Merger activity can also be related to
industrial development, state policy, government regulations, or (international)
competition.
In our examination of merger activity during the pre-war period from 1868 to 1937, we
first discuss findings from previous research and then turn to our own comprehensive
analysis. The research on M&A in the pre-war period is very limited, but two periods of
increased M&A activity can be distinguished from previous research: the first period is
from 1882 to 1885, and the second period is the 1920s. As a result of the Matsukata
reforms in the 1880s, a lot of companies went bankrupt and the number of companies fell
from 3,336 in 1882 to 1,279 in 1885. As the size of the companies in 1885 had increased
considerably, Röhl (2005, p.346) assumes that a lot of the failing companies were absorbed
by healthier companies. The 1920s, characterized by the many financial crises and the
Kantǀ earthquake, caused a lot of companies to fall into bankruptcy and a similar trend as
in the 1880s occurred.
Previous research provides anecdotal evidence of companies that failed in the 1920s,
including zaibatsu companies such as Kuhara and Fuijita. Flath (2000) mentions that the
“larger zaibatsu6 emerged from the war boom stronger than ever, and proceeded to absorb
many of the failing businesses” (p.52). Nakamura (1994) argues about the bankruptcies
that “[T]he four big zaibatsu7 and the major spinning companies came through largely
unscathed owing to their conservative management policies and so stayed ahead where
other companies fell behind” (p.11). These developments had an important effect on
industries’ concentration ratio and the size of surviving companies. The stronger
companies were primarily the zaibatsu companies that increased their influence on the
6 “Larger zaibatsu” are Old zaibatsu with origins prior to or beginning in the Meiji period, such as Mitsui,
Mitsubishi, Sumitomo and Yasuda. Zaibatsu groups such as Kuhara and Fujita are know as Taishǀ zaibatsu and
emerged resulting from the economic boom of WWI.
7 Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo and Yasuda
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overall economy. Another characteristic of the 1920s is that a lot of banks failed and the
total number fell from 2,036 banks in 1920 to 895 banks in 1930. Similar to the above-
described process with regard to companies, stronger banks absorbed failing banks and
herewith strengthened their own position. Based on these two periods of increased M&A
activity in pre-war Japan, we see that these were primarily aimed at absorbing companies
in financial distress (Moulton 1931; Aoyama and Nishikawa 1958).
Okazaki (1999, 2001) looks into M&A activity of zaibatsu companies and examines the
six largest zaibatsu groups. We discuss his findings below but first look into his detailed
explanation of two M&A deals in pre-war Japan (his research covers four deals in total).
These case studies provide insight into the major actors and motives of the mergers and we
give short summaries of two deals:8
Tokyo Steel - Tokyo Steel was established in 1917 and started a relationship with the
Mitsubishi zaibatsu through a 500 thousand yen loan with the Banking Department of
Mitsubishi Goshi in that year. Due to declining prices and excess inventory of products
and raw materials, Tokyo Steel went into deficit two years later. The company’s financial
situation deteriorated and as of 1925 the company “whose paid-in capital was 2,000,000
yen, owed more than 2,000,000 yen to Mitsubishi Bank, besides 1,400,000 yen to other
creditors” (Okazaki 2001, p.263). Mitsubishi Bank investigated the financial needs and
future prospects of Tokyo Steel, and as the company was considered important to the
industries of Japan, proposed a rescue loan. Although Mitsubishi Bank only had the
intention to provide the rescue loan, the presence of a hostile takeover led to acquisition of
shares. After the acquisition, “84.3% of the shares were held by Isaji Endo, who was the
chief of the Section of Loan, Mitsubishi Bank, and had been dispatched as an auditor in
1928” (Okazaki 2000, p.15). Management of the company was done by professionals from
Mitsubishi Iron Works.
Nihon Flour Mill - Nihon Flour Mill was established in 1896 and came to have relations
with Suzuki Shoten9 in the early 1920s. “[I]t became increasingly dependent on Suzuki as
its financial condition deteriorated. In 1922, Suzuki became top shareholder with a 13.1%
holding” (Okazaki 2001, p.264). Nihon Flour Mill faced increasing financial difficulties in
the mid-1920s and tried to negotiate a merger with Nisshin Flour Mill in 1926. Nisshin
Flour Mill abandoned the merger because Nihon Flour Mill’s debt level was higher than
expected. Hereafter Suzuki arranged, through its intimate business relations with the
Taiwan Bank, a rescue loan for Nihon Flour Mill. Subsequently, Nihon Flour Mill reduced
its capital by 75% and the shareholding of Suzuki in Nihon Flour Mill increased to 72.8%.
Two executives from Suzuki and one from Taiwan bank were installed and restructuring
was started under their management. In the financial crisis of 1927, however, Suzuki and
Taiwan Bank bankrupted and Nihon Flour Mill “turned to Mitsui & Co. (Mitsui Bussan),
with which it had trading connections” (p.264). A new board of directors for Nihon Flour
Mill, including chairman and executive director, was formed by Mitsui & Co. that became
a dominant shareholder with 60% after buying the shares held by Taiwan Bank.
The case studies by Okazaki (2001) present various important points on M&A activity in
the pre-war period. They indicate that the holding company was most important in making
decisions related to M&A, and show that banks had an important advising role to the
8 Please refer to Okazaki (2001) for more detailed information.
9 A major trading company which rapidly grew during the World War I.
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holding companies, besides providing rescue loans. In his investigation of the role of
zaibatsu companies in pre-war M&A activity, Okazaki (1999, 2001) uses a data-set
consisting of 97 zaibatsu companies. In order to establish whether a company is taken over
by a zaibatsu company, he compares the year the company was established with the year
the company came to belong to the respective zaibatsu. He finds that by this measurement
19 companies were taken over by zaibatsu companies (20%). He argues that the M&A
market was active and that the zaibatsu companies played an important role. He mentions
that “zaibatsu companies also disciplined the non-affiliated companies in the capital
market. The holding companies and the core affiliated companies frequently executed
takeover, which contributed to restructure the targeted companies, through replacement of
the directors, assistance of management” (Okazaki 2000, p.1).
Okazaki (1999, 2001) focuses on M&A activity of zaibatsu companies, and below we
review his findings by investigating M&A activity of both zaibatsu companies and non-
zaibatsu companies. Although Okazaki (1999, 2001) uses the term “discipline” with
reference to takeovers in the pre-war period, this should be interpreted as changing the
management of weak companies by strong companies, not as hostile takeovers. 10 The
increased merger activity was primarily caused by failures as a result of financial
difficulties due to the economic recession and financial crises in the 1920s. As Okazaki
(2001) indicates with his quotation of Mitsubishi Steel, failing companies were absorbed
with a rescue motive: “Tokyo Steel will not recover unless substantial new funding is
invested. However, because its business is indispensable to the industries of Japan, it
would be a great loss for our nation to let it go bankrupt” (Mitsubishi Steel 1985 p.111,
quote from Okazaki 2001, p.263).
In the following sub-section we look into merger and takeover activity of TSE listed
companies in 1937, and investigate whether the zaibatsu companies were more involved in
these activities than non-zaibatsu companies.
2-1-1 TSE listed company data
We look into pre-war merger activity of 537 industrial companies listed on the Tokyo
Stock Exchange in 1937. We analyze the corporate history of these companies for merger
and takeover activity and herewith provide to our knowledge the most extensive data-set
on M&A activity of industrial companies in pre-war Japan. Prior research focused on
aggregate data of companies (Röhl 2005), or a limited number of case studies (Okazaki
1999, 2001). Miyajima, Imajoh and Kawamoto (2007) examine M&A activity of 200 top
non-financial companies, measured as total assets in fiscal year 1937. Our data-set covers
more companies as we collect information on M&A activity of all listed companies, as
described in the Kabushiki Gaisha Nenkan of 1937 (Joint-stock company Yearbook). For
these companies we collect all available data on merger activity in the period 1906-1937:
the information in the corporate history provides us with (i) the number of merger cases for
each company and (ii) the size of the merger transactions by equity value.11 Analysis of the
number of merger cases gives equal weight to all transactions and indicates the breadth of
merger activity. The size of the merger transaction indicates which periods are dominated
10 Based on discussion with Professor Okazaki in February 2008.
11 A merger case is a merger transaction and does not clarify the number of target companies involved. With
reference to the size of the merger transaction, this includes all target companies in a multi-company merger.
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by large transactions and measures the depth (materiality) of sizable merger transactions
(Bruner 2004).
The size of the merger transaction is measured as the written-up capitalization of the
bidder company’s equity capital at the time of the merger. This amount is a lower limit of
the actual transaction amount of merger activity, because we only look at the TSE listed
companies and we could not deduct the merger value for 25 acquisitions that were paid in
cash. For these 25 acquisitions there was no change in the bidder company’s equity capital
and we assigned a value of zero. Figure 2-1 shows merger activity in the period 1906-37 as
the number of merger cases and the total transaction value. Although overall merger
activity was low in the pre-war period, not exceeding 41 merger cases in any year, there
are clearly periods in which we can see concentrated merger activity. In the periods 1920-
23 and 1927-29 the annual average of merger cases was 35 at a value of 150 million yen.
In comparison, the number of merger cases was 8 at a total transaction value of 10 million
yen in the period 1906-19.
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Figure 2-1 Mergers in the period 1906-1937
Notes The sample consists of 537 non-financial listed bidder companies that engaged in absorption mergers, consolidations and
tender offers in the period 1906-37. The transaction size of the merger is measured as the written-up capitalization of the bidder
company’s equity capital at the time of the merger. The number of merger cases is depicted on the left vertical axis and the
transaction size on the right vertical axis.
Source Kabushiki Gaisha Nenkan (Joint-stock company Yearbook) of 1937. The corporate history of 537 non-financial
companies listed on the TSE in the year 1937 was analyzed on M&A activities.
We first look into the size of bidder companies and the role of zaibatsu groups in merger
activity. The size of bidder companies is the equity capitalization in the year 1937. Table
2-1 shows the number of companies in the sample by size and whether they belong to a
zaibatsu group. Companies with equity capital lower than 5 million yen and in the group 5-
10 million yen are 29% and 19% of the total sample, respectively. Most companies belong
to the group with equity capital of 10-50 million yen, at 41% of the total sample. There are
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61 companies with equity capital of more than 50 million yen. Column 2 shows that 45%
of all sample companies were involved in one or more mergers. Bidder companies engaged
in mergers are concentrated in the groups with higher equity capital; 109 bidder companies
in the 10-50 million yen group (50%) and 49 companies in the group of 50 million or more
(80%). In the group of the smallest companies only 28% of the 155 companies are
involved in mergers.
Next, we look into the importance of zaibatsu companies in merger activity and define
zaibatsu companies according to the lists in Okazaki (1999). The lists provide the more
important companies that belong to zaibatsu groups as of 1937. As he also looks at other
information sources12 and includes financial companies, his total of zaibatsu companies is
higher than in our data-set. We follow Okazaki in the list regarding the zaibatsu groups
Mitsui, Sumitomo, Yasuda, Asano and Nissan; of the 76 companies in these 5 zaibatsu
groups, we have 39 companies in our own data-set. The companies we do not have in our
data are 15 financial companies and 22 companies that do not have widely held shares. We
use data of Shibagaki (1968) to examine the companies that are part of the Mitsubishi
group and our data-set includes 26 companies. In our sample 63 companies (12%) are
related to a zaibatsu, and these companies primarily belong to the groups of larger
companies with 56 of the 63 companies having an equity capital of more than 10 million
yen.
Table 2-1 Sample companies by mergers and zaibatsu in the period 1906-1937
All Merger
(a) (b)
< 5 mln yen 155 29 44 28 2 1 1 2
5-10 mln yen 102 19 40 39 5 5 2 5
10-50 mln yen 219 41 109 50 41 19 17 16
>50 mln yen 61 11 49 80 15 25 11 22
All 537 100% 242 45% 63 12% 31 13%
%Company size % of (a) % of (a) % of (b)All Merger
Total Sample Zaibatsu companies
Notes The sample consists of 537 non-financial companies listed on the TSE in 1937, of which 242 companies engaged in
absorption mergers, consolidations and tender offers in the period 1906-37. The size of the bidder companies is the equity
capitalization as of 1937. Zaibatsu companies belong to one of the following groups: Mitsubishi, Mitsui, Sumitomo, Yasuda,
Asano and Nissan
Sources Kabushiki Gaisha Nenkan (Joint-stock company Yearbook) of 1937. The corporate history of 537 non-financial
companies listed on the TSE in the year 1937 was analyzed on M&A activities. To categorize whether a company belonged to the
zaibatsu groups Okazaki (1999) was used for Mitsui, Sumitomo, Yasuda, Asano and Nissan, and Shibagaki (1968) with reference
to Mitsubishi zaibatsu.
The number of zaibatsu companies involved in a merger is 31, which is 13% of all
companies engaged in mergers. As this percentage is in line with the 12% of zaibatsu
companies in the total sample, we can conclude that, as far as the number of companies is
concerned, zaibatsu companies and non-zaibatsu companies engage in merger activity at
the same level.
The discussion above is based on the number of bidder companies that engaged in
merger transactions. It only considered whether the company bought, or merged with,
another company. The analysis did not examine the number of merger transactions of the
companies. It is possible that zaibatsu companies merged with more target companies than
non-zaibatsu companies, herewith initiating more M&A transactions. We look at the
12 For companies that do not have widely held shares.
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average number of merger transactions that bidder companies engaged in. Bidder
companies that were part of a zaibatsu group initiated 2.2 transactions and non-zaibatsu
bidder companies 2.4 transactions. We find that four zaibatsu companies and 29 non-
zaibatsu companies were engaged in five or more merger transactions. Based on our data,
we do not find evidence that zaibatsu companies were more active in merger activity than
non-zaibatsu companies in the pre-war period. This holds for the number of zaibatsu
companies engaged in mergers, as well as the number of merger transactions the zaibatsu
companies initiated.
Table 2-2 Mergers by size of bidder and target in the period 1906-1937
<5 mln yen 5-10 mln yen 10-50 mln yen >50 mln yen
< 1 mln yen 34 75 50 23 8
1-5 mln yen 29 23 45 37 4
5-10 mln yen 14 0 3 24 16
10-50 mln yen 18 2 3 17 49
>50 mln yen 5 0 0 0 22
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
All mergers
Bidder
Target
Notes The sample consists of 537 non-financial listed bidder companies that engaged in absorption mergers, consolidations and
tender offers in the period 1906-37. The target size is measured as the written-up capitalization of the bidder company’s equity
capital at the time of the merger. The size of the bidder companies is the equity capitalization as of 1937.
Source Kabushiki Gaisha Nenkan (Joint-stock company Yearbook) of 1937. The corporate history of 537 non-financial
companies listed on the TSE in the year 1937 was analyzed on M&A activity.
Table 2-2 provides information of merger transactions by the size of the target and bidder
companies. The table shows the percentages by size-class of target companies for the size-
class of bidder companies. The column of all merger transactions shows that most target
companies belong to the size group below 5 million yen (63% of the total). Target
companies in the size groups 5-10 million yen, 10-50 million yen and over 50 million yen
are 14%, 18% and 5% respectively. Except for bidder companies with an equity capital
over 50 million yen, most target companies in mergers belong to the size group below 5
million yen. Regarding bidder companies in the group of 10-50 million yen, the percentage
falls to 60%, and target companies with equity capital in the same group form 17%. Bidder
companies with equity capital over 50 million yen primarily engage in mergers with target
companies at a value of more than 10 million yen, accounting for 71% of the target
companies in this group (sum of 49% and 22%). We conclude that the target companies in
the pre-war period were small, both in absolute size and relative to the bidder company.
We also see that, except for the largest bidder companies (over 50 million yen), all bidder
companies primarily merged with the smallest target companies (lower that 5 million yen).
Industrial sectors - We can distinguish 4 sub-periods in our analysis of the period 1906-
37. Figure 2-1 shows that the periods 1920-23 and 1926-28 are characterized by
concentrated merger activity. In the periods 1916-19 and 1929-33, on the other hand, both
the amount and number of mergers is significantly lower. Merger activity increases
slightly in the period 1934-36.
The two periods of high merger concentration in the 1920s are dominated by the
electricity sector. In 1920-23 the electricity sector accounted for 35% of all merger cases,
followed by textile and other manufacturing at respectively 19% and 13%. When
measuring by transaction amount of the mergers, the share of the electricity sector is 59%.
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The amount of the mergers in the manufacturing sector is 12%, which indicates that the
target companies in the manufacturing sector are larger than those in the textile sector. In
the period 1926-28 the transport sector replaces the textile sector in the top 3 by number of
mergers. The mergers are still concentrated in the electricity sector with 68% of the total
amount and 52% of the total number of mergers.
The most important reason for the high number of mergers in the electricity sector was
the modernization of the Japanese economy in the 1920s. Nakamura (1994) indicates that
mechanization and electrification increased rapidly in factories and even the smallest
companies in the 1920s. Herewith the electrification ratio rose rapidly and the electricity
companies, in order to increase efficiency and create economies of scale, initiated mergers.
Table 2-3 Mergers by industrial sector in the period 1916-1933
1916-19 1920-23 1926-28 1929-33 1916-19 1920-23 1926-28 1929-33
Electricity and gass 25 35 52 30 28 59 68 39
Other manufacturing 25 13 10 21 26 12 11 32
Textile 23 19 10 13 24 9 2 6
Mining 6 2 0 0 7 8 0 0
Cement 6 2 3 3 2 1 2 1
Chemical 6 2 5 4 2 2 0 6
Land transport 4 5 15 21 5 9 9 11
Steel 4 1 0 1 6 0 0 2
Land and warehousing 2 1 2 0 0 0 1 0
Shipping and shipbuilding 0 0 2 1 0 0 5 0
Other 0 1 2 4 0 0 0 4
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Number of mergers Transaction size
Notes The sample consists of 537 non-financial listed bidder companies that engaged in absorption mergers, consolidations and
tender offers in the period 1906-37. The transaction size of the merger is measured as the written-up capitalization of the bidder
company’s equity capital at the time of the merger. The percentages are calculated as the average number of mergers and
transaction amount by industrial sector for the respective sub-period.
Source Kabushiki Gaisha Nenkan (Joint-stock company Yearbook) of 1937. The corporate history of 537 non-financial
companies listed on the TSE in the year 1937 was analyzed on M&A activities.
Regarding the period 1916-19, table 2-3 shows that the shares for the industrial sectors
textile, electricity, and manufacturing are similar with reference to the number of merger
transactions and total amount. In the period 1929-33 the amount and number of mergers is
largest for the electricity sector, but only at respectively 39% and 30% of the total.
Transport and manufacturing both account for 21% of the number of mergers, and 11%
and 32% of the total amount respectively. In 1934-36, when merger activity increased,
most activity takes place in the manufacturing sector.
Miyajima, Imajoh and Kawamoto (2007) find similar results from their sample of 200
companies, but they argue that three merger waves occurred in pre-war Japan: the first
wave in 1900-13, the second during the 1920s, and the third in the 1930s. As the number
of mergers is low in the entire sample period, not exceeding an annual total of 41 merger
cases, and activity is concentrated in only one industrial sector, we cannot term these
periods as a ‘merger wave’, according to our own definition. Our data only indicate that
mergers between companies increased during the years 1920-23, 1926-28 and 1934.
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2-2 Post-war mergers
R In the post-war period we identify two merger waves: the first in the 1960s and the
second in the 1990s.
R The first merger wave in the 1960s is characterized by mergers to promote industrial
growth in the sectors Construction, Chemicals, and Iron and steel. Other sectors were
reorganized by mergers, such as Retail and wholesale, Transportation, and Services.
R The largest mergers in the 1990s occurred in the sectors Electrical equipments, Non-
ferrous, Chemical, and Paper.
In this section we examine the developments in merger activity after WWII. We analyze
this period chronologically, combining our own data on mergers in Japan with discussions
in the literature. Our own data is derived from two sources; (i) the annual reports from the
Japan Fair Trade Commission (“JFTC”), and (ii) the information from the company Recof.
The JFTC annual reports provide a wealth of information on domestic merger activity,
because companies were required to report their mergers according to the Antimonopoly
Act up to 1997.13 JFTC therefore provides all information on merger activity in Japan,
whereas the company Recof provides only publishes publicly available information on
M&A activity.
Below we show that, if thoroughly examined and not limited to the aggregate data in the
summary, the JFTC data present interesting information. With the data we examine the
number of targets and the targets’ amount of assets, and also look into the data by
industrial sector when available. In some cases we add the average size of the target
companies by industry, which indicates the relative importance of the industry’s mergers
in a merger wave. In order to examine whether the mergers are dominated by large bidder
companies that merge with small target companies, we look into the structure of the
mergers based on the total equity value or total assets prior to the merger, if the data permit.
13 The JFTC data is often criticized and not used. For example, Milhaupt and West (2001) write about the data for
the period 1969 to 1989 that they “may significantly overstate the level of merger activity in Japan. The JFTC
data include mergers of tiny firms (including limited liability companies and partnerships) and intra-group
mergers.” (p.13) Based on their data for the period 1969 to 1989, they conclude that “Japan has not experienced
significant merger “waves” as in the United States.” (p.13)
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Figure 2-2 Mergers in the period 1950-1997
Notes The graph shows the number and transaction amount of all domestic mergers of non-financial companies. The transaction
amount is measured as the target companies’ total assets prior to the merger.
Sources Number of cases from various issues of JFTC. Transaction amount from the JFTC annual report in each year in the
sample (this information is available for the years 1972-74 and 1978-1997).
Figure 2-2 shows the number of merger cases from 1950 to 1997, and the amount of total
assets for the years in which this information is available (1972-74 and 1978-97). We can
distinguish four sub-periods in merger activity in the post-war period:
1) 1950s: reconstruction and reorganization mergers (zaibatsu revival mergers).
2) 1963-72: First Japanese merger wave; the number of merger cases increased
considerably compared to the preceding period.
3) 1985-89: increasing trend in M&A activity, primarily by Japanese companies in
foreign countries. We have not termed this as a merger wave, because the size of the
target companies in domestic mergers remained small and similar to the preceding
period.
4) 1991- present: Second Japanese merger wave; the number of merger cases is high, and
the transaction size of M&A activity shows a strong increase.
The pre-war zaibatsu groups were broken up after the war and the related companies were
prohibited to use the zaibatsu company names, logos and symbols. These measures were
implemented and largely adhered to until the friendship treaty was signed in 1952 and the
occupation forces transferred control to the Japanese government.14 A lot of companies
that had been broken up re-established their pre-war relations and connections in the 1950s.
In the Mitsubishi zaibatsu, for example, dissolution targets were the companies Mitsubishi
Trading, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Mitsubishi Mining and Mitsubishi Kasei. Mitsubishi
14 These measures are explained in detail in sub-section 3-2-2.
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Trading was broken up in more than a hundred companies, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries in
East Japan Heavy Industries, Central Japan Heavy Industries, and West Japan Heavy
Industries, Mitsubishi Mining in Mitsubishi Mining and Taihei Mining, and Mitsubishi
Kasei in Nihon Kasei Industries, Asahi Glass and Shinko Rayon (Johnson 1982; Hoshino
1984; Hadley 1970).
The strategic reorganization of Mitsubishi Trading started in the years from 1949 to
1951 when smaller companies combined their operations and re-established their pre-war
relations. After 1952 larger trading companies merged and the pre-war company
Mitsubishi Trading largely revived. Mitsubishi Heavy Industries merged the operations of
the three separated companies in 1964. Overall, mergers between reorganized companies
in order to return to the pre-war structure were common in all former zaibatsu groups
during the 1950s and 1960s (Johnson 1982; Hoshino 1984; Hadley 1970; Miyajima 2007).
2-2-1 First merger wave
The first merger wave in Japan occurred in the period 1963-72. The strong increase in the
number of mergers was the most important difference between the wave and the preceding
period 1953-62. The annual average of cases was 1,031 during the wave, considerably
higher than the average of 431 cases in the preceding period. In contrast to merger waves
in the U.S., that increase and decrease, waves in Japan increase and remain at the higher
level. 15 After our examination of the size of the merging companies we turn to the
industrial sectors in which these took place.
Size - Table 2-4 shows the post-merger equity capital of the new company after the merger.
It presents the average number of merger cases by equity size for the period 1963-72, the
preceding period 1953-62, and the subsequent period 1973-76. The period 1953-62 is
dominated by mergers of small companies with 57% of all cases at an equity value of less
than 10 million yen. Mergers at a value between 10 and 50 million yen and over 50 million
are respectively at 25% and 18% of the total in the period before the wave.
Table 2-4 Mergers by size in sub-periods of 1953-1976
Post-merger equity No. % No. % No. %
< 10 mln yen 247 57 369 36 235 24
10 - 50 million 108 25 393 38 426 43
50 - 100 million 30 7 100 10 118 12
100 - 500 million 32 7 115 11 142 14
0.5 - 1 billion 6 1 19 2 25 3
1 - 5 billion 9 2 25 2 24 2
5 - 10 billion 2 0 4 0 3 0
10 - 50 billion 2 0 7 1 9 1
Total 433 100% 1,031 100% 980 100%
1953-62 1973-761963-72
Notes Size is measured as equity capital from the new combined after the merger for non-financial companies. The number of
mergers is the annual average for the respective sub-period. The percentages show the share of the mergers in each period by
equity size.
Source Various issues of JFTC annual report.
The size of the mergers increases considerably during the merger wave. The percentage of
the smallest mergers falls by 21 percentage-points to 36%, while the percentage of mergers
15 Please refer to sub-section 8-3-2 for a discussion and presentation in graphs of the five U.S. merger waves.
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at a value 10-50 million yen increases to 38% (up by 13%). The number of mergers at a
value of more than 50 million yen increases to 26% (up by 8%). During the merger wave,
mergers were predominantly in the equity class 10-500 million yen at 59%, a percentage
similar to the mergers lower than 10 million yen in the period 1953-62. In the period
following the merger wave, from 1973 to 1976, the percentage of small companies
continues to fall and the percentage of large companies to increase. In the period 1973-76
the mergers with a post-merger equity capital of more than 100 million yen account for
20% of the total sample.
Table 2-5 Mergers by industrial sector in sub-periods of 1953-1976
% Top5 % Top5 % Top5
Retail and wholsale 27.3 1 30.3 1 32.6 1
Machinery 10.8 2 8.2 4 7.3
Transportation and warehousing 9.2 3 9.2 2 7.3 5
Food 8.3 4 5.1 2.8
Chemical 5.9 5 3.2 2.8
Textile 5.8 4.3 3.2
Miscellaneous services 5.3 8.6 3 10.1 2
Construction 4.8 5.2 8.5 4
Iron and steel 4.1 5.2 4.1
Real estate 3.8 7.5 5 9.2 3
Wood 2.7 2.3 2.2
Other manufacturing 2.1 1.6 1.0
Printing 2.0 1.7 1.2
Glass, cement and ceramics 1.6 1.9 2.1
Other 1.5 0.9 0.4
Mining 1.5 1.0 1.1
Agriculture and fishery 1.0 1.1 1.0
Paper and pulp 0.9 1.0 1.2
Rubber products 0.7 0.7 0.5
Electricity and gass 0.3 0.2 0.2
Total 100% 100% 100%
1953-62 1963-72 1973-76
Notes The number of mergers is the annual average for the respective sub-period. The percentages show the share of mergers in
industrial sectors by sub-period. Industrial sector is classified as in the annual report of Japan Fair Trade Commission. The
column “Top5” indicates the industrial sectors in which most mergers occurred.
Source Various issues of JFTC of annual report.
Industrial sector - Table 2-5 shows the proportion of mergers that occurred in the 20
industrial sectors during the merger wave, the preceding and following period. Although
not indicated in the table, each industrial sector showed an increase in merger activity
between the periods 1953-62 and 1963-72, which confirms that the latter period can be
termed as a merger wave. During the wave most mergers occurred in the Retail and
Wholesale sector with 30.3% of all mergers, followed by Transportation (9.2%), Services
(8.6%), Machinery (8.2%), and Real Estate (7.5%).
The table shows that in the periods preceding and following the merger wave most
mergers occur in the Retail and Wholesale sector as well. The reason for the high number
of mergers in this sector lies in the Japanese distribution system, also referred to as
distribution keiretsu. Companies that have a downstream relationship in the production and
distribution process form a distribution keiretsu. The multi-layered Japanese distribution
system has the following features: (i) retail sector with large number of very small shops,
and (ii) wholesale sector with stratified structure and segmentation by product type. These
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characteristics result in highly segmented sales channels built for each product group.
Japanese wholesalers do not supply shops with 70% or 80% of the product assortment, but
specialize in one specific category of merchandise. In order to build their own marketing
channels, product manufacturers began selecting and setting up wholesalers throughout
Japan as sales agents. Especially the development of supermarkets in the 1960s resulted in
rationalization and reorganization of distribution operations, which resulted in a high
number of mergers in this sector (Kawabe 1989; Suzuki 2002).
The technological innovations that took place in the corporate sector from the 1960s
onward (economic take off of Japan), were part of a general modernization wave. In 1964,
Japan announced its conformance with article 8 of the IMF charter, which stipulates the
elimination of controls on capital transactions16, and this further spurred modernization and
high growth. Japan’s trade balance began to show a surplus starting in the second half of
the 1960s, although the oil crises in 1973 and 1979 caused temporary balance of trade
deficits. The changing circumstances made Japanese companies realize that reorganization
was necessary to compete with foreign companies. This led to various process innovations
in parts production and rationalization spread from prime contractors to first-, second- and
third-tier subcontractors. As a result of these developments we see a concentration of
mergers in industries that depend on foreign demand and trading, such as Machinery,
Transportation and warehousing, and Miscellaneous services. Other important sectors were
those related to the promotion of economic growth or fundamental change in the industrial
structure (new industry or new technology). Important mergers to promote industrial
growth occurred in the sectors Construction, Chemicals, and Iron and steel (Odagiri 1992;
Johnson 1982; Hoshino 1984; Hadley 1970).
Another argument for the first merger wave is that it resulted from the fear of takeovers
by foreign companies. According to Miyajima (2007), mergers in the steel and automobile
industries have been the response of the capital liberalization. We revisit the first merger
wave in chapter 9, where we indicate that we think the economic growth and technological
innovations is a better explanation.
16 Please refer to section 4-1 for a more detailed explanation about the elimination of controls on capital
transactions 1964.
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Figure 2-3 Mergers between large companies in the period 1957-1978
Notes Mergers between non-financial target companies and bidder companies with an equity capital exceeding 1 billion yen prior
to the merger.
Source Annual report of JFTC for each year in the sample (retrieved from information on large mergers in these reports).
Large mergers - Figure 2-3 shows mergers of which the target company and bidder
company have an equity value of over 1 billion yen. The figure covers the period 1957-78,
and the trend of these large mergers is similar to the overall merger activity in figure 2-2.
The peak year for large mergers was 1963; most cases occurred for all large mergers as
well as those with combined equity value of over 10 billion yen. After 1963 the number of
merger cases declined, and in 1966 and 1967 the mergers between companies over 10
billion yen drops below 5 merger cases. Higher merger activity occurs in the following
years, but the mergers over combined equity value of over 10 billion yen are negatively
affected by the oil crisis in 1973; the number of merger cases with equity value below 10
billion yen remains relatively high after this year.
Regarding the mergers aimed at promotion of economic growth, the government and
bureaucracy took an active role. Government policy was aimed at improving competitive
strength of Japanese companies in relation to foreign companies and preventing excessive
competition. In this respect, mergers were important, enforcing both policy goals. In the
shipping industry this resulted in 6 horizontal mergers of 12 shipping companies in 1964,
such as Mitsui Sempaku and Osaka Shosen into Mitsui O.S.K. Line, and Nippon Yusen
and Mitsubishi Shipping into Nippon Yusen. The steel industry was also a targeted
industry and various mergers were undertaken in order to achieve economies of scale in
large-scale steel enterprises. In 1965 Kobe Steel merged with Amagaseki Seitetsu, in 1967
Fuji Iron and Steel merged with Tokai Seitetsu, and in 1970 Yawata Iron and Steel merged
with Fuji Iron and Steel. MITI played an important role in the merger between Yawata
Iron & Steel and Fuji Iron & Steel to form Nippon Steel in 1970. The two steel makers
shared a 35.6% of crude steel production, which exceeded the JFTC criterion of 30%. The
37
Section 2-2 Post-war mergers
25
JFTC rejected the merger but under pressure from MITI approved after a formal hearing.
MITI was also involved in the merger between the auto companies Prince Motors and the
Nissan Group Corp. in 1966 (Caves and Uekusa 1976; Kester 1991; Hasegawa 1996; Hart
1992). Friedman (1988) argues, however, that this merger was not in line with MITI’s
plans. Initially, MITI wanted to consolidate the industry and arrange all automotive
companies behind Nissan and Toyota. This proposal was opposed by the automotive
companies and MITI amended the plan to form three companies; Toyota, Nissan, and a
combination of Toyo Kogyo, Fuji, and Isuzu. These plans and additional amendments
were not accepted either by the automotive industry and the number of automotive
companies had increased to seven by 1970 (Christelow 1995; Friedman 1988).
2-2-2 Latter half 1980s
The latter half of the 1980s is characterized by high corporate profits and a low number of
corporate bankruptcies. Companies made investments in plant and equipment and a lot of
urban development took place. This situation led to rising stock and land prices in the late
1980s, the stock market index reaching a maximum of 38,915 in December 1989 and land
prices peaking in September 1991. Japanese companies were very active in M&A activity
in this period, both domestic and in targeting companies and investment projects outside
Japan. Odagiri (1992) indicates that there was an increasing trend in domestic M&A
activity, primarily aimed at diversifying company’s operations.
The high stock prices combined with the loosening of controls on international capital
controls and easy monetary policy boosted Japanese M&A activity abroad in real estate
and companies. Outward real estate investment increased from 2.5 billion dollars in 1985
to 46.4 billion dollars in 1990. These investments were made in well-known commercial
properties, shopping centres, golf courses, hotels, and undeveloped land in the states of
Hawaii and California. For example, Mitsubishi Real Estate bought an interest in New
York City’s Rockefeller Plaza at a value of 120 billion yen (1.46 billion dollars) in 1989.
Real estate investments in Europe were concentrated in London with for example the
purchase of Britannic House, Moor Lane by EIE International and the Old Bailey by
Mitsui Real Estate. Real estate investments in the early 1980s were primarily made by
construction, development and trading companies (notably Kumagai Gumi, Itoh, Shimizu
and Kajima), and in the late 1980s life assurance companies were the most active investors
(Mason 1997; Lapier 1998).
Japanese companies were also active in acquisition of foreign companies such as the
acquisition of Firestone Tyer and Lever by Bridgestone in 1988 for 333,190 billion yen,
Columbia Pictures by Sony in 1989 for 644,000 billion yen, and MCA by Matsushita
Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. in 1990 for 780,000 billion yen (Recof 2003).
2-2-3 Second merger wave
The stock market bubble burst after its peak in 1989 and lost more than half its value by
1992. After the land price bubble burst in 1991, land prices showed a continuing fall in the
1990s and 2000s. With the burst of the two bubbles, many indebted companies had
difficulty in making interest payments and repaying debt. The debt was mortgaged by land
and real estate, and resulted in non-performing loans for financial institutions during the
1990s. The bursting of the bubbles and the subsequent economic recession led a lot of
companies to initiate M&A activity as a means to restructure operations. The second
merger wave coincides with these developments and starts in 1991. The wave is still
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continuing at present but can be divided into two periods; the first period covers the years
1991-97 and the second period starts in 1999 and continues at least until 2006 (our data-set
ends in December 2006). Table 2-6 provides details on the mergers in the two periods of
the second wave with data from JFTC (up to 1997) and Recof. The table gives the average
of merger cases of both sources, the amount of domestic mergers from JFTC and the
amount of allM&A activity from Recof.
Table 2-6 Merger activity by number of cases and by amount in the period 1984-2006
Merger Cases Target assets inmln yen
Merger
Cases M&A cases
M&A amount
in mln yen
1984-1990 1,453 2,728,963 48 517 --
1991-1997 2,487 22,328,845 204 772 --
1999-2006 -- -- 625 2,862 11,088,627
JFTC data Recof data
Notes JFTC data: average number of all non-financial domestic mergers and annual average of targets’ total assets for the sub-
periods. Recof data: all M&A activity involving a Japanese company for which information was publicly available.
Sources Annual report of JFTC for each year in the sample. Recof (2003, 2007).
The JFTC and Recof data show that the number of mergers in the period 1991-97
increased considerably compared to the period 1984-90, respectively by 71% and by more
than 3-fold. In the period 1999-2006 the Recof data show an average of mergers at 625
cases and an average of 2,862 cases for total M&A activity. In this period the number of
M&A cases increased by 2,090 cases, compared to an increase of 255 between the periods
1984-90 and 1991-97. Table 2-6 clearly indicates that the size of the mergers was the most
important characteristic of the second wave. The JFTC data show that, whereas the number
of merger cases increased by 71% between the two periods, the size of the target
companies, measured as the target company’s total assets, increased more than 8-fold from
2,700 billion yen in 1984-90 to 22,300 billion yen in 1991-97. The amount provided by
Recof is not comparable with the JFTC data, as it reveals only the amount of M&A cases
for which information was publicly available. JFTC shows the target company’s assets size
of all domestic mergers.
Compared with the first merger wave we have more JFTC information available for the
first period of the second merger wave. This allows us to do a thorough analysis and we
start by looking at industrial sector level with the number of targets, the total size of the
targets, and the average size of the targets. In the analysis we compare the period 1991-97
with the preceding 7-year period. Table 2-7 indicates that we can refer to the increased
merger activity in 1991-97 as a wave because all 24 industrial sectors we investigate have
an increase in mergers measured by number, size and average, compared to the preceding
7-year period: Whereas in 23 industries the value measured as total assets and average
assets more than doubled during the wave, the number of targets more than doubled in
only 5 industrial sectors. We can conclude that the size of the targets was considerably
larger during the wave.
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Table 2-7 Comparison of merger activity by industrial sector between 1984-1990 and 1991-1997
No. of targets Total assets Average assets
Increase
>100% 5 23 23
50-100% 14 0 0
0-50% 5 1 1
Decrease
0-50% 0 0 0
50-100% 0 0 0
Notes Merger cases are compared based on annual averages for the non-financial industrial sectors in the periods 1984-90 and
1991-97. The number of mergers is measured as the number of target companies, total assets as the target companies’ total assets
prior to the merger. Average assets is calculated by dividing targets’ total assets by the number of targets in an industrial sector.
Source Annual report of JFTC for each year in the sample.
Similar to the first wave, most mergers occurred in the sector Wholesale and retail with
almost 30% of all cases and 32% of the total transaction amount. The sectors Real estate
and Miscellaneous services were second and third with percentages of respectively 11%
and 10% of the total transaction amount. The table shows the averages for individual
mergers in each industrial sector as well, and reveals that the three sectors Wholesale and
retail, Real estate and Miscellaneous services do not belong to the top three according to
this measure. In fact, the sectors’ percentages do not exceed 3%. This implies that the
merger activity was dominated by a lot of mergers involving small target companies in
these industries. The average size of a merger is highest in the industries Electrical
equipments, Non-ferrous, Chemical, and Paper and pulp. The industrial restructuring was
the result of mergers by large companies during the period 1991-97.
We examine the influence of mergers between large companies on the overall structure
within an industrial sector. We measure the importance of merger activity in a sector by
dividing the total asset amount of target companies by total assets of all companies in the
respective industrial sector. 17 By this measure large mergers are concentrated in the
industries Paper and pulp, and Chemical.18 The mergers had an important effect on the
structure of the sectors with a ratio of target companies’ total assets involved in mergers at
31.8% in the Paper and pulp industry, and at 39% in the Chemical industry. In 1993 the
company Jujo Paper merged with Sanyo-Kokusai Pulp to form Nippon Paper industries,
and Oji Paper merged with Kanzaki Paper to form New Oji Paper. New Oji Paper merged
with Honshu paper in 1996 and the new company was renamed to Oji Paper. The first
large merger in the chemical industry occurred in 1994 when Mitsubishi Chemical
Corporation merged with Mitsubishi Kasei Corporation to form Mitsubishi Petrochemical.
A year later Taiyo Toyo Sanso merged with Taiyo Sanso into the company Toyo Sanso. In
1997 Mitsui Chemicals was formed when Mitsui Petrochemical Industry merged with
Mitsui Toatsu Chemicals, Inc.
17 Total assets of target companies calculated form data yearly issues of the JFTC annual reports. Total assets of
all companies in industrial sectors retrieved from Ministry of Finance Japan, Policy research institute
“http://www.mof.go.jp/1c002.htm”
18 Also in the banking sector, but we focus in our discussion on non-financial companies.
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Table 2-8 Mergers by industrial sector in the period 1991-1997
% Top 5 % Top 5 % Top 5
Retail and wholsale 29.7 1 32.0 1 3.0
Real estate 10.7 2 11.1 3 2.1
Miscellaneous services 9.5 3 16.1 2 1.6
Chemical 8.5 4 2.4 9.9 3
Electrical equipments 8.0 5 2.4 13.6 1
Transportation and warehousing 4.6 4.6 5 4.0
Machinery 4.2 1.9 5.0
Construction 3.6 6.8 4 1.3
Metal 3.0 1.4 7.2 5
Non-ferrous metals 2.5 0.4 12.4 2
Textile 2.5 1.9 3.9
Food 2.5 2.3 4.0
Paper and pulp 1.9 0.5 7.4 4
Transportation equipments 1.7 0.9 3.6
Glass, cement and ceramics 1.4 1.5 2.0
Other manufacturing 1.3 1.6 1.9
Printing 1.1 1.5 2.5
Iron and steel 1.0 0.6 4.4
Precision instruments 0.8 0.6 3.9
Agriculture and fishery 0.3 0.4 2.4
Wood 0.3 0.7 1.0
Rubber products 0.2 0.2 1.9
Mining 0.1 0.1 0.5
Electricity and gass 0.0 0.1 0.5
Total 100% 100% 100%
No. of targetsTotal assets Average assets
Notes Percentage of mergers by non-financial industrial sector for the number of targets, target’s total assets and targets’ average
assets. The number of mergers is measured as the number of target companies, total assets as total assets of the target companies
prior to the merger. Average assets is calculated by dividing the targets’ total assets in an industrial sector by the number of
targets in that sector.
Source Annual report of JFTC for each year in the sample.
Table 2-9 shows the number of merger cases, their amount and averages by merger type
for the periods 1977-83, 1984-90 and 1991-97. The table indicates an increasing trend in
each measurement of merger activity. The merger wave is clearly driven by horizontal
mergers with an annual average total of 805 merger cases at a value of 8,453 billion yen.
Companies faced a lot of difficulties, or even financial distress, and coped with the
problems by strengthening their position in the market. Compared to the preceding period,
large companies engaged in mergers affecting the structure of entire industrial sectors. The
average asset value of targets is 354 billion yen which is slightly lower than the forward
and backward vertical merger at respectively 426 billion yen and 485 billion yen. This
indicates that the average vertical merger deal was (slightly) larger than horizontal mergers.
The table also shows that vertical mergers, whether forward or backward, are similar in
number and size during the period 1991-97. The importance of vertical mergers indicates
that companies restructured the production process. As the forward and backward mergers
were at the same level, the parent companies were engaged in rationalizing both their
production channel and their sales channels. Conglomerate mergers occur more frequently
than vertical mergers in the three sub-periods, but the size of these mergers is considerably
smaller. The average size of a transaction involving geographic expansion is 69 billion yen
and the average size of a transaction involving product extension is 256 billion yen.
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Overall, the mergers in the period 1991-97 were dominated by horizontal and vertical
mergers.
Table 2-9 Mergers by merger type in the period 1977-1983
Forward Backward GeographicExpansion
Product
Extension Other
No. of targets
1977-83 241 77 80 208 117 331
1984-90 439 109 135 244 172 411
1991-97 805 186 186 311 264 686
Total assets (mln yen)
1977-83 417,334 267,200 248,755 176,930 139,432 250,304
1984-90 1,893,433 276,599 1,398,132 620,996 592,463 848,982
1991-97 8,452,568 2,652,868 2,950,283 1,635,105 2,339,139 4,278,105
Average assets (mln yen)
1977-83 48,992 179,362 67,221 8,810 26,120 19,804
1984-90 75,801 39,050 111,182 65,826 95,795 51,617
1991-97 354,220 426,424 484,801 69,153 256,418 221,944
Vertical Conglomerate
Horizontal
Notes The number of mergers is measured as the number of target companies, total assets as total assets of the target companies
prior to the merger. Average assets is calculated by dividing the targets’ total assets by number of targets for each merger type in
an industrial sector. Mergers are in non-financial industrial sectors.
Source Annual report of JFTC for each year in the sample.
Second period
The second period of the second wave is characterized by the many changes in the laws
and regulations regarding M&A. The Antimonopoly Act was amended in 1997 and created
the possibility to set up holding companies19 and in this year simplified merger procedures
were also introduced. Since 1999 the Japanese Commercial Code permits Japanese
companies to use stock swaps and stock transfers for corporate acquisitions and
reorganizations. As of fiscal year 1999 Japanese companies had to adopt new accounting
standards, requiring companies to disclose consolidated rather than parent-only earnings in
financial reports and to report financial assets at market value instead of book value. The
corporate reorganization tax reforms have been effective since 2001 and allow for easier
corporate divestures. For our analysis of the second period of the second wave we turn to
Recof data. As already discussed, this data is different from the JFTC data as it looks into
all M&A activity for which information is publicly available, in stead of only, but all,
domestic mergers. Further, the amount is not the amount of all transactions but only of
those transactions for which the amount was available. The data allows us to look more
closely at the difference in M&A activity between the two periods of the second wave. We
focus on the kind of M&A activity and whether companies that engage in the activities
belong to the same horizontal corporate group.
19 Establishment of a pure holding company had been prohibited since 1945. Please refer to sections 3-2 and 3-3
for a detailed discussion.
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Figure 2-4 M&A cases in the period 1985-2006
Source Recof (2003, 2007)
Figure 2-4 shows that total M&A activity increased considerably in the latter half of the
1990s. Until 1996 total M&A activity did not exceed 700 cases, it increased to 1,227 in the
year 1998 and jumped to 1,813 in the year 1999 to reach 3,755 cases in 2006.
In the years 1997 and 1998 the number of merger cases was 357 and 358 respectively,
showing only a small increase compared to 1996 with 318 cases. After stock swaps and
stock transfers were permitted in 1999, the number of merger cases increased with more
than 200 transactions to 569 cases in 1999. Interestingly, the number of merger cases
remained stable in the range of 600 cases during the period up to 2006.
Acquisitions, resulting in ownership exceeding 50%, also showed a strong increase in
1999 with 124 transactions to 435 cases. The number of acquisitions continued to rise with
the implementation of the tax-free restructuring law in 2001 and Industrial Revitalization
Law in 2003, reaching totals of 1,211 and 1,246 cases in 2005 and 2006.
Business transfers totaled 623 cases in 2001, showing a strong increase of 138 transactions
as the tax-free restructuring law allowed easier business divestures and sell-offs of assets as part
of corporate restructuring. Business transfers increased to 700 cases in 2002 and this level has
remained stable. Capital participation increased sharply to 725 cases in 2000, dropped the
following 3 years to 487 to increase again thereafter. Increased investment shows a smooth
upward trend.
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Table 2-10 M&A activity categorized by in-group and out-group cases in the period 1990-2006
In-group Out-group In-group Out-group
Merger 76.3 23.7 86.0 14.0
Acquisition 7.2 92.8 11.7 88.3
Business Transfer 19.1 80.9 36.8 63.2
Capital Participation 3.3 96.7 1.9 98.1
Increased Investment 26.5 73.5 14.1 85.9
Total 25.4 74.6 31.7 68.3
1990-1997 1998-2006
Source Recof (2003, 2007)
Table 2-10 shows the percentages of the M&A activity by in-group and out-group
transactions. Of all transactions, the percentage of in-group transactions increased in the
period 1998-2006. This higher percentage for in-group transactions was primarily caused
by the increase in in-group mergers (76.3% to 86%) and business transfers (19.1% to
36.8%). These two types of M&A were primarily used to restructure the organization of
group companies as a result of the new regulations. Over the period 1990-2006, we see
that acquisition, capital participation and increased investment predominantly occurred
between companies that did not belong to the same group.
The possibility to form a holding company and to use stock swaps and stock transfers,
combined with the need for industrial restructuring resulted in large M&A deals in the
financial services and telecommunications sectors. In 2000 Mizuho Holdings was formed
in a merger of the Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank, Fuji Bank and Industrial Bank of Japan. The
Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi, Mitsubishi Trust and Banking, and Nippon Trust Bank formed
the Mitsubishi Tokyo Financial Group. Tokai Bank and Sanwa Bank merged into the UFJ
Bank in January 2001. In the telecommunications sector DDI, KDD, and IDO (Nippon
Idou Tsushin) formed the new company, KDDI. Japanese companies in financial distress
provided opportunities for foreign companies to enter the Japanese market. In 2001
Manulife Century Life Insurance acquired Daihyaku's insurance contracts following its
bankruptcy, and American International Group (AIG) acquired the bankrupt insurance
company Chiyoda Mutual Life.
In 2002 the most important goal of the government was to clean up bad debts of
companies and banks tried to revitalize important customers with debt-equity swaps.
Examples are the debt-equity swap of (i) Daiei by UFJ Bank, Sumitomo Mitsui Banking
Corporation, Mizuho Corporate Bank, (ii) Haseko Corporation by Daiwa Bank, Chuo
Mitsui Trust and Banking, Mizuho Corporate Bank, and (iii) Orient Corporation by
Mizuho Corporate Bank. Foreign investment firms were also involved in restructuring
Japanese financial institutions, such as Ripplewood Holdings’ acquisition of the Long-
Term Credit Bank of Japan and Lone Star’s acquisition of First Credit (bankrupt non-bank
that had been affiliated with the Long-Term Credit Bank of Japan).
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2-3 Hostile takeovers
R The first hostile takeovers in the post-war period occurred immediately after WWII and
they continued during the entire period.
R Greenmail is the practice of a target company buying back its own shares from a hostile
bidder at a substantial premium, but can also result from an unsuccessful hostile tender
offer attempt.
As we explained in chapter 1, the difference between hostile tender offers and greenmail
lies in the motivation of the bidder (raider). Whereas in a hostile tender offer a bidder tries
to attain operational control over the target company, in a greenmail the bidder wants the
target company to buy back its own shares at a substantial premium. In post-war Japan
greenmail has primarily been done by so-called shite groups that, after the purchase of a
large number of shares, “threaten to use special large-shareholder rights (e.g., to inspect the
company’s books or call a special shareholders’ meeting) to hamper management’s
control” (Kester 1991, p.245). The two activities are closely related because an
unsuccessful hostile tender offer attempt is likely to evolve into greenmail. Distinguishing
an unsuccessful hostile tender offer from greenmail is therefore difficult; greenmail can be
the result of buying up shares with the intention to greenmail, or the result of an
unsuccessful hostile tender offer. This implies the possibility that an unsuccessful hostile
tender offer is interpreted as greenmail. In line with previous research, we use the term
hostile takeover for both activities when multiple interpretations are possible. In chapter 7
we revisit the cases discussed below, and explain why we think the hostile takeovers in this
section need to be interpreted as greenmail.
The first hostile takeovers in the post-war period occurred in the 1950s. The Korean
War had increased the wealth of various businessmen and, combined with a falling stock
price of many companies, hostile takeovers towards former zaibatsu companies occurred
“where shares have been bought up quietly on the market” (Okumura 2000, p.65). Youwa
Properties, a company that had been part of Mitsubishi real estate (a first-tier company of
the Mitsubishi zaibatsu), was confronted with stock cornering in 1952. This resulted in the
stock price to increase from 323 yen in January 1952 to 1,600 yen in August 1952
(Okumura 2000). In August 1952 the takeover group’s ownership of Youwa Properties had
reached 34%, and a seat on the board of directors was requested (Miyajima 1994, p.318).
Mitsubishi Bank, together with eight former zaibatsu companies, bought back the shares in
September 1952. The zaibatsu companies responded to these hostile takeovers as a group
by “coordinating white knight and white squire defensive arrangements to protect their
former affiliated companies from hostile takeovers” (Morck and Nakamura 1999).
Another well-known case is the hostility by Hideki Yokoi towards Shirokiya, a
department store company. Mr. Yokoi had become wealthy from dealings on the black
market, with the military and Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (“SCAP”). In
1953 he had purchased more than 40% ownership of Shirokiya and won control over the
board after a general stockholder’s meeting. Four days later Yokoi lost this control because
of illegal trading. The chief executive of the Tokyu Store, also a department store company,
mediated in the process. Morck and Nakamura (2003) argue that “[Y]okoi continued
launching corporate takeovers over the following two decades. After Shirokiya, he
mounted raids on Toa Oil, Daikyo Oil, Imperial Hotels, Tokai Shipping Line, Toyo Sugar,
Shibaura Sugar, Taito Sugar, Dainippon Sugar and many other companies” (p.77: with
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corrected spelling company name “Shirokiya”). Although we term these activities as
hostile takeovers, we show in chapter 7 that these are better qualified as greenmail.
Morck and Nakamura (1999) argue that a series of high-profile hostile takeover raids
occurred in the two decades after the 1950s. We failed to find any hostile tender offers, and
table 2-11 indicates some greenmail cases by shite-groups that occurred during the 1970s
and 1980s. This is a very short list of the actual number of greenmail cases. Kester (1991)
indicates that a list was published in 1988 that showed 120 private investors, companies,
and groups engaged in greenmail or associated risk-arbitrage in 156 listed companies.
Together they had positions with a market value of 1.5 trillion yen in 1988, of which 58%
was in companies on the First Section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange.20
Table 2-11 Greenmail cases in the 1970s and 1980s
Target Owner Year Est. SharesPurchased (%)
Kao Soap Hong Kong investor group 1970s
Ajinomoto Hong Kong investor group 1970s
Nakayama Sasagawa 1970s
Mitsui Mining Mr. Toguri 1976 ถ30
Daido Sanso Nihon Tochi 1977
Oji Paper Hong-Kong based companies 1978 13
Okamoto Sasagawa group 1978
Yuasa Battery Nihon Tochi 1980
Tokyo Nissan Shuwa 1981 22.9
Kobe Electric Railway Sasagawa group 1983
Mitsui Toatsu Nihon Tochi 1985
Toyota Automatic Loom Works Nihon Tochi 1987 7.1
Chujitsuya Shuwa 1989 33
Inegaya Shuwa 1989 25
Isetan Shuwa 1989 24
Nagasakiya Shuwa 1989 14
Sources Kester (1991); Sheard (1991)
Greenmail cases - In 1976 Mr. Toguri of the Osano group obtained approximately 30%
ownership in Mitsui Mining. Ten members of the Mitsui keiretsu, coordinated by Mitsui
Bank, bought the shares back and share-ownership of Mitsui Mining by group-members
increased to 60% (Sheard 1989). Another stock-cornering group, Hong Kong Investor
Group, bought shares in the companies Kao Soap, Ajinomoto and Oji Paper. As a Mitsui
keiretsu group company, the shares of Oji Paper were repurchased by the Mitsui Bank,
Mitsui Trust & Banking, other Mitsui keiretsu companies, and the Industrial Bank of Japan
(Sheard 1989; Morck, Nakamura and Shivdasani 2000). Similar to the Mitsui keiretsu,
repurchase of shares from stock cornering groups occurred in other keiretsu companies.
Nakayama Steel faced hostilities in 1978 and, belonging to the Sanwa keiretsu, its shares
were bought back by group-members and banks it had relations with (Sheard 1989, p.428).
In the 1980s similar greenmail cases occurred, for example, by greenmailer Nihon Tochi in
1987. Nihon Tochi had bought 7.1% of Toyota Automatic Loom Work’s shares. These
shares were repurchased by Toyota Motor, at a profit of at least 10 billion yen for Nihon
Tochi (Kester 1991, p.246). Other large cases in the 1980s are the stock cornering of
20 Please refer to Kester (1989) and Sheard (1989) for more examples of greenmail cases.
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shares from retail companies such as Chujitsuya (33%), Inageya (25%), Isetan (24%),
Matsuzakaya (16%), and Nagasakiya (14%) by a real estate company, Shuwa (Sheard
1989, p.428). Chujitsuya and Inageya, in an attempt to dilute Shuwa’s shareholdings issued
a 20% equity stake in each other. Shuwa filed for a court injunction to stop the new equity
issuances and the court deemed the issue unfair: there was no rational use of the funds and
was only aimed at lowering a specific shareholder’s ownership in the company. Shuwa
later sold its ownership in Chujitsuya to Daiei and Inageya to Aeon.21 As indicated above,
various kinds of companies were targeted, including well-known companies that were part
of horizontal keiretsu, such as Konica, Teijin (Sanwa group), Sapporo Breweries (Fuyo
group), Mitsubishi Rayon (Mitsubishi group), and Mitsubishi Steel (Mitsubishi group)
(Kester 1991, p.247).
The greenmail cases up to the late 1980s involving parties such as shite-groups, led to the
first hostile takeover involving a foreign company in 1989. In April 1989 Boone Company,
an investment company headed by T. Boone Pickens, purchased 20.2% of Koito
Manufacturing Company from a private investor, Mr. Watanabe.22 Koito Manufacturing
Company is Japan's largest maker of automotive lighting equipment and an important
supplier for Toyota Motor Company that owns 19% of Koito’s shares. Mr. Watanabe, a
Japanese billionaire, had been amassing Koito stock during a year and a half and was
trying to have Toyota repurchase the shares. Toyota, however, after adhering to the
expensive greenmail in relation to Toyota Automatic Loom Company in 1987, had sworn
never to comply with such demands again. Mr. Watanabe, unable to profit from his
investments, asked Mr. Pickens to act as shareholder in an attempt to put additional
pressure on Koito and Toyota. When Mr. Pickens arrived in Japan he argued that he was
interested in Koito as a long-term investment and asked for a seat on the board of directors.
After he had been unable to get a seat on the board for 2 years he sold his shares in 1991.
Whether Pickens really was a long-term investor, as he claimed himself, or was merely
used as additional pressure by Mr. Watanabe, is difficult to say and opinions are divided.
In our opinion the actions by Mr. Pickens are more likely due to be a greenmail attempt
because of the sequence of events and the fact that he sold his stake in Koito back to Mr.
Watanabe in 1991.
21 The Asahi Shimbun: February 25,2005, Livedoor sues to block radio company's tactic
22 Based on The New York Times: April 5, 1989, Pickens Group Confirms Stake; April 20, 1989, Pickens
Courting a Wary Tokyo ; October 12, 1993, Hotel Sale May Signal End of Japan's Patience ; December 6, 1992,
Corporate Japan's Unholy Allies. Reuters: July 6, 1991, Pickens Drops Japan Suit.
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2-4 Hostile tender offer attempts
R Prior to 1999 there were no hostile tender offers in Japan and in the period from 1999
to July 2007 thirteen attempts were initiated.
R Only two hostile tender offers were successful, but the “hostility” in both tender offers
is doubtful as the bidder company and target company had a long-standing relationship.
In this section we look into the hostile tender offer attempts that were initiated as of 1999.
As the list is short, and the cases are of great importance for the Japanese economy and our
institutional analysis of hostile takeovers, we discuss all cases individually.
Table 2-12 Hostile tender offers in Japan
Bidder Target Year Type Result
Cable & Wireless IDC 1999 Hostile TOB Succesful
Nippon Boehringer
Ingelheim Co.
SS Pharmaceutical 2000 Hostile TOB Succesful
MAC Corp Shoei 2000 Hostile TOB Not successful
Steel Partners Yushiro Chemicals 2003 Hostile TOB Dividend increase
Steel Partners Sotou 2003 Hostile TOB Dividend increase
Livedoor Nippon Broadcasting 2005 Off-market purchase Negotiation
Yumeshin Holdings Nihon Gijitsu Kaihatsu 2005 Hostile TOB White knight
Rakuten TBS 2005 Off-market purchase Negotiation
MAC Shin-Nihon Musen 2005 Hostile TOB White knight
Don Quijote Origin Toushu 2006 Hostile TOB White knight
Oji Paper Hokuetsu Paper 2006 Hostile TOB White squire; poison pill
Steel Partners Myojo Foods 2006 Hostile TOB White knight
Steel Partners Sapporo Brewery 2007 Hostile TOB Poison pill
Steel Partners Bull Dog Sauce 2007 Hostile TOB Poison pill
Steel Partners Tenryu Saw 2007 Hostile TOB Not successful
Sources Newspaper articles as indicated in footnotes 23-35 of this chapter.
Cable & Wireless23 - Cable & Wireless P.L.C. (“C&W”), a British telecommunications
company, initiated the first hostile tender offer bid in Japan. The target company was
International Digital Communications Inc. (“IDC”), a small phone company with a
minor part of the international call market. It should be noted that the use of “hostile”
needs to be interpreted with care in this case; C&W was among the original founding
shareholders of IDC in 1986 and can therefore be considered as an insider. The reason for
the tender offer was that private negotiations to strengthen relations were not fruitful.
C&W’s initial bid was in March 1999 for more than 50% of IDC’s shares at a bidding
price of 100,000 yen. Although the specific amount was not disclosed, Nippon Telegraph
and Telephone Corporation (“NTT”) offered a price that was a few thousand yen higher.
After a board meeting in April, the IDC board rejected the offer of C&W in favour of NTT.
On May 7 C&W increased its bid to 107,372 yen for 82.3% of the shares in order to obtain
full ownership of the company. NTT raised its bid to 108,974 yen and C&W responded by
increasing its bidding price to 110,577 yen a share. The two second largest shareholders,
23 Based on The New York Times: September 23, 1987, Japan Phone Accord Fails ; April 15, 1999, N.T.T. Says
It Has Edge In Acquiring Rival Concern ; May 7, 1999, Cable and Wireless In Bid for I.D.C. of Japan ; June 2,
1999, Bidding war intensifies ; June 10, 1999, Cable and Wireless Wins Fight for Japan Phone Carrier ; June 17,
1999, Cable and Wireless in Talks With Local Japanese Phone Carriers.
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Toyota and Itochu said they would accept the offer of C&W at this price and C&W
obtained 97.69% ownership of IDC through the tender.
Boehringer Ingelheim24 - The second hostile tender offer was by Boehringer Ingelheim
GmbH (“BI”), a large German pharmaceuticals company that wanted to take advantage of
the deregulation of the Japanese pharmaceutical market. The target company, SS
Pharmaceuticals Company (“SSP”), is a Japanese drug maker that produces over-the-
counter and prescription drugs, vitamin supplements and tonics, and has a vast distribution
network and its own chain of stores. BI had a long relationship with SSP, owned 19.61%
in the company and, as the largest shareholder, had a seat on the 16-member board of
directors.
BI started its tender offer on 17 January 2000 and aimed to attain at least a 33.4% stake
in SSP, a percentage that would enable the company to veto management decisions, in
order to assure long-term security of the investment. BI offered a premium of 42% over the
closing price the day before it made its offer, sent shareholders letters explaining the offer,
and set up a toll-free number for shareholders who wanted more information. Through the
tender offer BI could raise its ownership in SSP to 35.86%.
MAC Corporation25 - The third hostile tender offer attempt was the first hostile takeover
involving a Japanese bidder and Japanese target. The Japanese bidder company was MAC
Corp.26, an acquisition fund established by a former bureaucrat, Mr. Yoshiaki Murakami.
The target company was Shoei Company, a cash-rich former silk company that had
diversified into electronics and property and belonged to the Fuyo keiretsu group; Fuyo
group members owned 60% of Shoei.
MAC made a hostile tender offer for all shares of Shoei with an offer period from 24
January 2000 to 14 February 2000 at an offer price at 1,000 yen per share, which was a
premium of 14% compared to the day before the offer. After the announcement of the bid
Shoei’s share price rose considerably, reaching 1,480 yen at one point. MAC managed to
increase its ownership from 2.78% to only 6.52%. It was argued that the shareholdings
within the Fuyo group prevented the hostile takeover, but another explanation might be the
very low premium, especially in relation to its shareholdings in Canon (Shoei spun off the
company Canon years ago).27
24 Based on The New York Times: January 18, 2000, Bid for Japanese Drug Maker Is Latest Sign of
Deregulation ; February 17, 2000, In Hostile Bid, Germans Buy 35% of Japan Drugmaker.
25 Based on The New York Times: January 18, 2000, Bid for Japanese Drug Maker Is Latest Sign of
Deregulation ; January 25, 2000, A hostile Japanese offer; February 15, 2000, Hostile Takeover Bid in Japan
Ends on an Educational Note ; March 29, 2000, Japanese Shareholder Activist Loses 2nd Battle With Company.
26 MAC is an affiliate of M&A Consulting Inc., a company that engages in advisory work and fund management.
27 Bremner (2005) explains that after this failure Murakami changed his strategy from investing millions and
turning around a company to focusing on small and mid-size cash-rich companies. For example, he bought up
11% of the Tokyo Style, a small clothing company with a lot of cash and argued that the company had to share
the company’s wealth with the shareholders by increasing dividend and repurchasing one third of the outstanding
shares.
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Steel Partners28 - The U.S. hedge fund Steel Partners of the United States29 (“SP”) has
been the most aggressive foreign raider in Japan, undertaking hostile takeover attempts
since 2003. All its offers have failed, either by anti-takeover measures or friendly tender
offers by other companies.
SP engaged in its first hostile tender offer attempts to gain complete ownership of
Japanese companies on 19 December 2003. The targets were Yushiro Chemical Industry,
the largest Japanese producer of machinery lubricants, and textile dyer Sotoh Company.
The management of both companies strongly opposed to the bid because it was perceived
as an asset stripping takeover rather than restructuring. The tender offers failed in both
cases after the two companies significantly increased dividend payouts.
Being the top shareholder with 23.1%, SP targeted Myojo foods, an instant-noodle
producer, with a tender offer for all its shares from October 27 to November 27, 2006. The
management did not agree with the bid and found a white knight in the industry-leader
Nisshin food. Nisshin made a tender offer for 33.4% of Myojo Foods’ shares at a price of
870 yen per share for the stake, exceeding the price of 700 yen per share offered by SP. SP
supported the Nisshin's offer and sold its shares in Myojo Foods and made a 73% return on
its failed takeover bid for Myojo Foods.
In February 2007 SP targeted Sapporo Brewery, Japan's third-largest brewer, which
produces Yebisu beer and distributes Guinness stout and Beringer wines in Japan, and
owns real estate in Yebisu. SP had become the largest shareholder of Sapporo with 18.64%
and launched a tender offer for all shares. After SP had indicated it wanted to increase its
shareholdings in Sapporo, the management implemented takeover defenses after gaining
shareholder approval in March. The poison pill and the so-called “advance warning
system” were implemented. The latter delays a takeover offer for months or longer by
requiring bidders seeking more than 20% of shares to go through a questioning process
with management in which they are supposed to solicit approval for the sale.
Bull-Dog is a sauce manufacturer well-known for its Worcestershire sauce. SP, owning
10.15% of Bull-Dog Sauce, declared it wanted to improve the company’s performance and
made a tender offer for the remaining shares on May 16. The price with a 20% premium
was set at 1,584 yen per share and raised on June 15 to 1,700 yen. The management of the
company did not support the bid and gained shareholder approval on June 24 to install a
poison pill defence. This defence allows Bull Dog to issue three warrants per share. SP’s
request to prevent the issue was rejected by the Tokyo District Court. On May 24 SP made
a tender offer for all the shares of Tenryu Saw Manufacturing. In the offer period from
May 24 to July 4 it got tenders for 2.57% of common stock, herewith increasing its
ownership to only 11.18%.
28 Based on The New York Times: February 25, 2004, Sotoh Bid Fails ; February 17, 2004, Textile Concern
Fights Takeover. Forbes: March 29, 2007, Sapporo Adopts Defense Against Steel Partners ; June 29, 2007, Tokyo
Court Deals Blow To Foreign Activist Investors ; August 8, 2007, Japan High Court Keeps Bull-Dog Sauce From
Steel Partners' Jaws. Bloomberg News: November 16, 2006, Nissin Food offers $108 million for Myojo stake.
International Herald Tribune: July 5, 2007, Steel Partners rejected in Japan, again. Reuters: May 23, 2007, Steel
Partners launches offer for Japan Tenryu Saw. FT.com: August 8, 2007, Steel Partners fights on for Bull-Dog ;
July 9, 2007, Japan's court approves Bull-Dog poison pill.
29 In Japan it engages in business as Steel Partners Japan Strategic Fund.
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All hostile tender offers in Japan by Steel Partners, the most active company in hostile
takeovers, failed. Reuters reports on May 23, 200730 that Steel Partners has spent 337
billion yen to take a stake of more than 5% in 30 Japanese companies.
Livedoor 31 - Livedoor was a fast-growing start-up company that provided internet
consulting services to businesses and maintains Web sites for electronic commerce.
Nippon Broadcasting System (“NBS”) is a radio broadcaster and affiliated with Fuji
Television network, Japan’s top television network. In 2005 Nippon Broadcasting was,
owning 22.5% of outstanding shares, the largest shareholder of Fuji Television. The latter
decided to launch a tender offer bid for the shares of NBS on 17 January in order to secure
management control. In the mean time, Livedoor and its subsidiaries had obtained 35% of
the outstanding shares of NBS by 8 February in off-floor trading. The financing of the bid
was controversial as Lehman Brothers had given “Livedoor the money in exchange for
“death spiral” convertible bonds, which give Lehman the right to convert the bonds into
shares at a constant discount to the share price. This, in effect, would reduce the value of
Livedoor's shares—indeed, Livedoor's shareholders may already be suffering from that”
(The Economist, March 23, 2005).
On that day Livedoor president Horie held a press conference in which he declared
that he wanted to create a tie-up with the Fuji Television group. The board of directors
rejected Livedoor’s proposal the next day and on 23 February NBS decided to issue 4,720
new share rights to Fuji Television. The new issue would amount to 1.44 times the
existing shares and reduce ownership of Livedoor’s to 17% and increase ownership of
Fuji Television to 59 %. The warrant issue led to a court battle and the ruling did not
allow the warrant issue because it was not in the best interest of, or fair to all shareholders.
On 7 April Livedoor, NBS and Fuji Television agreed on business collaborations and
capital ties. As part of the deal, Livedoor would sell its NBS shares to Fuji Television, in
return for which Fuji Television would purchase some 12.75% of Livedoor stocks for 44
billion yen. In September NBS became a wholly-owned subsidiary of Fuji Television.
Yumeshin Holdings32 - Yumeshin Holdings is a construction design company that made a
hostile tender offer bid for the majority of the shares of Japan Engineering Consultants
(“JEC”), a company that offers consultancy on construction. On 11 July 2005 Yumeshin
announced its tender offer period would start on July 20 and end on August 12, aimed at
raising its ownership from 6.4% to 53.71%. JEC had taken defensive measures in the form
of 5-for-1 stock split if a company would acquire more than 20% of its shares. The use of
this split was announced on July 18, and because it was approved by Tokyo District Court,
Yumeshin lowered its bidding price to 110.
30 Reuters: May 23, 2007, Steel Partners launches offer for Japan Tenryu Saw.
31 Based on The New York Times: March 25, 2005, Plot Thickens in Japan's Hostile Takeover Battle ; April 14,
2005, Livedoor and Fuji TV in Talks ; April 19, 2005, Hostile Takeover Bid Ends Civilly in Japan. The Asahi
Shimbun: February 25, 2005, Livedoor sues to block radio company's tactic.
32 Based on The Japan Times: July 21, 2005, Yumeshin makes bid for Japan Engineering ; July 22, 2005,
Yumeshin cranks up takeover bid ; August 9, 2005, White knight rides to consultancy's rescue. Bloomberg: July
30, 2005, Japan Engineering to Issue Options to Thwart Yumeshin (Update1). International Herald Tribune:
August 1, 2005, Japan Engineering aims to thwart bid. Kyodo News International: August 13, 2005, Yumeshin
fails in hostile takeover bid for Japan Engineering.
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Following this event JEC found a white knight, Eight Consultants Co., a construction
consulting company. Eight Consultants made a friendly tender offer at 118 yen per share
and explained it would turn Japan Engineering Consultants into a subsidiary. Yumeshin
accepted the tender offer and transferred its 22.22% ownership of JEC to Eight Consultants.
Rakuten33 - Rakuten operates the largest online shopping service in Japan and on October
13, 2005 the company announced it wanted to merge with Tokyo Broadcasting System
(“TBS”) and create a holding company in order to compete globally. TBS is Japan’s third-
biggest television broadcaster and adopted a poison pill defence by offering a unit of
brokerage Nikko Cordial an option to buy a stake of up to 21.2% in the event that a hostile
bidder would acquire 20% or more of the company’s shares. Rakuten stopped buying
shares of TBS after it had acquired 19.09 % of total shares. Mizuho Corporate Bank
mediated on November 30 in an attempt to reach an amicable resolution of the situation.
TBS agreed to investigate collaboration opportunities and Rakuten agreed to refrain
from buying up new TBS shares and to entrust its acquired shares in excess of 10% to a
financial institution (Mizuho Trust and Banking Co.).
Don Quijote34 - Don Quijote, a discount retailer, launched a surprise hostile tender offer
on Origin Toshu in the period January 16 to February 9. Don Quijote already owned
31.06% and wanted to increase its shareholding to 51% at a bidding price of 2,800 yen.
Origin, a food manufacturer and retailer, had not been informed in advance by Don Quijote,
strongly disagreed and requested help from Aeon, Japan’s largest department store. Aeon
agreed to a friendly counter tender offer for 50.01% at a price of 3,100 yen for the period
of January 31 to March 1, 2006.
The tender offer of Don Quijote failed but thereafter the company started buying shares
of Origin Toshu in the market, announcing on February 15 it owned 47.81% of Origin. At
the end of February Don Quijote sold its shareholdings to Aeon that had acquired 95.67 of
the Origin by March 1.
Oji Paper35 - The first Japanese hostile tender offer by a blue-chip company was Oji Paper,
Japan's largest paper manufacturer, for the shares of Hokuetsu Paper Mills, the sixth
largest paper manufacturer. Prior to the bid, Oji Paper had approached Hokuetsu Paper to
suggest a friendly merger or acquisition. Hokuetsu Paper objected to the proposal and
implemented two anti-takeover devices; it adopted a poison pill and issued 50 million new
shares to Mitsubishi Corporation (30.5% stake in the company). Responding to these
developments Oji Paper started the hostile tender offer in order to obtain 50%. Hokuetsu
Paper did not need to use the poison pill because it had been able to get support from
Mitsubishi Corporation, its main bank, and business partners. In addition, Japan’s second
33 Based on International Herald Tribune: October 13, 2005, Online company plans bid for Tokyo broadcaster;
October 13, 2005, Rakuten takes aim at Tokyo Broadcasting. South China Morning Post: October 14, 2005,
Rakuten moves in on TBS as media shake-out deepens. Nikkei Business: May, 1, 2007, Rakuten asks business
heavyweights for help in attempt to form business tie-up with TBS.
34 Based on Reuters: January 30, 2006, Japan's Aeon to make white knight bid for Origin. The Japan Times:
February 16, 2006, Don Quijote shocks Origin by boosting stake to 46% ; March 15, 2006, Aeon completes
takeover of Origin 'bento' chain.
35 Based on International Herald Tribune: September 5, 2006, Failed takeover bid by Oji seen as loss for
Hokuetsu. Wall Street Journal: September 6, 2006, Oji Paper Drops Hokuetsu Bid As Japan Braces for 'Hostile'
Era.
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largest paper manufacturer Nippon Paper Group bought 8.8% of Hokuetsu Paper’s shares.
Hokuetsu Paper could effectively stabilize 40-50% of the outstanding shares and only
5.3% of the shares were tendered to Oji Paper.
2-5 Conclusion
In this chapter we investigated M&A activity in Japan, focussing on mergers and hostile
takeovers in the pre-war and post-war periods. For the pre-war period we looked into
mergers of companies listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange in 1937. The number of
mergers was low, not exceeding an annual total of 41 merger cases, and merger waves did
not occur. We did not find a difference in merger activity of zaibatsu companies and non-
zaibatsu companies. Activity was concentrated in the electricity sector, and the main
motive for mergers appears to have been the rescue motive as most transactions seem to
occur between a strong bidder company and weak target company.
Next, we presented M&A activity in the post-war period. Using JFTC data, we showed
the number of domestic mergers by annual total and industry and also looked into detailed
information on targets for the period 1970-1997. The analysis of the detailed information
of each individual year, combined with the Recof information, provided additional insights
on the developments in domestic mergers in the post-war period. In this period we found
two merger waves: the first in the period 1963-72, and the second from 1991 to present.
The first merger wave coincided with the removal of controls on capital transactions in
1964 and appears to be partly influenced by administrative guidance of the Japanese
bureaucracy. The largest mergers were concentrated in the Steel, Transportation and
Automotive sectors. The main aim of the mergers was to prevent excessive competition
and increase the scale of domestic companies in order to become competitive with foreign
companies.
The second merger wave started after the collapse of the bubble economy and is related
to industrial restructuring as the economic recession resulted in bad performance and
difficulty to repay loans. In the early 1990s the largest mergers occurred in the Paper and
pulp, Chemical and Banking industries, and especially mergers aimed at rescuing failing
companies were important. After the regulatory changes in the latter half of the 1990s the
number and size of M&A activity increased considerably, although the number of mergers
remained stable in the period 1999-2006. In this period we also see that companies were
engaging in mergers for strategic purposes.
We looked into hostile takeovers during the post-war period and found that the first
cases occurred immediately after WWII. During the entire post-war period hostile takeover
activity took place, but only in 1999 the first hostile tender offer was initiated. In the
period 1999 to July 2007 thirteen hostile tender offer attempts were launched, of which
only two were successful. The “hostility” in these successful hostile tender offers can be
questioned, however, as the bidder company and target company had a long-standing
relationship.
Chapters 3 through 5 will provide background information to interpret M&A activity in the
pre-war and post-war period. After a discussion of the informal institutions, formal
institutions, and the political and economic development of Japan, we will examine their
influence on companies’ financing decision, ownership structure, corporate governance
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structure, and formation of corporate groups. This information forms the basis for the
institutional model for M&A that we will introduce in chapter 6.
According to the institutional model, chapter 7 will subsequently integrate all
information and analyze hostile takeovers in the post-war period. In this chapter we
explain how the hostile takeovers up to 1999, and the thirteen hostile tender offer attempts
in the period 1999-2006 need to be interpreted.
In chapter 9 we will investigate the mergers of the second merger wave in Japan
empirically. We examine whether shareholder wealth is created, and our analysis focuses
on mergers with a rescue motive and the role of the main bank.
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Informal and formal institutions
This chapter discusses the informal institutions, political development, and formal
institutions. These institutions prove to have a major impact on decisions related to
financing decisions, ownership structure, corporate governance structure, corporate group
formation, and M&A activity. As these decisions are influenced by the historical and
context-specific background of managers and companies, we look into the origins of
Japan’s informal institutions and describe the political development and formal institutions
as of 1639, the year Japan implemented a political system that banned almost all foreign
contact.
Section 3-1 discusses the informal institutions in Japan, and section 3-2 examines the
political development and formal institutions related to financial markets. These
institutions strongly influence companies’ financing decisions. Section 3-3 discusses the
formal institutions related to ownership structure, corporate governance structure, and
M&A activity. We summarize and conclude the chapter with section 3-4.
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3-1 Informal institutions
R Characteristics of the (moral) Constitution of Seventeen Articles, which is based on
Shinto, Confucianism, and Buddhism, are still present in contemporary Japan.
R The corporate ie system is the “house” system that places importance on continuity of a
company, rather than its individual members.
R The dǀzoku is a group of related “houses” and forms a pyramidal pattern of corporate
relationships with personal and financial linkages.
Informal institutions “come from socially transmitted information and are part of the
heritage that we call culture” (North 1990, p.37). In this section we look into the
development of religion and tradition in Japan. We examine the origins of Shinto and look
into Confucianism and Buddhism that entered Japan from Korea and China in 552AD.
These three elements had an important influence on the Constitution of Seventeen Articles
which was promulgated in 604AD. This constitution of moral development is discussed in
sub-section 3-1-2, and the ie system and the dǀzoku system are looked into in the next sub-
section.
3-1-1 Religion and tradition
Shinto - The indigenous people of Japan is the Jomon that lived in the period from
10,000BC to 300BC. The Jomon was a Mesolithic people that hunted and gathered food in
small tribes. Hooker (1996) describes that after they had changed their lifestyle from
hunter-gatherers to settlement in large villages, the first signs of religion appeared. In the
period 1,000BC to 300BC “the Jomon developed an identifiable religion-they produced a
remarkable number of figurines and stone circles constructed outside the main villages
begin to appear.”36
Although there was some form of religion present during the Jomon period, the origins
of Japan’s current Shinto, and also of the Japanese language and social structure, date back
to 300BC (start of the Yayoi period). The Yayoi, a people from the north of China, were
the first to enter Japan via Korea and introduced a new religion that would evolve into
Shinto. In this period so-called uji developed, clans headed by a patriarch. Each clan had
its own god, kami, and these gods were sacred spirits which took the form of things and
concepts important to life, such as wind, mountains, trees, rivers and fertility. Religion was
transmitted through communal rituals aimed at maintaining harmony between nature,
humans and kami. As agriculture had become important for the Yayoi, the rituals became
closely tied to the agricultural year. “[A]ll members of the community took part, if only
symbolically, in the final meal, thus bringing harmony again to the relationship of humans
and the kami”37 (Watt 2003).
Battles between the various uji were frequent, and Hooker (1996) explains that “[W]hen
one uji conquered another, it absorbed its god into its own religious practices. In this way,
the Yayoi slowly developed a complex pantheon of kami that represented in their hierarchy
the hierarchy of the uji”. 38 The supreme god of all Shinto gods is the Sun Goddess
Amaterasu, and prior to the end of WWII the Imperial Family was regarded as her
descendents.
36 http://www.wsu.edu:8000/~dee/ANCJAPAN/ANCJAPAN.HTM
37 http://iis-db.stanford.edu/docs/127/religion.pdf
38 http://wsu.edu/~dee/ANCJAPAN/YAYOI.HTM
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Confucianism - Confucianism entered Japan from Korea and China in 552AD.
Confucianism is a tradition founded by Master Kung, K'ung Fu-tzu, from which the Latin
name “Confucius” is derived. The most reliable source of his teachings and beliefs is the
Lunyu (Lun-yü, or Analects), which is a collection of sayings by and about Confucius and
his disciples. Within Confucianism it is believed that to achieve a state of orderliness and
peace in the world, it is necessary for human beings to cultivate virtue. In the Analects the
concepts of Ren (Jen) and Li are most important. Ren (Jen) can be translated as
“benevolence,” “humaneness,” “goodness”, or “virtue”. Li can be translated as “ritual” or
“etiquette” and stands for rites, ceremonies, proper behaviour, and good manners. The
other three of the five Confucian virtues are righteousness (yi), wisdom (zhi), and
faithfulness (xin). Righteousness is doing what is appropriate for one’s role, as for example
father, son, teacher, or student. Wisdom has several aspects, including being a good judge
of the character of others. Filial piety is acting out of love and respect for one’s parents,
and faithfulness includes honesty (Yao 2000, p.34).
Yao (2000) indicates that “[C]onfucius repeatedly taught that while it was important to
observe ancient rituals strictly, it was even more important to have a sincere heart and a
devoted spirit: 'For if a person lacks humaneness (ren) within, then what is the value of
performing rituals? For if a person lacks humaneness within, what is the use of performing
music?' (Lunyu, 3: 3)” (p.32). In contrast, other Chinese philosophers argued that emphasis
should be placed on ritual (Xunzi) or righteousness (Mengzi) (Yao 2000, p.77).
Overall, the five virtues need to be studied and trained in order to participate properly in
the hierarchies of the two types of human relationships. The first is the ‘three bonds’ (in
Japanese: sankǀ), which are functional pairings between rules and minister, father and son,
and husband and wife. The second type is the ‘five relations’ (in Japanese: gǀrin) that
cover loyalty between rules and minister, filiality between father and son, differential
harmony between husband and wife, precedence between elder and younger sibs, and trust
between friends (Sekiguchi 2003, p.27). The importance of hierarchical ranking is visible
in various elements of the Japanese society. It not only orders relationships of individuals,
but also companies, groups, and material objects. There is flexibility in the principle of
hierarchy and equality though. When dealing with outsiders, the outside hierarchical
relations override the inside hierarchical relations (Hendry 2003).
Buddhism - Similar to Confucianism, Buddhism entered Japan in 552AD. It was founded
in India by Siddhartha Gautama, Lord Buddha, who lived from 560BC to 480BC. His
teachings were not written down but transferred from one generation to the next by word
of mouth, which led to various groups with their own interpretation. The main teaching of
Buddhism is the path of practice that an individual can take up to gain release from
suffering. Most important in this respect is that an individual needs to try to overcome self-
centeredness and have compassion for fellow beings.
“[T]he Buddha held that to gain release from suffering one had to attain a new
understanding of reality. In particular, one had to see that persons and things do not exist
autonomously on the basis of individual “selves,” but rather that all things are linked in a
network of interdependency. To overcome the self-centeredness of the ignorant, one had to
transform one’s way of thinking and acting through the practice of Buddhist morality,
mediation and wisdom or study” (Watt 2003).
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3-1-2 Constitution of Seventeen Articles
By 500AD the uji had evolved into military states headed by aristocratic families who
were constantly fighting over power. The situation of constant struggles between uji led to
the promulgation of the Constitution of Seventeen Articles in 604AD by Shǀtoku Taishi, a
regent under Empress Suiko (ruling between 592AD-628AD). The document was not a
legal constitution, but stressed virtues of harmony and importance of moral development
for government officials, based on the principles of Buddhism and Confucianism. The
following year he also implemented court hierarchy and “twelve grades of rank were
established, named after six virtues, subdivided into greater and smaller” (Sansom 1978,
p.91).
The Constitution of Seventeen Articles formed the basis for the Taika Reform in 645AD,
which was primarily aimed at unifying the country to be able to levy tax and defend itself
from foreign intrusions. The reform converted uji from separate states into provinces and
gave the Tennǀ, “Divine Emperor”, absolute power over the provinces. Herewith Japan
was changed from “an uneasy confederation of tribes into a centralised bureaucratic state
on the Chinese model” (Sansom 1978, p.95). The new position of the emperor was in
conformity with the principles of both Shinto and Confucianism. According to Shinto, the
Emperor was a legitimate descent from the Shinto sun goddess Amaterasu and “ruled by
the Decree of Heaven”39 (Hooker 1996). Confucianism legitimates the position of the
emperor as the parent of the people and patriarch of the family state, based on the
principles of patriarchal family and filiality. Sekiguchi (2003) explains that if “filiality in
the family is extended to the public realm, it becomes loyalty, the basis of public morality.
Loyalty to the family patriarch is thus the foundation of state rule” (p.29).
The heritage of the Constitution of Seventeen Articles was not only the basis for the
Taika Reform, but its characteristics are still present in contemporary Japan. Below we
describe the articles we think are important in relation to our discussion on M&A in Japan.
We focus in particular on the rules of conduct that are likely to influence decisions related
to ownership, corporate governance, and M&A activity; subjects that will be examined in
the next chapters.
Harmony & Tolerance - The Japanese accentuate harmony and human nexus, and they
try to avoid conflict, confrontation, and criticism. Nakamura (1958) mentions about the
attitude towards the co-existence and unity of Shintoism, Buddhism, and Confucianism:
“[A]mong the scholars conflicts and controversies were carried on which advocated
different doctrines, but among the common people they were made to fuse and harmonize.
The Japanese are by nature inclined to rapprochement without threshing out an issue”
(pp.299-300). A good example is the previously discussed way that kami of conquered uji
were absorbed in the conqueror’s religious practices.
Other examples of tolerance are the absorption of foreign words and foreign cultures.
The Japanese welcome these cultural elements from other countries by integrating them in
their own culture. In this process, however, they will never deviate from what has been
inherited from the past such as, for example, their ancestral gods.
I. Harmony is to be valued, and an avoidance of wanton opposition to be honoured. All
men are influenced by class-feelings, and there are few who are intelligent. Hence there
39 http://wsu.edu/~dee/ANCJAPAN/YAMATO.HTM
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are some who disobey their lords and fathers, or who maintain feuds with the
neighboring villages. But when those above are harmonious and those below are
friendly, and there is concord in the discussion of business, right views of things
spontaneously gain acceptance. Then what is there which cannot be accomplished !
X. Let us cease from wrath, and refrain from angry looks. Nor let us be resentful when
others differ from us. For all men have hearts, and each heart has its own leanings. We
are not unquestionably sages, nor are they unquestionably fools. Both of us are simply
ordinary men. How can any one lay down a rule by which to distinguish right from
wrong ? For we are all, one with another, wise and foolish, like a ring which has no
end. Therefore, although others give away anger, let us on the contrary dread our own
faults, and though we alone may be in the right, let us follow the multitude and act like
them.
Modesty & Group - In Japanese interpersonal relationships, modesty about oneself is
highly valued, and compliments should be given to others.
VI. Chastise that which is evil and encourage that which is good. This was the excellent
rule of antiquity. Conceal not, therefore, the good qualities of others, and fail not to
correct that which is wrong when you see it.
It is important to be reserved about one’s own desires because the group is more important
than the individual. Individual attitudes are subordinated to the group’s interest, which
implies that people individually do not express their own ideas. If there is one specific idea
within the group that everyone agrees to, individuals will not move against the group’s
idea.
XV. Turn away from what is private, and to set our faces towards that which is public-
this is the path of a Minister. Now if a man is influenced by private motives, he will
assuredly feel resentments, and if he is influenced by resentful feelings, he will
assuredly sacrifice the public interests to his private feelings. When resentments arise,
it interferes with order, and is subversive of law. Therefore in the first clause it was said,
that superiors and inferiors should agree together. The purport is the same as this.
The importance of the group can be seen in decision-making as well. An example of the
importance of the group is the ringisei. According to this system a document is circulated
to managers whose department is affected by a particular decision. Each manager signs the
document indicating assent to the decision, the document functioning primarily as
developing consensus within the company.
XVII. Decisions on important matters should not be made by one person alone. They
should be discussed by many. But small matters are of less consequence. It is
unnecessary to consult a number of people. It is only in the case of the discussion of
weighty affairs, when there is a suspicion that they may miscarry, that one should
arrange matters in concert with others, so as to arrive at the right conclusion.
Trust - Trust or good faith is another very important norm in relationships between
Japanese.
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IX. Good faith is the foundation of right. In everything let there be good faith, for in it
there surely consists the good and the bad, success and failure. If the lord and the
vassal observe good faith one with another, what is there which cannot be
accomplished ? If the lord and the vassal do not observe good faith towards one
another, everything without exception ends in failure.
3-1-3 Ie system
The ie system is often translated as ‘family system’, but as Hendry (2003) suggests, the
actual meaning of the system is better reflected in its literal translation ‘House’ because of
its “connotation of continuity” (p.26). The importance of the ie system lies in the ie being
the continuing entity, rather than any individual member. Conversely, the continuity of the
ie is most important for each individual member who is expected to have complete loyalty
towards the ie. The relations within the ie are characterized by Confucian principles, the
head is responsible for all his subordinates and enjoys privileges given by the subordinates.
Hendry (2003) indicates that this is not an independent position and that “if any particular
head became despotic or detrimental in some other way to the house as a whole, he could
be removed according to the decision of a wider family council” (p.27). The hierarchical
lines within the ie are organized based on age, sex, and expectation of permanency in the
house.
Although it was customary and desirable that the eldest son would succeed his father,
this was not essential. The continuation of the ie was most important and in a family
business this was stable management. Regarding the importance of stable management, Ito
(1997) indicates that this does not necessarily imply business expansion but “[R]ather, as is
often stated in the family precepts of merchant families, the emphasis is on thoroughgoing
service and commodity quality, for which the maintenance of appropriate management is a
prerequisite; and it was for this reason that importance was attached to such material
requirements as land, family residence, and store premises” (p.35).
Regarding succession, if the eldest son was not qualified as a successor of the head or
“[I]f there were no children at all, a new spouse could be sought, or a relative’s child could
be adopted, or the head could take a concubine to produce an heir, who would then be
brought up by his wife. It was also permissible, if necessary, to adopt a totally unrelated
child, so that the blood connection, while desirable, was not indispensable to the continuity
of the ie” (Hendry 2003, p.28). If there were only daughter(s), the spouse could be selected
based on his qualities and this was often most preferred by the head of the ie (Kitano 1962).
A son that did not become the heir could set up his own house and start an ie, or marry into
another ie. The latter option meant he had to leave his own ie.
If he set up his own house, this would be regarded as a branch of the main house and
this could develop into a wide group of houses. This group of related houses is called a
dǀzoku and is formed as a pyramidal pattern of relationships with personal and financial
linkages. Within the dǀzoku the junior houses are ranked hierarchically in order of
genealogical distance or in chronological order of being hived off from the parent house
(Cornell 1964, p.454). Both the relations within the dǀzoku as well as those with
companies outside the dǀzoku are based on Confucian principles. The companies in the
hierarchical pyramid have a particular position or rank in relation to other (group)
companies, and employees of the company share the same status as the company in the
outside world. The ranking of the company in relation to other companies is very
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important and the employees are driven to improve the company’s status as to advance
their own status (Hendry 2003).
Interaction between companies can develop and evolve into long-term and stable
relations and even oyabun/kobun relations. Oyabun means parent-part and kobun means
child-part; with reference to companies it refers to the relation of a parent company with a
subsidiary company (Hendry 2003, p.119). The oyabun/kobun can also develop regarding
the relation of an employer and employee. Caldarola (1965) argues that when
industrialization of Japan started, the factory managers had difficulty to recruit people
because of the family-orientated psychology:
In fact, for people nurtured on the family system there is great inner need for this basis
that is a guarantee of subsistence, a source of relief, a support to one’s spirit against
disorder and insecurity of the world outside. A certain guarantee of the extension of
paternalistic ties made it possible for youngsters to venture away from the shelter of
home (pp.367-368).
This led factory managers to create a safe haven in the form of a new family, the
“company family”. The company takes responsibility for the well-being of the employee
and the employee will be loyal to the company. This type of oyabun/kobun relationship is
not only between employer and employee, but also teacher-student, parent-child, and
between the senpai and kǀhai within Japanese companies. The senpai is a person who is
already working in the company when the kǀhai enters. The senpai feels responsible for
the development of the kǀhai within and outside the company. He teaches the kǀhai how to
function in the company and gives assistance and advice. The kǀhai on his part builds up
debt to the senpai and repays this with loyalty and respect towards the senpai (Cole 1971;
Hendry 2003).
Lifetime employment, seniority-based wages, and enterprise union are three important
elements of the labour system in Japan, originating from the “company family” system.
Lifetime employment is the system in which employees are recruited directly from school
or university and remain working for the same company until retirement. The seniority
wages system entails that salary progression is based on length of service with the
company, rather than the individual’s skill or output. Milhaupt (2001) describes this as “a
mutual expectation of employer and employee […] that the employee will enjoy
continuous employment until mandatory retirement age. Wages that undercompensate for
productivity at the outset of the employment relationship are eventually offset by wages
that overcompensate for productivity in the latter stages of the employee’s career” (p.8).
The enterprise union is a union for all employees in the company up to middle-
management, which enhances identification with the company's interests by all employees
(Crump 2003, p.5).
Another important aspect of the “company family” is that it not only concerns the
company, but also the group to which the company belongs. Starting in the pre-war period,
employees were assigned to jobs in related group companies. One of the reasons was to
create a vast understanding of the group’s business activities, but more importantly, to
build and strengthen the relationships between employees and companies. Kester (1989)
argues about the post-war job rotation that employees will treat each other with respect
because in the future they might work together.
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3-2 Formal institutions
R The pre-war Japanese government tried to set up a modern financial and legal system
in order to be able to renegotiate the unequal treaties it had signed in 1857-58.
R A modern banking system, stock market, and bond market were set up and functioned
effectively up to 1937.
R After WWII, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers’ policies were aimed at (i)
demilitarizing and democratizing Japan, and (ii) setting up a regulatory environment
for a safe and stable financial system.
In this section we look into political change, regulatory changes, and the development of
financial markets from the start of the Meiji period (1868-1912) to present. In order to
understand the (importance of the) changes in the Meiji period, we first describe some
aspects of the preceding period, the Tokugawa period (1600-1868). Next, we investigate
laws and regulations related to the banking sector, bond market, and stock market.
3-2-1 Pre-war political development and financial markets
As of 1639 Japan maintained a system of sakoku, 'the closed country', and banned almost
all foreign contact for more than two centuries. Only diplomatic relations with Korea and
the Ryukyu Islands (Okinawa) were upheld, and trading relations were strictly controlled
and restricted to those conducted with Chinese and Dutch merchants. Japanese were
forbidden to leave Japan, and foreigners were not allowed to settle in Japan (Allen 1946).
The political system was formed by the bakufu (central government) and the han (local
government). The bakufu, headed by the shǀgun, had absolute political power over the han
that were ruled by daimyǀ. The Japanese society was sociologically separated into four
classes: the samurai, peasants, artisans and merchants (shinǀkǀshǀ). In this system the
samurai had the highest status as soldier and ruler. Peasants were awarded the second
highest class as they were the foundation of the state through their production of rice and
payment of taxes. Artisans were placed at the third class and merchants formed the lowest
class. Artisans were ranked above merchants because they provided the samurai class with
goods such as weapons and military supplies; merchants were primarily engaged in pursuit
of profit and self-enrichment. Individuals were supposed to remain in, and marry within,
their own social class (Hendry 2003; Beasley 1963; Sheldon 1958).
In the nineteenth century the system of sakoku started to become diffult to maintain as
industrialized Western countries expanded trading activities in East Asia. Commodore
Perry entered Tokyo Bay with four military ships in 1853 and demanded Japan to open its
ports. In 1857 and 1858 the bakufu was forced to open the country to foreign trade and
signed unequal treaties with Britain, the U.S., France, Holland, and Russia. The unequal
treaties resulted in a severe loss of Japan’s sovereignty as foreigners were free to settle in
designated areas and granted legal extraterritoriality. In the treaties Japan had also
renounced its tariff autonomy, resulting in marginal or no tariffs on foreign goods from the
countries involved. The treaties raised violent political opposition among the lower rank
warriors of some han (Satsuma, Choshu, Tosa and Hizen), who were dissatisfied. As the
shǀgun had signed the treaties without consent of the emperor or other daimyǀ, the
warriors of the four han engaged in a coup d'état in the name of patriotism. They seized
power, established the Meiji government in 1868, and restored the Emperor to a
constitutional position (which he had not occupied for 800 years). The contact with foreign
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countries and the unequal treaties resulted in a transformation in Japan’s economy, legal
system, and economic regulations. The fear of becoming colonized by a Western country,
led to the Meiji policy of fukoku kyǀhei (wealthy nation, strong army) (Fukasaku 1992;
Beasley 1963, p.2; Allen 1946, p.25).
The feudalistic system of the Tokugawa period was changed into a centralized
bureaucracy in 1869, and clans surrendered their domains to the government. In 1871 local
government in han was replaced by prefectures (haihan chiken), and during the period
1870-71 the four-class system was abolished (shimin byǀdǀ). In this period the old
financial and administrative system associated with feudalism disappeared, and
homogenization of citizens (kokumin) and establishment of a centralized nation-state
(kokka) was promoted (e.g. Suzuki 1996, p.27). In 1889 the Meiji constitution was
promulgated and the following year the Diet was opened, replacing the political system
with a centralized government and prefectures. Development of financial markets started
as the government committed itself to building a modern financial system organized
around a modern banking sector. The financial system and financial markets followed the
market mechanism and developed rapidly until 1937. After 1937 the financial system
changed as the government took control over funding of companies. According to the
Temporary Funds Adjustment Act the government allocated funds to war-related
industries. The 1938 National General Mobilization Act gave the government even more
control over the economy as it authorized decisions on aspects such as use of labour and
materials (e.g. Röhl 2005).
Banking sector - The National Bank Act of 1872 was the first step towards the creation of
a modern banking system. Modeled after the National Bank Act in the United States40, the
system was decentralized, and national banks regulated the money supply. Each national
bank had to hold 40% of equity in gold and could issue bank notes at 60% of its equity.
Because bank notes had to be convertible into gold, only four banks had been established
by 1874. The National Bank Act was amended in 1876, and the reserve requirement for
gold was relaxed to 20%; the remaining 80% was allowed to be national bonds or samurai
stipends. Notes could be issued up to 80% of equity and needed to be convertible into
government notes. By 1880 the number of national banks had increased to 151 (Teranishi
2005). In the years 1876-1879 the amount of bank notes increase from 1.7 million yen to
34.4 million yen, causing an annual inflation rate of 20% (Hoshi and Kashap 2001). The
high number of national banks and the absence of a monetary policy led to high inflation
and eventually to the abandonment of this system.
A central bank, the Bank of Japan, was established in 1882 and, according to the
Convertible Bank Notes Act (effective as of 1884), became the only entity to issue the
national currency. Similar to Germany, a system was set up that separated the type of
funding by financial institution. The national banks were gradually transformed into
commercial banks, and the Hypothec Bank of Japan and Industrial Bank of Japan were
established to provide long-term credit to the sectors agriculture and industry (Allen 1946,
p.47). In 1899 all national banks had become ordinary banks, and the total of ordinary and
saving banks increased to 2,334 in 1901 (Teranishi 2005, p.59, table 3.1). In 1901 the
capital requirement for joint stock banks was set at 500 thousand yen and for private banks
40 This US National Bank Act was enacted in 1864, did not have a central bank but national banks that were
authorized to issue bank notes.
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at 250 thousand yen, encouraging consolidation of banks. By the end of 1913 the number
of banks had fallen to 2,158. Due to the banking crises of 1920, 1922 and 1927, smaller
and weaker banks fell into bankruptcy or were acquired by larger banks.41 The Ministry of
Finance also restricted the establishment of new branches in 1923, and this prompted large
banks to acquire smaller banks in order to expand their networks. The Trust Act and Trust
Business Act, effective as of 1923, increased the activities of banks as they were allowed
to engage in the placement and underwriting of bonds. The revised banking law of 1928
raised the capital requirement of banks in Tokyo and Osaka to two million yen and of other
banks to one million yen. This further stimulated mergers between smaller banks and
absorption of smaller banks by larger banks. The number of commercial banks fell from
1,515 to 65 in the period 1928-45, and a high proportion of the total banking business
came to be conducted by a very few large banks working with branches. By the end of
1928 the “big five” banks (Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, Yasuda and Dai-ichi) held 34%
of the deposits of the ordinary banks, and if the deposits of the nine next largest ordinary
banks are added, this proportion increases to 55%. The first four of the “big five” banks
were part of zaibatsu groups, and these groups greatly increased their financial power
during the 1920s (Allen 1946; Hoshi 1995; Okazaki 2006).
Stock markets42 - Whereas the banking system was imported from the West, the stock
markets originated from the rice and commodities markets that had developed during the
Tokugawa period. The government failed to introduce the rules of the London exchange in
1874 because the private sector felt these were too restrictive. In 1878 it “promulgated a
new Stock Exchange Act, which recognized many transaction formats inherited from rice
markets” (Hoshi and Kashap 2001, p.25). The first stock exchanges, the Tokyo Stock
Exchange and Osaka Stock Exchange, were also established in this year. Okazaki et al.
(2005) show that the number of exchanges peaked in 1897 with 46 exchanges, but declined
thereafter and remained at around 10 exchanges from 1910. The Tokyo Stock Exchange
was the largest stock exchange in terms of revenue in the pre-war period.
Bond market - Ohno (2006) argues about securities exchanges that “initially, few stocks
were traded and these exchanges functioned mainly as a secondary market for government
bonds. Former samurais who received government bonds in exchange for the previous rice
salary often wished to sell them as they faced financial distress. In the 1880s, as many
railroad companies were established, railroad bonds gradually became the most important
instruments for trading” (p.92).
According to the Commercial Code of 1890 it was required that the name of the owner
was inscribed on bonds, and this did not make them attractive investments. The
Commercial Code was amended in 1899, and allowed companies to issue bearer bonds
(Hoshi and Kashap 2001).
In 1905 the Secured Debenture Trust Act was passed and “allowed large banks to be
trustee of the collateral securing corporate bonds on behalf of the owners of securities”
(Hoshi and Kashap 2001, p26). This, however, did not result in an increase of bond issues
abroad. Bond financing increased after 1920 and especially in the years 1928, 1934, and
the period 1939-45 it was an important way of financing.
41 Please refer to section 4-1-1 for more information on the economic development during this period.
42 See: Suzuki (1989), Kaizuka (1986), Oka (1993) and Akimoto (1993)
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3-2-2 Post-war political development and financial markets
After WWII, Japan was placed under the command and authority of the Supreme
Commander for the Allied Powers (“SCAP”). SCAP’s main concern was to demilitarize
and democratize Japan, and to set up a regulatory environment in order to create a safe and
stable financial system. These regulations intended to supply sufficient capital to
developing industries and to enhance the availability of funds in low productivity and
traditional areas. Japan’s new constitution was enacted on 3 May 1947 and changed Japan
from a centralized bureaucratic state into a democratic country with a cabinet system. The
occupation of Japan and supreme power of SCAP came to an end when the Peace Treaty
took effect on 28 April 1952 (Wagatsuma 1956, p.107).
The Imperial Order 567, set forth in November 1946, prohibited companies that had
been part of the same zaibatsu group prior to the war from holding each other’s stocks.
Until the Peace Treaty this “completely prevented the same-line companies from holding
the liquidated (by zaibatsu dissolution) and newly issued stocks” (Miyajima 1994, p.320).
The Antimonopoly Act was passed in 1947 and prohibited (i) private monopolies to control
business activities and restrain competition, (ii) unreasonable restraint of trade, including
cartels (with some exemptions, as will be explained in sub-section 4-1-2), and (iii) unfair
trade practices. Another important aspect was the prohibition of the pure holding company
in the post-war period. The implemented measures included forced liquidation of 42
holding companies and the two largest trading companies, Mitsui Bussan and Mitsubishi
Shoji, confiscation of stock-ownership of zaibatsu families, purging of 1,575 top
executives of more than four hundred companies, and the prohibition of the use of the pre-
war trademarks by Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, and Yasuda (Odagiri 1992, pp.171-172).
The U.S. concern for the Soviets and their influence in Korea changed their attitude to
rebuilding Japan as an economic ally of the United States; the initial program of anti-trust
legislation and de-concentration measures was largely cancelled. The change in the U.S.
attitude is especially visible with reference to the de-concentration and reorganization
activities of Japanese companies. Initially 257 industrial companies and 68 companies in
distribution and services had been designated for reorganization, but the final plan of 1949
involved only 11 companies for dissolution (excluding Mitsubishi and Mitsui trading
companies that had already been dissolved), and 7 companies for divestiture (of plants or
shares). After the peace treaty came into force in 1952, the zaibatsu reassembled the
following decade as keiretsu but, as we will explain in section 4-3, their form and
substance was substantially different (Johnson 1982).
The Securities and Exchange Law (shǀken torihiki hǀ) was enacted in 1948 and,
inspired on the Glass-Steagall Banking Act in the United States, it regulates the
relationship between the stock company and capital markets. It also re-established the
structure of segmented financial markets and specialized institutions. Securities business
was only to be performed by securities companies, and commercial banks were responsible
for short-term financing. Long-term financing was left to long-term financial institutions,
such as trust banks and long-term credit banks. Compared to the pre-war financial system,
commercial banks and trust banks lost the right to engage in underwriting for bonds.
Within the banking sector the so-called convoy system was implemented. This system
refers to a wide set of financial regulations that limit competition, including interest rate
controls, branching restrictions, and restrictions on the range of financial products
available (Teranishi 2005; Hoshi and Kashap 2001).
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Deregulation of the Japanese financial system became an ongoing process as of the 1970s.
In the latter half of the 1970s bond markets were gradually deregulated, and the Foreign
Exchange and Trade Control Act was reformed in 1980. After the reform companies were
allowed to turn to foreign markets for funding and making investments abroad. Other
changes in laws and regulations during the 1980s were characterized by efforts to establish
a financial environment that was more responsive to competition. In this decade the
financial reform increased competition not only among banks, but also between banks,
non-depository institutions, and other private financial institutions such as securities
companies. This new situation made the financial institutions also look for other business
opportunities.
According to Steenbeek (1996), even until the end of the 1980s the primary focus of the
Japanese regulators was insuring the soundness and stability of the financial system
through government protection of the domestic financial institutions. Only during the
1990s the financial institutions were forced to give up some protection to compete with
institutions out of reach of Japan's regulators. This policy change, enforced by the
changing international financial markets, was pursued during the 1990s and can be seen in
the Big Bang-plan.43 The Financial System Reform Act that went into effect in 1993 meant
a change in the separation principle within the financial system. Banks were allowed to
form subsidiaries that could operate in the securities business, and securities companies
were allowed to set up subsidiaries to engage in trust business.
In November 1996 the new financial deregulation plan “Japanese Big Bang” was
announced. The main aim of the plan was to make the existing Japanese financial system
free, fair, and global. Regulators hoped to use the Big Bang to liberate Japan from the
long-lasting economic slump as it promoted innovation in financial products and services,
and improved the openness of the entire system. The Japanese government realized that its
measures of protection of the banking sector needed to be abandoned. The convoy system
caused the large moral hazard problems with banks and had resulted in non-performing
loans at financial institutions.
In 1997 the severity of the problems of Japanese financial institutions became evident in
bankruptcies of the Hokkaido Takushoku Bank and Yamaichi Securities Company and the
Long-Term Credit Bank of Japan and Nippon Credit Bank in 1998 and 1999, respectively.
Large Japanese banks were faced with rising Japan premiums and lower credit ratings due
to high amounts of (non-performing) loans. This situation, combined with the difficulty to
maintain the level of capital requirements of the Basel Committee to operate
internationally, resulted in banks selling shareholdings in companies (Miyajima and
Fumiaki 2005, p.14; Scher 2001, p.1).44
Stock market - The Securities and Exchange Law was enacted in March 1947, and in
April 1949 stock exchanges were re-established in Tokyo, Osaka and Nagoya. Trading on
these exchanges began on 16 May. Until the late 1960s the standard for equity issue of
stock was par instead of market value. As the market value was typically higher, this
discouraged companies from turning to equity financing. Combined with the ("required")
dividend payment at 10% of face value, it was a relatively expensive form of funding from
a cash flow perspective as well. Stock issues at market price were permitted from 1966
43 See: Ito (1997) and Nihon Keizai Shinbun (1997)
44 We will show the implications on companies’ financing decision and ownership structure in sub-section 4-3-4.
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onward, but only during the 1970s public share issues started to become popular. The
difference with the years just after 1966, when the par value-restriction was abolished, was
the rise in market prices during the 1970s (Hoshi and Kashap 2001).
During the 1980s and 1990s the development of the stock market is characterized by
further financial deregulation. The most important effect of the deregulation was that
companies could more easily enter foreign stock markets as the strict rules were gradually
abolished.
Bond market - Because of the balanced budget doctrine in the high growth period, the
Japanese government did not issue bonds for revenue purposes from the mid-1950s until
1965. In 1965 the government began to issue seven-year fixed coupon bonds for the first
time. Since the mid-1960s government bond issues have dominated the bond market, with
corporate bonds representing only a very small fraction of the total market. Even in the
period 1986-90, straight corporate bond issues accounted for a mere 3% of total bond
issues in Japan (Hodder and Tschoegl 1993). The reason why Japanese companies have
not used bonds to obtain financial resources lies in the collateral requirements and issue
terms. Corporate issuers had to pay management fees and underwriting commissions, and
compensate a trustee for a variety of services that substantially increased issue costs. Also,
companies had to obtain approval on the terms and timing of the issues from a committee
dominated by a group of large banks (referred to as "commissioned banks"). This
procedure was cumbersome and lacked flexibility.
Only as of 1979, Japanese companies were allowed to issue unsecured bonds. And
initially, only a limited group of companies was eligible for making these issues. The
restrictions on bonds were relaxed in stages, until several hundreds of companies were
eligible for unsecured issues as of 1988, and the number of bond transactions increased. So,
until the late 1980s the bond markets were either closed or prohibitively expensive for
most Japanese companies. In the 1990s, the importance of bond issues has been increasing,
but the issues primarily involved foreign bonds.
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3-3 Formal institutions related to M&A
R Before WWII the general shareholders’ meeting had unlimited authority in all financial
and managerial matters and appointed the board of directors and auditors.
R After WWII the minority shareholders gained a lot of power, and authority on
managerial matters was transferred from the general shareholders’ meeting to the board
of directors.
R As of 1997 companies can set up pure holding companies and merger procedures have
been simplified.
R As of 2001 companies can freely buy back their own shares and cancel or hold them as
treasury stock.
Table 3-1 shows the major legislative changes, announced and implemented since the late
1990s, which created various incentives for Japanese companies to engage in M&A
activity. Important changes include amendments to the Japanese Commercial Code (JCC),
the enactment of the Industrial Revitalization Law, and implementation of new accounting
standards. This section describes the formal institutions that have a direct influence on
M&A activity. Our analysis of the company law goes back to its origins in the pre-war
period, and we discuss (the amendments of) the Antimonopoly Act and securities
exchange law for the post-war period.
Table 3-1 Important laws and regulations related to M&A as of 1997
Holding companies
Simplified merger process
Stock option system
1999 Stock swap and stock transfer
New accounting system
Industrial revitalization law
2000 Civil Reoganisation Law
2001 Easier procedure for spin-offs and split-offs
Freely repurchase own shares
2005 Amendments simplified merger process
Short-form merger process
2007 Merger currency flexibility
1997
3-3-1 Company Law
A very important role in the modernization of the Japanese economy in the Meiji period
was the introduction of new company structures. The joint-stock company was introduced
in the 1870s and strongly promoted by the government. As previously described,
companies were traditionally organized through the ie system and capital was raised from
within that system. The introduction of the joint-stock company created the possibility to
raise capital from anonymous investors through share issue. Due to the lack of a legal
environment, however, the introduction of the joint-stock company structure created
various problems. The most serious problem was that due to “the lack of regulations there
was no sufficient limitation of liability of shareholders in case of insolvency. Against all
their expectations, the shareholders were held responsible for the losses, with dire
consequences for their private assets” (Röhl 2005, p.352).
69
Section 3-3 Formal institutions related to M&A
57
In July 1893 the Company Law, Bills and Notes Law, and the Bankruptcy Law of the
Old Commercial Code (kyǌ shǀhǀ) came into force and solved some of the problems that
companies and investors faced. The Old Commercial Code introduced limited liability for
shareholders, a license system that necessitated joint-stock companies to get governmental
approval for incorporation, and introduction of required bodies within companies.
Regulations regarding the bodies prescribed the joint stock company to consist of a general
shareholders’ meeting (sǀkai), a board of directors (torishimari-yaku), and auditors (kansa-
yaku). The general shareholders’ meeting had unlimited authority in all financial and
managerial matters and appointed the board of directors and auditors. A minimum of three
directors was mandatory and each individual director could legally represent the company.
Auditors supervised directors’ behavior, assessing whether it was lawful and in line with
the shareholders’ interests, but could not dismiss directors. It was possible for auditors to
be board members at the same time Blakemore and Yazawa 1953, pp.16-17; Tatsuta 2005,
pp.192-193).
In 1899 the Old Commercial Code was replaced by the New Commercial Code. The
New Commercial Code changed the licensing system for stock companies into a
registration system and provided regulations for mergers. The Old Company Law did not
have any provisions for mergers and if two companies wanted to merge, one of them had
to be dissolved first. Another amendment in the new law was that directors had to be
shareholders, and auditors were not allowed to act as directors simultaneously. Effectively,
this meant that a lot of companies were managed by large shareholders as there were
comparatively few small investors in most companies. A large shareholder also often took
the role of the auditor (Röhl 2005, pp.350-362).
The amendments in 1911 were primarily aimed at preventing the creation of so-called
“bubble companies” (hǀmatsu kaisha) by introducing strict personal liability for promoters.
The limited liability of stock companies invited a lot of well-known persons, promoters, to
establish companies based on their reputation, selling stock to investors at a substantial
premium. “[O]ften these promoters were mostly interested in cashing up that premium and
did not actively engage in running the company. Usually, the result was a prompt business
failure with the investors losing all their invested capital. A further consequence was an
increasing loss of confidence of the investing public in the stock corporation in general”
(Röhl 2005, p.374). The amendments in 1938 improved the protection of shareholders by
providing better means to control the board of directors, increasing the number of cases for
which shareholder approval was required. The requirement of being a shareholder to
become a director or auditor was also abolished and made it easier for companies to recruit
managers based on the required skills. The board of directors could select directors who
were allowed to represent the company by themselves (Röhl 2005, pp.373-376).
Post-war period - After the war the company law was amended by SCAP based on the
U.S. Uniform Stock Transfer Act of 1909 and Illinois Business Corporation Act of 1933.
The changes in the post-war company law related to the reorganization of corporate
powers, the strengthening of shareholder rights, and the creation of new financing
opportunities (Blakemore and Yazawa 1953). The zaibatsu dissolution and subsequent
dispersed shareholding in companies entailed that the shareholders’ general meeting did no
longer function as an efficient manager. This necessitated a reorganization of corporate
powers and authority was transferred from the shareholders’ general meeting to the board
of directors. The authority of the shareholders’ general meeting was limited to matters such
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as amendment of the articles of incorporation, decrease in stated capital, decision on the
company’s consolidation, approval of financial statements, declaring dividends, and
election of directors and auditors. The board of directors became the body responsible for
managing the company and strengthened its position. For example, the board of directors
had the power to issue additional shares up to the ceiling authorized by the articles of
incorporation. In contrast to the individual powers of pre-war directors, directors could
only control the company collectively. One or more representative directors was/were
appointed to take charge of daily operations. The power of corporate auditors was limited
to auditing of financial statements and reporting to the shareholders’ meeting.
As part of the pursuit of corporate democracy by SCAP and to protect minority
shareholders, the power of individual shareholders increased as a compensation of the loss
in power of the shareholders’ meeting and auditors. Various restrictions on voting rights
were abolished and shareholders were given direct controls over the board of directors in
case of unfair or illegal business practices. Any shareholder who had been a shareholder
for six months could initiate an action to enforce resignation of a director. “[T]o ensure
that these rights and obligations could be enforced, a derivative suit was introduced
following again the American model. To enhance the property rights of the shareholders,
restrictions on transferability were abolished” (Röhl 2005, p.394). The company law was
revised many times in the post-war period. As a consequence of business failures due to
window-dressing of financial statements in the mid-1960s, a major reform was
implemented in 1974. It was mandated that large companies had their financial statements
audited by certified public accountants prior to approval by the general shareholders’
meeting. As of 1981 large companies were required to appoint at least two auditors
(Tatsuta 2005, p.195).
Table 3-2 Ownership and rights in post-war Japan
Ownership
(voting rights) Rights
1.00% • Right to propose agenda at shareholders' meeting
3.00% • Right to request the calling of a shareholders‘ meeting
• Right request court to review majority decision not to remove a director
• Right to demand court-supervised inspection of company’s operation and finances
10.00% • Right to request court to review proposed dissolution of the company
> 33.3% • Blocking minority. Negative control – ability to veto special resolutions
> 50.0% • Majority control - ability to pass ordinary resolutions including in relation to
appointment of directors and auditors
> 66.6% • Full control - ability to pass special resolutions in relation to various issues including
- Removal of board members
- Transfer of the company's business
- Stock-for-stock (stock swap)
- Stock transfer
- Merger
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Since WWII it is possible for shareholders with a one percent ownership stake in a
company to propose the agenda on the shareholders’ meeting. 45 With three percent
ownership a shareholder can request a shareholders’ meeting, ask the court to investigate
why the majority decided not to remove a director, and inspect and make extracts of the
corporate books and records. 46 An ownership percentage of ten or more gives the
shareholder the right to request a court review of the dissolution of a company. If a
shareholder owns one third of a company’s voting rights, he can block special resolutions
such as M&A transaction and amendments to the articles of incorporation, and so on.
Ownership of more than 50% gives the owner the right to pass ordinary resolutions such as
electing and dismissal of the board of directors. 47 A shareholder can pass special
resolutions with ownership of more than two-third of the outstanding shares.
Stock buyback - Japanese companies had been prohibited to acquire and own their own
shares until 1994 when the Commercial Code was amended. As of 1994 companies are
allowed to acquire their own stock (treasury stock) “for legitimate reasons (such as for
transfer to an employee stock ownership program), when transferred to employees” (Jetro
2001, p.4). Stock option programs were authorized after the revision in 1997 and provided
flexibility in employee compensation schemes and incentives for managers to consider
share price. The option of the ‘own stock’ type enables a company to buy back shares and
then transfer these to directors and/or employees in the form of stock options. The ‘stock
warrant type’ gives directors and/or employees the right to receive new stock (Shishido
2004, pp.12-13; Jetro 2001, p.4-5).
As of 2001 companies can freely acquire their own shares and cancel or hold them as
treasury stock. Shishido (2004) indicates that “share repurchases become basically
unrestricted within the bounds of profit payable as dividend and subject to a few
procedural rules. Even the resale of treasury stock was deregulated” (p.10). Revision of the
law in 2003 allows the board of directors to decide buyback timing and size once required
amendments of the articles of incorporation have been approved at a general shareholders’
meeting.
M&A - Deregulation of merger procedures was started in 1997 and procedures were
simplified as follows: (i) the requirement for approval of the merger by one of the two
shareholder meetings was abolished, (ii) it was no longer necessary to notify individual
creditors, and (iii) simplified mergers were permitted. In a simplified merger the bidder
45 Prior to the 1981 reform this was possible for shareholders that, individually or as a group, held 1% of the
outstanding shares or 300 shares during six months or longer. In 1981 listed companies bundled their shares into
units, with the unit working like one share. If the shareholder had less shares than one unit, it only had limited
rights (mainly right to dividend). The main reason for this unit-system was to reduce the influence of sokaiya,
gangster-like professional disrupters of shareholders’ meetings. “[T]he 2001 reform replaced the unit share
scheme with another one that bundles shares in connection with voting rights. On the other hand, minority
shareholders’ rights, including proposal rights, are now granted to such shareholders as have at least a certain
percentage or number of voting rights.” (Tatsuta 2005, p.195)
46 The right to inspect the books was amended to 10% after structural impediment talks in the late 1980s. (Tatsuta
2005) The threshold ownership after the reform in 1950 was 3%. (Blakemore and Yazawa 1953, pp.20-21)
47 Prior to the law revision in 1974 a shareholder with at least 25% ownership could request an election of the
board of directors according to cumulative voting, irrespective of the articles of incorporation. As of 1974
companies were allowed for the possibility “to discard this method, and nearly all corporations have such a
provision in their charter” (Tatsuta 2005, p.194).
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company is not required to obtain shareholder approval for the merger. These procedures
are applicable when the size of the target company is less than 5 % of the bidder company
(Shishido 2004, p.14).
Amendments of the commercial code, effective as of October 1999, permit Japanese
companies to use stock swaps and stock transfers for corporate acquisitions and
reorganizations. The stock swap and stock transfer can be used to create a holding
company structure with wholly owned subsidiaries, as it makes it easier for parent
companies to obtain 100% ownership in companies. With a stock transfer parent
companies have the opportunity to use their own shares as currency to acquire (related or
unrelated) companies. In a stock swap a parent company can exchange its own shares with
those of a subsidiary company without approval of minority shareholders, if there is a
special resolution by the shareholders’ meeting of the target company. Whereas prior to
1999 companies could only swap shares in mergers, it was now also possible in takeovers.
This allowed cash constrained but highly valued listed companies to use their own stock to
pay for takeovers.
In 2001 a new statutory scheme became effective and provided parent companies a more
flexible framework to separate business units through spin-offs and split-offs. With the
corporate divesture system the shareholders’ meeting can pass a special authorizing
resolution, and a company can “transfer an internal division to another company and be
compensated with the stock of the acquiring company. Under this new type of business
transfer, acquiring companies could be freed from needing to raise funds for the purchase”
(Arikawa and Miyajima 2007, p.8). Before the amendment, assets to be transferred needed
court supervised valuations and liabilities required individual approval from creditors
(Milhaupt and West 2004, Ch.7).
Important amendments in the commercial code were enacted in 2005: introduction of
the short-form merger process, amendments to the simplified merger process of 1997
(effective as of May 2006), regulations regarding merger currency flexibility, and
triangular mergers (effective as of May 2007).
Simplified merger process - A vote of the bidder company’s shareholders is not
necessary when the ratio of the merger consideration to the net assets of the bidder
company’s assets is not higher than 20%. The previous consideration was a stock issue of
no greater than 5% of the total outstanding stock of the bidder company.
Short-form merger process – This process can be used when a bidder company merges
with a subsidiary company of which it owns 90% or more of the voting shares. In this case
approval of the target (subsidiary) company’s shareholders is not required. This speeds up
the merger process and can be used to squeeze out minority shareholders of the target
company.48
Merger currency flexibility - The new company law allows cash and other assets
(including for example, stock of a foreign parent company) to be considered as payment in
a merger. Previously, the merger currency was largely limited to shares of the bidder
company and cash could only be used in combination with shares (Kodate 2005). Kodate
(2005) further explains that according to the current law “[C]ash and the shares of
corporations other than the surviving entity may also be used as consideration for a merger
48 The minority shareholders, on the other hand, will have the right to block the merger if it violates the law or the
Articles of Incorporation, or if the terms are extremely unreasonable and threaten to have an adverse affect on the
target company’s shareholders.
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if the requirements of the Industrial Revitalization Act, such as receiving approval of the
relevant Japanese Ministers, are met” (p.3).
3-3-2 Antimonopoly Act
The Antimonopoly Act aims to secure free and fair competition by prohibiting monopolies
and anti-competitive or unfair arrangements. Mergers are not allowed if they restrict free
competition in a particular industry, or if they are achieved through unfair trade practices.
In order to control and prevent these situations, merging companies need to report their
proposal to the Fair Trade Commission.
The Antimonopoly Act was amended in 1998 “to reduce the scope of reporting and
notification requirements regarding mergers and stockholding and to improve examination
procedures” (JFTC 1998). As of January 1999 it was no longer necessary to notify each
merger to the Japan Fair Trade Commission. The notification requirement is limited to
mergers between a company with total assets of over ten billion yen (including the
company’s parent and subsidiary companies) and a company with total assets of more than
one billion yen (including the company’s parent and subsidiary companies). Also,
notification is not required for mergers between (i) a parent company and its consolidated
subsidiaries, and (ii) mergers between sister companies (when a parent company owns
over 50% of a subsidiary’s stock).
Holding company - Effective as of December 1997, the Antimonopoly Act was amended
in order to authorize the establishment of pure holding companies: this allows companies
to change business segments into joint-stock companies, making it easier to buy and sell
separate/individual segments. Also, within the holding company structure it is possible for
absorbed companies to survive as separate entities. The system prevents friction in
personnel and organizational matters in M&A deals.
The pure holding company was banned in 1947 by the Antimonopoly Act. Only the
operating holding company was allowed. A holding company possesses shares in
subsidiaries and effectively controls these companies. Stock ownership of subsidiaries is
50% or more, either directly or indirectly. In effectively controlled companies the holding
company is the largest shareholder and has stock ownership between 25% and 50%,
including stock ownership through other subsidiaries. The pure holding company only has
stock ownership and control of other companies and no business activities. The pure
holding company’s main purpose is to control the companies in the holding and earn
profits through dividend payment by these companies. The operating holding company has
its own profit-seeking business activities as well as stock-ownership in other companies.
In pre-war Japan pure holding companies had been important for the organizational and
governance structure of Japanese companies (zaibatsu). They were banned because of their
high involvement in the war-industry and it was argued that the pure holding company
would not be in line with the aim to create a fair and free market, as stock ownership
would not be flexible.
Financial institution stockholdings - After the war financial institutions were allowed to
hold only 5% of stock from outside companies. This percentage was increased to 10% in
1953 but the 1977 reform reduced the maximum share ownership from 10% to 5% as of
1987. Of the financial institutions only insurance companies are allowed to hold 10%.
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3-3-3 Securities Exchange Law
The most important regulations with reference to M&A in the Securities Exchange Law
are related to a tender offer bid or takeover bid (TOB). A tender offer (“Tender Offer”) is a
bidder company’s offer to a large number of unspecified persons to tender a company’s
shares. Tender offer regulations function as a means to prevent that minority shareholders
cannot participate in a specific transaction. Prior to 1971 tender offers were unregulated in
Japan, and from 1971 until 1990 a ten-day waiting period and prior review of all offers by
the Ministry of Finance were introduced. In 1991 this prior notification procedure was
abolished and, instead, notification can be given at the start of the tender offer process.
This will be the same day the notice of the bid is published in newspapers. It will still be
necessary for a foreign offeror to give notice through the offices of a resident filing agent,
but this no longer has to be a securities company or a commercial bank and can be a
resident of Japan such as a lawyer or an accountant. The validity period of tender offers
has been extended to 60 days (minimum period of 20 days).
In 1991 the compulsory tender offer system was introduced as well (Milhaupt and West
2001, p. 19). The tender offer regulations need to be adhered to when (i) more than 5%
(including shares held before the purchase) of a company’s outstanding voting rights is
purchased off-market from more than 10 sellers during a 60-day period, and (ii) more than
one third (including shares held before purchase) of the outstanding voting rights of a
company from any number of sellers is purchased on and off-market within 60 days. In
2005 the regulations were amended in response to the use of the off-hour trading system
by Livedoor. The regulations now also include purchases of more than one third of the
outstanding voting rights through specific transactions (for example, off-hour trading
systems such as Tokyo Stock Exchange Trading Network System – ToSTNet). Another
important amendment was introduced after the purchase of Origin Toshu’s shares by Don
Quijote in 2006. TOB regulations now also apply to serial purchases (other than
acquisitions of newly issued shares), if these purchases result in the bidder company’s
ownership to exceed one third of a company’s outstanding voting rights and the purchase (i)
is made within a period of three months, (ii) exceeds 10% of outstanding voting rights,
irrespective of the purchase method (including market-based acquisitions or acquisitions of
newly issued shares), and (iii) is made off-exchange or through an off-hour trading system
and exceeds 5% of outstanding voting rights (excluding an acquisition over a tender offer).
3-3-4 Other laws related to M&A
Industrial Revitalization Law - The Industrial Revitalization Law (sangyǀ saisei hǀ)
came into effect in October 1999. “The purpose of the Law is to systematically improve
the productive potential of the management resources available to Japanese companies”
(Jetro 2001). The industrial revitalization measures are three-fold: (i) facilitating business
restructuring (special measures for companies with ministerial approval of restructuring
plan), (ii) support for business start-ups and growth of SMEs, and (iii) stimulating R&D
and technology development.
The first measure, facilitating business restructuring, provides companies with special
measures (for example, tax preferences and fiscal and financial support) when ministerial
approval is received for the restructuring plan. These restructuring plans can be disposition
of excess facilities but also M&A activities or other forms of restructuring. The law was
amended in 2003, and the support measures for corporate restructuring were increased, as a
means to cope with structural oversupply and excess debts. “More specifically, support has
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also become available with respect to projects including “management resource reuse
projects” that are aimed to improve productivity of businesses transferred from other
companies, the scope of simplified corporate restructuring has been expanded, and mergers
for money or other companies’ stocks have become allowable” (Jetro 2001).
Civil Reorganization Law - The Civil Reorganization Law (minji saisei hǀ) came into
effect on April 1 2000. The main goal of the reorganization law is to provide viable
companies that experience difficulties with mechanisms to reorganize business.
Reorganization can be in the form of restructuring debt, replacing management and/or
reorganizing the corporate structure. Reorganizing the corporate structure can be achieved
through mergers, acquisitions, or other M&A or restructuring activities. The law offers
provisions for rapid execution of organizational procedures.
Accounting Standards - From fiscal year 1999 new accounting standards were
implemented to improve international comparison. New regulations affecting M&A
activity were the obligation to disclose consolidated rather than parent-only earnings in
financial reports, and the requirement of reporting financial assets at market value instead
of book value. Other regulations included introduction of statement of cash flows,
introduction of tax effect accounting and market valuation of retirement benefits. Market
value accounting was introduced for pension liabilities in 2001 and for holding companies
in 2002 (Hattori 2004, Chapter 2).
3-4 Summary
This chapter discussed the informal and formal institutions in pre-war and post-war Japan.
We showed that informal institutions originate from Shinto, Confucianism, and Buddhism.
Based on the principles of the latter two, Shǀtoku Taishi wrote the Constitution of
Seventeen Articles in 604AD. This moral constitution stresses virtues, of which most are
still present in contemporary Japan. Examples of the virtues are harmony, tolerance,
modesty, trust, and importance of the group. Other important informal social institutions in
Japan are the ie system and the dǀzoku system, which represent the relationships between
individuals and companies in a group.
Section 3-2 described the political development and its impact on the financial markets
in the pre-war and post-war periods. In 1872 the National Bank Act was implemented to
create a modern banking system, and in 1878 the Stock Exchange Act came into force. The
Meiji constitution was promulgated in 1889 and changed the political system into a
centralized bureaucratic state. Japan was placed under the command of SCAP after WWII,
and SCAP’s policies were aimed at demilitarizing and democratizing Japan. Japan changed
into a democratic country and a regulatory environment for a safe and stable financial
system was set up. The stock market and the bond market are characterized by continuous
deregulation in the 1980s and 1990s.
Section 3-3 discussed the formal institutions related to ownership and M&A in the pre-
war and post-war periods. Before WWII, unlimited authority in all financial and
managerial matters was placed in the general shareholders’ meeting. After the war,
minority shareholders gained a lot of power, and authority on managerial matters was
transferred to the board of directors. The Antimonopoly Act banned establishment of pure
holding companies and prohibited shareholdings between companies of the same pre-war
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corporate group. The latter prohibition was abandoned after the peace treaty was signed in
1952, and establishment of a pure holding company is authorized since 1997. Laws
directly related to M&A were implemented from the late 1990s onward, with simplified
merger procedures, merger currency flexibility, and easier notification procedures for
tender offers. As of 2001 it is possible for companies to buy back their own shares and
cancel or hold them as treasury stock.
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4
Ownership and corporate
governance
This chapter investigates the influence of informal and formal institutions on the financing
decision of Japanese companies and the formation of corporate groups. As we explained in
chapter 1, the financing decision results in the ownership structure that consequently leads
to the corporate governance structure. The ownership structure and the corporate
governance structure, constrained by the informal and formal institutions, subsequently
have an important influence on M&A activity of companies.
In our analysis the historical and context-specific background is important and we
therefore use the Meiji period (1868-1912) as a starting point. Taking WWII as our
breaking point, we look into the pre-war and post-war periods. In section 4-1 we start with
a brief economic overview of the two periods. Section 4-2 investigates the financing
decision, ownership structure, governance structure, and formation of groups in the pre-
war period, and section 4-3 examines these for the post-war period. Section 4-4
summarizes and concludes the chapter.
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4-1 Economic characteristics49
R The government played an important role in the initial stage of pre-war economic
development, as traders had not accumulated sufficient wealth to make the necessary
investments.
R During the post-war period, government involvement was in the form of administrative
guidance of companies (gyǀsei shidǀ).
R In the pre-war period as well as the post-war period, companies in the same industrial
sector worked closely together in trade associations.
This section provides the context-specific background for interpretation of Japanese
companies’ financing decision and ownership structure. We start by examining the
economic development during the pre-war period and the post-war period; in our
discussion we pay special attention to the role of the government and trade associations. In
sub-section 4-1-2 we look into administrative guidance and cartels during the post-war
period.
4-1-1 Economic development
As discussed in section 3-2, in order to adjust the treaties to equality, the Meiji government
focused on the creation of a modern legal system and a capitalistic society to attain
economic growth. As to the latter, the government took the initiative to establish
companies equipped with Western machinery50, set up technical schools, and send students
for studying and training purposes to Europe and the U.S. Foreign instructors, advisers,
and engineers were also invited to come to Japan to help running companies and train
technicians (Beasley 1963). The Kobushǀ (Ministry of Engineering and Public Works) was
created in 1870 and ran companies ranging from lighthouses, telegraph lines, railroads,
mines, shipyards, iron and steel mills, to model factories for manufacturing machines,
glass, cement, and bricks. In 1880 government-owned industrial undertakings and
properties totaled 3 shipbuilding yards, 51 merchant ships, 5 munitions works, 52 other
factories, 10 mines, 75 miles of railways, and a telegraph system linking the most
important cities (Allen 1946, p.30).
Johnson (1982) argues that the unequal treaties resulted in the direct involvement of the
government, because Japan could not protect private initiative in developing industries;
tariff autonomy was not realized until 1911 (p.25). Beasley (1963) explains that the wealth
of the Tokugawa merchants was too small to engage in activities that needed long-term
and expensive investments. Their restricted activities, in particular regarding foreign trade,
had not resulted in the required accumulation of wealth.
During the 1880s, many of the government-owned companies were sold to private
entrepreneurs. The government faced an increasing debt burden due to the deflationary
policy and, in her desire to establish a modern economy, wanted companies to be managed
by private initiative. Companies were primarily sold to entrepreneurs that had close
49 See: Pierce (1993), Rixtel (1997) and Suzuki (1989)
50 Allen (1946) indicates that enterprising daimyǀ and the shǀgun had already started to set up Western-style
factories during the first half of the century. “The lord of Satsuma, for example, had founded works for the
manufacture of pottery, cannon and cotton yarn. Indeed, the first cotton spinning mill in Japan was started in 1861
by this daimyo who imported Lancashire textile machinery for the purpose. The Shogun himself had founded
Western enterprises, including two shipbuilding yards, during the later fifties” (p.29).
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connections with the government, the so-called (tokken) seishǀ. The seishǀ were able to
adopt new technologies and developed into leaders of zaibatsu groups. In line with the
Meiji government’s policy, the seishǀ were committed to Japan’s economic development
and to strengthening her military power. Examples of sales of government-owned
companies are the Nagasaki Shipyard, Sado Gold Mine and Ikuno Silver Mine to
Mitsubishi, and Miike Coal Mine and Shinmachi Silk Spinning Mill to Mitsui (Johnson
1982, p.23). The cost to the zaibatsu companies were often lower than the investments
made by the government. Morck and Nakamura (2003) mention that “many state-owned
enterprises were in dismal shape, and […] many privatized enterprises encountered serious
difficulties” (p.26). According to Fukasaku (1992), the unsuccessfulness of companies was
due to bureaucratic inefficiency and inexperience, and “the major significance of
government enterprises lies in the fact that experiences in modern industrial
entrepreneurship had been gained, and certain practices in going about it” (pp.20-21).
Allen (1946) argues that “[I]t can be said with truth that there was scarcely any important
Japanese industry of the Western type during the later decades of the nineteenth century
which did not owe its establishment to State initiative” (p.30). The establishment of the
government-led companies had laid the foundations for the economy, and their sale
resulted in Japan’s economic growth.
After the 1880s, the role of the government evolved into providing the economic
environment in which domestic companies could grow and become more competitive vis-
à-vis foreign companies. The government facilitated the required foundations for economic
development by expanding the transportation infrastructure (railways and ports) and
communication systems (telephone and postal services). Japan’s industrial take-off in the
period 1885-1905 was driven predominantly by textiles, trade, and heavy industries such
as iron, steel, and shipbuilding. Growth in these industries was spurred by the Chinese-
Japanese War in 1894–95, the occupation of Taiwan, and the Russian-Japanese War of
1904-05. This period is also characterized by the development of the dual structure (nijǌ
kǀzǀ) in the Japanese economy. There was a high degree of market concentration in
leading industries, dominated by a small group of very large companies, supported by a
large number of small- and medium-sized companies and affiliated suppliers.
During the First World War (“WWI”) European companies stopped exporting, and this
enabled Japanese companies to penetrate new markets such as India and South East Asia.
Exports to existing foreign markets, China and the United States, also increased (Beasley
1963, p.214). Total exports boosted from 1.2 billion yen in 1914 to 4.5 billion yen in 1919,
and GNP grew at an average of 6% in the period 1885-1915. Established zaibatsu became
very rich in this period; paid-in capital of Mitsui Trading Company increased from 20
million yen in February 1918 to 100 million yen in 1919. A lot of new (holding)
companies, Taishǀ zaibatsu, were also established by the so-called sensǀ narikin (wartime
nouveaux riches). One of the most famous new zaibatsu was set up by Kaneko Naokichi
and included companies such as Suzuki Trading, Kobe Steel, Harima Shipbuilding,
Imperial Rayon (Teijin), Nihon Flour Mill, Great Japan Celluloid, and Hǀnen Refining
(Johnson 1982, pp.89-90).
80
Chapter 4 Ownership and corporate governance
68
-0.20
-0.10
0.00
0.10
0.20
0.30
0.40
0.50
18
85
18
88
18
91
18
94
18
97
19
00
19
03
19
06
19
09
19
12
19
15
19
18
19
21
19
24
19
27
19
30
19
33
19
36
19
39
%
Figure 4-1 GNP growth in the period 1886-1942
Notes Annual GNP growth calculated based on gross national expenditure as estimated by Ohkawa, Takamatsu, Yamamoto.
Source International Financial Statistics Yearbook.
The WWI boom collapsed in 1920 and Japan experienced a severe financial recession as a
result of increased competition from Western companies. As the quality of Japanese
products was still inferior to Western products, total exports fell from 4.5 billion yen in
1919 to 2 billion yen in 1920. The first financial crisis occurred when the stock market
crashed, and the index fell from 254.1 in February 1920 to 112.6 in September 1920.51 The
so-called Ishii panic occurred in 1922 (a number of banks collapsed), and the Kantǀ
earthquake of 1923 caused severe destruction in Tokyo and the Kantǀ region. The financial
panic in 1927, due to financial problems of several banks, led to bank runs and closure of
almost 40 banks. The old zaibatsu companies had greater and more diversified financial
resources than other companies, and the effect of the economic downturn in the 1920s was
therefore only limited. In contrast, the impact on zaibatsu companies established during
WWI was strong and several went bankrupt (Johnson 1982, p.96). Although GNP growth
fell considerably compared to 1915-19, it remained positive at an average of 1% over the
period 1920-29. The lifting of the gold embargo in 1930, combined with the effects of the
world depression of 1929, and the strict deflationary policy, hit the Japanese economy hard;
GNP fell by 10% during the Showa depression of 1930-1931.
The effects of the Showa depression were felt in all industrial sectors, but especially in
the agricultural sector. Poverty, combined with dissatisfaction with the government, led to
the emergence of military and rightwing groups in the beginning of the 1930s (Allen 1946).
In the period from 1932 to 1945 Japan recovered economically from the 1920s and turned
into a military state. The Manchurian Incident in 1931, when the military overtook
Manchuria without government consent, indicates that the government could not control
51 The stock exchange index in 1913 at 100.
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the military anymore. The military tried to increase their influence further by undertaking
two military coups in 1931 (both failed), and by assassinating the prime minister in 1932.
Other groups that criticized politicians and the large zaibatsu companies also emerged.
One of these groups is the Ketsumeidan (Blood Brotherhood Club) that murdered a former
finance minister and the founder of the Mitsui zaibatsu. The military gained full political
control 52 in 1937 and started the China-Japan war. Allocation of financial resources
according to the market mechanism was replaced with planning by government and
bureaucracy during the wartime period 1937-45. The government obtained authority to
allocate funds directly to munitions and other war-related industries. Banks were used as
intermediaries and therefore played an important role in companies' capital funding in this
period (Kaizuka and Ono 1986). In these years, a designated bank system was
implemented and large companies were assigned to one bank from which it should procure
funding. Of the 2,240 companies in this system, 1,582 (more than 70%) were assigned to
one of the five major zaibatsu banks.53 These zaibatsu banks belonged to zaibatsu groups
that played an important role in the war-related industry. The zaibatsu banks' provision of
capital to companies during the war-period was indispensable and in 1945 total deposits
and credits had amounted to 45.7% and 67.2%, respectively (Aoki 1994).
Trade association - In addition to the government and the zaibatsu groups, the trade
association was an important element in the economic development of pre-war Japan. The
trade association can be defined as “a combination (or federation of combinations) of two
or more firms that has as one of its principal purposes the furtherance of common business
interests” (Schaede 2000, p.30). The associations in the pre-war period were aimed at
sharing technical information, protecting members’ privileges, establishing trade rules, and
endorsing credit for members. Later, the associations also controlled prices and eliminated
the common practice of companies' raiding competitors for employees (Schaede 2000,
p.240). The first trade association was the Association of National Banks that was formed
in 1876 by the roughly 150 banks that were established since 1868. In industry, the first
trade association was the Japan Paper Manufacturing Association in 1880, followed by the
Japan Cotton Spinners’ Association in 1882. Trade associations were also set up in the
linen yarn, home-produced petroleum, and regional coal mining industries (Lynn and
McKeown 1988).
It is important to distinguish the trade association from a cartel, as the functions of the
latter are primarily limited to control of output and prices. Teranishi (2005) mentions that
cartel agreements with these objectives were exceptional in the pre-war period. He
explains that there were only 84 cartels in 1932 and that “7 were formed before 1914, 12
during 1914-26, and more than half (48) during 1930-32 after the shock of the return to the
gold standard and enactment of the Controlling Important Industries Act (jǌgyǀ sangyǀ
tǀsei hǀ)” (p.100). According to Caves and Uekusa (1976), the financial difficulties in the
period 1920-31 resulted in a more important role for cartels in the 1920s and their rapid
increase in the 1930s. In 1925 a law was passed that authorized cartels and provided for
compulsory adherence by members. The Controlling Important Industries Act of 1931
gave the government the power to enforce adherence to the cartel at the request of more
52 During the coup three ministers were assassinated. After the military coup failed, Emperor Showa demanded
the military to stop.
53 Dai-Ichi, Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo and Yasuda.
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than two-thirds of the companies in the industry. The government was authorized to set up
compulsory cartels with the wartime controls of 1938, and had initiated and supervised
1,538 compulsory cartels by the time the war ended (Caves and Uekusa 1976). Schaede
(2000) argues that cartels were only effective in recession and depression years. In
economic downturns the members colluded, with the cartel functioning as a safety net,
while in booming markets the members competed fiercely. Although the number of cartels
was low and only increased during the war, already by 1886 there were at least 1,579 trade
associations.
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Figure 4-2 GDP growth and inflation rate in the period 1952-2004
Source International Financial Statistics Yearbook (various issues).
Post-war economic development - Japan faced a great challenge after the war because the
air raids had destroyed most of the production facilities, and capital and raw materials were
scarce. An investment- and export-led strategy was implemented in order to obtain an
inflow of raw materials and foreign capital. Japan was committed to reconstruct the
economy and this objective was achieved in the mid-1950s when the take-off period of the
Japanese economy started. The years from mid-1950s until mid-1970s are characterized by
a high growth economy (double-digit GNP growth) and a balanced government budget.
The high economic growth was supported by a high level of capital investment in the
private sector, generated by high personal savings. Other important aspects were imported
foreign technology and the large transfer of the working population from primary to
secondary industrial sectors. 54 In 1964 Japan accepted article 14 of GATT (no
governmental subsidies of exports), and article 8 of IMF. The latter meant Japan would
also adhere to article 11 of GATT (no trade controls because of balance of payments
54 Overall, the supply of high-quality labor was supported by fast growing population.
83
Section 4-1 Economic characteristics
71
deficits). The same year Japan became a member55 of the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD), and committed itself to trade liberalization and
the removal of controls on capital transactions (Johnson 1982, p.263).
Around 1973 the high-growth period ended with the shift to floating exchange rates, the
first oil crisis and the rise in worldwide inflation rates. Figure 4-2 depicts the Japanese
GDP-growth and inflation rate for the period 1952-2004. A period of lower growth
commenced after 1973 and the general economic strategy shifted its focus to domestic
demand. It also became apparent that the way the financial system had functioned would
have to change. As explained in section 3-2, regulatory reform of the Japanese financial
system became an ongoing process in the 1970s.
During the 1980s GDP grew at an average of 6% and inflation was low. A lot of
investments were undertaken in plant and equipment, resulting in a stock market and land
price bubble. These bubbles burst in respectively 1989 and 1991, and companies had
difficulty repaying their debts. This subsequently resulted in bankruptcies of financial
institutions in the latter 1990s, and economic growth fell to an average of 0.89% over the
period 1992-2004. Negative growth was experienced for the first time in 1998, and the
Japanese economy stagnated during 1998-2004 at an average of -0.43%. Inflation was low
in the first half of the 1990s (1.34%) and turned into deflation in the latter half of the 1990s
and the 2000s.
4-1-2 Administrative guidance (gyǀsei shidǀ)
Administrative guidance refers to the role of the government and bureaucracy in the
economic development of post-war Japan. In the 1950s the government implemented
policies to protect and foster domestic industries in order to achieve economic
independence and full employment. During the 1960s this policy was changed to
establishing solid economic growth and a higher living standard (income-doubling plan).
In the latter half of the 1960s improvement of Japan’s international position was most
important. The post-war economic plans of the government had three characteristics: they
(i) indicated the direction of economic and social development, (ii) showed the policy
direction of the government, and (iii) specified behavioural guidelines for people and
businesses (Nakamura 1994, p.89). Table 4-1 shows the objectives and goals of the policy
plans from the 1950s to the 1970s.
The government guided companies and industrial sectors in various ways. When an
industrial sector faced a business downturn, “a helping hand would be extended by the
government in the form of cartel assistance, tax reductions or exemptions, and industry
wide plant and equipment capacity expansion agreements (setsubi chǀsei)” (Nakamura
1994, p.66). Overall, the government provided companies with a safe economic
environment in which plant and equipment investments were promoted.
Government policies were significant in promotion and explanation of the
industrialization process, but the role of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry
(“MITI”) was most important in the implementation. Lynn and McKeown (1988) mention
in this respect that “Japan is a parliamentary democracy with a parliament, the Diet, that is
frequently characterized as reigning rather than ruling. It is the bureaucracy that rules”
(p.91). Johnson (1982) argues that “[I]n general, prewar ministers had more influence over
55 “some seventeen temporary reservations to the OECD's code of behavior for members but "fully opened
economy" was at last on the nation's agenda” (Johnson 1982 p.263).
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their ministries than postwar ministers, a change that again reflects the rise in bureaucratic
power in the postwar era” (p.55). In the implementation, MITI’s goals were the (i)
promotion of resources toward favoured industrial sectors, (ii) promotion of larger
operations in the form of large-scale plants in favoured industrial sectors, (iii)
encouragement of import and dissemination of new technology, and (iv) protection of
domestic markets from foreign products and companies, (v) preventing excessive
competition in periods of lower growth, and (vi) discouragement or (occasionally)
promotion of entry in industrial sectors (Caves and Uekusa 1976, p.149).
Table 4-1 Government policy plans for the period 1955-1971
Name of plan Five-year Economic Self-support Plan
Planning period FY1955-60
Objectives Economic independence; full employment
Goals Achievement of economic independence & full employment on the basis of a stable
economy
Name of plan New Long-range Economic Plan
Planning period FY1958-62
Objectives Maximum growth, higher living standard, full employment
Goals To seek a steady rise in the national standard of living and to approach full employment
by continuing to achieve as high a growth rate as possible while maintaining economic
stability.
Name of plan National Income-Doubling Plan
Planning period FY1961-70
Objectives Maximum growth, higher living standard, full employment
Goals To advance toward an outstanding improvement in national living standard and full
employment. For these purposes, seek to maximize stable growth of the economy.
Name of plan Medium-term Economic Plan
Planning period FY1964-68
Objectives Correction distortions
Goals To correct distortions, i.e., to bring in line with the pace of economic & social
development those sectors lagging behind in production or living standards, and to seek
the harmonious development of the economy & society. To promote social development.
Name of plan Economic & Social Development Plan
Planning period FY1966-71
Objectives Development toward balanced & enriched economy& society
Goals To create the basic conditions for securing the position of the Japanese economy in
changing international milieu and for people's enjoyment of a full life appropriate to that
position; and to develop toward a balanced & enriched economy & society.
Source Summary of Nakamura (1981), Table 39, pp.84-88.
Odagiri (1992) divides the role of MITI in the post-war period up to the first oil crisis into
three periods. The first period starts in 1945 and ends before 1950, when priority
production (keisha seisan) was given to the industrial sectors coal-mining and steel.
Providing the coal-mining industry subsidies, low interest loans and so on, resulted in low
cost coal that was necessary for the steel industry. The 1950s, the second period, is
characterized by industrial rationalization (sangyǀ gorika) and involved promotion and
introduction of new equipment and technology. Infant industries, such as the automotive,
electric and electronic equipment, and petrochemical industries (p.290), were supported
and protected from foreign competitors with quotas and tariffs (ikusei). The third period,
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the 1960s, can be termed as the new industrial order (shin sangyǀ taisei). Trade and
foreign exchange were liberalized, and import restrictions decreased from 466 in 1962 to
100 in 1972, and 27 by 1975 (Odagiri 1992, p.288). In the 1960s MITI felt that Japanese
companies were not large enough to be competitive vis-à-vis foreign companies and
mergers and investments were encouraged. After the first oil crisis government policy was
directed towards the promotion of knowledge-intensive industries and adjustment of
structurally depressed industries. Regarding the latter, “[T]he government used the
Temporary Measures Law for the Stabilization of Designated Depressed Industries […] to
legalize the formation of cartels in order to co-ordinate scrapping production facilities in
such industries as aluminium, synthetic fibres, and petrochemicals, and to create a fund to
guarantee the firms against any debts incurred” (Odagiri 1992 p.289). In the period after
1973 government policy was directed to the promotion of knowledge-intensive industries
and adjustment for structurally depressed industries. In the 1980s MITI focused on
encouraging imports and discouraging exports, by persuading the industrial companies to
adopt voluntary export restraints.
Cartels - As mentioned above, cartel arrangements between companies were an important
element of administrative guidance in the post-war period. The Japan Fair Trade
Commission (‘JFTC’) controls the formation of cartels based on the Antimonopoly Act,
which prohibits unreasonable restraints of trade. Only two types of cartel agreements are
permitted with JFTC consent: the depression cartel and the rationalization cartel. In a
depression cartel the producers decide to limit production due to an excess of supply over
lacking demand. This cartel is aimed at preventing failure of companies in an economic
downturn when prices fall below average cost. The rationalization cartel is aimed at
colluding on aspects such as the industry-wide exchange or restriction of technology,
technical improvement, product standardization and quality improvement, cost reduction,
or making collective use of facilities (e.g. transportation or storage) (Caves and Uekusa
1976, p.143).
Although these two cartels were permitted according to the Antimonopoly Act, because
it was necessary to get JFTC approval, they were rarely used by MITI. In the period from
1953 to 1984, JFTC approved seventy-one depression cartels and thirteen rationalization
cartels (Lynn and McKeown 1988, pp.41-43). More important for MITI’s administrative
guidance was the ‘approved association’, which only needs an approval license from the
regulating ministry (Schaede 2000). Hadley (1970) refers to the ‘approved association’ as
“Administrative Guidance Cartels” because MITI recommended companies in the
association to adhere to its guidance (p.381). Companies were inclined to do so, because
MITI had various tools to support its recommendations, such as easy access to capital, tax
breaks, approval of licenses, authorization of foreign technology import, and permission to
establish joint ventures. If companies adhered to the MITI policy these activities were easy
and quick, but if they did not the process could be cumbersome, long and costly56 (Johnson
1982; Caves and Uekusa 1976). Schaede (2000) indicates that in 1996 there were 2,223
56 Caves and Uekusa (1976) describe how MITI handled a situation in which Sumitomo Steel did not follow the
prescribed policy. “Sumitomo, seeking to break into the circle of leading steel makers and equipped with a World
Bank loan, constructed a large integrated mill in 1959 that greatly increased its capacity. When a 1964 recession
led the steel makers to negotiate output quotas among themselves, Sumitomo initially refused to go along with the
low quota dealt to it. The company's president was summoned to the ministry, however, and wisdom prevailed”
(p.55).
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approved associations. In the same year there were 9,655 voluntary associations, which are
self-regulating trade associations independent of a regulating agency.
4-2 Pre-war financing and ownership
R The most important financing method in pre-war Japan was internal financing.
R Equity financing started to decline gradually from 1942 onwards, instead of the latter
1930s as commonly claimed in previous research.
R A zaibatsu group is a conglomerate of companies, organized in pyramid form, owned
by rich families and/or a family-owned holding company.
R Pre-war corporate governance was concentrated within the holding company of the
zaibatsu group.
It is commonly argued that, in comparison with the post-war period, Japanese companies
relied more on equity finance than bank loans in the pre-war period. Okazaki (1999a)
mentions that “pre-war Japanese firms had built-in systems for shareholders to monitor
management. This was an important condition that allowed stocks and shares to be the
main channel for capital provision” (p.106). Hoshi and Kashap (2001) argue that “if one
compares the prewar system to the postwar US system and postwar Japanese system, the
US system has more in common with prewar Japan” (p.50). We examine the importance of
bank loans and equity finance with aggregate data in this section and in the next chapter
we investigate the financing decision and ownership structure of Mitsubishi zaibatsu
companies.
Before we discuss the external financing decision, it is important to realize that, in
accordance with the pecking order of financing, internal financing was the most important
source of funding in the pre-war period. We show this with detailed data in our case study
of the Mitsubishi zaibatsu in the next chapter, and Teranishi (1994) mentions that
“[I]mportant industries outside the reign of the zaibatsu, such as cotton spinning and
railroads, also used internal financing” (p.53). Table 4-2 shows that internal financing was
most important in total funding up to 1936 (51.6% in 1935 and 47.4% in 1936). After 1937
the importance of external financing increased and, when looking at external funding in
relative percentages, new share issues were more important than loans in the years 1934-
38.
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Table 4-2 Sources of funds for companies in the period 1931-1944
Internal Loans Shares Bonds
1931 43.4 7.7 16.9 32.0
1932 181.8 -88.6 -26.5 33.3
1933 105.2 -32.4 -3.9 31.1
1934 54.8 -13.0 2.8 55.4
1935 51.6 14.4 1.0 32.9
1936 47.4 21.3 -2.3 33.5
1937 33.3 31.3 -0.1 35.5
1938 30.5 29.6 5.4 34.6
1939 27.1 40.5 7.9 24.5
1940 30.4 37.3 5.5 26.7
1941 33.6 27.2 10.1 29.1
1942 41.5 29.1 7.6 21.9
1943 30.3 39.2 7.8 22.6
1944 24.2 58.5 8.3 9.1
Notes Percentages calculated based on data collected from mentioned source and also its underlying sources. The underlying
sources are indicated in the notes of figure 4-3 as they are used to indicate the flow of funds during the period 1903-1945. The
percentages of table 4-2 are frequently used in the discussion on pre-war financing in Japan; Hoshi (1995) for the period 1934-
1944, and Hoshi and Kashap (2001) for the period 1931-1957. Hoshi and Kashap (2001) only show the “Sources of External
Funds for Industries: 1931-57” (p.85), and therefore fail to present a full overview of the sources of funds.
Source Based on data collected from statistical yearbook “Supply of Industrial Funds (Increase and Decrease (1931-1984)”
Looking at external finance as a percentage of GNP, rather than the mentioned relative
percentages, provides additional insights. Figure 4-3 shows bank loan, equity, and bond
financing as a percentage of GNP for the period 1904-44. The figure indicates that in 1906,
after the Russo-Japan war, loan financing was most important at 11.2% relative to GNP
(equity financing was 2.1%). The figure also unveils that, apart from 1906, bank loan and
equity financing were not very important for Japanese companies prior to 1915. In the
period 1904-15 the average increase in bank loans (excluding 1906) and equity funding
was respectively 3.3% and 2.6% as percentage of GNP. These findings confirm that
internal financing was the most important source of funding. Resulting from increased
production during WWI, financing through loans and equity increased considerably. Loans
started increasing in 1916 and equity in 1917 by respectively 11.4% and 10.0% of GNP,
showing double-digit growth in the next 3 years. In the period 1916-19 the average
increase in loans was 14.5%, and in the period 1917-20 the averge increase in equity
financing was 11.3%.
In the period 1922-27 the use of bank loans returned to the level prior to WWI at 1.7%.
Bond financing increased in importance and averaged 2.7% in this period. Stock financing
returned to the pre-WWI level as well, averaging 2.8% in the period 1924-27. Figure 4-3
shows that in this period the annual increase in stock financing was 2.9% and in bond
financing 4.0%. After the third bank crisis in 1927 the loans financing turned negative at
an annual average of -2.3% until 1935.
The most important aspect in pre-war financing that the figure shows is Japanese
companies’ financing as of 1935. It is commonly argued that the post-war main bank
system started in 1937, because Japanese companies turned to loans in stead of equity
financing. In the war-period capital-intensive industrialisation took root and companies
needed to make a lot of new and expensive investments. These investments caused
companies to run out of internal funds quickly and made them adjust their financing
decision. Hoshi and Kashap (2001) argue that “bank financing was increasing steadily
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during 1937-45, while the importance of stock financing and bond financing was declining
gradually. By 1939 new equity financing had become much less important than bank
borrowing” (pp.85-86). Okazaki (1999a) states about the period 1936-40 that “the shift to
the wartime economy led to a reduced role for the capital markets, which before the war
had been the main channel of funds to the corporate sector” (p.112). These conclusions are
based on the percentages of “Supply of Industrial Funds” provided by the Bank of Japan,
but these data do not illustrate the trend in financing. For example, in 1939 total funding
was almost 7 billion yen, of which loans accounted for 55.6% and equity finance for
33.6%. It appears that equity had become much less important, but the total equity
financing amount of 2.3 billion yen was the highest level in the pre-war period. Equity
financing did not decrease in the period 1937-43, but had increased to almost 4 billion yen
in 1943. Because the stock investments of financial institutions were 9 billion yen in this
year, we can assume they played an important role in equity financing of companies. The
average annual stock financing in the period 1937-43 was 2.9 billion yen and the average
security investment of financial institutions was 4.6 billion yen.
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It is unlikely, however, that the equity financing in the 1940s was driven by an economic
rationale. The period 1940-45 is characterized by an increasing role of the government and
banks in strategic and financing decisions. Various war-related regulations were
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implemented to reduce the influence of stockholders and to place managers under direct
control of bureaucrats. One of the first regulatory measures related to companies’ financing
decision was “the compulsory lending system (Meirei Yushi Seido) of the IBJ in March
1939 (Kaisha Rieki-Haito oyobi Shikin Unyo-rei). Lending and security subscriptions over
certain amounts had to be approved by the government, and those not directly or indirectly
related to expansion of productive capabilities of the munitions industry were not
approved” (Teranishi 1994, p.65). Figure 4-3 shows that the various regulations made
loans a very important financing method, and that equity financing started to decline
gradually from 1942. The Designated Financial Institution System for Munition Company
Financing that started in January 1944 had the largest effect on the financing decision. It
resulted in loan financing to jump to 14.8 billion yen, and equity financing to drop to 1.7
billion yen.
4-2-1 Pre-war zaibatsu
Prior to WWII, large companies in Japan were often organized in so-called zaibatsu groups.
These groups are conglomerates of companies, organized in pyramid forms, owned by rich
families and/or a family-owned holding company. The holding company controlled the
principal operating companies of the group, and the latter controlled many other
companies through subsidiaries and shareholdings. There were three zaibatsu types with
each their own financing method.
At the end of WWII the four largest zaibatsu groups (Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, and
Yasuda) controlled about one quarter of the paid-in capital of all incorporated companies
(Caves and Uekusa 1976, p.60). These zaibatsu belong to the first type, Old zaibatsu, and
were the most important companies in the Meiji period. The Mitsui zaibatsu and Sumitomo
zaibatsu originated in the Tokugawa period (1600-1868), and the Mitsubishi zaibatsu and
Yasuda zaibatsu were established in the Meiji period. These zaibatsu had close
relationships with politicians who supported these businesses to establish strong domestic
industries (in stead of foreign companies). The groups’ main activities involved the
industrial sectors trading and finance, they were very profitable and up to WWI “expanded
their activities by reinvesting profits” (Teranishi 1994, p.53).
The second zaibatsu type, the Taishǀ zaibatsu, emerged as a result of the export-led
boom during WWI (1916-1920). Various merchant families had engaged in the
manufacturing industry during the WWI boom and had become very rich. They wanted to
expand their businesses while keeping control over the company. The main source of
financing for these zaibatsu was bank loans from a so-called “organ bank”. Examples are
the Asano, Kuhara, Okura and Suzuki groups. In the bank crisis of 1927 a lot of these
organ banks fell into trouble, and this led to the collapse of most of these zaibatsu. A
famous example is Suzuki Shoten with its ‘organ bank’, the Taiwan bank.
The Shinkǀ zaibatsu, New zaibatsu, emerged in the 1930s when the heavy and chemical
industries started to develop in Japan. These groups had close relations with the military
authorities and took advantage of the military demands, especially the munitions boom in
the 1930s. The groups were technology-oriented with main activities in mining, chemicals
and manufacturing, and the business leader had an engineering background. Each group
had relations with various financial institutions and also relied on the stock market for
financing. The largest of these zaibatsu were the Nissan, Nichitsu, and Riken groups. Some
of these zaibatsu had accumulated a lot of capital during WWI and focused on sustaining
continuing growth. Other groups, upon initiative of the military, made investments in the
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Japanese colonies. The old zaibatsu were reluctant to make investments in heavy and
chemical industries, which provided the Shinkǀ zaibatsu an opportunity to grow in these
fields (Caves and Uekusa 1976, p.60; Shiba and Shimotani 1997).
Depending on the type of zaibatsu, the companies relied on internal, equity, or debt
financing. Figure 4-3 showed an important increase in the issue of equity and use of bank
loans during the years 1917-20, when Taishǀ zaibatsu emerged. In the 1930s the issue of
equity increased as the Shinkǀ zaibatsu arose. Teranishi (2005) explains that the use of a
financial intermediary was a common financing method for non-zaibatsu companies.
“[M]erchants (the commercial sector) were the major borrowers from banks. […] These
funds were used either to invest in equities of large corporate firms or to lend on to small
and medium enterprises and indigenous producers, including farmers. Equities were often
used as collateral for the loans” (p.61).
4-2-2 Pre-war corporate governance
The financing decision of a company results in its ownership and corporate governance
structure. Okazaki (1999a) shows that the holding company played an important role in
corporate governance within the zaibatsu group. In his comparison between the board of
directors of zaibatsu and non-zaibatsu companies, he finds that “monitoring through direct
participation in management was awarded only a relatively small role in the zaibatsu firms.
What substituted for this was the systematic monitoring by the holding company of all its
subordinate firms” (pp105-106).
Okazaki (2000) explains the importance of the holding company in the decision making
process and lists the “Rules on relationship between the core affiliated companies and
Mitsubishi Goshi” (1918) as follows:
a. Directors and auditors of a core affiliated company should be registered at Mitsubishi
Goshi.
b. Rules enacted by Mitsubishi Goshi should apply to the core affiliated companies. In
case a core affiliated company enacts different rules or important rules, approval by
the president of Mitsubishi Goshi is necessary. All the rules enacted by the core
affiliated companies should (be) reported to Mitsubishi Goshi.
c. Budgets and settlements of a core affiliated company should be approved by the
president of Mitsubishi Goshi.
d. A core affiliated company should send the expected fund flow and expected profit and
loss to Mitsubishi Goshi.
e. The chief of the Section of Audit, Department of General Affairs, should audit the
accounts of the core affiliated companies, according to the order of the president of
Mitsubishi Goshi.
f. The staffs of a core affiliated company should be screened and employed by
Mitsubishi Goshi. The personal affairs of the stuffs above the counselor (sanji) of the
other stuffs should be sent to the president of Mitsubishi Goshi, by way of the Section
of Personal Affairs, the department of General Affairs, in advance.
Rules related to raising funds by core affiliated companies were also established. Okazaki
(1999a) explains that “a core affiliated company should concentrate operational accounts
to the Bank department of Mitsubishi Goshi. Mitsubishi Goshi could monitor the
operations of a core affiliated company through the Bank Department” (p.9). According to
Odagiri (1992), ownership was separated from managerial decisions and competent
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managers could (sometimes with difficulty in convincing the holding company) pursue
dynamic investment and diversification strategies that were very important for the growth
of the zaibatsu (p.170).
The Taishǀ zaibatsu that emerged during the boom of WWI were characterized by their
high degree of bank financing from an organ bank. The bank did not diversify, leading to
the situation that, if the company would get into trouble, the bank would fail as well.
The Shinkǀ zaibatsu, established in the 1930s, were probably the only companies with
strong similarities to U.S. companies. They used stock financing and had relations with
various financial institutions. So, it is likely that for this type of zaibatsu the stock market
was important in the corporate governance process. However, to compare these zaibatsu
with the U.S. stock market appears to be difficult as they emerged in the 1930s and had
important relations with the military.
4-3 Post-war financing and ownership
R Individuals did not sell their shareholdings in the 1950s, but were unable to purchase
new shares.
R A vertical keiretsu is a group of companies that take part in the production process of a
core company, or parent company.
R A horizontal keiretsu, also referred to as kigyǀ shǌdan, is a non-hierarchical group of
independent companies in various industrial sectors.
R Post-war corporate governance is characterized by the main bank system: a special
relationship of a company with a bank, the so-called main bank.
R The deregulation of financial markets weakened main bank relationships, and the
1990s are characterized by unwinding of cross- and long-term shareholdings.
In this section we examine the financing decision of Japanese companies in the post-war
period. We start our discussion by looking into the effect of the dissolution of the zaibatsu-
groups, as described in sub-section 3-2-2, on companies’ ownership structure. While the
stock market was closed in the period 1945-49, the government arranged the so-called
democratization of securities, which involved massive stock transfers from zaibatsu
families, holding companies, and main member companies to individual investors. Priority
in purchasing government-owned stocks was given to companies' employees and residents
of localities in which plants were located (Oka 1993).
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Although holding companies were prohibited, the zaibatsu families had lost their
controlling power, and top executives were purged, the loyalties among the former
zaibatsu companies had survived. Co-ordination of the groups’ activities was restored in
the form of "presidents' clubs", wherein all pre-war core companies and financial
institutions participated, and the group’s bank played an important role (Caves and Uekusa
1976, p.63; Odagiri 1992, p.281). Miyajima (1994) explains that the management of
zaibatsu companies tried to stabilize stockholdings in three ways. The first method was
through promotion and financing of stockholding by employees. Second, by asking
“individuals and securities companies outside the corporate structure to hold their
companies’ stock through unofficial contracts” (p.321). Third, financial companies of
other zaibatsu groups were asked to hold their shares in exchange for deposits. The result
of the democratization process was that the percentage of individual holdings at the Tokyo
Stock Exchange had increased to 69.1% in 1949, from 53.1% in 1945 (National Stock
Exchange Council).
Loss of Japan's production facilities during WWII meant that economic revival was slow
and companies’ profitability low. The TSE re-opened in June 1949 and only 80 companies
out of the 502 listed paid dividends (Oka 1993). Oka (1993) argues that because dividend
payments were almost non-existent, individual stockowners started to sell their stocks to
institutional investors such as banks. Since most stocks paid no dividend, individual
investors thought they could better transfer their funds to banks for at least some financial
margin in terms of deposit interest (during the period 1945-58 this was fixed at 5%
(Akimoto 1993), and in period 1959-71 at 4%57). According to Miyajima (1994), the
declining share prices induced individual shareholders to sell, and Teranishi (2005)
explains that the buyers of those shares were mainly individuals that had made huge profits
from the Korean War boom.
This situation resulted in a high risk of hostile takeovers in Japan. In sub-section 7-1-1
we present previous research that argues that horizontal keiretsu were formed during this
period in order to prevent hostile takeovers. In sub-section 7-2-2 we give our own
57 International Financial Statistics Yearbook
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interpretation of the hostile takeovers and formation of horizontal keiretsu in this period
according to our institutional model that will be introduced in chapter 6.
The so-called yield revolution in the high growth period, when dividend yields fell
below those of deposits and savings, strengthened the sale of stocks by individuals even
more (Akimoto 1993). During the high growth period the individual shareholding
percentage declined from 53.2% in 1955 to 32.9 in 1975. “[T]his was due to two effects,
outright selling and a failure to buy new equity issued by companies” (Hoshi and Kashap
2001, p.97).
It is generally argued that the stock market in the period from 1949 to 1975 was
characterized by a transfer of stock ownership from individuals to other market
participants. Figure 4-5a indicates stockownership in percentage of shares during the
period 1950-75 for the following groups: individuals, financial institutions, and companies.
We agree with Hoshi and Kashap (2001) that the percentage of individuals’ shareholding
fell during the high-growth period. On the other hand, we do not find any evidence of
falling share ownership by individuals. Figure 4-5b shows that, in line with an increasing
number of total shares, the number of shares held by individuals increased as well. It is
possible that employees of companies started selling their shares (Miyajima 1994), but it
appears that the buyers were predominantly other individuals, as argued by Teranishi
(2005).
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Stock ownership by companies and financial institutions started to increase as of 1952,
when the Peace Treaty was signed. Especially the holding of shares between former
zaibatsu companies changed considerably. Miyajima (1994) shows that cross-
shareholdings of 18 same-line companies of the former Mitsubishi zaibatsu jumped from
1.8% in 1951 to 10.8% in 1952. Another important increase in shareholdings by companies
and financial institutions occurred during the latter half of the 1960s after the collapse of
the stock market in 1965. This crisis was primarily caused by the bad performance of
investment trust companies that started to sell a lot of their shares during the depression
years of the late 1960s.
If we return to the falling ownership percentage of individuals during the high-growth
period, it seems to be partly explained by the failure of individuals to buy new shares. We
have summarized data on security financing of companies at all stock exchanges in table 4-
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3. The table shows that up to 1965 only 6% of the issued shares was offered to the public.
An upward trend of public offering started in the 1970s as financial markets were being
deregulated.
Table 4-3 New share issues in the period 1956-1990
1956-60 1961-65 1966-70 1971-75 1976-80 1981-85 1986-90
Offering to Shareholder 94 94 88 51 24 19 13
Public Offering 6 6 11 45 70 72 57
Private Placement -- 1 1 5 5 5 3
Exercise Warrants -- -- -- -- -- 4 26
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Note Percentages calculated as average of annual percentage of respective period.
Source Calculated based Nomura Securities “Sources of Increase in Outstanding Shares (All Stock Exchanges)”
4-3-1 Post-war financing decision
Because Japanese companies had virtually no internal funds left after WWII, their reliance
on external funds persisted. In chapter 3 we explained that it was difficult for Japanese
companies to enter the stock market, and that raising capital through the issue of stock was
highly unattractive because this had to be issued at face value. The collateral requirements
and the high issue costs of corporate bonds were the reason these were not used during this
period. In the immediate post-war period the stock market and bond market were therefore
virtually non-existent.
As a result, companies could only finance their operations through bank loans and this
made the corporate sector in Japan the largest deficit unit of the Japanese economy in the
period 1945-73. The high levels of loans, combined with share ownership by financial
institutions, sometimes resulted in a special relationship between companies and a bank:
the main bank system, as will be discussed in sub-section 4-3-3.
Table 4-4 Net sources of funds for Japanese non-financial companies
1962-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1991-94 1995-97
Internal 39 50 43 52 56 53 71 91
Loans 47 43 52 42 39 34 23 6
Bonds 2 3 1 8 2 -2
Stock 3 3 4 5 3 5
Total 97% 99% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
11 6
Notes Percentages are the average of the years in each sub-period.
Sources Bank of Japan, Economic Statistics Annual; Ministry of Finance, Flow of Funds Tables (no distinction made between
Stock and Bonds for period 1962-69).
Around 1973-74 the financing decision of Japanese companies started to change because
of a diversity of influences. Most important were (i) the increase in the corporate liquidity
after the high growth period, and (ii) the deregulation process that opened new fund-raising
possibilities for Japanese companies. Table 4-4 shows the relative shares of funding
sources by non-financial companies in Japan. From the mid-1970s onward, external fund-
raising by Japanese companies declined as a result of the high internal reserves that had
been built up during the high growth period. At that time companies also started to look for
other ways to raise funds, which was possible as a result of the deregulation of the
financial system. This move towards different financing methods is manifested in the
increase of corporate stock- and bond issues.
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The management of companies also started to look for cost-cutting possibilities with
reference to the financing decision and began to raise funds on international capital
markets. The amount of foreign bonds increased from 600 billion yen in 1975 to 3,600
billion yen in 1991, which raised the share of foreign bonds in securities issues from 3% to
25%. As table 4-4 shows, however, this is a very small percentage in total external funding
that continued to be dominated by loans from private financial institutions. Indirect
financing in the form of loans started to decline after the stock market and real estate
bubbles burst. Loans by private financial institutions fell by 400 billion yen in 1994, and as
external direct financing increased Japanese companies started to depend more on
securities markets. In this process the main bank relationship also weakened because the
companies looked for alternative ways to obtain and invest funds.
4-3-2 Post-war keiretsu
Two important industrial groups can be distinguished in the post-war period, the vertical
keiretsu and the horizontal keiretsu.
Vertical keiretsu - The vertical keiretsu group comprises companies that take part in the
production process of a core company, or parent company. Companies in the group can be
wholly or partially owned by the parent company (such as subsidiaries and affiliates) or
independent companies. It is a structure of shareholdings, including technology and
personnel transfers from the core company to first-tier suppliers, from first-tier to second-
tier, and so on. The participating companies are assemblers and subcontractors, and part of
a subcontracting system (Nishiguchi 1994; Odagiri 1992).
Westney (2001) argues that “[T]he vertical group structure clearly has a strong country
component: it is the dominant mode of business enterprise in large Japanese firms across
industries” (p.157). The structure of a core company with a network of subsidiaries is
present in all major industrial sectors such as heavy industries, construction, food and
beverages, chemicals, energy, steel, electronics, automotives, trading companies,
department stores, transportation and real estate.
The vertical keiretsu also results in a difference in size of Japanese and U.S. large
companies. Westney (2001) indicates that the number of employees of Japanese companies
is significantly lower than U.S. companies on a non-consolidated basis. In the year 1987
the number of employees was only 65,000 for Toyota, compared to 765,000 employees of
General Motors. Other examples are Canon with 15,000 employees versus Xerox with
113,000, and Fuji Photo with 11,000 employees versus Kodak with 145,300. Westney
(2001) concludes about the comparison of companies in the two countries that “[C]learly a
more appropriate target for benchmarking was the group rather than the lead firm of the
group” (p.156).
Horizontal keiretsu - The horizontal keiretsu, also referred to as kigyǀ shǌdan, are non-
hierarchical groups of independent companies in various industrial sectors. The post-war
kigyǀ shǌdan differ from the pre-war zaibatsu; they do not have a central decision-making
unit and are not under tight financial control from a parent company. These keiretsu groups
are formed around a city bank and/or general trading company (sǀgǀ shǀsha). Groups of
companies that consist of a city bank are also referred to as financial keiretsu, kinyǌ
keiretsu. In these groups the city bank functions as the main bank of the group companies.
The group companies also have relations with other financial institutions such as insurance
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companies and trust banks. The financial institutions provide member-companies debt
financing, have a considerable ownership in member companies, and dispatch members to
the board of directors. The kinyǌ keiretsu are organized around the six large city banks and
because each bank also belonged to a kigyǀ shǌdan, the kinyǌ keiretsu overlaps the kigyǀ
shǌdan (Odagiri 1992).
The six horizontal keiretsu that were formed in post-war Japan are Mitsui, Mitsubishi,
Sumitomo, Dai-Ichi Kangyou, Fuji, and Sanwa. Mitsui, Mitsubishi, and Sumitomo are
usually called ex-zaibatsu groups as they find their origins in the respective zaibatsu. The
Dai-Ichi Kangyou, Fuji, and Sanwa keiretsu, centered on respectively the Dai-Ichi Kangyo
Bank (DKB), Fuji Bank and Sanwa Bank, are essentially kinyǌ keiretsu. An important
characteristic of these groups was the “one-setism”, which meant that in each group there
was only one company per industry in order to prevent intra-group competition (Caves and
Uekusa, 1976). The “one-setism” did not result in a cartel, but in arrangements of
“repeated oligopolies” (Hadley 1970). In each industry, the top three or four leading
companies are/were from one of these horizontal keiretsu.
4-3-3 Post-war corporate governance
The post-war Japanese corporate governance is characterized by the horizontal keiretsu
and the main bank system. 58 Companies in a horizontal keiretsu have cross-shareholdings
between the different stakeholders of the companies. Among the stakeholders are suppliers,
customers, trading companies, other affiliated companies, and the main bank. The
shareholdings are argued to be based on trust and selling of these shares is not done
(violation of trust), which reduces the pressure to develop a stock market to trade
(Jacobson and Aaker 1993; Sheard 1989; Kester 1991).The horizontal keiretsu has various
functions, such as exchange of information (e.g. through monthly meetings of “presidents”
clubs), the pursuit of growth through in-group joint ventures, and mutual insurance.
As explained in section 3-2, in the wartime and high-growth period the banking sector
played an important role in the financial markets and a special relationship between banks
and companies developed: the main bank system. Hoshi (1995) argues that the main bank
system could only develop because the number of banks had declined in the pre-war period.
Large and financially healthy banks are necessary for a system such as the main bank
system. The main bank assists and takes responsibility for a member company in financial
distress with new lending, reduction in the existing amount of debt, or mediation in
activities such as mergers (Caves and Uekusa 1976; Hoshi 1998; Odagiri 1992). The
affiliation of a company with its main bank is characterized by a multitude of financial,
informational, and managerial relationships. The involvement of the main bank in the
operations of the company is illustrated by the Bank loans, Cross-shareholdings, Payment
settlement accounts, Information services and supply of management resources, and Bond-
issue related services (Aoki 1994).
58 See: Sakamoto (1995), Sheard (1994) and Tanimoto (1994)
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Bank loans - One characteristic of the main bank system is that companies rely to a high
degree on bank loans for their external funding. According to Aoki (1994) this bank
borrowing was more than 70% of the total of external finance until 1986. The main bank
typically provided the largest part of the company's borrowing. Table 4-5 shows the
percentile provision of the loans by financial institutions and the main bank, the latter
identified as the city bank that supplies the largest share of loans.
Horiuchi (1994) investigates the number of banks that companies use to obtain loans.
Large listed companies have an average of 20.8 banks for the total amount of loans. For
these companies he finds an average of 7.9 clearing banks, banks that handle daily cash
transactions for the companies. If we take these clearing banks as the sum of city banks
and regional banks, we see that they provide the companies between 35% and 45% of bank
loans. As the main bank's provision of loans amounts to 12.5%-15% during these years, we
find that the main bank is responsible for about 33% of these loans. The other 6.9 banks
take care of 66% of the loans, and these banks are therefore individually less important to
the companies.
Table 4-5 Corporate loans by financial institutions in the period 1977-1991
Regional
Main bank Others Banks
1977 12.5 16.4 5.7 14.5 16.5 9.8 24.6
1978 12.8 16.7 5.9 14.7 16.3 9.5 24.0
1979 13.3 18.2 6.2 14.5 15.7 8.8 23.2
1980 13.3 18.6 6.3 14.2 15.4 8.7 23.5
1981 13.5 18.9 6.7 14.0 15.0 8.2 23.7
1982 13.6 19.1 7.2 13.9 14.7 7.9 23.5
1983 13.6 19.1 7.8 13.7 14.4 7.5 23.8
1984 14.2 19.6 8.5 13.6 13.8 6.8 23.4
1985 14.8 20.4 9.0 13.4 13.7 6.1 22.6
1986 15.3 21.2 9.1 13.7 13.5 5.7 21.4
1987 15.6 21.8 9.4 14.0 13.3 5.3 20.7
1988 15.7 21.3 9.6 13.7 12.8 5.2 21.7
1989 16.1 21.8 9.4 14.0 12.5 5.3 20.9
1990 15.8 20.2 9.2 13.2 11.7 6.2 23.7
1991 15.0 19.2 9.2 12.3 11.4 8.4 24.4
OthersYear City banks LTCB Trust bank Insurance
Source Aoki (1994)
The table also shows that the loan provision of Long-Term Credit banks and Trust banks is
at a similar level as the main bank. Aoki (1994) shows that this is primarily caused by the
fact that long-term loans at these banks is approximately 20%, while the main bank takes
care of long-term loans for a mere average of 7%. In comparison, the Long-Term Credit
banks and Trust banks provide only 7% of short-term loans, compared with 21% of the
main bank. This confirms that short-term corporate borrowing is the most important
characteristic of the main bank relationship. The importance of short-term loans reflects
the main bank's oversight role with reference to the ongoing finances, the company's
operations and management.
Cross-shareholdings - In the horizontal group, group-members and the main bank are also
important shareholders. The main bank is usually one of the top shareholders and most
likely to exercise control over the company. According to Kosei Torihiki Iinkai (1992) the
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group of core companies that collectively own approximately 10-25% possess this control.
In principle, the members of the group never sell these shares to any other third party, and
will be able to mobilize the shareholdings of the group members in case of an emergency,
for example a hostile takeover.
Payment settlement accounts - Another important characteristic of the system is that the
company operates a payment settlements account with the main bank. The main bank
manages the cash flow receipts and payments of inter-firm transactions, and assumes
responsibility for payment of the company's cheques and promissory bills. The bank is also
often involved in the foreign exchange business and other banking business of the
company. In this way the main bank not only has constant supervision over the financial
position of the company, but is basically a part of the company (the "finance-department").
These characteristics affirm the close links between the company and the main bank.
Information services and supply of management resources - The main bank can have a
considerable influence on the functioning of the company. It can, for example, provide the
client company with information about possible investment or acquisition (assets)
opportunities, or introduce potential business partners. Second career main bank associates
also often sit as directors or auditors on the client-companies' board of directors. This
strengthens the bonding between the main bank and the client-company even more.
Bond-issue related services - In the relationship of the company and the main bank, the
latter also plays a significant role in the issues of both domestic and international bonds.
The main bank performs the role of the trustee administration, which involves the
assessment and custody of collateral and arranging creditors' meetings.
4-3-4 Recent changes in corporate governance and ownership
As of the 1970s important changes occurred in the main bank’s corporate governance and
the ownership structure of Japanese companies. As indicated in the previous sub-sections,
the governance function of the main bank is strongly related to the financing decision of
companies. Deregulation created new financing opportunities for companies and bank
loans were no longer the cheapest or easiest funding source for companies. The less
important role of loans in companies’ financing decision reduced the influence of financial
institutions, particularly the main bank (e.g. Schaede 2006).
Figure 4-6 summarizes the loan/assets-ratios 59 for manufacturing companies in the
period 1960-2006, showing percentages for all companies and those with assets larger than
1 billion yen. The figure indicates that until the mid-1970s the loan/assets-ratio fluctuated
between 35% and 40%, but declined as a result of the deregulation process. Especially
dependency on loans fell for large companies, indicating that these companies have easier
access to other financing methods.
59 Loan consists of short-term loans and long-term loans.
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Figure 4-6 Loan/assets-ratio of manufacturing companies in period 1960-2006
Note Loan/assets-ratios for (i) all manufacturing companies, and (ii) manufacturing companies with assets larger than 1 billion
yen.
Source Ratios calculated based on data retrieved from Ministry of Finance Japan, Policy research institute
“http://www.mof.go.jp/1c002.htm”
It is important to realize that, although a lot of Japanese companies have a main bank, this
does not apply to each Japanese company. We explained that this relationship evolved
from the war-years when the designated banking system was implemented. Companies of
strategic importance in the war were assigned to one of the large banks by the government.
However, not all Japanese companies were of strategic importance and developed strong
links with a bank.
Another reason is the vertical keiretsu group. As we explained above, this group is
characterized by an important relationship between a subsidiary company and its parent
company. The parent company provides the subsidiary company not only with
management advice and/or knowledge transfer, but sometimes also with financial
resources. This latter function reduces the importance of banks to this type of companies
and the possible development of a main bank relationship.
Campbell and Hamao (1994) look into the debt/assets-ratio60 of Japanese companies in
the period 1970-91 to examine whether affiliation with a main bank had a significant
influence on the capital structure of companies. They find that main bank companies have
tended to rely more on debt than non-main bank companies in the entire period. The
financial deregulation process lowered the debt/assets-ratios for both groups, but the non-
main bank companies experienced a stronger decline than companies affiliated with a main
bank. A company in a main bank system has a diversity of ties with the main bank and
60 Debt defined as the sum of: (i) short-term borrowings, (ii) current position on long-term debt, (iii) bonds and
debentures maturing within one year, (iv) bonds and convertible bonds, and (v) long-term borrowings. Assets are
this debt plus the market value of equity
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other stakeholders, which makes it more difficult to turn to other means for procurement of
funds. Although the non-main bank companies may also have had a significant amount of
debt, it was easier for these companies to turn to market-based financing instruments and
they showed a remarkable change in the use of external funds after the mid-1970s. Schaede
(2006) argues that these developments, combined with the change of ownership, have
resulted in banks not being able to function as monitors of companies. In chapter 9 we
discuss previous research on the monitoring role of the main bank and investigate the main
bank’s influence in the merger process with event studies.
The ownership structure of companies started to change in the 1990s. Table 4-6 indicates
the percentages of cross-shareholdings and long-term (stable) shareholdings in value and
in volume. Cross-shareholdings are between companies that mutually hold each other’s
shares, and long-term shareholdings “include ‘shares issued or owned by financial
institutions’ and ‘shares held by related listed companies’ (such as parent firms), and
measured the long-term shareholding ratio” (Kuroki 2003, p.4).
Table 4-6 Cross-shareholdings and long-term shareholdings in period 1987-2002
Value Unit share Value Unit share
1987 18.4 14.5 45.8 42.5
1988 18.0 14.5 45.7 42.7
1989 17.3 14.6 44.9 42.5
1990 18.0 15.0 45.6 43.1
1991 17.8 14.9 45.6 42.8
1992 17.8 14.8 45.7 42.8
1993 17.5 14.5 45.2 42.0
1994 17.4 14.2 44.9 41.2
1995 17.1 13.9 43.4 39.7
1996 16.3 13.7 42.1 39.0
1997 15.1 13.1 40.5 37.7
1998 13.3 12.4 39.9 36.6
1999 10.6 11.1 37.9 33.9
2000 10.2 10.7 33.0 31.4
2001 8.9 9.1 30.2 30.4
2002 7.4 7.2 27.1 26.0
Cross-holding Long-term holding
Source NLI Research Institute
Both types of shareholdings started to decrease in the 1990s, and especially in the latter
half. By volume, the cross-shareholding was 15% in 1990, fell to 12.4% in 1998 and to
7.2% in 2002. Long-term shareholdings were at 43.1% in 1990, 36.6% in 1998 and 26% in
2002. The main reason for the decreasing percentages of the two types of shareholdings
are that companies with these shareholdings suffered large unrealized losses due to falling
share prices after the stock market burst in 1989 (Kuroki 2003). Also, consolidated
accounting and reporting requirement of investments at market value put pressure on
companies to sell shareholdings in companies and banks. Miyajima and Fumiaki (2005)
indicate that selling of bank shares was the result of high risk (non-performing loan
problems) and low return; the index for bank shares fell from 100 in March 1995 to 53.8 in
February 1999, an index that was considerably lower than the TOPIX at 85.6 as well. The
unwinding of shares by companies combined with the banking crisis in 1997 subsequently
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resulted in banks selling their shareholdings in companies (Scher 2001; Miyajima and
Fumiaki 2005).
4-4 Summary
After Japan opened the country to foreign contact and trade, it realized that its economic
development lagged compared to other countries. The government took the initiative in
industrial development as it feared to become colonized and realized that individual
businessmen did not have sufficient wealth to make the necessary investments. In the
1880s the government sold its companies to businessmen with political relations (seishǀ)
and ability to build strong and internationally competitive companies. These businessmen
became the leaders of the pre-war zaibatsu groups, conglomerates of various companies,
organized in pyramid form, owned by rich families and/or a family-owned holding
company.
In the post-war period government involvement changed into administrative guidance
(gyǀsei shidǀ) of companies. New laws prevented the establishment of holding companies
and new corporate structures developed in the post-war period: the vertical keiretsu and
horizontal keiretsu. The vertical keiretsu is a group of companies that belong to the same
production process of a core company, or parent company. A horizontal keiretsu (kigyǀ
shǌdan) is a non-hierarchical group of independent companies in various industrial sectors
with origins in the pre-war period. Financial institutions, especially commercial banks,
have an important role in these groups and relations between group members are
characterized by cross- and stable shareholdings. Corporate governance in the post-war
period is characterized by the main bank system, a special relationship of a company with
a bank, the so-called main bank. This relationship is characterized by loan provision, cross-
shareholdings, payment settlement accounts, information services and supply of
management resources, and bond-issue related services.
The most important method of financing in the pre-war period was internal finance, but
in the 1930s external finance became more important. Regarding external finance it is
commonly argued that the use of equity financing decreased in the 1930s, as companies
started to rely more on debt finance. We show that this argument is incorrect and that only
a gradual decline in equity finance started as of 1942. In the post-war period the stock and
bond markets were not efficient and expensive for capital procurement. This led companies
to rely to a high degree on bank loans for financing. We look into the developments of
share-ownership in the 1950s because previous research argues that individuals started to
sell their shares during this period. We show that this conclusion is invalid because it only
considers ownership percentages. The absolute number of individuals’ shareholding
increased in this period. The lower percentage only indicates that individuals did not, or
could not, purchase new share issues. Deregulation of financial markets in the 1980s has
resulted in more financing opportunities for companies and a weakening position for the
main bank.
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Mitsubishi groups
In chapter 4 we showed how economic development and informal and formal institutions
resulted in the financing decisions of companies with aggregate data. We explained that
the holding company played an important role in corporate governance during the pre-war
period, and that the main bank was most important in the post-war period. This chapter
provides a case study of the Mitsubishi group in order to get more insight in the
characteristics of the corporate groups in the pre-war period and post-war period. Section
5-1 discusses the financing decision and ownership structure of the Mitsubishi zaibatsu
companies. We examine the post-war financing decision and ownership structure of
companies related to the Mitsubishi horizontal keiretsu and the Mitsubishi (main) bank in
section 5-2. The Mitsubishi vertical keiretsu is discussed in section 5-3 and the next
section summarizes and concludes the chapter.
In chapter 7 we will revisit the description of the Mitsubishi zaibatsu and Mitsubishi
horizontal keiretsu in order to analyze the transformation according to the institutional
model we will explain in chapter 6.
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5-1 Mitsubishi zaibatsu
R The holding company decided to change the ownership structure in the period 1930-35,
when anti-zaibatsu sentiments were strongest.
R Zaibatsu companies increased their capital during the latter 1930s, and the holding
company purchased a lot of these shares.
R The commonly argued relation between zaibatsu companies’ capital increase and their
changing ownership structure is invalid.
The Mitsubishi zaibatsu was founded in 1873 by the entrepreneur Yataro Iwasaki. Iwasaki
was born in the Tosa domain, a samurai-controlled region, which is now Kochi prefecture.
He started working for the domain in the Nagasaki office of the financial agency and
engaged in trading and promotion of products that were produced in the Tosa domain.
After the Meiji Revolution61 the Nagasaki office was closed, and in 1869 Iwasaki was
transferred to the Osaka office (Osaka Nishinagabori Shokai). The Meiji government
banned all domain-related companies, and the Osaka branch was transformed in a private
enterprise of which Iwasaki was appointed manager. The next year Iwasaki received a
government lease of the Osaka office, which included the trading company, land, buildings
and three ships. Following the implementation of the haihan chiken in 1871, which
abolished clans and established the prefecture system, Iwasaki took over other enterprises
that had been run by the Tosa domain. Iwasaki received land, buildings and ships, and also
a silk mill, camphor factory and coal mines that were disposed by the Tosa domain. He
established the company Tsukumo Shokai in 1873, later renaming the company Mitsubishi
Shokai, and finally, Mitsubishi Mail Steamship Co. Mitsubishi’s direct political
involvement started with military transports of the Formosa (Taiwan) Expedition in 1874.
The government entrusted thirteen government-owned ships to Mitsubishi in order to
facilitate the military transportations for the expedition (these ships had been purchased
abroad). In this year the government ordered Mitsubishi to open a steamship line to
Shanghai and to develop domestic routes. The government also paid 30 thousand yen and
200 thousand yen as reserve fund and subsidy, respectively. While developing domestic
routes, Mitsubishi started other activities such as exchanges, insurance, warehousing and
other trade related activities (Shibagaki 1968).
The political involvement promoted a monopoly in the management of domestic and
international sea routes for Mitsubishi; the marine transport protection policy protected
privately owned marine transportation. The government’s ‘First order’ of 1875 transferred
the entrusted ships to Mitsubishi free of charge, and the ‘second order’ fixed the period of
government assistance funding (250 thousand yen) at fourteen years and transferred
another fifteen ships62 to Mitsubishi. The company absorbed another shipping company
Kaiso Kaisha that operated between Tokyo and Osaka and by 1875 it had become the
largest shipping company in Japan. Having a monopoly in Japan and owning 37 ships,
Mitsubishi started routes to Hong Kong (1879) and Vladivostock (1881). Although
competition on the Shanghai-route was fierce with P&O Steam Navigation, Mitsubishi
drove foreign ship lines out of the market with government support. Mitsubishi's shipping
activities in this decade were closely connected with its associations to the Government. In
61 End of the Tokugawa period (1600-1868), start of the Meiji period (1868-1912).
62 The government had bought these ships from a company that had fallen into bankruptcy.
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the early 1880s, some opinions in the government turned critical of its generosity toward
Mitsubishi, and a semi-government shipping enterprise was set up to compete with
Mitsubishi. The resulting competition became so fierce that the government had to resolve
the situation by merging the two shipping companies into Nippon Yusen Kaisha (NYK) in
1885. Hereupon, Mitsubishi gave up its interests in shipping to turn its business operations
to shipbuilding, mining and banking (Fukasaku 1992; Beasley 1963; Allen 1946).
During the selling-off of government-operated companies in the 1880s, Mitsubishi was
able to obtain the Takashima Coal Mine, the Sado and Ikuno mines, and the Nagasaki
Shipbuilding Yard. Nagasaki Shipbuilding Yard was the oldest of the bakufu shipyards
established in 1857 by Dutch engineers and, rather than building ships, it facilitated a
machinery factory for repair. Mitsubishi Shipbuilding Company was set up in 1917 and it
“also diversified its productive activities to build more land machinery and other products
especially turbine generators and even steel furniture. In 1934 the firm amalgamated with
Mitsubishi Aircraft Company to become Mitsubishi Jukogyo Kabushiki Kaisha
(Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Ltd)” (Fukasaku 1992, p.42).
In 1893 the holding company, Mitsubishi Goshi, was established. The company
implemented an independent accounting system for departments during the period 1908-11,
and as of 1911 Mitsubishi Goshi was composed of the following departments: (i)
Shipbuilding, (ii) Business, (iii) Real Estate, and (iv) Mines and Coal Mining. The konzern
system was adopted in 1917, and turned departments into independent joint stock
companies. This process was started with the companies Mitsubishi Shipbuilding &
Engineering, Mitsubishi Iron and Steel and Mitsubishi Paper, and the following year (1918)
the companies Mitsubishi Mining and Mitsubishi Shoji were made independent. In 1919
Mitsubishi Marine & Fire Insurance and Mitsubishi Bank were established, and in 1920
and 1921 the companies Mitsubishi Internal Combustion Engine Manufacturing Company
and Mitsubishi Electric Manufacturing were respectively split off from Mitsubishi
Shipbuilding & Engineering (Shibagaki 1968; Okazaki 2001).
Due to their important role in the process of militarization leading up to WWII, zaibatsu
companies faced an increased need for capital in the 1930s and turned to banks or went
public to raise funds. Related to the raising of public funds, Hoshi and Kashap (2001, p.62)
argue that the power of the zaibatsu’s headquarters was challenged, and Miyajima (1994)
mentions “[W]ith regard to the financing of subsidiary companies, the importance of paid-
in capital declined as monetary demand increased during wartime. Holding companies’
stockholding in subsidiary companies decreased as the subsidiary companies’ stock sold
on the open market increased” (p.297). Teranishi (1994) explains about the change in
corporate financing that internal financing was abandoned “to adapt to the changing
industrial structure, and partly to mitigate anti-zaibatsu sentiments” (pp.58-59).
“[M]itsubishi was most active with offering shares, it had already started with Mitsubishi
Mining and Mitsubishi Bank in respectively 1920 and 1927, and “shares of first-line
companies, including holding companies themselves, were offered to the public after
1934” (Teranishi 1994, p.59). Mitsui zaibatsu and Sumitomo zaibatsu started selling shares
to the public in respectively 1933-34 and 1934-37 (Teranishi 1994).
We find support for the argument of Teranishi regarding the anti-zaibatsu sentiments
and the sale of first-line companies’ shares in the 1930s. As explained in chapter 3, in the
1930s various right-wing and anti-zaibatsu movements arose and in 1932 the leader of the
Mitsui zaibatsu was assassinated. In this period there were also assassination attempts on
other zaibatsu leaders, which undoubtedly forced zaibatsu families to reconsider their
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control over the company. In any event, financing needs were not the only motivation for
the families and holding companies.
Table 5-1 shows the shareholdings of some Mitsubishi zaibatsu companies and supports
our assumption that the anti-zaibatsu sentiment was very important. Mitsubishi Heavy
Industries and Mitsubishi Mining are in this respect especially interesting to examine. In
1932 the number of shares of Mitsubishi Heavy was 1 million and its share capital was 50
million yen. The Iwasaki family and the holding company owned 98.6%, which was 49.3
million yen of share capital. In 1935 the percentage of shareholdings of the Iwasaki family
and the holding company had decreased to 56.8% of total share capital (30.9 million yen).
As described above, it is usually asserted that zaibatsu companies turned to public offering
of shares in order to increase funding, herewith reducing the influence of the holding
company. This assumption is incorrect for Mitsubishi Heavy as share capital was increased
by only 10% in the period 1930-1935. The sale of the holding company, that reduced its
ownership by 41.8%-points, had as its main effect that the ownership structure of
Mitsubishi Heavy changed.
Of course, the reason for the sale by the holding company could be that it was not able
to finance the holding of Mitsubishi Heavy’s shares any longer and therefore decided to
sell. However, this assumption does not hold if we look at the period 1935-40. In this
period Mitsubishi Heavy increased its share capital (and number of shares) more than 4-
fold and in 1940 the family and holding company still owned 43.6% of the company. The
holding company had increased its shareholdings in Mitsubishi Heavy from 30.9 million
yen in 1935 to 104.6 million yen in 1940 to maintain a similar ownership percentage.
Table 5-1 shows the same pattern for Mitsubishi Mining; the holding company sells its
shares to the public in the period 1920-35, and the holding company purchases shares
when share capital is increased in the period 1935-40.
These data indicate that the holding company decided to change the ownership of the
zaibatsu companies in the period 1930-35, prior to a capital increase. When zaibatsu
companies increased their reliance on external funding, the holding company bought
shares to maintain an ownership percentage of 40% to 50%. Including ownership by other
related companies this resulted in group ownership between 47.2% and 61.4% in 1940.
The suggested relation of external finance and change in ownership structure cannot be
found for the Mitsubishi zaibatsu companies. The holding company’s desire to prevent
losing control over its subsidiaries is also seen by the shareholdings of Mitsubishi
Logistics and Mitsubishi Electric at respectively 46.8% and 59.9% in 1940. This was quite
a change from 1935 when Mitsubishi Bank was the largest shareholder of Mitsubishi
Logistics with 83.5%, and Mitsubishi Shipbuilding had shareholdings of 81.2% in
Mitsubishi Electric. The real decline in influence of the holding company occurred in the
period 1940-45 when the various war-related regulations were implemented. Ownership of
Mitsubishi Heavy by the holding company and related companies, for example, had fallen
to 25.1% in 1945.
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Another interesting aspect of the pre-war ownership structure is the importance of Meiji
Life Insurance and Tokyo Fire and Marine as related shareholders. As of 1940 they have
shareholdings in Mitsubishi Bank (13.1%), Mitsubishi Trust Bank (23%), Mitsubishi
Heavy (6.7%), Mitsubishi Mining (4.3%), Mitsubishi Trading (2.6%), Mitsubishi Logistics
(13.1%), and Asahi Glass (in 1935 at 28.2%). Tokyo Fire and Marine was also the most
important investor in group companies of the Mitsubishi zaibatsu pyramid with ownership
in 23 companies in 1930. Mitsubishi Bank was second with shareholdings in ten, followed
by Mitsubishi Mining and Mitsubishi Trading with respectively shareholdings in eitgh and
seven group companies. For the large companies in table 5-1 the shareholdings by
Mitsubishi bank, Mitsubishi Trust bank and related companies were less important. The
only exception was Mitsubishi Trading having Mitsubishi Heavy, Mitsubishi Mining and
Asahi Glass as shareholders in 1940.
5-2 Mitsubishi horizontal keiretsu
R Resulting from the main bank system, companies have a strong relationship with either
the Mitsubishi Bank or the Mitsubishi Trust Bank.
R Corporate cross-shareholdings in the horizontal keiretsu are very limited and
concentrated in the six most important companies. We show their shareholding
relationships with our “Mitsubishi Keiretsu Diamond”.
R The diamond companies and financial institutions have shareholdings in each other and
important subsidiaries.
As chapter 4 explained, the post-war Japanese financial system is characterized by the
horizontal keiretsu and the main bank system. Until recently, these two concepts were
accepted as important characteristics, but Miwa and Ramseyer (2001) have questioned
their importance and even their existence. They examine the relation between the main
bank and group companies, and the cross-shareholdings between group companies. They
do not find strong evidence to support the importance of either the main bank or horizontal
keiretsu and conclude that both are a myth. Miwa and Ramseyer (2001) claim that the
Japanese keiretsu is a “figment of academic imagination”, by arguing that the concepts
used for cross-shareholdings and main bank are trivial. They explain that ideas of the
largest amount of loans, the monthly luncheon of presidents, and the companies in which
presidents held equity positions, are not a strong enough base to qualify companies as
being part of a main bank system or not.
Their assertion provides an interesting starting point to examine the horizontal keiretsu
because it is often argued to prevent hostile takeovers. We replicate the study of Miwa and
Ramseyer (2001) on a slightly smaller scale and investigate shareholdings and loan
relations of 55 companies in the Mitsubishi keiretsu for the year 1975, and of 24/25
companies in the years 1988 and 1998. Our data confirm their findings with reference to
the low number cross-shareholdings, but we find strong evidence for the existence of the
horizontal keiretsu and main bank system.
5-2-1 Data and Methodology
Our starting sample is the selection of Mitsubishi keiretsu companies as identified by
Nakatani (1984, p.233). Nakatani investigates profitability of keiretsu groups and because
we are interested in the shareholdings and loans between the group companies, we add
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Mitsubishi Bank, Mitsubishi Trust Bank, Meiji Life Insurance, Tokyo Fire & Marine,
Mitsubishi Trading, Mitsubishi Estate, and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries. Our final sample
consists of 55 companies and four financial institutions. We obtain shareholder and loan
data of the sample companies for the year 1975 from the publication Kigyǀ Keiretsu Soran,
which shows the largest 20 shareholders of the sample companies and the total outstanding
loans at the various financial institutions.
Table 5-2 Loan provision and shareholdings by Mitsubishi keiretsu financial institutions
No. Comp. Mean No. Comp. Mean
Bank 52 16.5 51 4.8
Trust Bank 52 13.4 48 3.0
Life Insurance 17 1.8 42 3.5
Cas. Insurance 2 0.0 44 2.3
Total 31.7 11.3
Loans Shareholdings
Notes Our sample consists of 55 companies; the Mitsubishi keiretsu companies as identified by Nakatani (1984, p.233), and
Mitsubishi Bank, Mitsubishi Trust Bank, Meiji Life Insurance, Tokyo Fire & Marine, Mitsubishi Trading, Mitsubishi Estate, and
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries. We obtain shareholder and loan data of the sample companies for the year 1975 from the publication
Kigyǀ Keiretsu Soran,
Sources Nakatani (1984, p.233) and Kigyǀ Keiretsu Soran, for the year 1975.
We first look into the provision of loans by the group’s financial institutions. Mitsubishi
Bank and Mitsubishi Trust Bank provide 51 companies with loans, and Meiji Life
Insurance has loans outstanding at 17 companies. We find one company with loans from
Mitsubishi Bank, one company with loans from Mitsubishi Trust Bank only, and two
companies do not have loans outstanding at any of the group’s financial institutions.
Average loan percentage for Mitsubishi Bank is at 16.5%, for Mitsubishi Trust bank at
13.4% and for Meiji Life Insurance at 1.8%. The companies also rely on other financial
institutions for loans such as Taiyo Kobe Bank (38 cases with an average of 1.9%), Tokai
Bank (37 cases with an average of 2.7%), Industrial Bank of Japan (35 cases with an
average of 4.2%) and the Long-term Credit Bank (34 cases with an average of 5.0%). All
sample companies with loans had a group’s financial institution as their most important
source for funding.
One of the most important aspects of the main bank system, as part of the horizontal
keiretsu, is that the financial institutions have shareholdings in the companies it provides
loans to. Mitsubishi Bank has shareholdings in 51 companies, Mitsubishi Trust in 48
companies, Meiji Life Insurance and Tokyo Kasai in respectively 42 and 44 companies. In
34 companies all 4 financial institutions have share-ownership (average of 16.6%), and in
each company either Mitsubishi Bank, Mitsubishi Trust Bank or both have shareholdings.
Of the companies in which not all financial companies have ownership, in 19 companies
there are two or three financial institutions with shareholdings, and there is only one
shareholder in two companies.
Miwa and Ramseyer (2001) investigate whether the financial institutions act cohesively
in loan-provision to test whether keiretsu groups exist. We replicate this test and as table 5-
3 shows, loan provision by the Mitsubishi Bank is negatively correlated with loan
provision by the Mitsubishi Trust Bank and Meiji Life Insurance, similar to Miwa and
Ramseyer (2001).
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Table 5-3 Loan correlation Mitsubishi keiretsu financial institutions
Bank Trust Bank Life Ins.
Bank 1.000
Trust Bank -0.266 a 1.000
Life Ins. -0.120 0.204 1.000
Notes “a” indicates significance at 0.10 level. Our sample consists of 55 companies; the Mitsubishi keiretsu companies as
identified by Nakatani (1984, p.233), and Mitsubishi Bank, Mitsubishi Trust Bank, Meiji Life Insurance, Tokyo Fire & Marine,
Mitsubishi Trading, Mitsubishi Estate, and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries. We obtain shareholder and loan data of the sample
companies for the year 1975 from the publication Kigyǀ Keiretsu Soran.
Sources Nakatani (1984) and Kigyǀ Keiretsu Soran for the year 1975.
Unlike Miwa and Ramseyer (2001), we interpret the results in table 5-3 not as evidence
that the group’s financial institutions did not act cohesively. In contrast, we argue that it
needs to be considered as cohesive action; if a company within the group needs loans, it
seems inefficient and unnecessary that the loans are retrieved equally from each financial
institution. The group element should be seen in the fact that in some cases primarily
financial institution A provides loans, and in other cases primarily financial institution B.
This can be examined by analyzing the loans provided to the 55 companies in our sample
by Mitsubishi Bank and Mitsubishi Trust Bank.
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35 37 39 41 43 45 47 49 51 53 55
Lo
an
s
as
pe
rc
en
ta
ge
of
to
ta
ll
oa
ns
Mitsubishi Bank Mitsubishi Trust Bank
Figure 5-1 Loans fromMitsubishi Bank and Mitsubishi Trust Bank in 1975
Notes Our sample consists of 55 companies; the Mitsubishi keiretsu companies as identified by Nakatani (1984, p.233),
Mitsubishi Trading, Mitsubishi Estate, and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries. The banks are: Mitsubishi Bank and Mitsubishi Trust
Bank. We obtain loan data of the sample companies for the year 1975 from the publication Kigyǀ Keiretsu Soran,
Sources Nakatani (1984) and Kigyǀ Keiretsu Soran for the year 1975.
Figure 5-1 shows the loan percentages of the total outstanding loans for each company,
starting with the company that had the highest loan provision by Mitsubishi bank. We find
that some companies have similar loan percentages at both financial institutions, but that a
majority of the companies either relied on Mitsubishi Bank or Mitsubishi Trust Bank for
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the majority of its loans. The financial companies within the group thus acted cohesively
by assigning companies to particular financial institutions within the group, reducing the
necessity to provide loans at the same level to all companies.
Next, we investigate the shareholdings between the keiretsu companies. Excluding
financial institutions, we find 94 shareholdings in other group companies and these
holdings are primarily held by 16 companies. The number of cross-shareholdings within
the group is low with only twelve cases, corresponding with the findings of Miwa and
Ramseyer (2001). The average ownership by other group companies is 11.07% and by
financial institutions 13.58%, bringing the average group shareholding to 24.65%. Of these
companies, ownership by group companies and financial institutions exceeds 50% in seven
companies and 33.3% in 16 companies. Shareholdings of independent and other financial
institutions increase the average shareholding to 43.52%. Terming these financial
institutions as “stable shareholders” increases the number of companies with shareholding
over 50% and 33.3% to respectively 21 and 43 companies.
Table 5-4 Group ownership in Mitsubishi keiretsu
Group
companies
Group
finance
Sub-
total
Indep.
finance
Sub-
total
Other
finance Total
Average shareholding (%) 11.07 13.58 3.12 15.75
24.65 27.77 43.52
Number of companies
Shareholding > 50% 7 8 21
Shareholding > 33.3% 16 20 43
Notes Our sample consists of 55 companies; the Mitsubishi keiretsu companies as identified by Nakatani (1984, p.233), and
Mitsubishi Bank, Mitsubishi Trust Bank, Meiji Life Insurance, Tokyo Fire & Marine, Mitsubishi Trading, Mitsubishi Estate, and
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries. We obtain shareholder and loan data of the sample companies for the year 1975 from the publication
Kigyǀ Keiretsu Soran,
Sources Nakatani (1984) and Kigyǀ Keiretsu Soran for the year 1975.
Of the 16 companies with shareholdings in other group companies, we investigate the
companies with shareholdings in seven or more companies. We get a sample of six
companies in which the cross-shareholdings are also concentrated with ten cases. The
companies in this group are Mitsubishi Trading (29 shareholdings), Mitsubishi Estate (7),
Mitsubishi Heavy (17), Asahi Glass (10), Mitsubishi Electric (10) and Mitsubishi
Petrochemical (10). When we link the cross-shareholding relationships between these
companies, we discover the Mitsubishi Keiretsu Diamond63 as shown in Figure 5-2.
63 Our analysis of the shareholding relationships between companies in the Mitsubishi keiretsu resulted in figure
“Mitsubishi keiretsu diamond” and shows the cross-shareholdings of Mitsubishi companies. As the Mitsubishi
symbol is a diamond, we have termed the figure as such and it indicates the relationships between the most
important companies in the keiretsu.
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Heavy Petrochemical
Asahi Glass
Trading Estate
Electric
Figure 5-2 Mitsubishi Keiretsu Diamond
Notes Our sample consists of 55 companies; the Mitsubishi keiretsu companies as identified by Nakatani (1984, p.233), and
Mitsubishi Bank, Mitsubishi Trust Bank, Meiji Life Insurance, Tokyo Fire & Marine, Mitsubishi Trading, Mitsubishi Estate, and
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries. We obtain shareholder and loan data of the sample companies for the year 1975 from the publication
Kigyǀ Keiretsu Soran, Our sample consists of 16 companies that have shareholdings in other group companies. The figure shows
the 6 companies in which the cross-shareholdings are concentrated with 10 cases.
The diamond indicates the cross-shareholdings of, and between, Mitsubishi Trading,
Mitsubishi Estate, Mitsubishi Heavy, Asahi Glass and Mitsubishi Electric. The
shareholdings in Mitsubishi Trading by the other diamond companies are highest with
10.2% and lowest in Mitsubishi Petrochemical with 1.7%. Shareholdings in the other
companies range between 5.0% and 5.8%, of which Mitsubishi Trading has the most
extensive shareholdings with 10.8%. These six companies are also important shareholders
of the group’s financial institutions and together they own 13.5% and 11.0% in
respectively Mitsubishi Trust Bank and Mitsubishi Bank.
The financial companies own shares in all diamond companies, ranging from a total of
26% in Asahi Glass to 11.1% in Mitsubishi Electric. Although Mitsubishi Trading is the
only diamond company with ownership in Asahi Glass, including the financial institutions
brings the total to 31.7%. The financial institutions also have important shareholdings in
Mitsubishi Trading (24.5%), Mitsubishi Petrochemical (19.9%), and each other. The
financial institutions are clearly at the apex of the keiretsu structure and with reference to
shareholdings in group companies, Mitsubishi Bank and Tokyo Casualty are most
important.
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Table 5-5 Ownership of/by diamond companies and financial institutions
Comp.
Shareh.
MB Trading 2.4 5.6 1.1 1.7 10.8 2.0 3.7 2.3 8.0 18.8
MB Heavy 5.6 1.5 2.6 4.1 3.7 3.2 2.1 9.1 13.1
Asahi Glass 1.5 1.0 1.7 1.0 3.6 2.0 2.5 1.8 6.3 9.9
MB Estate 1.1 1.0 0.8 0.7 2.5 0.9 1.5 2.4 4.9
MB Electric 2.0 1.4 0.8 2.2 1.2 1.7 2.9 5.1
MB Petrochem. 0.0 1.2 0.8 2.0 2.0
Sub-total 10.2 5.8 5.6 5.1 5.0 1.7 11.0 13.5 6.1
MB Bank 7.9 5.8 8.3 4.0 3.4 5.5 26.8 5.8 5.8 32.7
MB Trust 4.1 2.6 5.2 2.7 1.1 2.9 14.5 1.5 2.6 3.1 7.2 21.7
Tokyo Casualty 4.9 3.7 9.1 4.0 5.0 7.8 29.6 5.9 7.7 4.8 18.4 48.0
Meiji Life 7.7 3.2 3.4 4.0 1.6 3.7 15.8 4.7 1.7 6.4 22.2
Sub-total 24.5 15.3 26.0 14.6 11.1 19.9 12.0 12.0 13.7
Total 34.7 21.0 31.7 19.7 16.1 21.6 23.0 25.5 19.9
Tra-
ding Heavy
Petro-
chem.Electr.Estate
Asahi
Glass
Sub-
total TotalBank
Trust
Bank
Non-
Life
Sub-
total
Notes Our sample consists of 16 companies that have shareholdings in other group companies. The “Mitsubishi Keiretsu
Diamond” shows the 6 companies in which the cross-shareholdings are concentrated with 10 cases. We obtain shareholder and
loan data of the sample companies for the year 1975 from the publication Kigyǀ Keiretsu Soran,
Regarding shareholdings, other than the cross-shareholdings in the keiretsu diamond, we
find large differences in ownership percentages with a minimum of 0.3% and maximum of
61.3%. Mitsubishi Trading is clearly at the apex of the keiretsu with shareholdings in 24
other group companies, being the only shareholder of the diamond companies in eleven
companies at an average ownership of 1.5%. This low percentage should not be interpreted
as evidence for these companies’ unimportance to the group though. The average group
shareholding increases to 29% when other group companies and financial institutions are
included. The importance of the shareholdings by the diamond companies is evident when
comparing the companies in which they have shareholdings and those in which they do not.
In 37 companies one or more of the six companies have shareholdings at an average of
10% and, including other group companies and the financial institutions, group ownership
in these companies increases to 31.2%. In the 18 companies in which the six do not have
shareholdings the average of the group is only 10.23% with financial institutions being
very important with shareholdings of 10.16%.
As we explained in the previous chapter, it is argued that the cross-shareholding started
to disappear with the deregulation of Japan’s financial markets. Table 5-6 shows that group
ownership of the diamond companies and the three financial companies is indeed
decreasing. Average group ownership in companies fell from 24.1% in 1975, to 22.3% in
1988, and subsequently to 20.4% in 1998. The decline in 1988 was caused by falling
ownership of companies, and the lower ownership in 1998 by decreasing shareholdings of
financial institutions. Average shareholdings in financial institutions amounted to 22.8% in
1975, 21.5% in 1988 and 18.2% in 1998. Over the period we see a continuing fall in
ownership of companies, by 0.7% in 1975-88 and 1.6% in 1988-98. Ownership of
financial companies only shows a strong decline by 1.8% in the period 1988-98.
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Table 5-6 Cross-shareholdings of diamond companies and financial institutions
1975 1988 1998
Trading 34.7 28.7 27.4
Heavy 21.0 17.8 14.4
Asahi Glass 31.7 26.0 24.3
Estate 19.7 23.5 20.2
Electric 16.1 16.1 14.4
Chem. 21.6 21.7 21.9
Av. Comp. 24.1 22.3 20.4
Bank 23.0 21.2 15.3
Trust Bank 25.5 22.0 20.6
Non-Life 19.9 21.4 18.6
Av. Fin. 22.8 21.5 18.2
Sources Own data-set for 1975. Publication Nippon Kigyǀ Shǌdan for the years 1988 and 1998.
5-3 Mitsubishi vertical keiretsu
R Companies in the horizontal keiretsu are in most cases the core company in a vertical
keiretsu.
R Some companies in the horizontal keiretsu are part of the vertical keiretsu of another
horizontal keiretsu company.
R Previous research on horizontal keiretsu can be biased because of the influence of the
vertical keiretsu relation between horizontal keiretsu companies.
In this section we look into the vertical keiretsu groups of companies within the Mitsubishi
horizontal keiretsu. As we already explained in chapter 3, vertical keiretsu groups are an
important characteristic in Japan and exist in each industrial sector. Most of the large
companies of the Mitsubishi horizontal keiretsu are therefore also the parent company of a
vertical keiretsu. In this section we examine the number of companies in a vertical keiretsu
and investigate whether the companies identified as being part of a horizontal keiretsu, are
also part of each others’ vertical keiretsu relationship. We use a publication that indicates
the corporate groups in the industrial sectors and shows the vertical keiretsu of the largest
company in each sector. As the publication only gives information on the largest
companies, detailed information is not given for each Mitsubishi company. Table 5-7
shows the number of subsidiaries and affiliated companies for six Mitsubishi companies.
Large vertical keiretsu groups are those of Mitsubishi Shoji with 574 subsidiaries and 206
affiliated companies and Nippon Shipping with 329 subsidiaries and 32 affiliated
companies. The high number of companies in the vertical keiretsu reinforces the
suggestion by Westney (2001) that a Japanese company cannot be as a separate entity.
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Table 5-7 Shareholdings in Mitsubishi vertical keiretsu in the year 1988
Corp. Total Corp. Total
MB Construction 62.3 70.2 MBMaterials 25.8 33.7
MB Plastics 48.0 55.1 MB Chemical 0.5 7.6
MB Automotive 38.3 50.4 MB Heavy Ind. 14.4 26.6
MB Cable Industries 32.9 46.6 MBMaterials 3.7 17.4
MB Shindoh 32.7 42.0 MBMaterials 5.1 14.4
MB Storage 18.3 40.8 18.3 40.8
MB Steel Mfg. 17.0 34.3 17.0 34.3
MB Kakoki 15.0 34.9 15.0 34.9
MB Shouji 10.4 31.3 574 206 10.4 31.3
MB Paper Mills 9.0 28.7 9.0 28.7
Nikon 7.4 26.0 7.4 26.0
MB Materials Corp. 7.1 20.2 114 24 7.1 20.2
Asahi Glass Company 6.7 26.6 200 46 6.7 26.6
Nippon Shipping 6.5 22.2 329 32 6.5 22.2
MB Gas Chemical Comp. 6.0 21.8 6.0 21.8
MB Real Estate 5.9 21.9 5.9 21.9
MB Rayon 5.8 19.2 5.8 19.2
Kirin Brewery 5.4 21.5 5.4 21.5
MB Chemical Corp. 5.2 23.4 168 113 5.2 23.4
MB Heavy Industries 4.4 15.4 128 53 4.4 15.4
MB Electric Corp. 3.6 15.0 3.6 15.0
Average 15.3 32.7 8.8 22.8
Company
Shareholdings
Shareholdings
exlcuding vertical
keiretsuNo. of
Subs.
No. of
Aff.
Belongs to vertical
keiretsu of
Sources Publication Nippon Kigyǀ Shǌdan for ownership percentages; vertical keiretsu information from Kigyǀ gurupu to gyoukai
chizu.
We examine whether a company in the horizontal keiretsu is part of another company’s
vertical keiretsu and first look into the ownership of the companies in the horizontal
keiretsu. The first and second columns of the table indicate the shareholdings of group
companies and all group companies (including ownership of the group’s financial
institutions) respectively. The average for company ownership is 15.3% and for total
ownership the average is 32.7%. The table indicates corporate ownership percentages
exceeding 30% for the following five companies: (i) Mitsubishi Construction at 62.3%, (ii)
Mitsubishi Plastics at 48%, (iii) Mitsubishi Shindoh at 32.7%, (iv) Mitsubishi Cable
Industries at 32.9% and (v) Mitsubishi Motors at 38.3%. All these companies belong to the
vertical keiretsu of another company in the horizontal keiretsu. The companies Mitsubishi
Construction, Mitsubishi Shindoh and Mitsubishi Cable Industries belong to the vertical
keiretsu of Mitsubishi Materials, Plastics belongs to Mitsubishi Chemical, and Mitsubishi
Motors belongs to the vertical keiretsu of Mitsubishi Heavy Industries.
In the two columns on the right of table 5-7 we show the ownership percentages
excluding the shareholdings of parent companies in the vertical keiretsu. The average
shareholding of group companies falls from 15.3% to 8.8%, and the average total
shareholdings from 32.7% to 22.8%. None of the companies have corporate ownership
exceeding 30%. These findings are interesting with reference to previous research on the
influence of the horizontal keiretsu. The results of previous research can be biased because
they included relations between a parent company and a subsidiary in a vertical keiretsu
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instead of separate entities that had cross-shareholdings.
5-4 Conclusions
This chapter examined the financing decision and ownership structure of companies in the
pre-war Mitsubishi zaibatsu and post-war Mitsubishi keiretsu. Prior to the war the holding
company was most important and owned in most cases more than 90% of the shares in the
main group companies. During the 1930s the zaibatsu families started to change the
ownership structure because of the anti-zaibatsu pressures. In this period the first signs of
group shareholdings appeared, especially the insurance companies were important and in
some cases other related companies. Mitsubishi Bank and Mitsubishi Trust Bank were
relatively unimportant shareholders and also during the war period 1937-45, when loan
financing increased, banks did not develop into important shareholders.
The main bank system and the horizontal keiretsu developed after the war. In these
systems financial institutions are at the apex with loan provision and share ownership of all
group companies. Similar to the pre-war zaibatsu, insurance companies are important
shareholders in group companies in the post-war system. A new development can be seen
in Mitsubishi Bank and Mitsubishi Trust Bank becoming important shareholders of group
companies.
We did not find a lot of cross-shareholdings in our sample and they are concentrated in
six companies, which we termed as the ‘Mitsubishi keiretsu diamond’ companies. The
financial institutions have close relations with the keiretsu diamond companies through
cross-shareholdings and the two groups together have extensive ownership in other
(important) group companies. The diamond companies and the four financial institutions
were all direct subsidiaries of the pre-war Mitsubishi holding company and Iwasaki Family.
This indicates that the pre-war apex companies remain important as apex companies in the
post-war period.
We found that companies in the horizontal keiretsu are in most cases the core company
in a vertical keiretsu, but some companies in the horizontal keiretsu are part of the vertical
keiretsu of another horizontal keiretsu company. Previous research on the horizontal
keiretsu might be influenced by relations between a parent company and a subsidiary, and
results could therefore be biased.
In chapter 7 we will analyze the findings of the Mitsubishi groups in the pre-war and post-
war periods in relation to the informal and formal institutions and economic development,
as described in chapters 3 and 4. In our institutional model we pay special intention to the
historical and context-specific background. We examine the development of the vertical
keiretsu and the transformation of ownership structure from the pre-war zaibatsu to the
post-war horizontal keiretsu. In the next chapter we will first introduce the institutional
model that will be used for this analysis.
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6
Institutional model for M&A
This chapter presents the institutional model for M&A activity. The background
information, as discussed in chapters 3 through 5, is used to design the model. We
integrate Japan’s informal institutions and formal institutions, and their subsequent
influence on companies’ financing decision, ownership structure, and formation of
corporate groups. Our model offers a framework to examine the institutional elements with
a dynamic perspective, and their influence on M&A activity. The model is inspired by the
Williamson 4-level model (Williamson 1998), Williamson 3-level model (Williamson
1996), insights from North (1990, 2005) and Greif (2006). Williamson provides us with a
good theoretical framework to investigate the vertical keiretsu in Japan, and North
indicates the importance of path dependence in institutional change. Greif presents strong
evidence to investigate the significance of groups in a society, and to include historical and
context-specific background of institutional elements in the analysis.
In section 6-1 we start with an explanation of the framework of the institutional model,
and in the following three sections we discuss the four levels. The levels are respectively
the informal institutions, formal institutions, governance structure and M&A activity, and
individual actors. Section 6-5 explains institutional change and the next section concludes
the chapter.
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6-1 Framework of institutional model
R The institutional model for M&A consists of five boxes at four levels: informal
institutions at level one, formal institutions at level two, governance structure and
M&A activity at level three, and individual actors at level four.
R In our institutional model we open the neoclassical black boxes of governance structure
and individual actors.
R Motivation is important in the model because it induces an individual to follow social
rules (or not) and results in the individual’s behaviour.
R Being a member of a group results in a shared mental model that has an important
influence on the motivation of an individual, and therefore functions as an institutional
element.
R The elements in the model need to be studied against a historical and context-specific
background, as this is the information that actors of a society share and internalize.
In this section we explain our institutional model for M&A activity. Before we look into
the model we explain institutions. North (1994) defines institutions as:
“[T]he humanly devised constraints that structure human interaction. They are made up
of formal constraints (e.g., rules, laws, constitutions), informal constraints (e.g., norms
of behavior, conventions, self-imposed codes of conduct), and their enforcement
characteristics” (p.360).
Greif (2006) mentions that institutions are the equilibrium phenomena of the interaction of
social rules and motivation, and consist of institutionalized rules. As such, “[I]nstitutions
are shaped by a society’s social and cultural heritage, and they contain norms and
internalized and behavioural beliefs” (Greif 2006, p.380). Institutionalized rules evolve
from the social rules when individuals are motivated to follow them, and they are
commonly believed to be followed by others. A social rule can only become
institutionalized and part of an institution when it is self-enforcing. “[B]ehavior is self-
enforcing in that each individual finds it best to follow the institutionalized behavior that,
in turn, reproduces the institution in the sense that the implied behavior confirms the
associated beliefs and regenerates the associated norms” (Greif 2006, p.16). This implies
that each individual decides, based on his private knowledge and information, to follow the
expected behaviour whilst expecting others to behave in a similar way. Institutional
elements are formed by the institutionalized rules and provide the micro-foundations of
individuals’ behaviour. As such, institutional elements consist of the shared cognitive
system, coordination and information, and “inherited from the past are the properties of
societies and individuals, history - encapsulated in institutional elements - influences
selection among alternative institutions in new situations” (Greif 2006, p.380).
Figure 6-1 shows our institutional model for M&A activity and indicates that informal
and formal institutions are located at levels one and two respectively. Informal institutions
constrain the three other levels and consist of culture, norms, and the ie system (as
described in section 3-1). Formal institutions constrain governance structure, M&A
activity and individual actors. The formal institutions are formed by the company law,
securities exchange law, Antimonopoly Act, and government policies. These laws have an
important influence on M&A activity as they regulate the shareholder rights, tender offer
procedures, and companies’ organizational structure respectively (as described in section
3-2). In our model we treat informal and formal institutions as exogenous parameters.
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Informal institutions are held constant and we consider a change in formal institutions as
an exogenous parametric change that brings about new transactions and necessitates a
search for new institutions. With the model we focus on the process of change and argue
that new institutions not only reflect environmental factors, but also the impact of
institutional elements inherited from the past. The parameters form an important part of
institutions and influence the endogenous variables; governance structure, M&A activity,
and individual actors.
L4
L3 Horizontalkeiretsu
Vertical
keiretsu
Trade
association
M&A
activity
Governance structure
Company
Ⴓ
L1
L2
Ie system and dǀzoku system
Government policies (competition, economic, financial)
Company Law
Securities Exchange Law
Antimonopoly Act
Ⴓ
Norms/values (Constitution of Seventeen Articles): Ⴓ
- Harmony & Tolerance, Modesty, Group, Trust
Informal institutions
Religion and tradition;
Individual actors
Formal institutions
- Shinto, Buddhism, Confucianism
Motivation
Behavioral beliefs
Internalized beliefs
Internalized norms
- Cultural learning
- Habits, routines
- Experience
Individual
mental maps
Shared mental
maps
Shared cognition
Mental maps
Figure 6-1 Institutional model for M&A
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M&A activity, consisting of greenmail, hostile tender offers, and mergers, is positioned at
level three. Governance structure is also placed at level three, and individual actors at level
four. M&A activity, governance structure, and individual actors are linked to each other
with bi-directional solid arrows, because they have a mutual influence on each other, as
will be explained in section 6-3.
The neoclassical box ‘Governance structure’ is opened because, in order to understand
M&A activity, we argue it is important to analyze: (i) the company, and (ii) corporate
groups such as horizontal keiretsu, vertical keiretsu, and trade associations. The box
‘company’ represents a company’s ownership and governance structure, rather than the
neoclassical interpretation of a production function that determines the price and output
level of a product in order to maximize profits. Informal and formal institutions have an
important impact on the ownership and governance structures of companies, and the
motivation to form corporate groups. We take a historical and context-specific perspective
to examine the dynamic development of companies and corporate groups. Our model
shows that level three is an outcome of the dynamic interactions between economic
development, (foreign) competition, and changes in informal and formal institutions that
govern motivations and behaviour of individuals.
The box ‘Individual actors’ consists of three layers: (i) shared cognition, (ii) individual
mental maps and shared mental maps, and (iii) motivation. We open the black box of
individual actors because we think the traditional neoclassical theory does not sufficiently
explain the behaviour of actors. The neoclassical theory revolves around the allocation of
scarce resources among alternative ends, emphasizing equilibria. These equilibria are the
solutions of maximization problems of self-interested individuals who make fully rational
decisions and have rational preferences among outcomes that can be identified and
associated with a value. Our model indicates that behaviour of actors is the result of the
interaction between the mentioned three layers. The layers should be analyzed separately
in order to understand why particular individual actors initiate M&A activity. Informal and
formal institutions provide individuals with shared cognition, which is exogenous to each
individual whose behaviour it influences. The informal and formal institutions also result
in an individual actor’s mental map and motivation. The mental map enables, guides, and
motivates the individual actor to follow a specific behaviour. Depending on his motivation,
each individual actor will behave in a particular manner in response to the institutional
elements implied by others’ behaviour and/or expected behaviour. Belonging to a group or
not, will also have an important influence on the individual actor’s behaviour (shared
versus individual mental map). The behaviour of actors, constrained by informal
institutions and formal institutions, influences governance structure and M&A activity.
Changes that affect the economic activities in a society, such as increased foreign
competition, may also influence the actions of actors at the micro-level through the
strengthening or weakening of social norms, social relationships, and cultural attributes.
There is feedback between the levels of the model. For example, new formal institutions
will influence the informal institutions, and companies, corporate groups, and individual
actors will try to influence formal institutions. Although these strategic actions can be very
important and are interesting to analyze, their analysis is not feasible in the scope of the
current study. The model therefore does not have feedback from governance structure and
individual actors to formal institutions. As described above, we have only added solid
arrows between governance structure, M&A activity, and individual actors.
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In chapter 7 we will analyze hostile takeovers in post-war Japan according to our model.
We think that this model is better suited for this analysis than methods used in previous
research; previous research provides explanations with a static perspective and treats the
institutional elements as exogenous variables. The two findings on hostile takeovers in
previous research are (i) the influence of a company’s stable and cross-shareholdings, and
(ii) the specific Japanese culture. Regarding the stable and cross-shareholdings, the
influence of shareholders (individual actors) on hostile takeovers is looked into by
analyzing it at a specific point in time. The analysis does not look into the historical and
context-specific background, which necessitates including the motivation of individual
actors to be(come) shareholder, and examining how/why (changes in) formal institutions
influence the stable and cross-shareholdings. Similar to the shareholdings, the argument of
the specific Japanese culture does not explicitly identify the motivation of actors to act
according to the ‘harmony’ characteristic; there is no distinction made between individual
actors.
Both arguments are therefore isolated and self-terminating, rather than exhaustive, once
a critical list of variables is determined. The focus lies on the reason why hostile takeovers
do not occur, in stead of identification of the nature of hostile takeovers and the motivation
of the actors to initiate them. The two arguments therefore do not differentiate between the
two forms of hostile takeovers, hostile tender offers and greenmail, despite the large
difference in their nature and the actor’s motivation. In our model we solve these problems
by taking the dynamic development of various elements within the Japanese society into
consideration. We do not pre-define dependent and independent variables, but focus on the
full complexity of governance structures and individual actors. The informal and formal
institutions need to be considered in relation to the motivation of individuals. Another
important feature of our model is that it looks into the historical and context-specific
background of the informal and formal institutions, groups, and the economy. These factors
and their development “reflect and constitute the cultural and social world that members of
a society share and internalize” (Greif 2006, p.380). An economy and its characteristics
need to be examined in a broader perspective, including historical developments.
6-2 Informal and formal institutions
R Informal institutions are norms, customs and traditions in a society.
R Formal institutions are the constitution, laws and economic rules in a society (rules of
the game).
Figure 6-1 shows that the informal institutions (social embeddedness), representing the
norms, customs, mores, traditions and so on, are located at the first level of the model.
Informal institutions have historical origins as “they come from socially transmitted
information and are part of the heritage that we call culture” (North 1990, p.37). Resulting
from their origin they will change very slowly on the order of centuries or millennia
(Williamson 1998). Commons (1961 [1934]) indicates that informal institutions are
obtained through learning and explains their development as follows64:
64 “Concerns” refers to “going concerns”, which “in most general terms, […] is an organization of coordinated
activity; it is collective behavior with a common purpose, and a collective will, governed by common working
rules. Going concerns, as units of organization, occur in all phases of social life” (Commons et al. 1950, p.355).
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“[I]ndividuals begin as babies. They learn the custom of language, of cooperation with
other individuals, of working towards common ends, of negotiating to eliminate conflicts
of interests, of subordination to the working rules of the many concerns of which they
are members. They meet each other […] as prepared more or less by habit, induced by
the pressure of custom, to engage in those highly artificial transactions created by the
collective will. […] Instead of isolated individuals in a state of nature they are always
participants in transactions, member of a concern in which they come and go, citizens of
an institution that lived before them and will live after them” (pp.73-74).
North (1990) indicates that informal institutions (norms of behaviour) are very important
in primitive societies with small communities:
“[U]nder these conditions, it simply pays to live up to agreements. In such a world, the
measured costs of transacting are very low because of a dense social network of
interaction. Cheating, shirking, opportunism, all problems of modern industrial
organization, are limited or indeed absent because they do not pay. Norms of behavior
determine exchange and formal contracting does not exist” (p.55).
As these societies become more complex, laws and regulations originate from these
informal institutions. It is the ‘justice’ within the norms of behaviour that is formalized in
the laws and regulations in a society.
Formal institutions - The second level represents the formal institutions and consists of
the rules of the game, formed in the polity, judiciary, and bureaucracy. The main
difference with the informal institutions is that the rules of the game can be enforced
through the judiciary system. Formal institutions only come into existence when a society
has grown more complex and the informal institutions become too difficult to enforce.
Therefore, the origin of formal institutions lies in the originally accepted informal
institutions within a society.
“[T]he move, lengthy and uneven, from unwritten traditions and customs to written laws
has been unidirectional as we have moved from less to more complex societies and is
clearly related to the increasing specialization and division of labor associated with
more complex societies” (North 1990, p.46).
Formal institutions consist of the constitution, laws, and regulations. Laws define property
rights, entailing the rights over the use and the income to be derived from property and the
ability to alienate an asset or a resource (Eggertson 1990). The theory of property rights
emphasizes the importance of clear definition and enforcement of these rights so efficient
outcomes will be attained.
Rule bargaining by various organizations takes place at this level. Laws and regulations
are established and bargained over by organizations in society, and “reflect the bargaining
strength of contractors, trade unions, and others in the political market” (North 1990, p.63).
North (1990) also argues that “[I]n developed countries, effective judicial systems include
well-specified bodies of law and agents such as lawyers, arbitrators, and mediators, and
one has some confidence that the merits of a case rather than private payoffs will influence
outcomes” (p.55).
Enforcement of rules should be effective and it is important for transacting parties that
by signing a contract both agree to live up to some set of standards. “[T]he property rights
of an actor are embodied both in formal rules and in social norms and customs, and their
economic relevance depends on how well the rights are recognized and enforced by other
members of society” (Eggertson 1990, p.7).
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6-3 Governance structure and M&A activity
R M&A activity is constrained by all other boxes and influences governance structure
and individual actors.
R Our model opens the neoclassical black box of governance structure, identifying two
layers: the company and corporate groups.
R According to transaction cost economics, transactions are aligned to alternative modes
of governance in order to economize transaction costs.
Level three is where the play of the game takes place, governance structures are formed,
and M&A activity is initiated. This level is constrained and influenced by informal
institutions and formal institutions. We have placed solid bi-directional arrows between
governance structure, M&A activity, and individual actors, because they have an important
mutual influence over each other. M&A activity results from (strategic) considerations of
individual actors, such as, for example, a company’s management, its shareholders, or a
hostile raider. The governance structure of a company will have an important impact on
these considerations and wether they will succeed. At the same time, M&A activity affects
the governance structure, and can have an impact on the behaviour of individual actors in
relation to stock ownership and M&A activity.
Informal institutions have an important influence on decisions to engage in mergers,
greenmail, and hostile tender offers. Based on norms of behaviour, individual actors can
decide whether, and how, they engage in M&A activity. As will be explained in chapter 8,
a company’s management, shareholders, and creditors are likely to be important in this
process. The shareholders and creditors monitor and control the management through
‘corporate governance’. The term ‘corporate governance’ generally indicates the control of
shareholders on management’s decisions through the board of directors. In the M&A
process, also taking account of their role in a bankruptcy procedure, the creditors (can)
play an important role which needs to be considered. In case of M&A, the role of
shareholders is not only that of monitoring and control. Shareholders can approve or
disapprove a merger or tender offer proposal, and with their ownership in a company they
can also initiate or prevent a deal.65 In this respect it is important to understand the
motivation why shareholders decide to hold shares in a company. With the model it is also
possible to examine the influence of other actors. Actors can be employees, government
officials, bureaucrats, labour union members, private households, foreign investors, foreign
companies and so on. As stakeholders, each actor (can) have a direct influence on M&A
activity.
In relation to the governance structure, informal institutions can influence (i) financing
decisions, (ii) corporate governance, and (iii) formation of corporate groups. Regarding the
financing decision, as a result of certain norms or customs, management might prefer a
particular financing method over another. Informal institutions can also influence
corporate governance when providing actors incentives, other than economic, to become
shareholder of a company. The strength and cohesiveness of corporate groups in a society
result from informal institutions as well.
With the model it is also possible to investigate how formal institutions influence modes
of governance, financing decisions, and M&A activity. In relation to the M&A activity and
65 Please refer to Chapter 8 for a more detailed description of the merger process.
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corporate governance, we can look into laws and regulations that influence ownership
structures, mergers, and hostile takeover activity. Regarding the financing decision we can
examine the laws and regulations related to debt and equity financing. Changes in
ownership and corporate governance of companies can result from new financing
possibilities, new financial institutions, and/or new investors. Regarding merger and
hostile takeover activity, these can be influenced by: “[M]ore than a dozen separate forces
drive takeover activity, including such factors as deregulation, synergies, economies of
scale and scope, taxes, the level of managerial competence, and increasing globalization”
(Jensen 1988). Other factors are problems and/or opportunities caused by alterations in
economic conditions, efficiency conditions, and/or technology. On a macro economic level
they can be related to industrial development, state policy, government regulations, or
(international) competition.
6-3-1 Transaction cost economics
As previously mentioned, governance structure in our model consists of two layers. At the
higher layer we have positioned the corporate groups: horizontal keiretsu, vertical keiretsu,
and trade association. At the lower layer the company is located and, according to
transaction cost economics (“TCE”), we investigate the mode of governance in vertical
relationships between companies.
In New Institutional Economics the focus is on institutional arrangements, in particular
the relation of transactions with different types of contracts and organizations. Institutional
arrangements, also referred to as ‘modes of governance’, are governance structures such as
companies, markets, hybrids and bureaus that coordinate economic transactions. TCE
operates on this level and “invokes the discriminating alignment hypothesis, according to
which transactions, which differ in their attributes, are aligned with governance structures,
which differ in their cost and competence, so as to effect a (mainly) transaction cost
economizing result” (Williamson 1998, p.37). The explanandum of NIE is “the governance
structure to be defined as the institutional matrix within which transactions are negotiated,
co-ordinated and executed” (Groenewegen and Vromen 1997, p.36). Informal and formal
institutions, technology, and individuals’ preferences are taken as given in the explanation
of institutional arrangements.
Individual agents are opportunistic and have exogenous preferences and bounded
rationality. They are “guided by considerations of self-interest to make allowance for
strategic behaviour. This involves self-interest seeking with guile and has profound
implications for choosing between alternative contractual relationships” (Williamson 1975,
p.22). NIE is designed for specific research questions (optimalisation under constraints)
and assumes that “the social institutions and norms, and changes to them, arise as the
(intended and unintended) result of the decisions and actions of individuals” (Rutherford
1994, p.32). Institutions are the result of interaction between individuals. The individual is
the only real actor and more important than the social whole. Individuals give society its
aims and interest as society cannot have aims and interests of its own.
NIE analyzes property rights at level two and the governance structure at level three
while treating the informal and formal institutions as exogenous variables. Institutional
change in NIE is advanced by examining changes in contracts and institutional
arrangements, caused by exogenous changes in informal institutions, formal institutions
and changes of technology. When there is no ‘Pareto’-optimum, the wealth-maximizing or
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cost-minimizing individual actors will renegotiate organizational structures and change the
institutional arrangements.
The transaction cost economics forms the basis for NIE’s perspective on firms, markets,
and property rights. The unit of analysis in transaction cost economics is the transaction.
Commons (1950) proposes that transactions occur between “exchangers” that make “offers
and bids to each other for the physical delivery of commodities […] these "exchangers" are
sellers for money and buyers with money, and the accurate name of their dealings is
alienation and acquisition of the two ownerships. This ownership is "property," meaning
the "rights" of property. They are alienating and acquiring property rights in a commodity”
(p.49). He also argues that the transaction “must contain in itself the three principles of
conflict, mutuality, and order” (Commons 1932, p.4).
Transactions are costly to identify and execute, and institutional arrangements arise in
the search of economizing these costs. Coase (1937) argues that these costs are the reason
why it might be more profitable to establish a company. He introduces the concept of
transaction cost into the explanation of the firm; cost of organizing a transaction within the
company need to be compared with the cost of using the price mechanism.
Williamson (1998) explains that transaction cost economics concerns itself with the
alignment of transactions to alternative modes of governance in order to economize
transaction costs. Alignment is influenced by the behavioural attributes of human agents
and the attributes of transactions. The behavioural attributes of human agents are bounded
rationality and opportunism; bounded rationality results in incomplete contracts, and
opportunism implies that a contract as a mere promise without credible commitments is
not self-enforcing.
The attributes of transactions are identified as (i) the frequency of the transaction, (ii) the
uncertainty (disturbances), and (iii) the asset specificity of transactions (Williamson 1998,
p.36). Frequency of the transaction relates to the information a party obtains when it is
frequently involved in a transaction. This party will have more and ‘true’ information,
which is not available to the party infrequently involved in the transaction. Uncertainty
refers to the fact that we do not live in a stationary world and everything is subject to
change. Asset specificity is most important in the transaction cost analysis and refers to
transaction-specific assets of the supplier. These can take a variety of forms, such as
physical assets specificity, human assets specificity, site specificity or dedicated assets.
These assets have a contractual hazard (risk) because they lose value when the transactions
are prematurely terminated. The buyer and supplier can set up safeguards for the
contractual hazards such as a penalty for premature termination. As mentioned above,
although frequency and uncertainty play a role, transaction cost economics focuses on the
asset-specificity of transactions.
Figure 6-2 shows the relationship between asset-specific transactions and governance
structures. It indicates the influence of special purpose technology of the supplier (k > 0),
general purpose technology of the supplier (k = 0), safeguards provided by the buyer (s > 0)
and no safeguards provided by the buyer (s = 0). The basic alignment is that transactions
without specialized investments and with a lot of competition between suppliers will be
organized in “Ideal” markets. As contractual hazards rise, transactions will move to the
hazard and hybrid structures. Hazard is the structure in which a supplier has made
specialized investments but does not have any safeguards. In a Hybrid structure the
supplier makes specialized investments and sets up contractual safeguards. The transaction
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cost theory predicts that higher contractual hazards will eventually lead to vertical
integration of the supplier by the buyer company. This is termed as Firm (hierarchy) in
which transactions are organized under unified ownership.
A ("Ideal market")
k = 0
B (Hazard)
k > 0
s = 0
C (Hybrid)
s > 0 market safeguard
administrative
D (Firm)
Figure 6-2 Simple contracting schema
SourceWilliamson (1998)
This process is the so-called “private ordering” in which governance “is the means by
which order is accomplished in a relation in which potential conflict threatens to undo or
upset opportunities to realize mutual gain” (Williamson 1998, p.37). It should be
mentioned that complex forms of organization will be disadvantageous when contractual
hazards are low, because hierarchies incur costs resulting from added bureaucracy.
6-4 Actors
R Our model opens the black box of actors and includes shared cognition, individual
mental maps, shared mental maps, and motivation in the analysis.
R Shared cognition comprises all information that is commonly known by actors such as
rules, beliefs, and norms inherited from the past and represent the preferences and
conscience of individuals.
R Mental maps are internal mechanisms and, as a result of (cultural) learning and
experience, guide choice making.
R Motivation represents the actors’ behavioural beliefs, internalized beliefs and
internalized norms, motivating individuals to follow particular social rules or not.
R Groups within a society are individuals with the same cultural background and
experience, resulting in a shared mental model.
At level four the individual actors are located. They are constrained by the informal and
formal institutions and, as discussed in the previous section, influence governance
structure and M&A activity through behavioural attributes. Simultaneously, individual
actors are influenced by governance structures and M&A activity. In our model we look
into shared cognition, individual mental maps, shared mental maps, and motivation in our
analysis of individual actors. Shared cognition comprises all information that is commonly
known by actors such as rules, beliefs and norms inherited from the past, and represent the
preferences and conscience of individuals. Although actors are aware of informal and
formal institutions, they do not necessarily act accordingly. An individual actor has to be
motivated to follow particular rules, and his/her motivation derives from belief in the rules
and the actor’s preferences and conscience. Institutional analysis needs to focus on the
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question why some rules are followed and others are not. Greif (2006) mentions that “[A]t
the center of analysis is the motivation to follow rules - and consequently beliefs and
norms. It highlights the need to study rules and motivation to follow them in an integrated
manner” (p.39).
An important element in our model is the mental map that consists of habits, routines,
cultural learning and experience. The mental map belongs to shared cognition and Denzau
and North (1994) argue that individuals with the same cultural background and experience
have the same mental models. We extend this argument to groups within a society and
argue that members of a particular group in a society, with the same background, have
shared mental models. As each individual also has an individual mental map, the degree to
which an individual acts according to a shared mental map depends on the degree the
individual belongs to a particular group.
Motivation - Greif (2006) defines an institution as “a system of rules, beliefs, norms, and
organizations that together generate a regularity of (social) behavior” (p.30). Regularity of
behaviour implies the behaviour that (most) individuals follow, or are expected to follow
in a given situation. The regularity helps an individual in choosing his own behaviour
based on the expected behaviour of others. Regarding the interaction between the
individual and society, there are situations in which individuals cannot control an
institution that influences their behaviour (institutions shape behaviour), and situations
where the institution is an outcome of individuals’ actions. This dual meaning describes
institutions as “systems of factors that are social in being man-made, nonphysical, and
exogenous to each individual whose behavior they influence” (Greif 2006, p.44).
Our analysis of the individual actor begins with the informal and formal institutions, the
institutions that are commonly known and (i) create shared cognition, (ii) provide
information, (iii) coordinate information, (iv) coordinate behaviour, and (v) indicate
morally appropriate and socially acceptable behaviour. Shared cognition has the most
important influence on behaviour because it represents the preferences and conscience of
individuals.
Motivation represents actors’ behavioural beliefs, internalized beliefs and internalized
norms, and motivates individuals to follow particular social rules or not. Behavioural
beliefs concern behaviour of others, internalized beliefs with regard to the relation between
actions and outcomes, and the world around the individual. Internalized norms are
“socially constructed behavioral standards that have been incorporated in one's superego
(conscience)” (Greif 2006, p.37). Greif (2006) indicates that the “[M]otivation provided by
beliefs and norms exogenous to each individual whose behavior they influence is the
linchpin of institutions, as it mediates between the environment and behavior” (p.45).
Mental models - Denzau and North (1994) indicate that, in order to understand
individuals’ decision making, it is necessary to include their mental models in the analysis.
Individuals construct mental models “to make sense out of the world around them, the
ideologies that evolve from such constructions, and the institutions that develop in a
society to order interpersonal relationships” (p.4). The mental models are internal
mechanisms and, as a result of (cultural) learning and experience, guide choice making. A
theoretical framework therefore needs to include the interaction between informal
institutions, formal institutions and actors.
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In this respect we would like to refer to Aristotle’s ancient Greek tri-partite conception
of the soul. According to this conception, the soul should be thought of as a map of human
capacities that is made out of three components. The soul has a vegetative component, an
appetitive component, and a calculative component. The vegetative component is irrational
and responsible for functions such as growth and nutrition (common to all species). The
appetitive component has both an irrational and rational part and is responsible for our
emotions and desires. It is irrational because emotions and desires can lead our behaviour
(like animals), and rational in that (only) humans have the ability to control desires by
reason. Proper control of our desires is called moral virtue and is formed in the vegetative
and appetitive component of the soul. The calculative component of the soul is purely
rational and responsible for the human ability to think and reason logically, evaluate, etc.
Intellectual virtue stands for mastering these calculative abilities. It should be stressed that
the rationality of the appetitive component and the calculative component is not similar.
Only the calculative component stands for the actual capability of theoretical reasoning
and practical thinking. The appetitive component is concerned with passions and actions
and cannot itself reason, but is capable of following reason.
Aristotle (350BC) shows that the habits that are developed during childhood are only the
first step in the development of the soul. When habits are formed and we have the ability to
reason, it becomes necessary to obtain practical wisdom in order to make rational choices.
Rational choice is the result of humans’ ability to reason and evaluate instead of following
uncontrolled desires and emotions. Aristotle observes that choice is related to things that
are in our power, and to means rather than ends. Choice is different than a wish, because a
wish is related to an end and can be for impossible things. Choice is not an opinion either;
we can have an opinion about various things, including things that are beyond our power.
Further, whereas an opinion can be false or true, a choice is either good or bad. Rational
choice is the produce of reasoning instead of following uncontrolled desires and emotions
arising from the appetitive component of the soul. That someone with great wisdom is able
to make irrational choices results from the person’s inability to fully control the desires and
emotions.
We argue that the ‘virtuous behaviour’ with which Aristotle deals in his Nicomachean
Ethics also applies to decisions of economic agents. Aristotle argues that it is ‘happiness’
or ‘living well’ that is chosen rationally. Happiness is a final state, desirable for itself and
can be achieved through attaining wealth, honour, friendship, and/or pleasure. Thus, the
difference in the general concept for economic agents is that wealth is not desirable for its
own sake but for the sake of happiness. Depending on the individual’s rational choice,
happiness can also be achieved with honour, friendship, pleasure, or a combination of
these.
This reasoning can also be seen in the work by Eggertson (1996), who explains that
rational choice is often misunderstood in social studies that state that rational choice is
culturally defined. He asserts that preferences and informal institutions are different among
cultures and result in different rational choices. “[T]he rational choice approach only
involves the assumption that individuals act consistently with their preferences when faced
with alternative opportunity sets […] Preferences and institutional arrangement may differ
among cultures, but it is not helpful, as far as we can see, to visualize choice as being a
different phenomenon from one culture to another” (Eggertson 1996, p.18). Eggertson
suggests making the rational choice richer by introducing altruism as a norm.
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Shared mental maps - The shared mental maps box reflects ‘groups’ of individuals with
shared ideas and thoughts. By using ‘groups’ as an institutional element, we can consider
various relations of actors that influence motivation and behaviour. We follow Hayek
(1967) who argues that:
“the properties of the individuals which are significant for the existence and
preservation of the group, and through this also for the existence and preservation of the
individuals themselves, have been shaped by the selection of those from the individuals
living in groups which at each stage of the evolution of the group tended to act
according to such rules has made the group more efficient” (p.72).
Individuals influence the group’s rules of conduct and the group influences the individuals’
rules of conduct. Hayek (1967) explains how the group’s rules of conduct influence the
individual’s rules of conduct as follows:
“if behaviour according to the rules serves a sort of mark of recognition of membership
of the group. If deviant behaviour results in no-acceptance by the other members of the
group, and observance of the rules is a condition of successful co-operation with them,
an effective pressure for preservation of an established set of rules will be maintained”
(p.78).
Rules of conduct influence the individual through the process of belonging to the group,
but also by setting boundaries to the individual’s behaviour. Groups can have a structure in
which in-group status is incorporated and relations of the members are important, but most
important in a group is a set of norms with a distinct character of "we-ness". This distinct
character will give rise to norms relating to out-groups, and reflects the behaviour and
attitudes of individual members in interactions within the group and with out-groups
(Sherif and Sherif 1953, p.230). Groups are formed in each society and their strength and
cohesiveness depends largely on the informal institutions within the society. Sherif and
Sherif (1953) explain that behaviour of individuals is different when they are alone or part
of a group and argues:
“[I]f characteristics prevalent among individuals of a group are products of group
relationships and interactions, and not some essence of individual members, then the
study of group differences must begin with analysis of these group relationships and
interactions, and not with individuals in isolation. More specifically, it is difficult to
foresee any value to the study of national character unless the implied group differences
are related in a functional way to differences in social structure, stratification, degrees
of differentiation, mode of life, and central values within the national group, and within
its subgroups” (p.31).
Sherif and Sherif (1953) also mention that the norms and values within a group need not be
similar to those with regard to out-groups. Norms within the in-group can be democratic
and cooperative, and not corresponding with the norms toward out-groups. In fact,
“[D]epending on the nature of intergroup relations, at times the greater degree of solidarity
and coöperativeness within the in-group may mean more effective friction with out-
groups” (Sherif and Sherif 1953, p.209).
In our model groups entail not only organizations formed by actors with similar
background/nature, such as companies, courts or governmental agencies. Groups can also
take shape with actors from a different background, e.g. managers and creditors, managers
and shareholders, or managers and government officials. Further, it is possible that actors
are part of more than one group. Through the relations of the individuals, inter-company
groups are also located at his level, such as relations between two or more companies
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(managers), and a relation of a company with financial institutions (manager with
shareholders and creditors). Each of these groups will influence the behaviour of the actor
through the connection with the motivation box.
By adding the individual mental model and shared mental model in the ‘actor’ box, our
model provides an explanation for the difference between collectivist societies and
individualistic societies. Motivation of the actor is influenced by the group it belongs to
through the shared mental model, and herewith the group functions as an institutional
element.
Groups - Greif (2006) distinguishes two types of societies; the collectivist society and
individualistic society. The difference between the two societies lies in the cultural beliefs,
the “shared ideas and thoughts that govern interactions among individuals and between
them, their gods and other groups” (p.269). The cultural beliefs are attributes of
individuals and determine societal organizations and influence institutional development.
There is a fundamental asymmetry between beliefs inherited from the past and alternatives,
and the beliefs from the past affect decisions. Greif (2006) explains that in an
individualistic society the transactions are between actors from different groups. The
actors are influenced only by their own motivation to follow social rules that lead to
institutionalized rules and institutions. In a collectivist society, on the other hand, “each
individual interacts socially and economically mainly with members of a particular
religious, ethnic, or familial group” (p.269).
In the collectivist society the actor is not only influenced by his own motivation but also
by the shared beliefs and ideas within the group. The individuals have the same cultural
beliefs, a long-standing relationship in which knowledge of past behaviour is available,
and they belong to information-sharing networks. These networks are coordinating
mechanisms and institutions that guide behaviour of its members towards each other and
non-members. The network is used for information gathering and information
transmission, which makes punishment of improper behaviour by a member or non-
member self-enforcing. If a member’s behaviour is improper, based on customs and
tradition, this information will be collected by the network and transmitted to other
members, making collective punishment credible. All members know that collective
punishment is possible and therefore refrain from improper behaviour. The result is that
“[W]ithin these groups, contract enforcement is achieved through informal economic and
social institutions. Little cooperation exists between members of different groups, but
members of collectivist societies feel involved in the lives of other members of their
group” (p.269).
“[I]n individualistic societies, the social structure is “integrated” in the sense that
economic transactions are conducted among people from different groups, and individuals
frequently shift from one group to another” (p.269). Individuals do not have a long-
standing relationship with each other and there is no knowledge of each other’s past
behaviour. Each transaction is an individualistic, bilateral equilibrium that discourages
investments in information gathering. There are no methods in which individuals can
punish each other for improper behaviour and an external mechanism is needed. In the
individualistic society “[C]ontract enforcement is achieved mainly through specialized
organizations, such as courts. Self-reliance is highly valued.” (p.269)
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6-5 Institutional change
R Informal institutions cannot be changed through an exogenous shock; changes are path
dependent and occur in a matter of centuries or millennia.
R Formal institutions can be changed upon initiative of a third party or through external
pressure and are not necessarily path dependent.
R In our model, institutional change is a historical process and needs to incorporate
historical development of institutions and motivation of actors.
The most important difference between informal institutions and formal institutions is how
these change and influence behaviour and decision making of actors. Informal institutions
cannot be changed through an exogenous shock, and Williamson (1998) indicates that
changes in informal institutions occur in a matter of centuries or millennia. The change in
informal institutions will primarily derive from external influences such as new
information or knowledge. Changes in informal institutions will follow a path dependent
evolution, because they are present within individuals and transferred from one generation
to the next. Further, the level of the external influences determines the way informal
institutions change. If we suppose that a certain society is isolated and not exposed to any
external influences, it is likely that informal institutions evolve slowly and it might indeed
take millennia. Without new ideas or beliefs, the informal institutions that are transferred
from one generation to the next will not change to a large degree. In an open society on the
other hand, with a lot of external influences, it is unlikely that it takes millennia for
informal institutions to change. We might have the same norms and values of our parents
but our habits and customs will be influenced by new ideas and therefore be different. Also,
when social structures consist of a large number of individuals, the influence from outside
will be relatively small and change will take time.
In contrast, formal institutions can be changed upon initiative of a third party or through
external pressure. The pressures on formal institutions and economic development are
considerably stronger than on informal institutions and can result from (i) foreign pressure,
(ii) industrial development, (iii) changes in domestic and international political-economic
conditions, or (iv) state policy. Changes in formal institutions are therefore not necessarily
path dependent. Regarding the changes in formal institutions, the influence on the
governance structure can be important. Figure 6-1 indicates that the formal institutions
constrain the governance structure and the latter might be affected directly by the changes.
The governance structure might however also change as indicated by North (1990), who
explains that the difference in the rate of change for informal and formal institutions can
cause tension:
“the fact that the informal constraints that are culturally derived will not change
immediately in reaction to changes in the formal rules. As a result the tension between
altered formal rules and the persisting informal constraints produces outcomes that
have important implications for the way economies change” (p.45).
North (2005) mentions about path dependence that choices “are constrained by the heritage
of institutions accumulated from the past” (p.51). He argues that path dependence means
that “the institutions that have accumulated give rise to organizations whose survival
depends on the perpetuation of those institutions and which hence will devote resources to
preventing any alteration that threatens their survival” (pp.51-52).
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North (2005) also indicates that change will typically be incremental because
“large-scale change will create too many opponents among existing organizations that
will be harmed and therefore oppose such change. … Path dependence will occur
because the direction of the incremental institutional change will be broadly consistent
with the existing institutional matrix … and will be governed by the kinds of knowledge
and skills that the entrepreneurs and members of organizations have invested in” (p.62).
According to Denzau and North (1994) individual actors’ preferences and mental maps are
endogenous and, as we explained above, (cultural) learning and experience is important.
Campbell (1997) explains that the search process for a new governance structure is
influenced by interaction, interpretation and bricolage. Problem definition is a subjective
interpretation by actors with different interpretive frames, facilitating different
understandings and solutions to problems.
“…, as new frameworks of interpretation and their underlying interactive structures are
locked in or institutionalized through repetition they become more or less taken for
granted and provide the apparently ‘natural’ scripts that enable actors to define their
problems and interests in broadly similar ways” (p.21).
The evolutionary change is also a result of the process through which actors dealt with past
problems and/or opportunities. This is the process of “bricolage, whereby new institutions
differ from but resemble old ones” (p.22). Campbell (1997) mentions in this respect
technical bricolage, whereby already existing institutional principles are recombined to
increase efficiency or reduce inefficiencies. Symbolic bricolage is the process to make
solutions acceptable within a broad social environment, by accompanying them with
existing cultural symbols of language and rhetoric devices.
“To the extent that actors frame institutional solutions by drawing upon these already
existing cultural artefacts, their innovations are less likely to represent total breaks with
the symbolic past thereby leading to evolutionary rather than radical institutional
change at the symbolic level” (Campbell 1997, p.23).
Campbell and Lindberg (1991) also argue that change is path dependent. Change can result
from problems and/or opportunities caused by alterations in economic conditions,
efficiency conditions, and/or technology. The state can also initiate a transformation “in
response to domestic or international political-economic conditions” (p.329). These factors
will induce companies to search for a new governance structure, which will be constrained
by the old governance structure, institutional environment, and relationships with other
groups and the state. The search process towards a new governance structure within an
industrial sector is described as follows:
“[T]he centerpiece of such an evolutionary view of sectoral development is what we
have summarized heuristically as the search – a process whereby sectoral actors
pursue their interests within a variety of constraints and eventually select a new
governance regime by combining in intended and unintended ways their individual
strategies for coping with the dilemmas of production and exchange. Indeed, the
concept of constrained selection captures the essence of the search process as it
embodies the reciprocal relationship between actor and constraint, or strategy and
structure” (p.328)
Following Greif (2006), we argue that the fundamental asymmetry between institutional
elements inherited from the past and technologically feasible alternatives is important. It
implies that beliefs, norms, and organizations inherited from the past affect the subsequent
institutions. The institutional elements from the past are the attributes of institutions and
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individuals, reflecting the social and cultural worlds individuals know, forming the default
in institutional change. “[I]nstitutional elements reside in individuals’ memories, constitute
their cognitive, are embodied in their preferences, and manifest themselves in
organizations; they are what individuals bring with them when they face new situations”
(Greif 2006, p.188).
New situations can evolve “when an institution that governed a transaction is no longer
self-enforcing, when it is perceived to be losing its self-enforcing characteristics; or when
technological, organizational, and other changes bring about new transactions” (Greif 2006,
p.385). As long as the relevant parameters are in the range within which individuals’
behaviour is self-enforcing and reproducing, an institution will not change. When an
institution is no longer self-enforcing, due to exogenous parametric change, it will seize to
prevail. Institutional change is a costly process, involving introduction of alternative
models, which implicates the necessity to gain new information to develop the alternative
model. Institutional change is therefore “characterized by institutional refinement, that is,
attempts to reinforce failing institutions rather than create new ones” (Greif 2006, p.195).
The existing model is commonly known, followed by all individuals and therefore difficult
to change. Generally, it is best to follow the existing model even if better alternatives are
available.
6-6 Concluding remarks
This chapter presented our institutional model for M&A. The model consists of four levels
and each level needs to be studied against a historical and context-specific background, as
this is the information that individual actors in a society share and internalize. Located at
level one of the model are the informal institutions such as norms, customs, and traditions
in a society; informal institutions constrain the three other levels. At the second level we
place the formal institutions; the constitution, laws, and economic rules in the society
(rules of the game). Formal institutions constrain governance structure, M&A activity, and
individual actors. Located at level three are the boxes ‘Governance structure’ and ‘M&A
activity’, and at level four the box ‘Individual actors’. Because these boxes influence each
other, and are influenced by each other, they are linked with bi-directional solid arrows.
M&A activity results from (strategic) considerations of individual actors, such as, for
example, a company’s management, its shareholders, or a hostile raider. The governance
structure of a company will have an important impact on these considerations and wether
they will succeed. At the same time, M&A activity affects the governance structure, and
can have an impact on the behaviour of individual actors in relation to stock ownership and
M&A activity. Level three is the outcome of the dynamic interactions between economic
development, (foreign) competition, and changes in informal and formal institutions that
govern motivation and behaviour of individual actors. Behaviour of individual actors is the
result of the interaction with level three and constrained by informal and formal
institutions.
The neoclassical black boxes of governance structure and individual actors are opened
in our model. The governance structure consists of two layers: at the lower layer the
individual company with ownership structure and corporate governance structure, at the
higher layer corporate groups, such as horizontal keiretsu, vertical keiretsu, and trade
association. According to transaction cost economics, we investigate the mode of
governance in vertical relationships between companies.
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The box of individual actors is made up of the layers shared cognition, individual mental
maps and shared mental maps, and motivation. Shared cognition reflects the actors’
knowledge of informal and formal institutions, and the mental models are internal
mechanisms that guide choice making, influenced by (cultural) learning and experience.
Motivation is important in the model, because an individual’s behaviour is the result of
social rules that are motivated to be followed. Being a member of a group, individuals with
the same cultural background and experience, results in a shared mental model. The shared
mental model influences the motivation of the actor, and therefore functions as an
institutional element in the model.
Institutional change of informal institutions occurs in a matter of centuries or millennia,
whereas formal institutions can be changed upon initiative of a third party or through
external pressure. In our model, institutional change is a historical process and needs to
incorporate historical development of institutions and motivation of actors. Only changing
formal institutions does not result in different behaviour because “it requires creating new
systems of interrelated institutional elements that motivate, enable, and guide individuals
to take particular actions” (Greif 2006, p.402).
The informal institutions were described in chapter 3 and consist of Shinto, Buddhism,
Confucianism, and the ie system. Formal institutions are formed by the political
development and the formal institutions related to financial markets and M&A activity.
The two layers of governance structure were described in chapter 4 and 5: ‘company’
refers to ownership structure and corporate governance structure, and ‘corporate groups’ to
zaibatsu, horizontal keiretsu, vertical keiretsu, and trade association. We have not
explicitly identified ‘individual actors’ in the previous chapters, but the model indicates
that they are influenced by the informal institutions, formal institutions, governance
structure, and M&A activity. In the next chapter we use the model to investigate hostile
takeovers. In chapter 9 we will subsequently examine the impact of some of these
institutional elements on shareholder wealth creation at the announcement date of mergers.
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7
Institutional approach to
hostile takeovers
In this chapter we analyze hostile takeovers in post-war Japan according to our
institutional model for M&A. In section 7-1 we first discuss the interpretation in previous
research of some institutional elements. We explain how the horizontal keiretsu and
Japan’s cultural characteristics are argued to be related to the absence of hostile takeovers,
and how transaction cost economics explains the vertical keiretsu. In section 7-2 we look
into these elements in relation to our institutional model. We provide an interpretation of
trust and discuss how informal and formal institutions have influenced companies’ modes
of governance and group formation; we look into the horizontal keiretsu, vertical keiretsu
and trade association. Section 7-3 uses our new insights on the institutional elements to
interpret the hostile takeovers in the post-war period and the hostile tender offer attempts
in the period 1999-2007. Section 7-4 concludes the chapter.
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7-1 Interpretations from previous research
R The horizontal keiretsu were formed as a result of hostile takeovers in the 1950s and
prevented hostile takeovers in the entire post-war period.
R Hostile takeovers do not fit in with the Japanese culture.
R Hybrid structures without contractual safeguards can be sustained in Japan because of a
high level of trust, importance of reputation, and financial hostages.
In this section we show how according to previous research, the horizontal keiretsu and the
specific Japanese culture have limited hostile takeovers. Next, we show how transaction
cost economics explains the vertical keiretsu.
7-1-1 Horizontal keiretsu
The argument that the horizontal keiretsu were used as a defense mechanism originates
from the hostile takeovers that occurred in the 1950s. It is reasoned that these hostile
takeover attempts led Japanese companies to set up horizontal keiretsu with cross-
shareholdings in order to protect group companies. According to Morck and Nakamura
(2003), the buying back of the shares of Youwa Property by former zaibatsu group
companies in 1952 “triggered the realization by top executives that corporate raiders
could be blocked by establishing sufficiently large crossholding among former zaibatsu
firms” (p.78). They suggest that in the 1950s a market for corporate control took off in
which Japanese companies tried to gain control over other companies through hostile
takeovers, and that raiders extracted greenmail from unwilling target companies (Morck
and Nakamura 2003, p.3). They state that during this period Japanese companies had an
Anglo-American corporate governance, but that the acquaintance was short and
companies with dispersedly held ownership disappeared by the end of the 1960s (Morck
and Nakamura 2003). Japanese companies established cross-shareholdings because they
“would then all be safe from hostile takeovers, the need to pay greenmail would disappear,
and the company presidents would have secure tenure in their jobs” (Morck and
Nakamura 2003, p.78). Sheard (1989, 1991) mentions that just before the end of the U.S.
occupation in 1952, Japanese companies started to buy each others' shares in order to
prevent hostile takeovers, resulting in a considerable increase in intercorporate share
ownership between the former Mitsubishi, Mitsui and Sumitomo zaibatsu companies and
banks between 1949 and 1951. Another impetus to the cross-shareholding was the fall in
stock prices in 1965 when companies increased their cross-shareholdings to prevent U.S.
style hostile takeovers.
The cross-shareholdings of the keiretsu companies, functioning as anti-takeover barriers,
subsequently prevented hostile takeovers in the entire post-war period (Sheard 1989, 1991;
Aoki and Patrick 1994; Aoki and Sheard 1992; Nakatani 1984; Morck and Nakamura 1999,
2003). The cross-shareholding was an effective anti-takeover barrier because the
company’s stock was held by group members and motivated by relationships rather than
share price appreciation. The shareholders bought the stock of group companies to
symbolize the group loyalty and business links, and share ownership was not motivated by
speculation (Jacobson and Aaker 1993). In fact, Sheard (1989) and Kester (1991) argue
that the cross-shareholding structure eliminated the need for an expensive external market
for corporate control, which is strongly related to the stock price.
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As we discussed in chapter 6, in previous research the company’s cross-shareholdings is
taken as an exogenous variable without an analysis of the historical and context-specific
background. The argument only looks into the development in the post-war period, but
does not include the motivation of actors to be(come) shareholder. This focus prevents the
researcher to look into the motivation of actors that do not belong to the company’s
shareholders. Below we show that it is important to examine the influence of (changes in)
formal institutions in relation to informal institutions, and motivation of individual actors.
7-1-2 Culture
Another reason frequently given for the lack of M&A activity, especially hostile takeovers,
is that it does not fit in with the Japanese culture. Resulting from cultural characteristics
such as lifetime employment (and internal promotion), restricted labour mobility,
seniority-based wages, and company unions, Japanese companies prefer internal growth to
external expansion (Pettway and Yamada 1986; Odagiri and Hase 1989; Abegglen 1983).
The company is considered to be made up of employees, having a responsibility for
their well-being and future. The sale of a company, as a community of employees, is
regarded as the sale of people and deemed immoral. The management of the target
company will not accept a hostile tender offer (Abegglen 1983; Odagiri 1992). According
to Kester (1991), the buying and selling of companies is seen as “fleshpeddling”, and the
sale of a company is regarded as an admission of failure by the seller.
Pettway and Yamada (1986) indicate that Japanese companies are operated for the
benefit of stakeholders in the following order: firstly the managers and employees, then the
main bank, followed by customers and suppliers, and lastly for stockholders. Sato and
Hoshino (1984) and Abegglen and Stalk (1985) indicate that managers and employees
believe that the company belongs to them. Managers prioritize market share, and stock
price is least important of nine corporate objectives.
Odagiri and Hase (1989) and Odagiri (1992) point out that if Japanese companies
engage in M&A activity, capital participations and partial acquisitions are preferred to
mergers and complete takeovers. Mergers and complete takeovers introduce problems
related to differences in labor practices and cultures in companies, and result in uneasiness
and conflicts of interests. Overall, the Japanese cultural characteristics result in a negative
attitude towards merger and hostile takeover activities.
Previous research takes the informal institutions as an exogenous variable to explain the
low level of hostile takeovers. We think it is important to distinguish the arguments that
are put forward. The first argument concerns the motivation to attain corporate growth
through internal expansion, the second relates to the cultural characteristics such as life-
time employment and seniority-based wage systems. Although it is argued that the cultural
characteristics developed from the management’s motivation, a change in the cultural
characteristics does not necessarily originate from a different motivation of managers. Also,
the focus lies on the reason why hostile takeovers do not occur, rather than identification of
the nature of hostile takeovers and the motivation of actors to engage in hostile takeovers.
The specific Japanese culture does not explicitly identify the motivation of actors to act
according to the ‘harmony’ characteristic. This is assumed as an exogenous variable and
there is no distinction made between individual actors.
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7-1-3 Transaction cost economics and vertical keiretsu
In our discussion of the vertical keiretsu we look into the subsidiary system. Previous
research has indicated that, depending on the attributes of the transaction, the relation
between the core company and suppliers differs (see e.g. Asanuma 1994; Dyer 1996).
Suppliers can be independent companies (dokuritsu kaisha) or related companies (kankei
kaisha). An independent company supplies standardized products and its relationship with
the prime contractor closely approximates a "market" relationship. The core contractor
does not have financial or business links with the independent company. In the automotive
industry the independent companies generally supply numerous automakers and sell on
average 20% of their output to a given automaker (Dyer 1996).
The affiliated company, on the other hand, supplies the core company with non-
standardized products that make up for the majority of the supplier’s total output. The two
companies have a close relationship and the core company usually has stock ownership of
the affiliated company, transfers technology, and dispatches employees such as technicians
and senior executives (Gerlach 1987, p.132; Cusumano 1985). The parent company can
exert financial, managerial and technological control over the subcontractors and the two
companies engage in joint problem solving, price reduction and quality improvement and
long-term relationships. The transactions range from design, contract assembly and
systems-components subassembly, and demand the subcontractor to make asset-specific
investments that are not (easily) applicable to other customers/contracts. The governance
structure between the affiliated company and the parent company is the hybrid governance
structure.
Transaction cost economics (“TCE”) predicts that the governance structure of
transactions primarily depends on transaction-specific assets and safeguards for the
transaction. According to the theory, the choice of the governance structure moves from
“Ideal” markets to Hazard and Hybrid structures, and eventually to the Firm (hierarchy)
structure. In the ‘Hybrid structure’ the supplier sets up contractual safeguards, and in the
‘Firm structure’ the supplier is organized under unified ownership. The governance
structure ‘Firm’ is equal to the vertical merger as will be explained in section 8-2 (the
buying company absorbs the supplier). In this sub-section we investigate the choice of
Japanese companies to organize transactions with specialized investments in the
Hazard/Hybrid structure instead of the Firm structure.
The interesting aspect of the vertical keiretsu is that the supplier makes transaction-
specific investments without safeguards in the form of elaborate explicit contracts to protect
against the hazards of opportunism, as predicted by Williamson (1985). TCE theory would
predict that these Japanese transactors must have developed stronger safeguards to protect
against the hazards of opportunism. Asanuma (1988) explains that the legal contracts in the
automobile and the electronic industries are short standard contracts that only outline the
general obligations of the parties, and effectively act as a "constitution" for the
relationship. Research on the vertical keiretsu has been concerned with the question why
the hybrid governance structure between the supplier and the prime contractor could
sustain without contractual safeguards. It is argued that instead of contractual safeguards,
Japanese safeguards in the vertical keiretsu are formed by trust such as collective
responsibility, loyalty, reciprocal obligations, or harmony (Dore 1983; Sako 1991; Hill
1995; Smitka 1991; Powell 1990; Dyer 1996), reputation (Fruin 1992), and financial
hostages (Klein 1980).
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Trust is said to have been critical in lowering the hazards of opportunism and
minimizing transaction costs. Williamson (1996) argues that Japan, as a society with high
trust, requires less vertical integration and a larger amount of activity can be organized
under hybrid structures (p.317). Dyer (1996) finds evidence which “confirms that Japanese
automakers have been more effective than U.S. automakers at getting suppliers to trust
them […] Japanese suppliers were more likely to trust Japanese automakers to treat them
fairly and more willing to make dedicated investments based on oral agreements” (p.661).
Dore (1983) suggests that "opportunism may be a lesser danger in Japan because of the
explicit encouragement and actual prevalence, in the Japanese economy of what one might
call moralized trading relationships of mutual goodwill" (p.463), and that "the sentiments
of friendship and the sense of diffuse personal obligation which accrue between
individuals engaged in recurring contractual economic exchange" (Dore 1986, p.460).
Reputation can also serve to control opportunism in Japan because "the immediate gains
from opportunism in a regime where reputation counts must be traded off against future
costs" (Williamson 1991, p.291). Dyer (1996) defines reputation as the extent to which
suppliers feel that the prime contractor is fair and trustworthy in business relations. Fruin
(1992) argues that the horizontal keiretsu with the presence of the main bank and supplier
associations enforce this reputation mechanism in the Japanese automotive industry.
Exploitation or cancellation of business with a supplier is rather avoided by the parent
company because it can result in a negative reputation.
Financial hostages refer to stock ownership of the parent company in the supplier. The
parent company indicates its commitment to the business relation with the supplier through
these investments. The supplier herewith convinced about the motivation of the core
company will make the transaction-specific investments required by automakers.
Williamson (1985) refers to these mutual commitments as an arrangement akin to an
"exchange of hostages".
7-2 Corporate groups according to our model
R The Japanese society is characterized by high particularistic trust and low general trust.
R The horizontal keiretsu finds its origins in the ie system and developed from the pre-
war zaibatsu; it evolved as a result of the new formal institutions implemented after
WWII.
R The vertical keiretsu developed after WWII and is characterized by a relationship in
which the parent company and subsidiary are mutually dependent.
R Trade associations originate from 1092AD and have been very important in
disseminating new technology and information to companies in the same business
sector and in influencing government policy.
In this section we analyze the institutional elements from an institutional perspective. We
look into the historical and context-specific background of the economy and examine the
institutional elements because they “reflect and constitute the cultural and social world that
members of a society share and internalize” (Greif 2006, p.380). In our analysis we pay
special attention to the question how institutional elements are influenced by changes in
formal institutions. According to institutional economics, new formal institutions only
affect institutions when actors are motivated to follow them. Before we turn to the
institutional approach of the three groups we look briefly into the concept of trust.
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7-2-1 Trust
In previous research on relations between Japanese companies the concept of harmony and
trust is often used, suggesting it is a straightforward concept. It is argued that these
characteristics have prevented Japanese companies from (i) engaging in hostile takeovers
and (ii) opportunism in relationships within the vertical keiretsu. We define trust in
company relations as involving uncertainty about the behaviour of the transacting partner
and the preference to deal with someone that one party can feel safe about not being
cheated by the other party under conditions in which cheating is possible.
Yamagashi and Yamagishi (1998) argue that Americans are more trustful than the
Japanese. In their insightful discussion, they distinguish general from particularistic trust.
General trust is trust of individuals in general, the trust between individuals that do not
have a particular relationship with each other. Particularistic trust is trust between
individuals that know each other well and have a close and stable relationship.
Particularistic trust prevents individuals to cheat each other because both have a lot of
information about the other (knowledge-based particularistic trust), and their close
relationship allows them to control the actions of the other (relation-based particularistic
trust). Yamagishi and Yamagishi (1998) mention that “[W]hether a society is characterized
by high levels of general trust or particularistic trust depends on how densely networks of
mutually committed relations are established in the society” (p.113). They relate this to the
perception on the nature of human beings by individuals. This is in line with institutional
economics because individual’s behaviour is influenced by the behaviour of others. They
argue that people with a high level of general trust have a positive view of human nature
and are less inclined to form committed relationships based on high particularistic trust.
People with a low level of general trust, on the other hand, have a more negative view of
human nature and tend to build committed and stable relationships with a small group of
business partners.
They explain that networks of mutually committed relations in a society reduce
uncertainty in these relations and increase particularistic trust. These relations, on the other
hand, reduce the overall level of general trust. In Japan the particularistic trust is high and
the general trust is low, and “[T]he relative lack of general trust among the Japanese moves
them toward establishing networks of mutually committed relations. A fear of strangers
(i.e., a low level of general trust) motivates the Japanese toward establishing mutually
committed relations with persons they feel they can trust” (Yamagishi and Yamagishi 1998,
pp.113-114). There is also a causal relationship between particularistic trust and general
trust. When the particularistic trust in a society is high, leading transactions to occur in
mutually committed relations, general trust will not develop to a high degree. The
relationship between the level of general trust and particularistic trust is thus bi-directional,
termed as a ‘reinforcing feedback loop’ by Yamagishi and Yamagishi (1998). They
conclude that the feedback leads to two “ideal typical” societies. The first type is a society
in which general trust is low and uncertainty in the society is reduced by extensive
networks of mutually committed relations. “[T]his is a society in which people do not need
to be honest and trustworthy; the networks of mutually committed relations take care of
potential problems of social uncertainty” (p.116). The second type is a society in which
people have a high level of general trust, not requiring the development of extensive
networks of relations and resulting in a low level of particularistic trust. The second type of
society is closer to the U.S. society in which general trust is higher than in the Japanese,
which is similar to the first type.
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This is an interesting addition to the discussion of Greif (2006) on collectivist and
individualistic societies. Greif indicates that in a collectivist society the groups have
religious, ethnic or familial origins. The individuals in the group have the same cultural
beliefs and their long-standing relationship provides them knowledge of past behaviour.
The collectivist society is characterized by individuals’ high particularistic trust. As
Yamagishi and Yamagishi (1998) argue, the main motivation for individuals to form a
group in these societies is the lack of general trust. In contrast, in the individualistic
societies economic transactions are conducted among people from different groups
because the level of general trust is high (either trust in transaction partner or law enforcing
institutions). This discussion indicates that the elements of the Constitution of Seventeen
Articles of Shǀtoku Taishi that we discussed in section 3-1-2, need to be considered in
concert. The Japanese society is, in general terms, not characterized by harmony (article I),
tolerance (article X) or trust (article IX). These characteristics primarily describe the
relations within groups (article XVII).
7-2-2 Horizontal keiretsu
In sub-section 7-1-1 we indicated that previous research suggests that in the years after
WWII a market for corporate control took off and corporate governance of companies had
Anglo-American characteristics. It is argued that hereupon horizontal keiretsu groups were
formed as a means to prevent companies from hostile takeovers and that dispersedly held
ownership had disappeared by the end of the 1960s. This sub-section examines the
horizontal keiretsu from an institutional economics perspective. Rather than simply linking
one event to another, in casu hostile takeovers leading to horizontal keiretsu, our
institutional model argues that motivation and context-specific circumstances need to be
included in the analysis. We need to analyze the motivation to form horizontal groups, and
why companies did not opt for an Anglo-American takeover market. Supreme Commander
for the Allied Powers (“SCAP”) had introduced U.S. laws and regulations that allowed the
development of a competitive stock market. Yet, it did not evolve. The argument that the
horizontal groups were formed to prevent hostile takeovers pushes the question a step back.
Of course, high ownership by friendly and stable shareholders that do not sell their shares
prevents hostile takeovers. The question that needs to be answered, however, is why the
group structure developed. In this sub-section we first discuss the horizontal keiretsu in
light of the historical development of institutions, and in section 7-3 we show that the
causal relationship of hostile takeovers and horizontal keiretsu can be questioned and
needs further exploration.
As we explained in chapter 6, new institutions result from new transactions brought
about by technological, organizational and other changes. Institutional change is costly and
individuals therefore tend to reinforce failing institutions in stead of creating new ones.
According to institutional economics, historical development of institutions and the
context-specific background have an important effect on new institutions. Our analysis
therefore includes the cultural and social world that members of a society share and
internalize.
SCAP implemented two important legal amendments related to corporate ownership
after the war: the first was the change in influence from the general shareholders’ meeting
to the individual shareholder, and the second was the prohibition to form holding
companies. The combined effect of the amendments was a considerable increase of the
individual shareholder’s influence. Companies strongly objected because they thought the
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increased power of the individual investor would be abused and result in greenmail and
hostile tender offers (Röhl 2005; Blakemore and Yazawa 1953). So, we need to investigate
how institutions changed as a result of the new formal institutions in relation with the
existing rules, beliefs and norms. Basically, we attempt to gain insight in the motivation to
follow the new formal rules and/or the existing beliefs and norms. According to our
institutional model, it is necessary to investigate the motivation for companies to form
post-war horizontal keiretsu. This motivation is influenced by the shared cognition of
individuals, resulting from experience, knowledge and cultural norms and beliefs with
origins in the preceding period(s). As we explained in chapter 4, the Mitsubishi, Mitsui and
Sumitomo keiretsu originate from the pre-war zaibatsu. In order to understand the
formation of the horizontal keiretsu group, it is therefore necessary to understand why and
how the pre-war zaibatsu were formed. Further, the explanation of the corporate structure
in the pre-war period needs to be retrieved in periods prior to the Meiji period (1868-1912).
The pre-war zaibatsu evolved from the ie system that was present in agricultural
communities and merchant companies during pre-Meiji Japan. In chapter 3 we explained
that the house in the ie system was a highly independent economic unit and persisted over
generations. In the succession of the leader of the house the continuity of the house was
more important than the heir. A son who did not become the leader of the honke (the most
senior house) could marry into another house or set up his own house, bunke (junior house).
If he set up his own house, this was regarded as a branch of the main house, and through
this system a wide group of houses with personal and financial linkages (dǀzoku)
developed. Loyalty to the company was very important and necessary financial means
were raised within the group of houses. Partnerships or anonymous investors did not play a
role in corporate finance. Chapters 4 and 5 showed that the pre-war zaibatsu group
development was similar to the ie system. Internal financing was most important and
external finance not used until the 1930s. In the 1920s companies were hived off from the
parent company, and a group was formed in which loyalty to the parent (holding) company
and group companies was important. The discussion of succession of the leader of a
company is also interesting in this respect. Both in the ie system and the zaibatsu group,
the most important aspect was the continuity of the company and group. “[O]riginally
founded as family businesses, the groups operated until their dissolution on the principle of
absolute loyalty of the company managements to the regnant families” (Caves and Uekusa
1976, p.2).
Figure 7-1 shows the transformation of the ownership structure in the Mitsubishi group
during the pre-war and post-war periods. Based on our discussion in chapter 5, the group’s
transformation can be divided according to three periods: (i) up to 1920s, (ii) the 1930s,
and (iii) post-war. The organizational structure of the Mitsubishi zaibatsu up to the 1920s
was simple. The holding company and Iwasaki family owned the shares of the main
companies and financial institutions. The main companies and financial institutions,
together with the holding company and family, had shareholdings in the other zaibatsu
group companies. In the 1930s, due to the anti-zaibatsu pressures, the holding company
and family started selling shares and a different ownership structure developed. Buyers of
the shares were unrelated investors but also group companies, especially insurance
companies. The result was that the holding company and family were not completely alone
at the top of the pyramid anymore. Financial institutions started to hold shares of the
group’s main companies. The holding company, financial institutions and main companies
all had shareholdings in other related companies.
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Up to 1920s
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Post-war
Holding / Family
Other Companies
Financial institutions Diamond (main)companies
Main Companies &
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Figure 7-1 Ownership transformation of Mitsubishi groups
In the post-war period it was not allowed to form pure holding companies and the new
horizontal keiretsu system developed. The keiretsu diamond companies66 and the financial
companies replaced the holding company. The diamond companies have shareholdings in
the most important group companies and the financial institutions. The financial
companies, particularly the main bank, took the role of the holding company with
shareholdings in all group companies.
The developments in the pre-war and post-war periods indicate that continuity was most
important in the groups. Changes in the economic and regulatory environments caused
transactions to change, but the enforcement of continuity of the group resulted in
ownership structures that could sustain this. Regarding the post-war period, the regulatory
changes resulted in the prohibition of the holding company and a stronger position of the
individual shareholder, and horizontal keiretsu were formed to ensure the continuity of the
pre-war group. The importance of the zaibatsu family can also be derived from the fact that
a lot of group companies returned to their group logo when it was permitted again in 1952.
The importance of the group can be traced back to the pre-Meiji period and corporate
groups are likely to have been formed irrespective of the hostile takeovers in the 1950s.
Next we try to clarify that the causal relationship between hostile takeovers in the 1950s
and the formation of horizontal keiretsu can be questioned by explaining the chronological
order of the events. The main difficulty in this discussion is that only in 1952 zaibatsu
66 Please refer to sub-section 5-3 for our discussion and definition of the “keiretsu diamond”.
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companies and financial companies were allowed to hold shares of former zaibatsu group
companies. As the hostile takeovers occurred in the beginning of the 1950s, this coincides
with the laws allowing for cross-shareholdings. Does this mean, however, that the
relationship is causal?
Suzuki (1997) provides evidence that the zaibatsu companies tried to amass their own
shares prior to the hostilities. He explains how Mitsui Real Estate coped with the transfer
of shares by the Holding Company Liquidation Commission (“HCLC”) after the Mitsui
zaibatsu dissolution. Mitsui Real Estate increased its capital from 100,000 shares at 5
million yen to 1,000,000 at 50 million yen and the newly issued shares were distributed by
HCLC. A small part of the issued shares were allotted to company managers and
employees (60 thousand shares) and the remaining 840 thousand shares were sold to the
public at 400 yen. The management of Mitsui Real Estate made secret purchases of
280,000 shares (28% of outstanding shares) through Nomura Securities. Nomura Securities
functioned as “owner” of the shares and the purchase of about 120 million yen was
financed with funds from the Teikoku Bank, Chiyoda Bank, Joyo Bank and other financial
institutions. Suzuki (1997) explains that this allowed Mitsui Real Estate “to gain control
over its own stock. Other companies employed similar methods to effect protection against
takeovers, and it is for this reason that the major securities houses are found listed as major
stockholders in these companies around 1950” (p.78).
Our discussion on the new company law that reduced the influence of the general
shareholders’ meeting, together with the evidence from Suzuki on Mitsui Real Estate,
indicate that the ownership structure of group companies were of great concern for former
zaibatsu companies. We showed that the formation of keiretsu was not caused by the
hostilities in the 1950s, but that they evolved as a consequence of new laws and regulations.
The new formal institutions resulted in fear of the group’s discontinuity as they prevented
control of companies through holding companies and created opportunities for greenmail.
The lack of general trust had resulted in the formation of groups in the pre-Meiji and Meiji
periods and also led to the formation of the horizontal keiretsu in the post-war period. This
section showed that it is necessary to investigate various institutional elements to be able to
explain and understand the creation of horizontal keiretsu, and in section 7-3 we
investigate whether they prevented hostile takeovers in the post-war period.
7-2-3 Vertical keiretsu
The development of the vertical keiretsu is different from the horizontal keiretsu as it finds
its origins in the war-time period instead of the pre-war period. Although subcontracting
existed in the pre-war period, it was considerably different from the post-war vertical
keiretsu. Similar to our discussion of the horizontal keiretsu, comprehension of the pre-war
subcontracting system is indispensable for understanding the vertical keiretsu. It provides
insights in the development of the vertical keiretsu and indicates that the business chain
was not based on feelings of friendship or trust. In fact, the vertical keiretsu developed
because of the lack of both and was aimed at profitability of the parent company and
subcontractor company (often subsidiary).
In the pre-war period the relationship between the central company and the subcontractor
had two characteristics. The first was that the central company tried to reduce its cost by
forcing its subcontractors to accept a low price for products. The central company could
coerce subcontractors to accept its demands because of its capital superiority and very strong
position in the transaction. The weak position of the subcontractor was caused by the simple
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nature of products, excessive competition between small and medium sized enterprises, and
the lack of technology, marketing power and alternatives to sell its products. The parent
company used the subcontractors because of the low price and also as a buffer of business
cycles; in a business depression the parent would divert production from the subcontractor and
produce the product in-house.
During WWII, war-related companies had to expand their production rapidly but faced
problems with increasing production capacity and product quality improvement. The military
authorities took the initiative to solve these problems by requiring central companies to get
involved in the production process of subsidiaries. It was acknowledged that production
capacity and product quality could not be improved if the technological knowledge and quality
of supplies remained the same. Induced by to the so-called ‘Co-operation Factory System’,
central companies started extending technical assistance and leasing and selling machines to
the subcontractors in order to solve the mentioned problems (during the war primarily in the
metal industry). “[T]he subcontracting relations were no longer determined by the one-sided
interest of the central enterprise, but by the higher standpoint of social productive power and
this accelerated the progress of the medium-small enterprise” (Tasugi 1963, p.36).
Immediately after the war, the subcontracting relations returned to the pre-war structure of a
strong central company exploiting the subcontractors. Resulting from the economic
development induced by the Korean War boom of 1951-52 and also the boom in 1955-56, the
central companies tried to expand production as demand increased. Similar to the war-period,
they faced difficulties increasing their production capacity and product quality. Furthermore,
due to the self-centred attitude of the central companies in the previous period(s)
subcontractors were reluctant to assist the central companies in their expansion activities.
Subcontractors tried to select central companies that considered their position and, as they
were crucial in the production process due to their lower cost than the parent company, the
parent companies had to change their attitude towards the subcontractors. As competition
between large companies intensified with economic development, and these companies
wanted to secure supplies from subcontractors, the latter came to hold a stronger position in
negotiations.
The subcontractor’s position strengthened even more in the 1960s when accelerating
product proliferation and short product life cycles began to characterize product markets.
Flexibility was needed and central companies came to realize that the ability of
subcontractors to accommodate the required supplies was crucial for the increasing
product mix and variants, design changes, quick and frequent deliveries without incurring
prohibitive costs of implementation. In the new approach, large companies delegated
assembly of finished goods and subassembly or manufacture of system components to
subcontractors. Parent companies directed their efforts to the growth of the subsidiary and
associated suppliers by providing assistance in various ways such as training, dispatch of
technicians or senior executives to work at the supplier on a temporary or permanent basis,
et cetera. The subcontracting became strategically oriented and systematically executed. In
the automotive industry, for example, the prime contractor began to produce large-volume
products and the most important final products. The task of subcontractors changed from
uncomplicated tasks in the pre-war period and the first years of the post-war period to
assembling small-volume specific products and special-purpose vehicles in the 1960s. In
this way the prime contractor was relieved from operational and administrative tasks that
became increasingly more difficult and complex. The prime contractor could focus on
consumer demand and the competitive market, while the subcontractors focused on
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technological innovations and developments to shorten the product manufacturing time.
The subcontractors converted into subsystems manufacturers and contract assemblers,
according to their specialties. Another change in this period was the delegation of tasks
such as testing and design to the subcontractors. The main aim of the subsidiary and parent
company was to increase the competitiveness of the group and enhance their own
profitability.
Based on the preceding discussion we argue that the relation between the parent
company and the subsidiary in the vertical keiretsu cannot be advanced with transaction
cost economics. Transaction cost economics is applicable when the trading relationship
between two independent trading parties is analyzed. In those situations the attributes of
the transactions and opportunism are important. We have shown that in the vertical
keiretsu, however, the parent company and subsidiary company have a mutual benefit in
the transactions. The motivation of the two parties is economic and the agreements will be
upheld as it affects the profitability of both companies. The fact that the relationship is
based on economic motivations can also be deduced from the two-vendor practices of the
parent company and replacement of a subsidiary, if supplies do not meet the necessary
standards. This is also known by the subsidiaries that make efforts to maintain the required
level of quality. The fact that subsidiaries in the vertical keiretsu are stable shows that, in
principle, the two parties work together to improve product quality and profitability.
7-2-4 Trade associations
Trade associations are another corporate group we consider to be important to include in
the analysis of M&A in Japan. The first officially recorded trade organization in Japan
materialized in 1092AD. A Kyoto shrine, as a patron, guaranteed a group of merchants
exclusive rights of trade for specific products in its geographic area. This kind of group is
named za and are “groups of artisans and merchants with closed membership (i.e., new
merchants could not easily joint), official standing granted by a patron” (Schaede 2000,
p.218). The za had a positive effect on the economy while providing the patron tax income,
and functioned as self-regulation of trade in the absence of formal institutions. During the
15th century, when Chinese coins became a recognized currency in Japan 67 , the za
increased in importance. The recognition of Chinese coins as a valid currency led to
imitations of low quality to come into circulation, increasing the risks of being cheated for
merchants. “Merchant dishonesty was common, and almost expected, when transactions
were not on a regular basis” (Sheldon 1958, p.41). To prevent being cheated, and to have
the opportunity to hold someone responsible, merchants opted to avoid unknown
merchants and trade with “members of the various za, since za membership was a long-
term affiliation and bred interdependency” (Schaede 2000, p.219). The za evolved from a
means to stimulate economic development by a patron to a self-regulation system
independent of patronage.
During the Tokugawa period trade expanded rapidly and grew interregional and the
distribution system became more complex. Merchants shipped “products from the
countryside into the cities, changing rice into money, running warehouses for the daimyo
in the large cities, and providing credit for the daimyo” (Schaede 2000, p.224). In this new
trading environment the trade associations became more sophisticated and merchants
67 Japan’s first coins were minted in 708 and copper. During the 10th century these Japanese coins were replaced
by coins from China , the latter becoming a recognized currency in the 15th century.
147
Section 7-2 Corporate groups according to our model
135
established so-called nakama. Nakama are fixed-membership trade associations and its
literal meaning is “among those who know each other”. Sheldon (1958) argues that
nakama were primarily motivated by the “feeling of need for mutual protection and the
feeling of group solidarity” (p.54). The nakama evolved into kabu nakama and functioned
as monopolistic guilds that limited entry to the associations, colluded in price setting and
other rule-setting (quality, and so on.). Members were not allowed to deal with outsiders,
be that in their own trade or with outsiders in other product categories. Another favoured
barrier to entry was to demand certain quality and other standards. Sheldon (1958) explains
that “[K]abu has often been translated as "share," but this is not quite accurate, as
ownership was hereditary and the nakama could restrict transfer. The only entrance to an
established nakama was through inheritance, the purchase of kabu which had been
"vacated" by bankruptcy or lack of an heir, and through the apprentice system, all subject
to the approval of the nakama itself” (p.52).
The nakama provided its members a reputation of creditworthiness towards other
nakama, and collective action could protect its members from being cheated by members
of other nakama. In this system the trustfulness of the nakama to outside nakama was most
important and if a nakama-member did not act according to the rules, he could be expelled
or forced to pay a penalty. “To make this deterrent even stronger, many nakama set up an
“insurance fund” to which everyone had to contribute a sizeable amount. In the event that
one member broke the rules, e.g. by undercutting prices, his contribution would be used to
pay off those members who had incurred damage through his behaviour” (Schaede 2000,
p.229). Given the long-term costs that distrust meant to a merchant, the nakama were quite
successful in policing their members.
Although various nakama developed during the Tokugawa period, the Bakufu had
opposed them68 and only in 1721 all kabu nakama received official licensing. “Each kabu
nakama was required to pay a small annual fee (myǀga-kin), and each new member was
required to pay this fee to the Bakufu upon entrance.” Prior to 1721 only a limited number
of kabu nakama had been officially recognized such as pawn shops (in Osaka, 1642; in
Edo, 1692), second-hand dealers (Osaka, 1645; Edo, 1702), public bath houses (in Edo,
1650), and for peddlers and hairdressers (in Edo, 1659). Money-changers, unable to
exclude non-members from entering the market, were officially recognized in 1679. Up to
the Meiji period there were periods in which they were allowed or banned. Overall, the
kabu nakama provided a system of self-regulation for merchants to cope with mistrust,
inducing competition on product quality (and its improvements) rather than price (Sheldon
1958, p.57).
The Meiji government abolished all kabu nakama in 1871 but, due to the absence of an
institutional environment, new local organizations emerged and many resembled the pre-
Meiji nakama. The kabu nakama evolved in the trade associations as discussed in chapter
4. Formed by companies from the same industry the associations shared technical
information, protected members’ privileges, established trade rules, and endorsed credit for
members and controlled quality and prices. The associations were also important in their
representation of the industry in discussions with politicians and, as such, could influence
political decision-making. Cross-sectoral associations were also established to this aim, in
particular to influence tax, trade, and investment policies. In 1917 the Japan Industrial
68 The Bakufu was particularly vigilant against any attempts to corner a market, and any collusion among
merchants and officials to make big profits.
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Club (Nippon Kogyo Kurabu), precursor of Nikkeiren, was established. The club was
dominated by the zaibatsu companies and its members comprised of 185 large companies
and primarily supported the growth of the heavy and chemical industries after its
establishment. After 1922 this group was predominantly involved with labour issues and
pressuring the government for economic reform. The Japan Economic Federation (Nippon
Keizai Renmei), predecessor of Keidanren, was set up in 1922 and took over most of the
direct political activities of the Japan Industrial Club. This group is characterized by the
strong personal relations between politicians and managers of major companies. Two other
cross-sectoral associations are the Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry (Nippon
Shoko Kaigisho), for small and medium-sized businesses, and the Keizai Doyukai, a
discussion forum for younger executives (Lynn and McKeown 1988; Shaede 2000).
We conclude that Japanese companies decided to arrange the predecessors of the trade
association, za and kabu nakama, to prevent being cheated by unknown traders. The lack
of a legal system resulted in strong relations of companies in the same industry. Similar to
the discussion by Yamagishi and Yamagishi (1998), due to the low general trust in the
society, groups were established in which particularistic trust was high. As trade
associations have been present in Japan since 1092AD, we conclude it is an important
institutional element and we examine its influence on hostile takeovers in the next section.
7-3 Hostile takeovers according to our model
R Prior to 1999 there were no hostile tender offers, hostile takeovers were not aimed at
gaining operational control over a company and should therefore be seen as greenmail
attempts.
R Vertical keiretsu and trade associations have an important effect on hostile tender
offers.
In this section we take an institutional approach to hostile takeovers in post-war Japan. We
already mentioned in chapter 1 and chapter 2 that it is difficult to make a distinction
between greenmail and hostile tender offers, but there is an important difference in the
motivation of the bidder. In tender offers the bidder publicly announces it wants to acquire
a company (or a certain percentage of the outstanding shares) and states its motivation or
intention for the acquisition. The public announcement allows the targeted company and/or
other companies to act in response to the tender offer.
As we explained in section 7-1, the horizontal keiretsu (with stable and cross-
shareholders) and the Japanese culture are said to have prevented hostile takeovers in the
post-war period. Odagiri (1992) comments on the relation between the stable shareholders
and hostile tender offers as follows: “If, for instance, they are dissatisfied with the current
management and offered a high premium on their shares, will they really decline the offer?
It is difficult to answer this very interesting question, however, precisely because such
cases have been rare” (p.105). In sub-section 7-2-2 we explained that it is unlikely that the
hostile takeovers in the 1950s were the only, or main, reason for the formation of
horizontal keiretsu. In this section we examine the commonly asserted relation between the
horizontal keiretsu and absence of hostile takeovers. Is this assumed relationship valid or,
resulting from the interpretation of the 1950s with reference to the horizontal keiretsu, a
self-fulfilling prophecy? “[T]he self-fulfilling prophecy is, in the beginning, a false
definition of the situation evoking a new behavior which makes the originally false
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conception come true. The specious validity of the self-fulfilling prophecy perpetuates a
reign of error. For the prophet will cite the actual course of events as proof that he was
right from the very beginning” (Merton 1948, p.195).
We begin our analysis with the question why hostile tender offers did not occur in Japan
prior to 1999, and then examine the hostile tender offers in the period 1999-2007. Let us
start by acknowledging that it is possible that hostile tender offers were not initiated
because bidders thought that the attempt was deemed to fail as a result of the horizontal
keiretsu. As such, it can be argued that the horizontal keiretsu defended companies from
hostile tender offer attempts, and functioned as an implicit defense structure that never
needed to be used. Below we show that this reasoning is unlikely and that, in fact, it is
more probable that there were no hostile tender offer attempts because of other
institutional elements.
We need to consider the motivation of the bidder, whether the bidder was interested in
taking control of the company or getting paid greenmail. As we explained in chapter 2,
there is a strong relationship with a (failed) hostile tender offer and greenmail, which
makes it difficult to separate the two. The combination of the hostilities that occurred and
the formal institutions in the post-war period, however, suggest that the hostile takeovers
were aimed at greenmail. Most important in this respect is that Japanese companies could
not buy back their own shares prior to 2001. This implies that bidders that were interested
in greenmail would aim their hostilities towards companies that belonged to groups. The
group members would be able to buy back the shares from the greenmailer. Independent
companies might not be able to find friendly companies willing to purchase its shares and
the greenmailer would not be able to sell. Conform this argument, horizontal keiretsu were
often targeted by greenmailers. As also suggested by Kester (1991), the stable
shareholdings in the horizontal keiretsu groups were an advantage to greenmailers that had
no intention of getting operational control of companies. We think that the hostile
takeovers in the post-war period were nothing other than greenmail, and that the bidders
did not have the intention to get control over a company. In fact, if a bidder really wanted
to gain operational control over a company why did he not aim its activities on a company
independent of a horizontal keiretsu? In 1987, for example, according to the Keiretsu no
Kenkyǌ the member companies of the 6 horizontal keiretsu totaled 24 for Mitsui, 29 for
Mitsubishi, 20 for Sumitomo, 29 for Fuyo, 44 for Sanwa and 47 for Ikkan. This makes a
total of 193 companies related to a horizontal keiretsu compared to 1,724 companies listed
on the first section of TSE. If companies were indeed interested in hostile takeovers, and
horizontal keiretsu prevented these, it appears there were enough companies that were not
part of a horizontal keiretsu and more likely to be a successful target. Yet, there were no
hostile tender offer attempts prior to 1999.
In order to understand why Japanese companies did not initiate hostile tender offers or
hostile tender offer attempts, we think it is important to add two institutional elements in
the analysis: the vertical keiretsu and the trade association. The vertical keiretsu prevents
hostile tender offer attempts in three ways. The first important characteristic is that the
Japanese company cannot be seen as a separate entity as for example U.S. companies. As
we explained in section 7-2-3, the vertical keiretsu is a group of companies with
interdependent relations in the production process. Rather than the production of products
within the company, the Japanese company uses a wide subcontracting system that makes
it a difficult target for a hostile tender offer. The second characteristic of the vertical
keiretsu is that a parent company will be in great difficulty if a subsidiary would be taken
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over by another company, because of the subsidiary’s role in the production process. The
majority of its important subsidiaries is already fully owned, but if a hostile takeover is
attempted on an important partially owned subsidiary, the parent company will intervene
to secure its own production process. This important relationship between the parent
company and the subsidiary can also be seen in the greenmail attempts on subsidiaries.
The third aspect is the question whether it would be beneficial for a hostile bidder to try
and takeover an unwilling subsidiary company. When a hostile tender offer is forcefully
pursued against the will of a company’s management, which has good relations with its
suppliers and customers, the successful bidder company will probably lose these good
relations in the process.
The other aspect that is important in preventing hostile tender offer attempts in Japan is
the trade association. The discussion of horizontal keiretsu limits itself to the way a hostile
tender offer can be prevented by the shareholdings of member companies. It, however,
does not explain why a company that does not belong to the same horizontal keiretsu
would not initiate a hostile tender offer attempt against a company from another horizontal
keiretsu. As indicated in section 7-2, this is explained by the assumed Japanese cultural
characteristics of high level of trust. However, as the level of general trust is low, we could
expect that companies of different horizontal groups would engage in hostile tender offers.
We argue that the reason they do not engage in this kind of activity could derive from the
fact they belong to the same trade association. The trade associations originated to prevent
being cheated by unknown traders and in these associations companies in the same
industry participate and exchange information. They also discuss how to influence the
government regarding new laws and regulations. As such, companies in the same industrial
sector have close relationships, particularistic trust is high, and hostile tender offer
attempts could hereby be prevented.
7-3-1 Hostile tender offer attempts
Chapter 2 shows that prior to 1999 there had not been any hostile tender offers but that in
the period 1999-July 2007 thirteen hostile tender offers were launched. Of these hostile
tender offers one was aimed at attaining more than one third of the outstanding shares,
three at obtaining more than one half of the outstanding shares, and nine to obtain full
ownership. Two of the hostile tender offers were successful, two companies could fend off
the hostile tender offer by increasing dividend payout, in four cases a white knight rescued
the target, four target companies implemented a poison pill as a defensive measure, and
one company issued a poison pill and set up white squires. In our discussion we only look
into hostile tender offers and exclude the off-market purchase of NBS by Livedoor and the
request to merge by Rakuten after acquiring 19.09% of TBS’s shares. These cases,
especially the Livedoor purchase, were highly publicized and important in the sentiments
towards hostile takeovers. They resulted in implementation of hostile takeover defense
measures by many companies, but from an institutional perspective, the Livedoor case is
an example of smart financial engineering within the boundaries of an immature legal
system. As we showed in chapter 3, the law has been amended as a result of the Livedoor
event to prevent companies purchasing more than one third of a company’s outstanding
shares and circumventing the TOB regulations. The law was also amended after Don
Quijote’s purchase of shares in serial purchases without notification.
In order to understand whether cultural characteristics, horizontal keiretsu, vertical
keiretsu or trade associations had an important effect on hostile tender offers, we analyze
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the characteristics of the tender offers. We do this by answering the following questions:
Which companies are targeted, and who are the actors that initiated the hostile tender
offers?
When looking at the targets of the hostile tender offers we see that these do not involve
companies in a vertical keiretsu. Further, only one of the target companies, Shoei,
belonged to a horizontal keiretsu with 60% of its shares owned by group-members. This is
an important difference from the greenmail practices in the period prior to 1999 when
horizontal keiretsu companies were primarily targeted. Whether the hostile tender offer of
Shoei failed because of the group relations is doubtful. It is argued that the bidding price of
1,000 yen was far too low and the share price had increased to 1,480 yen after the bid.
These circumstances did not require actions by a white knight and implementation of anti-
takeover defenses was not necessary. The other target companies were independent
companies and increased dividend, used a poison pill, or asked assistance from a white
knight to prevent being taken over by the hostile bidder. Apart from the companies that
implemented poison pills, it can be argued that the other failed tender offers had an effect;
two companies increased dividend payout, and all white knights that prevented the hostile
takeover belonged to the same industrial sector as the target company, implying an
industrial restructuring. Regarding the white knights this might suggest that the relations
not only prevented hostile tender offers in the period prior to 1999, but also functioned as a
means to prevent companies falling into the hands of hostile bidders.
Regarding the latter point, we need to address the hostile tender offer made by Oji Paper,
the largest paper manufacturer of Japan, for Hokuetsu Paper, the sixth largest. Oji Paper
and Hokuetsu Paper both belong to the Japan Federation of Printing Industries. This raises
the question whether the influence of the trade association is changing. Oji Paper’s reason
for the hostile tender offer was the necessity to build a company that is competitive in the
international market. It explains that the two companies combined would create the
number 5 paper company in the world. At this size the company would be better able to
deal with the costs of oil, power and materials. According to a report by Hokuetsu Paper
there have been continued discussions with Oji Paper regarding the enhancement of
international competitiveness the last few years. During these discussions Oji Paper has
(coercively) requested Hokuetsu Paper to stop planning the construction of a cutting edge
facility several times. Oji Paper had not reached the level of technology to produce a
similar facility yet. Because Hokuetsu Paper did not comply with the request, Oji Paper
launched its hostile tender offer after the official announcement of the factory’s
construction. This hostile tender offer was not only to the dislike of Hokuetsu paper. The
Japan Federation of Printing Industries issued the following press release on August 8,
2006: “The market share of post-integration of Oji and Hokuetsu will likely violate the
anti-monopoly law. This integration is damaging to the printing industry and as the Japan
Federation of Printing Industries, we express our absolute opposition.”
As we mentioned in chapter 2, Mitsubishi Corporation bought 30% of the newly issued
shares. Hokuetsu Paper does not belong to a horizontal keiretsu and Mitsubishi
Corporation does not belong to its largest shareholders. We think that the reason for the
purchase of the shares lies in the good relations Hokuetsu has with other companies in the
Japan Federation of Printing Industries. Mitsubishi Paper belongs to the Mitsubishi UFJ
Financial Group keiretsu of which Mitsubishi Corporation is a member. Mitsubishi Paper,
the fifth largest paper company, had a comprehensive Business Alliance with Hokuetsu
Paper during the period July 2000 to July 2005. This business alliance might have led to
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particularistic trust and the above mentioned rescue. The other party that bought new
shares of Hokuetsu (8.8% ownership) was Nippon Paper. The latter two companies signed
a strategic alliance in which management autonomy was respected on December 1, 2006.
When looking at the bidder companies, the hostile tender offers attempts were
undertaken by two foreign bleu-chip companies, three Japanese companies, of which one a
bleu-chip company, a U.S. investment fund and a Japanese investment fund. Only the
hostile tender offers initiated by the blue-chip foreign companies were successful. The
main reason for their success seems to lie in the fact that both companies had a long
business relationship with the target company. Cable & Wireless was one of the founding
companies and largest shareholders of International Digital Communications. Boehringer
Ingelberg was the largest shareholder of SS Pharmaceuticals Company and even held a
seat on the board of directors. Both companies wanted to strengthen their relationship with
the target company as respectively the telecom and pharmaceutical sectors were being
deregulated. They wanted to increase their shareholdings in a friendly way with the
management but failed and then turned to the hostile tender offer. The interesting aspect in
this sequence of events is that it was not perceived as such by the target companies or other
related companies. The hostile tender offers succeeded because the companies had shown a
strong interest in the target company for a long time and wanted to improve efficiency.
Other Japanese companies and also the Japanese government thought it would be
beneficial for the Japanese economy, and the hostile tender offers therefore succeeded.
This appears to be the largest difference with the other hostile tender offers attempts that
all failed. It is unclear how the target companies would be affected if the hostile bidder was
successful, and whether it would have a positive influence on the economy.
This argument applies especially for the two investment funds that were responsible for
eight of the hostile tender offer attempts. It is unclear whether the companies’ intention is
greenmail, asset-stripping, or restructuring. The three Japanese companies that initiated
hostile tender offers attempts also failed. Of these three companies, Yumeshin Holdings
and Don Quijote do not belong to a trade association, and this could be a reason why they
initiated a hostile tender offer. The most interesting aspects of these hostile tender offer
attempts is that in both cases the hostile bidder did not engage in a hostile tender offer
contest with the white knight. Hereupon we can conclude that the hostile bidder companies
either did not have a real intention of getting operational control over the target company,
or there were other factors that pressured the company from not engaging in a tender offer
contest. The hostile bidder companies were able to profit from the sale of the target
company’s shares to the white knight, and this can indicate that the hostile takeover was
merely a greenmail attempt, similar to the shite groups.
In any event, we do not think that the nature of hostile takeovers in Japan is changing as
the recent hostile tender offer attempts can (also) be interpreted as greenmail. This,
combined with the fact the attempts remain at a very low level, leads us to question the
generally accepted explanations and the influence of the unwinding of cross-shareholdings
and changes in Japanese cultural characteristics. With our model we therefore propose the
vertical keiretsu and trade association as explanations why Japanese blue-chip companies
do not initiate hostile tender offers.
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7-3-2 Generated Hypotheses
In section 7-2 we explained that previous research argues that there were no hostile tender
offers in the post-war period as a result of horizontal keiretsu and the specific Japanese
cultural characteristics. In chapter 5 we showed that as of the 1980s the stable and cross-
shareholdings between companies reduced in importance. We also explained in chapter 1
that the cultural characteristics such as life-time employment and seniority-based wages
are not pursued by Japanese companies any longer. Although these two institutional
elements are said to have changed in Japan, we indicated above that we do not see an
increase in hostile tender offers. This raises the question whether they are indeed changing
and/or have the influence, as claimed in previous research. With our institutional analysis
we find that other explanations for the low number of hostile tender offers could be the
vertical keiretsu or trade associations. With our inductive research approach we generate
the following hypotheses with reference to hostile tender offers in Japan.
Hypothesis I:
The horizontal keiretsu and the specific Japanese cultural characteristics did not influence
hostile takeovers. Therefore, the observed recent changes do not have any effect.
Hypothesis II:
Horizontal keiretsu and/or the specific Japanese cultural characteristics did not change to
the degree it influenced hostile takeovers.
Hypothesis III:
Hostile takeovers are prevented by vertical keiretsu and/or trade associations.
Hypothesis IV:
Combination of Hypothesis II and Hypothesis III.
Hypothesis V:
Hostile takeovers are prevented by other factors.
7-4 Concluding remarks
In this chapter we looked into interpretations on corporate groups and hostile takeovers
from previous research, and we provided our own interpretation based on our institutional
model. Previous research argued that the six horizontal keiretsu were formed as a result of
hostile takeovers in the 1950s, and contends that these subsequently have prevented hostile
takeovers in the entire post-war period. Another explanation put forward is that hostile
takeovers do not fit in with the Japanese culture. Regarding the existence of the vertical
keiretsu, it is claimed that these can be sustained without contractual safeguards because of
a high level of trust, importance of reputation, and financial hostages.
Before we provided an explanation for the corporate groups according to our
institutional model, we indicated that the Japanese society is characterized by high
particularistic trust and low general trust. It is important to understand this trust is very
different from for example the U.S., as it results in the corporate groups in Japan.
The horizontal keiretsu finds its origins in the ie system and developed from the pre-war
zaibatsu. Resulting from the new formal institutions implemented by SCAP after WWII,
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the pre-war governance structures re-arranged itself in the horizontal keiretsu. The vertical
keiretsu is different from the horizontal keiretsu in that it developed after WWII. These
groups are characterized by a relationship in which the parent company and subsidiary are
mutually dependent. This mutual dependency and the benefit for the parent company,
rather than trust, have the most important influence on this relationship. The first trade
association was formed in 1092AD and trade associations have been very important in the
economic development of Japan. This also applies to companies in the same business
sectors, as the trade associations disseminated new technology and information. Trade
associations also try to influence government policy and the (competing) member
companies developed good relationships with each other.
We showed that the horizontal keiretsu as the most important prevention measure
against hostile takeovers is doubtful. Based on our analysis we concluded that in the post-
war period, all hostile takeovers need to be interpreted as greenmail attempts. New laws
implemented after WWII created the possibility to engage in greenmail and, as companies
could not repurchase their own shares prior to 2001, companies that were part of a
horizontal keiretsu were targeted. Rather than preventing hostile takeovers, the horizontal
keiretsu appear to have caused greenmail in the post-war period.
Trade associations are formed by companies in the same industrial sector and
information is exchanged and relationships are built. We show that because of the strong
relations in these groups, companies build a high level of particularistic trust, preventing
these companies to engage in hostile takeovers against each other.
The vertical keiretsu is another important impediment to hostile takeovers, functioning
in three ways. The first characteristic is that a large Japanese company is not the same as a
large U.S. company. Whereas the U.S. company tends to produce most products within the
company, the Japanese company uses a wide subcontracting system that makes it a
difficult target for a hostile takeover. The second characteristic of the vertical keiretsu is
that supply from the subsidiaries is indispensable in the production process of the parent
company. The majority of its important subsidiaries is already fully owned but if a hostile
takeover is attempted on an important partially owned subsidiary, the parent company will
intervene to secure its own production process. The third aspect is the question whether it
would be beneficial for a hostile bidder to try and takeover an unwilling subsidiary
company. Even if the hostile bidder would succeed it is very likely it will lose the
subsidiary’s suppliers and customers in the process. All these factors have limited hostile
takeover attempts to a high degree.
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Introduction to M&A
This chapter introduces M&A structures and discusses merger motives and drivers for
merger wave. Section 8-1 explains that M&A can be for the purpose of business
diversification and expansion, or corporate restructuring. The section indicates the
structures of M&A that can be used for each purpose and explains how a mergers or
Tender Offer Bid (“TOB”) can be implemented. Some available defensive measures for
hostile takeovers are also described. Section 8-2 discusses four motives for mergers and
two merger wave drivers, and presents findings of previous research. An overview of the
five merger waves that occurred in the United States since 1890 is given in section 8-3.
The discussion of the U.S. merger waves serves as a reference for our own findings on
merger waves in Japan. We conclude the chapter with section 8-4.
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8-1 M&A terminology69
R M&A activity can be aimed at (i) diversification or expansion or (ii) restructuring.
R Mergers and tender offers are diversification and expansion activities in which
managerial and ownership rights are transferred.
R Defensive measures for hostile tender offers are the poison pill, white knight, white
squire and greenmail.
M&A generally refers to a broad range of M&A structures including capital participations,
business tie-ups, divestures and other forms of restructuring. In sub-section 8-1-1 we
provide an overview of the main M&A types. This thesis primarily looks into (i) mergers
and (ii) Tender Offers (also referred to as “TOB”, “Tender Offer Buyout/Bid” and
“Takeover Bid”). Sub-section 8-1-2 explains the three most important merger structures
and sub-section 8-1-3 introduces the tender offer and some defensive measures against
hostile takeovers.
8-1-1 Types of M&A
Figure 8-1 shows that M&A activity can be divided in two activity types: (i) diversification
or expansion and (ii) restructuring. Diversification or expansion activities can be structured
as a merger, acquisition, capital tie-up or contractual agreement. Restructuring activities
consist of selling a company’s business unit(s) or (a part of all) assets.
Diversification or expansion – Within this type we can distinguish transactions with, and
without, a transfer of managerial and ownership rights. Transactions with a transfer of
managerial and ownership rights are the merger and acquisition. The merger is discussed
in the next sub-section. Here we discuss the two forms of acquisition. In a stock
acquisition the acquiring company buys more than 50% of a target company’s shares and
herewith attains majority ownership. This can be achieved by (i) stock acquisition from
existing shareholders, (ii) subscription of new issues of stock, (iii) acquisition via stock
swap or (iv) acquisition by Leveraged Buy-out (LBO), Management Buy-out (MBO) or
TOB.
An alternative to the stock acquisition is the asset acquisition, in which the buyer
company purchases the target company’s assets. The buying company can limit its
acquisitions to those parts of the target company that coincide with the buyer’s needs. If
the buyer company purchases all the assets of the target company, the latter becomes a
corporate shell with cash or securities that it received from the acquisition as assets. After
the transaction the company can be dissolved and a liquidating dividend paid to the
stockholders. Alternatively, the company may use its liquid assets to purchase other assets
or another company. After a partial acquisition of the target’s assets, the target company
can be continued after the transaction.
Activities not involving transfer of managerial and ownership rights are the capital tie-
up and contractual relationship. The first type of the capital tie-up is a capital participation
in which the acquiring company does not acquire more than 50% of the outstanding shares.
The second type of capital tie-up is a joint venture company, a separate entity in which two
(or more) companies invest. The third type is the alliance, but this does not necessarily
69 This section is based on Ravenscraft and Sherer (1987); Mueller (2003); Bruner (2004).
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involve equity participation. It can also be an alliance to exchange only human capital or
resources. On the other hand, it is more than a contractual relationship. A contractual
relationship is a licensing agreement, co-marketing agreement or joint-purchasing
agreement.
Capital participation
Joint venture company
Contractual relationship
Split-off
Capital tie-up
Divesture
Statutory consolidation
Merger
Asset acquisition
Acquisition
Stock acquisition
M&A activity
Diversification or Expansion
Equity carve-out
Restructuring
Triangular merger
Sell-off
Spin-off
Split-up
Statutory merger
Figure 8-1 M&A types
Restructuring - The restructuring type of M&A consists of transactions in which a new
entity is created. New entities are created through a sell-off, split-off and equity carve-out.
A sell-off is the sale of a company’s business or (a part of all) assets, and can be executed
as a spin-off or split-up. A spin-off is a sell-off of a part of the business or assets, through
which a separate new legal entity is created. The shares of the new entity are distributed on
a pro rata basis to existing shareholders of the original company. The shareholders of the
original company will have the same proportion of ownership in the new entity. The main
reason of this kind of sell-off is to create a separation in control and decision making
between the original company and the new entity. A split-up is a series of spin-offs
through which the original company is replaced by newly established entities. The original
company ceases to exist after the split-up.
A split-off is a restructuring form in which a subsidiary becomes a separate freestanding
entity. The parent company of the subsidiary swaps its own shares for shares in the
subsidiary. A proportion of the parent company’s shareholders receives ownership of the
new entity (previous subsidiary) in exchange for their ownership of the parent company.
In an equity carve-out a business unit of a company is sold through an initial public
offering (IPO). The business unit forms a new separate entity and its shares are sold to
outsiders. The equity holders need not be the same as the equity holders in the original
seller. A new control group is immediately created.
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In a divesture a part of the original company is sold to an outside third party. The
original company receives cash or equivalent consideration for the sale. Usually the buyer
is an existing company and no new legal entity results. It can be seen as a form of
expansion on the part of the buying company.
8-1-2 Mergers
Prior to our discussion of the merger types, we look briefly into the standard merger
process.
Merger process - During a friendly merger the merging companies’ management,
shareholders, board of directors and creditors are involved in the process. Their relative
influence primarily depends on the company’s financing decision70 i.e. the management’s
choice between internal, debt and equity financing. The financing decision results in a
company’s capital structure and has a determining effect on the ownership and corporate
governance structure.71
Generally, the bidder company’s management will approach the management of the
target company to suggest a merger between the two companies. If the target company’s
management is positive towards the proposition, the management of the two companies
will enter the negotiation phase. When the two parties reach an agreement about the
merger conditions, the merger process generally develops as follows:
ï Board of Directors’ meeting; to obtain board approval of the merger proposal and
execute the merger agreement.
ï Shareholders’ meeting; to obtain approval of the merger agreement.
ï Creditors are permitted to object to the merger after the shareholders’ meeting. If the
creditors make an objection to the merger, the company must provide them with
collateral security, property or debt.
ï Registration of changes in corporate structure.
The merger process shows involvement of management, shareholders, board of directors
and creditors. The latter actors can play an important role in the merger process, especially
when companies fall in financial distress. Creditors provide the company debt financing as
loans or corporate bonds in the form of a tradable public issue or custom tailored private
placement. Debt creates a tax shield for interest and shield benefits increase with a higher
amount of debt. The higher level of debt, on the other hand, also raises the probability of
financial distress and consequently bankruptcy costs (Brealey and Myers 1996).
A company having difficulty to meet its financial obligations is in financial distress.
When the company cannot meet its obligations, this can lead to its bankruptcy. In case of
bankruptcy, the creditors will take control over the company. Warner (1977) explains there
70 Myers (1984) indicates that according to the pecking order of financing, managers prefer internal finance and,
if external finance is required, debt over equity financing. Myers gives the interpretation of managerial capitalism
on the preference for internal financing as “a byproduct of the separation of ownership and control: professional
managers avoid relying on external finance because it would subject them to the discipline of the capital market”
(p.582). The preference of debt over equity results from asymmetric information between the management with
(insider) information and the shareholders/investors. A management that is optimistic about the future of the
company will consider its equity as undervalued and therefore issue debt. If the management is pessimistic about
the company’s future, it will issue the overvalued equity. On the other hand, as the investors will interpret an
equity issue as a signal that equity is overvalued, the company’s stock price might fall. The management will
therefore decide to issue debt.
71 The influence of the financing decision on the ownership structure is through private placement of shares.
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are direct and indirect bankruptcy costs. Direct bankruptcy costs are the legal and
administrative costs at the time of the bankruptcy. “[I]ndirect costs include lost sales, lost
profits, and possibly the inability of the firm to obtain credit or to issue securities except
under especially onerous terms” (p.338). These bankruptcy costs represent the difficulties
to run a company that is going bankrupt. It can become impossible to get financing for
necessary investments and/or (other) creditors could block selling off unnecessary assets.
Creditors can also take control of the company and engage in restructuring and M&A
activities.
Statutory merger - In a statutory merger the bidder company absorbs the target company.
The target company seizes to exist and its assets and liabilities are taken over by the bidder
company. A statutory merger is normally applied when the bidder is significantly larger
than the target. The target shareholders receive the bidder company’s shares and/or “boot”
(cash or notes) in exchange for their shares. A merger paid with cash will have no
influence on the shareholder structure of the bidder company. A payment in shares
however, depending on the target company’s shareholder structure, might result in large
changes in the voting control of the new company.
By utilizing a stock swap, the bidder company can exchange the shares of the target
company’s shareholders for its own existing or newly issued shares. A very important
feature of the stock swap is that, upon approval of two-third of both companies’
shareholders 72 , the bidder company can compel minority shareholders of the target
company to exchange their shares. Also, in transactions where shares are swapped or
transferred, there is no need to raise funds for stock. Prior to the legal amendments in
Japan during the late 1990s, it was only possible for the bidder company to squeeze out
dissenting minority shareholders with cash. If the minority shareholders do not wish to
become shareholders of the acquiring company, they have the right to sell the stock of the
target company to the acquiring company. Thus, it makes it easier for companies to gain
100%-ownership in other companies for either restructuring or acquisition purposes. It also
enables a parent company to easily get 100%-ownership in partially-owned subsidiaries
and create a holding company structure (Lebrun 2001).
Statutory consolidation - A statutory consolidation is a combination of two or more
companies in which the merged companies seize to exist and an entirely new entity is
formed. The shareholders of the merging companies receive shares of the new company in
exchange for their shares, which is also referred to as ‘stock transfer’. A consolidation is
often used in case of a “merger of equals”. In the literature and practice, this combination
is also frequently referred to as merger.
Triangular merger - In a triangular merger the bidder company establishes or has a
subsidiary company to merge with the target company. The bidder company can provide
the subsidiary with cash or its own shares as a medium of payment for the merger.
A forward triangular cash merger is a merger in which the subsidiary company buys the
shares of the target company with cash and then absorbs the target. The target company
seizes to exist. In a reverse triangular cash merger the payment is the same but in this case
72ᨓith at least 50% of all outstanding shares present at the shareholder’s meeting.
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the subsidiary company is merged into the target company. The subsidiary company seizes
to exist.
The other possibility is that the subsidiary uses the bidder company’s shares as a
medium of payment. This structure has two advantages for the bidder company compared
to a statutory merger. Firstly, the target company’s liabilities will be transferred to the
subsidiary, leaving the bidder company insulated from risks. Secondly, the merger does
not need to be approved by the bidder company’s shareholders. In a forward triangular
merger the subsidiary company buys the shares of the target company with the bidder
company’s shares and boot. The target company is absorbed by the subsidiary. In a reverse
triangular merger the subsidiary company buys the shares of the target company with the
bidder company’s shares and boot. Subsequently, the subsidiary company is merged into
the target company.
8-1-3 Tender offers
In a tender offer the bidder company attempts to gain a controlling interest in the target
company by asking the target’s stockholders to submit (tender) their shares. The tender
offer is an offer outside the public market, often against market price at a premium, and
can be made to the target’s board of directors or directly to the shareholders.
When a bidder company expects the management and board of directors to be neutral or
positive to a tender offer, it can consider a bear hug approach. According to this approach,
the bidder will make the tender offer to the target’s board of directors without making a
public announcement. The board of directors will be informed of the bid proposal and be
required to make a quick decision. If the target company’s board of directors and
management support the bid it will be a friendly tender offer, if they do not support the bid
it will be a hostile tender offer. In the latter case the bidder company will ask the target’s
shareholders to tender their shares without the board of directors’ approval. If the bidder
could have expected the negative response, it could also have decided to approach the
shareholders immediately, not engaging in the bear hug.
Schwert (2000) indicates that “most transactions contain elements of both friendly and
hostile deals. That is, some stakeholders are likely to be disadvantaged by the transaction
and there are likely to be some economic gains from combining the operations of the
bidder and target” (pp.2599-2600), and that “[H]ostility is usually perceived when an offer
is made public that is aggressively rejected by the target firm” (p.2600).
8-1-3-1 Defensive measures
There are numerous defensive measures the target company can take in order to prevent a
hostile takeover from succeeding.
Poison pill - The target company issues rights to existing shareholders to obtain new
shares at nominal cost (also referred to as ‘rights plan’). When a bidder company acquires
more than the threshold percentage of shares under the rights plan, the rights allow all
shareholders (excluding the bidder who triggered the threshold) to convert the right into
common shares. This dilutes the bidder company’s ownership percentage in the target, and
makes it more expensive and difficult to acquire control of the target company.
White knight - When a hostile tender offer is being carried out, the target company may
try to find a white knight. This is a friendly bidder company that will merge with the target
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company agreeing not to break it up nor drastically cut the labour force. The white knight
either has a business relationship with the company or is a direct competitor of the target
company. The white knight could be motivated by his own strategic motives, or just to
prevent the hostile bidder taking over the target company.
White squire - A friendly acquirer purchases a large block of stock in the target. As a
large stable shareholder, the white squire agrees to vote supportive for the target
company’s management but does not take control of the target company.
Greenmail - An acquirer (green mailer) buys up shares of a target company with the
objective that the target company will repurchase them at a premium. In these transactions
the green mailer makes profits at the expense of the company’s shareholders.
8-2 Merger motives
R The synergy motive implies that synergy gains are realized when two companies are
combined.
R A merger with an adaptive (failing company) motive can be seen as an alternative to
bankruptcy.
R Mergers with a managerial empire motive are driven by the management’s personal
goal at the expense of the company’s shareholders.
R The hubris motive implies that a bidder company’s management overestimates
obtainable synergies and therefore overpays.
A merger motive applies to individual merger cases and explains why a company decides
to merge with another company or to take over a company. In this section we discuss the
synergy, adaptive (failing company), managerial empire building, and hubris motive. If
applicable, we also examine the influence of the type of merger. Three merger types can be
distinguished; (i) the horizontal merger is a combination of companies in the same line of
business, (ii) the vertical merger is a merger between companies in different stages of the
same production cycle, and (iii) the conglomerate merger is a combination of companies
that are engaged in unrelated types of business.
Synergy motive - The synergy motive implies that synergy gains are realized when two
companies are combined. The combination of the two companies results in a higher value
than the value of the companies on a stand-alone basis (Jensen and Ruback 1983; Healey,
Palepu and Ruback 1992). This motive is most important in the discussion on mergers and
acquisitions and is a rational motive, based on expectations of possible gains. According to
this motive, the management of bidder and target companies will only engage in M&A
activity if it maximizes shareholder wealth of both companies. The wealth gains to the
target company’s shareholders should therefore be positively correlated to the bidder
company’s shareholder wealth gains, and both these gains will be positively correlated
with total gain (Berkovitch and Narayanan 1993). Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993),
Bradley et al. (1988), and Goergen and Renneboog (2003) find support for the synergy
motive in transactions with a positive total gain.
Synergy can result from increased market power or efficiency. Horizontal mergers can
increase market power of the bidder company by reducing the number of competitors. It is
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also possible that costs are reduced through higher efficiency by economies of scale and/or
stronger bargaining power towards suppliers, customers or financiers. On the other hand,
this motive can get a lot of opposition or even be prohibited by the government when it has
a large influence on the concentration within an industry. A vertical merger can achieve
higher market power by making it more difficult for other companies to enter the vertical
production chain, and by securing the company’s supply and/or sales (Comanor 1967).
Merging with a supplier is called backward integration, and a merger with a company at
the sales side is called forward integration. In a vertical merger better efficiency is possible
by (i) elimination of transaction costs between the two companies (no more profit seeking
by either company) (Williamson 1975), and (ii) by a shortened production process after the
merger. In a conglomerate merger market power can be increased by diversifying the
company’s activities through mergers. The company’s overall performance will be less
dependent on developments in one particular business sector (Mueller 2003; Bruner 2004),
and companies can increase efficiency with economies of scope (Bruner 2004; Ravenscraft
and Sherer 1987).
Adaptive (failing company) motive - In some cases a merger is a good alternative for
bankruptcy. Dewey (1961) argues that most mergers “have virtually nothing to do with
either the creation of market power or realization of scale economies. They are merely a
civilized alternative to bankruptcy or the voluntary liquidation that transfers assets from
falling to rising firms” (p.257). In this case the creditors will play an important role in the
restructuring activities to secure their outstanding loans.
The generalization of the adaptive motive by Dewey (1961) is not supported by research
that examines the profitability of target companies. Mueller (1980) and Harris et al. (1982)
find that target companies have average profit rates similar to non-target companies and
bidder companies. Weston and Mansinghka (1971) and Melicher and Rush (1974)
investigate conglomerate mergers during the 1960s in the U.S., and show that bidder
companies had below average profits, which were also lower than those of target
companies. Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987, Ch.3) find that their sample of target
companies had significantly higher profit rates than similar non-target companies.
Clark and Ofek (1994) look into 38 takeovers involving a distressed target and do not
find that the acquisition leads to superior performance. On the other hand, they cannot
conclude that the restructuring of the target company was a poor choice in relation to other
courses of action. Lang, Stulz, and Walking (1989) and Servaes (1991) examine returns in
mergers and takeovers involving poorly performing targets with Tobin’s q ratio as a
measure of managerial performance. Servaes (1991) finds that target, bidder and total
takeover returns are larger when the bidder company is performing well and the target
company is performing poorly. Holl and Kyriazis (1997) investigate UK mergers and their
findings support Servaes (1991) in that well-managed bidder companies acquire under-
performing target companies to obtain wealth gains.
Managerial empire building - The managerial empire building theory refers to the
behaviour of managers regarding M&A transactions. When management of a bidder
company decides to merge with another company, it is possible that this is driven by the
management’s personal goal at the expense of the company’s shareholders. The
managerial empire building motive argues that managers knowingly overpay in M&A
deals that are motivated by a maximization of the managers’ own utility at the expense of
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the company’s shareholders. The self-interest of the bidder’s management is the prime
reason for an M&A deal. The management might decide on a merger or acquisitions
because of the pursuit of growth in physical size of the company. The increase in size of
the company can result in more power and prestige for the manager and also have a
positive effect on his remuneration. The motivation of the merger is not the creation of
shareholder wealth, and the growth maximization hypothesis predicts that the abnormal
return will be low or negative when this policy becomes known to the market (Goergen
and Renneboog 2003; Conyon and Murphy 2002; Mueller 1969; Mandelker 1974;
Malatesta 1983). The managerial empire building motive is reflected in the bootstrap game
and use of surplus funds for M&A.
Bootstrap game - The bidder company can decide to merge with a target company to
increase its share price based on a higher accounting profit. This is the so-called bootstrap
game in which a bidder company with a high Price/Earnings-ratio merges with a target
company that has a low Price/Earnings-ratio. If the bidder company pays in stock, it will
increase its earnings per share and this can result in a higher share price if the market is
fooled (Brealey and Myers 1996).
Surplus funds - Companies that generate a substantial amount of cash but do not have
any profitable internal investment opportunities, look for ways to spend this capital. Ideally
such a company should distribute the surplus funds to shareholders by increasing its
dividend payments, or it should repurchase its stock. However, many companies turn to
mergers or acquisitions (Bruner 2002). This is not efficiency-related, but is used to prevent
the capital from flowing out of the company (Jensen 1986).
Hubris - The hubris theory also refers to behavioural assumptions and argues that the
bidder company’s management overestimates the obtainable synergies and therefore
overpays the M&A deal. Hubris, excessive pride and arrogance, refers to the assumption
of the management of the bidder company that it can create value where others cannot
(Roll 1986). Total wealth of the deal is zero and wealth is transferred from the bidder
company’s shareholders to the target company’s shareholders. Berkovitch and Narayanan
(1993) argue that an M&A deal motivated by hubris will have a negative correlation
between target and bidder gains, and zero correlation between target and total gains.
Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993), Roll (1986), Malmendier and Tate (2003), and
Hayward and Hambrick (1997) find evidence for the hubris amongst bidder companies in
the U.S. Raj and Forsyth (2003) examine acquisitions in the UK market and find that
bidder companies pay a higher premium in hubris acquisitions than general acquisitions.
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8-3 Merger waves
R Merger waves can be driven by (i) external shocks, such as shocks to an industry’s
economic, technological or regulatory environment or (ii) overvaluation of stocks.
R Five merger waves occurred in the U.S.; the waves were driven by a combination of
factors but ended when the stock market crashed.
R The merger motives differed in each wave, which was primarily caused by laws and
regulations related to market concentration and financial markets.
Merger waves are periods when, relative to other periods, a lot of M&A activity occurs. In
this section we discuss two drivers of merger waves and the merger waves that occurred in
the United States.
8-3-1 Drivers for merger waves
A driver for merger waves is different from a merger motive as it explains an overall M&A
movement, rather than an individual merger case. Merger waves can be driven by external
shocks or overvaluation in stocks. Although these are interrelated, each approach places its
emphasis on a particular aspect.
External Shocks - The neoclassical theory predicts that merger waves are initiated by
shocks to an industry’s economic, technological or regulatory environment. After an
industrial shock has taken place, assets will be reallocated as quickly and efficiently as
possible in the form of M&A activity (Andrade and Stafford 2004; Mitchell and Mulherin
1996). Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) document that deregulation, increased foreign
competition, financial innovations and oil price shocks can explain takeovers and
restructurings in industrial sectors. Andrade and Stafford (2004) make a distinction
between the “expansionary” and “contractionary” role of mergers; the former increases
capital stock of a company, similar to an internal investment, the latter facilitates
consolidation and reduction of a company’s asset base.
According to the expansion hypothesis, mergers can be seen as a way to respond to
increasing economic growth and a positive business cycle. The merger can increase the
company’s market power or efficiency and provide possibilities to exploit the market.
“[T]he profits of such market control are of course all the greater if the market is
expanding. We might thus expect attempts at mergers for market control to occur early in a
cyclical expansion, when expectations become favorable” (Nelson 1959, p.107).
According to the contraction (retardation) hypothesis, on the other hand, mergers are a
means by which a company can preserve profits when economic growth is falling. Mergers
occur when the overall business cycle is negative, demand falls or competition is rising.
Jensen (1993) argues that it can be the result of changes in the product and factor markets,
legal, political and regulatory systems, and the capital markets. In particular, he indicates
that excess productive capacity in many industries caused by technological and supply
shocks will result in reorganization and restructuring activities in order to eliminate the
excess capacity.
Harford (2005) argues that a merger wave can only result from an external shock if there
is sufficient capital liquidity to accommodate reallocation of assets.
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Overvaluation of stocks - The behavioural theory takes market mispricing as a given and
argues that companies’ market valuation is most important for M&A activity. According to
this theory managers are rational and the stock market is irrational. Managers will engage
in M&A activity when their own company is overvalued. The overvalued stock effectively
lowers the price of the acquisition and is used to acquire the assets of undervalued or less
overvalued companies. According to this theory, merger waves occur during stock market
booms as a result of managerial timing of market overvaluations of their companies
(Shleifer and Vishny 2003). Rhodes-Kropf and Vishwanathan (2004) build a theoretical
model that assumes that managers of bidder companies have complete information on the
value of the company and synergies that will be created with a merger. The managers of
the target company, on the other hand, do not have this information. In a stock market
boom, bidder companies will use stock swaps to finance the M&A activity with
overvalued stock. The managers of the target company will accept the bidder company’s
offer financed by the overvalued stock because they do not have complete information.
8-3-2 Merger waves in the United States
In the United States and Europe five merger waves can be distinguished since 1890. In this
section we look into the waves that occurred in the United States and explain their most
important characteristics.73
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Figure 8-2 Mergers in the United States in the period 1895-1930
Note The graph depicts the merger cases that occurred in the manufacturing and mining sectors.
Source Nelson (1959) for 1895-1918. Eis (1969) for 1919-1930
First merger wave - The first merger wave in United States started in 1895 and ended in
1904. The average annual number of companies that were absorbed into mergers during
73 Please refer to Goergen and Renneboog (2003) for a discussion of merger waves in Europe.
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this decade was 301 with an average capitalization of 691 million dollars. Merger activity
peaked in the years 1899 and 1901 with capitalizations exceeding 2 billion dollars.
The companies’ main M&A motive during this wave was to increase market power. The
mergers were predominantly horizontal and had a very important impact on the
concentration in a wide variety of industrial sectors. Nelson (1959) explains that “[I]t
transformed many industries, formerly characterized by many small and medium-sized
firms, into those in which one or a few large enterprises occupied leading positions” (p.5).
In this period industrial giants like DuPont Inc., Standard Oil, General Electric, Eastman
Kodak, and American Tobacco Inc. were established. Gaughan (1999) explains that
“[W]hile these companies are major corporations today with large market shares, some
were truly dominant firms by the end of the first merger wave” (p.22). The wave is
therefore also termed as “merging to form monopolies” (Stigler 1950).
Stigler (1950) argues that legislation on incorporation and elimination of almost every
restriction on mergers, together with the development of trading in industrial stocks on the
New York Stock exchange, had an important influence on the first merger movement. This
wave came to an end around 1903-05, when the equity market crashed.
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Figure 8-3 M&A announcements in the United States in the period 1963-1998
SourceMergerstat
Second merger wave - The second merger wave started in the boom years after WWI in
1919, peaked in the period 1928-29, and ended in 1930. The average annual number of
companies that disappeared into mergers during this twelve-year period was 250, with an
average capitalization of 1,012 million dollars.
Stigler (1950) explains that the companies that undertook the mergers in the second
wave were not the dominant companies in the industry like the first wave. The stricter
antitrust environment resulted in mergers of second rank companies. Vertical mergers were
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most important and industries were “changed from near-monopoly to oligopoly” (p.31).
Gaughan (1999) argues that this development was also caused by the “federal
government’s encouragement of the formation of business cooperatives to enhance the
nation’s productivity as part of the war effort” (p.29).
Debt had become an important medium of payment for mergers during this wave.
“Black Thursday”, the market crash on 29 October 1929, put an end to the wave.
Third merger wave - The third merger wave started in 1965 and ended in 1970. Gaughan
(1999) reports that the average annual number of companies that disappeared into mergers
during this six-year period was 3,866 with a peak in the year 1969 when 6,107 mergers
took place. The targets were significantly smaller than the bidders in this period.
In the 1960s the government’s fear for companies attaining monopoly power was high
and tough antitrust laws were implemented. Horizontal and vertical mergers were virtually
impossible for larger companies and those that wanted to expand operations therefore
turned to conglomerate mergers.
M&A activities during this wave were focused on diversification and creation of large
conglomerates. The Dow Jones Industrial average had increased from 618 to 906 in the
period 1960-68 and made stock an important medium of financing for M&A.
Fourth Merger Wave - The fourth merger wave started in 1981 and ended in 1989. The
average annual number of companies that disappeared into mergers during this nine-year
period was 2,534 with a total dollar value paid of 147 billion dollars. In this period the
average merger was worth 58 million dollars, marking a tremendous increase in value
compared with the average of 3.2 million dollars in 1970 (the year after the third wave).
As these numbers indicate, the fourth wave is characterized by mega-mergers (mergers
between very large companies). The other characteristic is the higher frequency of hostile
takeovers as shown in table 8-1. In the U.S., hostile takeovers already occur since 1908,
but during the 1970s major established companies started engaging in hostile takeovers
(for example, INCO versus ESB, and United Technologies versus Otis Elevator).
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Table 8-1 Tender offers in the United States in the period 1980-1993
Year TOB Contested TOB
1980 53 12
1981 75 28
1982 68 29
1983 37 11
1984 79 18
1985 84 32
1986 150 40
1987 116 31
1988 217 46
1989 132 28
1990 56 8
1991 20 2
1992 18 2
1993 32 3
SourceMergerstat
The corporate raider became more prominent during this wave as well. Development of
new financial instruments and markets (e.g. the junk bond market) facilitated the financing
of mergers and acquisitions. The most important medium of payment were cash and debt
and the new debt securities allowed smaller companies to acquire relatively larger targets
through leveraged buyouts.
Fifth Merger Wave – The fifth wave started in 1992 and is characterized by deals aimed
at strategic motives with bidder and target companies operating in the same industry.
Figure 8-3 shows an upward trend in M&A cases up to 2000. The number of M&A deals
increased from 2,574 cases in 1992 to 11,123 cases in 2000, the amount increasing from
respectively 96.7 to 1,268.6 billion dollars. This is a considerable increase compared to the
fourth wave in which the annual average was 2,534 deals at a dollar value of 147 billion
dollars. M&A deals showed a sharp drop in the years 2001-2002 as stock prices
plummeted on exchanges in the United States, resulting from the September 11 attacks, the
bursting of the internet bubble and the accounting scandals. M&A activity has been
increasing since 2003 and reached its highest level in 2006 with 11,750 M&A cases at a
value of 1,484.3 billion dollars.
8-4 Conclusion
This chapter introduced the M&A terminology that is used in the thesis. M&A activities
can be divided in the activities related to (i) diversification or expansion and (ii)
restructuring. The main focus of this thesis is M&A activity structured as mergers and
hostile takeovers. Regarding hostile takeovers we showed some available defensive
measures such as the poison pill, white knight, white squire and greenmail. Especially the
latter two defensive measures have played an important role in post-war Japan. Recently
the poison pill has become popular.
We discussed some merger motives and distinguished synergy, adaptive, managerial
empire building, and hubris. The synergy motive implies that synergy gains are realized
when two companies are combined, whereas a merger with an adaptive (failing company)
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motive can be seen as an alternative to bankruptcy. Mergers with a managerial empire
motive are driven by the management’s personal goal at the expense of the company’s
shareholders, and the hubris motive implies that the management overestimates obtainable
synergies and therefore overpays.
Section 8-3 showed that merger waves can be driven by external shocks, such as shocks
to an industry’s economic, technological or regulatory environment, or overvaluation of
stocks. Five merger waves occurred in the U.S., of which the first wave (1900) was aimed
at increasing market power, and the second wave focused on restructuring industrial
sectors. The third wave in the 1960s was aimed at diversification and creation of large
conglomerates, whereas the fourth wave was dominated by mega mergers (between large
companies) and by hostile takeovers. The fifth wave is characterized by deals initiated for
strategic motives.
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9
Merger activity
This chapter examines the influence of some institutional elements on merger activity in
Japan. In section 9-1 we start with an interpretation of M&A activity in the pre-war and
post-war periods; we focus on the effect of Japan’s political and economic development,
and the role of actors. We look into merger motives and drivers for merger waves, and for
the post-war period we discuss some results from studies that look into efficiency effects
of Japanese mergers. Section 9-2 discusses previous research on the monitoring role of the
main bank, the abnormal return in Japanese and U.S. mergers, and the profitability drivers
of mergers. Sections 9-3 and 9-4 show the results of our own studies on shareholder wealth.
We examine the influence of Japanese institutional elements such as the main bank system,
horizontal keiretsu, and presence of a parent company, and also look into data such as the
companies’ profitability and financial distress. In section 9-3 we examine the effect of
mergers on shareholder wealth of listed bidder companies in the period 1993-2003. Section
9-4 shows how shareholder wealth of listed bidder and target companies is affected by
mergers during the period 1981-2003. Section 9-5 summarizes and concludes the chapter.
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9-1 M&A activity over time
R In the pre-war period no merger waves occurred, and the main motives for mergers
appear to have been synergy and adaptive.
R The two merger waves in the post-war period were driven by external shocks: the first
wave by new regulations and increased competition, and the second wave by a collapse
of the stock and land prices (first half 1990s) and new regulations (latter half 1990s).
R Merger motives in the post-war period appear to be similar to the pre-war period.
Chapter 2 described M&A activity in the pre-war and post-war periods and provided
evidence that pre-war M&A activity was low. Regarding the post-war period we could
identify two merger waves: the first wave in the 1960s and the second wave starting in
1991. In this section we revisit our findings and examine merger motives, drivers for
merger waves, and which actors played a role. Pettway and Yamada (1986) explain that in
the post-war period, mergers between Japanese companies are normally initiated by either
a third party or the target company seeking managerial or financial assistance. This third
party can be the government, banks, or business leaders and, in contrast to the U.S., the
bidder company rarely takes the initiative.
Pre-war - Based on our analysis of M&A activity by 537 listed companies, we did not
find merger waves in the pre-war period. Understanding mergers in this period therefore
needs to be found in motives for individual mergers. Most M&A activity occurred in the
energy sector and we think this can be explained by the pursuit of synergies through
economies of scale. The electrification of Japanese companies necessitated improvement
of efficiency and M&A activity was indispensable in this process.
Also, the 1920s was a period of financial crises and economic recession in which a lot of
companies faced difficulties. Most mergers during the 1920s can therefore be explained by
the adaptive motive, where weak companies were rescued by stronger companies through
M&A. The question regarding the hostility needs to be viewed from this perspective as
well. Although it is possible that the difficulties in the 1920s resulted in companies
engaging in hostile takeovers of other companies, we think the explanation that companies
in financial distress asked assistance from stronger companies or banks is more plausible.
This would imply that prior to WWII, mergers were also arranged by a target company or
a third party, as argued by Pettway and Yamada with reference to the post-war period.
It is often argued that zaibatsu banks were not as important as the post-war main bank
because the zaibatsu companies did not rely on loan financing. We think that the analysis
of the influence of banks in the pre-war period should not be limited to the financing
decision of companies. The post-war main bank system is named as such because the main
bank, apart from being a loan provider, has various relations with the company. We
therefore argue that the independence on loans should not lead to the conclusion that the
main bank was absent in the pre-war period. As the case studies of mergers by Okazaki in
chapter 2 showed, banks played an important role in corporate governance; bank
executives were directed to become executive director of companies in mergers. Further,
the discussion of the importance of the main bank should be directed to the target company,
rather than the bidder company. We will come back to this issue in section 9-4 with
reference to the second merger wave, but it is important to realize that when a company is
in financial distress, its (main) bank will be concerned with its interests and try to arrange a
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merger with a stronger company. Regarding the pre-war period, it is commonly accepted
that the zaibatsu bank did not have a lot of its loans outstanding at companies that
belonged to its own zaibatsu. If the non-zaibatsu companies to which it lent would fall into
financial difficulty, however, the zaibatsu bank is very likely to take the initiative to
arrange a merger with a strong zaibatsu company to secure its own interests.
Overall, the synergy and adaptive motive appear to have been most important in pre-war
mergers. The large shareholders (holding company) played the most important role, but we
think that it is very likely that banks also had an important influence on mergers when a
target company was in financial distress. This thesis does not allow us to elaborate, but it is
very interesting for future research on mergers and the financial system in pre-war Japan.
First merger wave - The first merger wave in Japan occurred in the period 1963-72. The
drivers of this wave were diverse, but all were external shocks. The first merger wave
coincides with trade liberalization and removal of controls on capital transactions in 1964.
These mergers were aimed at preventing excessive competition between domestic
companies and increasing their international competitiveness. Acceptance of article 14 of
GATT, article 8 of IMF, and becoming a member of the OECD were important pressures
for change, but so was the continuing drive in improving production and product quality
by companies. It is often argued that the opening of Japan resulted in companies to engage
in M&A activity to protect themselves of being taken over by foreign companies, but
M&A activity was probably more strongly related to strengthening of competitiveness; this
period is also characterized by the formation of the vertical keiretsu, as discussed in
section 7-2-3. Further, fluctuations in economic growth in this period resulted in
independent decision making by companies, which needs to be included in the analysis.
Important actors influencing M&A activity in Japan were business managers, the
government and the bureaucracy. Regarding the bureaucracy, especially MITI tried to
influence M&A activity through administrative guidance to prevent excessive competition.
Evidence on the actual influence of MITI on M&A activity is mixed. Her involvement can
be seen in the mergers between Fuji Steel and Yawata Steel, and Prince Motors and Nissan
Motors. Friedman (1988) indicates, however, that MITI’s initial plan regarding the
automotive industry was to build an industry based on two large companies. The
automotive companies rejected these plans and subsequently more automotive companies
were established. So, MITI played an important role in post-war M&A activity, but it was
certainly not the only important actor in mergers; its influence was highly dependent on
acceptance of guidance by the business community.
Research on accounting performance 74 of mergers during the first wave primarily
indicates that performance did not improve after the merger. Only Ikeda and Doi (1983)
find that most of the performance measures improved for the bidder companies after the
merger, relative to the matched non-merging companies; they examine 49 mergers of listed
companies in the period from 1964 to 1975. In contrast, Muramatsu (1986) looks into
accounting performance of 43 mergers in the period 1966-1979 and finds that bidder
companies’ profit measures after the merger were lower. He compares these measures with
74 An accounting study examines the effect of a merger based on accounting information. Performance of the
mergers is measured as profit rates and growth rates. A comparison is commonly made between the sum of the
merging companies before the merger and the newly formed company after the merger. The studies are often
organized by comparing the performance with a non-merging matched sample to eliminate the effects of general
business conditions and industrial differences.
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a matching group of non-merging companies, and indicates that the growth rate was not
affected. Hoshino (1982) examines 15 mergers in 1970 and reports lower profitability and
safety after the merger (net worth to total liabilities and assets, and net profit to total
liabilities and assets, turnover ratio, and debt-equity ratio), and higher liquidity (current
ratio). He concludes that the motivation for mergers in the sample is managerial empire
building rather than pursuit of synergies to create shareholder wealth. It should be noted,
however, that he does not find a clear distinction between merging and non-merging
companies.
Second merger wave - The second merger wave is driven by external shocks as well. The
first period of the second merger wave occurred after the stock market and land price
bubbles burst, the economy fell in a recession, and a lot of companies and financial
institutions faced financial difficulties. In this period the most important actors were
companies that tried to restructure and re-organize their own operations and the operations
of subsidiaries and related companies. Banks, facing financial problems themselves,
attempted to limit the amount of their non-performing loans and also took the initiative in
arranging mergers to secure their own interests. This latter point will become clear in our
own empirical study in section 9-4. The merger motives appear to be similar to the motives
of the pre-war period, the synergy and adaptive motive being most important. The main
actors were managers of companies in financial distress and main banks. The second
period of the second merger wave starts after the regulatory changes in the latter half of the
1990s. The number of M&A deals and the total size of M&A activity increase
considerably, but the number of mergers remains relatively low and stable in the period
1999-2006.
Regarding this wave we look into the role of the main bank and large shareholders with
event studies in the sections 9-3 and 9-4. We pay special attention to the role of the main
bank that is argued to be important in monitoring of companies in the post-war period. We
examine whether the dissolving of cross-shareholdings has indeed lowered the influence of
the main bank as is commonly argued. Previous research confirms that the wave is driven
by external shocks, but evidence for the merger motive is mixed.
Arikawa and Miyajima (2007) investigate the period from 1991 to 2004 and find that the
second merger wave in Japan was caused by economic shocks. They demonstrate that
during the wave the role of mergers was both reactionary and expansionary; industries
with negative shocks (negative changes to growth opportunities and the decreasing sales)
experienced larger M&A deals as well as industries with positive shocks. At a company
level they find that target companies are companies with lower growth opportunities and
high leverage, which suggests that M&A is used as a means of corporate restructuring
during this wave.
Lin et al. (2008) examine whether bidder companies in Japan are motivated by hubris.
Their sample contains of 4582 M&A activities during the period 1989 to 2003, of which
3,005 were with Japanese targets and 1,577 with non-Japanese targets. They find that high
(low) hubris bidder companies have negative (positive) abnormal returns and conclude that
this is largely consistent with the hubris hypothesis that argues that over-confident
managers engage in value-destroying M&A activities. In their investigation of sub-sample
periods they find that hubris is more likely to occur during the period 1999-2003 than
1989-1998.
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Kruse et al. (2007) investigate 69 mergers of companies listed on the Tokyo Stock
Exchange during 1969 to 1999. Because they do not provide results for sub-periods, we
discuss their results here, but they cannot be seen as representative for the second merger
wave. They find that operating performance improves after the merger, especially for inter-
industry mergers. They only provide information between time-periods (1969-89 versus
1990-99) related to changes in employment and find that these are positively related to
post-merger performance for mergers in the period 1969-89. There is no relation between
operating performance and changes in employment during 1990-99, existing relationships
among merging companies, and distressed targets.
Studies that primarily focused on the period prior to the second merger wave find
negative performance following the merger. Odagiri and Hase (1989) examine profit rate
change and growth rate change in 243 M&A cases during the period 1980-1987. The
M&A cases consist of 43 mergers, 135 acquisitions and 65 capital participations. They do
not find significant evidence that the M&A cases improved profitability or growth of the
bidder companies. Yeh and Hoshino (2002a) examine 86 corporate mergers in the period
1970-1994 with a listed bidder, of which in 30 cases the target company was also listed.
They compare various accounting performance measures in pre-merger and post-merger
years with industry medians, and find that mergers in general have a negative impact on
the performance measures. Examination of the difference between keiretsu related mergers
and independent mergers shows that the keiretsu related mergers have a considerably
stronger negative influence over profitability and sales growth.
In contrast to the pro-cyclical U.S. merger waves, we find that mergers in Japan tend to be
counter-cyclical, both with respect to the general economy as well as with respect to stock
market valuations.
9-2 Previous research
R The main bank plays an important role in monitoring companies and, as a result of its
strong relationship with the company, can intervene quickly when the company faces
financial difficulty.
R Whereas positive abnormal returns for U.S. target companies at the announcement date
are considerable, previous research on Japanese target companies shows predominantly
negative results (or only slightly positive).
In this section we discuss previous research on main bank monitoring and abnormal return
at merger announcements, and turn to our own empirical research in the next sections.
9-2-1 Main bank monitoring
Aoki, Patrick and Sheard (1994) find that companies affiliated with a horizontal keiretsu
are more efficiently monitored by the main bank because short-term bank loans reduce
information asymmetry. Stulz (1990) and Kang, Shivdasani and Yamada (2000) argue that
short term debt and the management of payment settlement accounts allow banks in
general, and main banks in particular, to obtain confidential information about firms’
prospects and investment opportunities. It also allows financial institutions to intervene
quickly when problems arise. This results in lower bankruptcy costs and the main bank’s
presence also reduces free-rider problems between creditors (Berglof and Perotti 1994).
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Prowse (1990) shows that the threat of equity holders taking risky projects in order to
expropriate wealth from debt holders is eliminated in Japan due to large equity positions of
financial institutions, and especially of the main bank. Consistent with the main bank story,
high debt costs are attributed to an “agency fee” for bank monitoring by Aoki (1988) and
to an insurance premium for bailing out by the main bank in case of financial distress by
Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1990). Nakatani (1984) argues that the economic rent that
the main bank extracts is an insurance premium against financial distress of the members.
The long-term relationship with group-companies and risk-sharing between the company
and the main bank (sticky interest rate) make it very difficult for the bank to default on its
obligations if the company falls into difficulties. The threat of competition in the capital
market is herewith reduced as well. Keiretsu companies in financial distress are also less
affected by capital rationing and illiquidity (Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein 1991).
Kaplan and Minton (1994) find that when a company’s stock market performance is
poor, but the company is not in financial distress yet, member companies of the horizontal
keiretsu and the main bank will appoint external members on the corporate board (strongly
related to shareholdings). Once the company is in financial distress, only the main bank
will send external directors and take effective control of the company. Japanese banks are
herewith a substitute for shareholder pressure. Kang and Shivdasani (1995) also show that
new bank representatives are appointed in the boards of Japanese companies when their
financial performance lags.
Aoki (1990), Kester (1991), and Kaplan (1994) argue that Japanese executives manage
companies in the interest of debt-holders, and that, conditional on sufficient earnings to
satisfy banks and meet debt payments, managers can run companies in their own and their
employees’ interests without interference from the main bank. Jensen (1989) argues that
financial institutions holding debt and equity participation in the company, are inclined to
monitor company’s management strictly, which creates strong incentives for management
to make value-maximizing decisions. Morck and Nakamura (1999) suggest that banks
collude with managers of companies to deter external threats to corporate control and to
collect rents on bank loans. Horiuchi, Packer and Fukuda (1988) argue that the main bank
relationship seems to be less stable than generally believed. Change of main bank is caused
by company growth and not by uncertainty of performance. They do not find evidence that
the main bank relationship stabilizes performance of borrowing companies as a result of
risk-sharing. They mention that the insurance function of the main bank might come into
play only when a borrowing company gets into financial difficulties. As not all companies
in financial distress are bailed out or saved, however, the authors argue that the main bank
makes an assessment of the company’s economic viability at her own discretion. Morck
and Nakamura (1999) show that Japanese banks act primarily to protect their interests as
creditors, responding to potential and actual debt repayment problems rather than more
general indicators of financial health.
9-2-2 Previous event studies
Previous research on Japanese domestic mergers shows that bidder companies have a
positive stock price effect up to the announcement date of the merger, but this effect turns
negative thereafter. Similar results are found for target companies; the abnormal returns
before the announcement date are only slightly more positive for bidder companies.
Pettway and Yamada (1986) examine the period 1977-84 and find, for their 16
observations, positive returns for the bidder companies around the announcement date. The
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abnormal return at [-1] is significant at 0.60% and the Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR)
for the 2-day period [-1,0] is positive at 0.70%, but insignificant. Ito (1989) investigates 31
mergers between listed companies in the period 1971 to 1987, covering the period of
Pettway and Yamada. He finds a significantly positive CAR of 1.15% for the period [-1,0].
Although insignificant, the CAR becomes negative when the period around the
announcement date is expanded. This negative abnormal return for the expanded period is
confirmed by Komoto (2002) who examines mergers in the period 1980 to 1999. In his
sample of 88 mergers between industrial companies, he finds a negative CAR of -2.1% for
the period [-5,+5]. Yeh and Hoshino (2002) investigate 89 mergers in the period 1981-98
and find a significant negative CAR of -1.01% for the period [-1, 1]. Yeh (2007) looks into
109 mergers and 36 tender offers during the years from 1981 to 1998. For the period [-1, 1]
he finds a insignificant negative CAR of –0.34%, and for the period [-10, 1] a significant
positive CAR of 1.44%. Kang et al. (2000) investigate bidder returns over the period 1977
to 1993. They confirm the positive cumulative abnormal return for the period [-1,0] found
in previous research with a CAR at 1.17%
Figure 9-1 CAR results of previous event studies on Japanese mergers
CAR -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 AD 1 2 3 4 5
Bidder company
Pettway & Yamada (1986) 1977-1984 0.70%
Ito (1989) 1971-1987 1.15%
Komoto (2002) 1980-1999 -2.10%
Yeh and Hoshino (2002) 1981-1998 -1.01%
Yeh (2007) * 1981-1998 -0.34%
Kang et al. (2000) 1977-1993 1.17%
Target company
Pettway & Yamada (1986) 1977-1984 1.33%
-0.07%
-0.86%
Ito (1989) 1971-1987 1.26%
-2.85%
-1.75%
Komoto (2002) 1980-1999 -4.90%
* Sample includes 109 mergers and 36 tender offers.
For target companies Pettway and Yamada (1986) find a significant positive abnormal
return of 1.57% at [-1] and a significant negative abnormal return of -1.4% at [+1]. The
resulting CARs for the periods [-1,0] and [-1,+1] are respectively positive at 1.33% and
negative at -0.07%. The CAR for the longer interval [-5,+5] results in a negative CAR of -
0.86%. Ito (2000) finds similar results for the 31 target companies in his sample: the CAR
for [-1, 0] is positive at 1.26%, but turns negative for the periods [-1,+1] and [-5,+5] at -
2.85% and -1.75%, respectively. Komoto (2002) finds a negative cumulative abnormal
return of -4.9% for the period [-5,+5].
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U.S. mergers - Findings on abnormal returns for U.S. bidder companies show mixed
results. While some research finds positive abnormal returns (Asquith 1983; Asquith,
Bruner, and Mullins 1983; Loderer and Martin 1990), others find negative results
(Langetieg 1978; Dodd 1980; Servaes 1991; Kaplan and Weisbach 1992). The general
conclusion drawn by both Jensen and Ruback (1983) and Bruner (2002) is that the
abnormal returns of U.S. bidder companies are on average zero and that bidders’ investors
earn their required rate of return. The evidence on positive abnormal returns for U.S. target
companies at the announcement date is considerable (e.g. Langetieg 1978; Servaes 1991;
Kaplan and Weisbach 1992).
9-2-3 Profitability drivers
Most empirical studies employ additional explanatory variables to examine the overall
effect on stock prices, commonly addressed as profitability drivers. In this subsection we
discuss the following drivers: (i) relative size of the target company, (ii) corporate
diversification deals, (iii) unlisted versus listed target company, (iv) payment in cash
versus stock, and (v) hostile versus friendly deal. Specifically for the Japanese market,
earlier studies look into the importance of (vi) the main bank and (vii) membership of
keiretsu groups.
Relative size - The relative size of the target company appears to have a positive effect on
the abnormal return of the bidder company.
Asquith et al. (1983) investigate the gains accruing to bidding companies’ shareholders
in 214 merger bids during the period 1963-1979. They find that a merger bid for a target
half the bidder's size produces an estimated cumulated abnormal return of 1.84% greater
than a bid for a target that is one-tenth the bidder company's size. They do not find a
relation between the abnormal returns of 54 listed target companies and the relative size of
bidder and target.
Servaes (1991) examines 704 completed takeovers in the period 1972-87. The research
focuses on the abnormal returns from the announcement date of the takeover until the
effective date or the delisting date. He finds that the size of the target relative to the bidder
has a positive influence on the gains of the bidder company and the total gains, with the
latter being significantly positive at 4.56%. The results also show that gains are higher
when a good performing bidder company takes over a poorly performing target company.
Pettway and Yamada (1986) look into the size effect for Japanese mergers, classifying a
merger as “large” when the target company was more than 20% of the bidder company’s
equity size. In contrast to the U.S., their tests show a significant and greater abnormal
return for small mergers at the announcement date.
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Corporate diversification - Corporate diversification is found to destroy value. Studies by
Berger and Ofek (1995), Comment and Jarrel (1995), Lang and Stulz (1994) and Morck et
al. (1990) support this finding. In contrast, Matsusaka (1993) and Hubbard and Palia (1999)
find evidence that cross-industry M&A did create value in the U.S. in the 1960s.
Morck et al. (1990) look into the announcement effect of unrelated diversification
acquisitions for bidder companies’ shareholders in the period 1975-87. The sample
consists of 91 unrelated acquisitions and 235 related acquisitions. They find that “[M]ean
returns in related vs unrelated acquisitions are not statistically of substantively different in
the 1970s, but are in the 1980s” (p.42). In the period 1980-87 the mean abnormal return for
related acquisitions is 2.88%, and for unrelated acquisitions -4.09%.
Matsusaka (1993) examines 199 acquisitions in the years 1968, 1971 and 1974. The
sample consists of 67 diversification acquisitions and 132 related acquisitions.
Shareholders of bidder companies receive a significantly positive abnormal return at the
announcement of a diversification acquisition. Gains of bidder companies that made a
related acquisition are significantly negative in the sample years.
Hubbard and Palia (1999) investigate 229 diversification mergers and 163 related
mergers between 1961 and 1970. They find positive abnormal returns in diversification
mergers as well as related mergers for the shareholders of the bidder companies.
Cash vs stock - The abnormal returns for bidder companies and target companies in
mergers paid by cash are higher than stock-for-stock mergers.
Travlos (1987) examines the influence of the method of payment on the abnormal return
of bidder companies. The sample consists of 167 successful takeovers (126 merger offers
and 41 tender offers) in the period 1972 through 1981. The shareholders of the 60 bidder
companies that financed the takeover through the exchange of common stock lost 1.47% in
the two-day period [-1, 0]. The shareholders of the bidders that paid cash for the shares of
the target company received normal rates of returns at the announcement.
Heron and Lie (2002) investigate the influence of the method of payment on the
abnormal return for the bidder company, the target company and the companies combined.
Their sample consists of 859 acquisitions by 657 bidder companies, announced and
completed between January 1985 and December 1997. For the 3-day interval [-1, +1] they
find an average abnormal return for target companies at 25.4% for cash payments and at
17.1% for stock payments. For the bidder companies their results are similar to Travlos
(1987). The shareholders get a normal return when the acquisition is paid with cash and
negative at -1.9% when it is stock-financed. The combined result of acquisitions for cash
payments is 5.3% and significantly higher than the 0.9% for the stock exchange.
Unlisted Target vs Listed Target - The announcement effect of bidder companies in
mergers with unlisted target companies is stronger than with listed targets companies.
Chang (1998) examines the shareholder wealth created by bidder companies in 281
merger offers of privately held targets. The sample covers the period 1981-92 and consists
of 131 cash offers and 150 stock offers (one third of the offers are mixed offers of stock
and cash). The abnormal return of the two-day announcement period [-1,0] is significantly
positive at 2.64% when stock is offered, but there is no significant gain when cash is paid
at 0.09%. In the matched sample of listed targets, stock payment results in a significant
negative return at -2.64% and cash payment in an insignificant abnormal return of -0.02%.
180
Chapter 9 Merger activity
168
Faccio et al. (2004) investigate almost 4,500 acquisitions by European companies over
the period 1996 to 2001. Bidder companies that acquired unlisted target companies
realized a significant excess return of 1.48% and bidder companies of listed target
companies an average negative abnormal return of –0.38%.
Kang et al. (2000) do not find a significant difference between the abnormal returns of
bidder companies in mergers with privately or publicly held target companies in Japan.
Hostile versus friendly - Announcement of tender offers and hostile takeovers results in
higher abnormal returns than friendly mergers for both bidder companies and target
companies.
Rau and Vermaelen (1998) investigate bidder companies’ long-term performance in
mergers and tender offers, announced and completed in the period 1980-91. Performance
is computed over three years after completion of the bid and compared with an equally
weighted control portfolio. Bidder companies underperform the control portfolio in
mergers and realize a small but significant gain in tender offers. The research finds a large
difference in performance between value bidders (high book-to-market ratio) and glamour
bidders (low book-to-market ratio). Glamour bidders perform worse than value bidders in
mergers and tender offers (performance of glamour bidders in mergers is negative and
significantly different from the positive abnormal return of value bidders).
Lang, Stultz and Walking (1989) examine bidder, target and combined gains of 87
successful tender offers in the period 1968-86. The influence of the bidder’s and target’s
Tobin’s q on the abnormal returns for the period [-5,+5] is investigated.
On the other hand, Healy, Palepu and Ruback (1992) found that hostile deals were
associated with insignificant improvements in cash flow returns, owing possibly to the
payment of higher acquisition premiums.
Main bank - In the previous section we discussed monitoring by the main banks. The
presence of the main bank allows companies to focus on long-term goals like business
growth and market share, rather than short-term stock price maximization in the interest of
shareholders (Nakatani 1984; Odagiri 1992; Kester 1991; Porter 1992; Kang and Stulz
1996). According to Aoki (1984), protecting access to future loans is often more important
than shareholder wealth maximization for Japanese companies. Kester (1986) argues that
managers have an incentive to maximize the value of the nexus of trading and financial
contracts between companies, not necessarily shareholder wealth. Morck and Nakamura
(1999) indicate that banks use their influence on boards primarily to maximize the value of
their loan portfolios, which can deviate substantially from shareholder value maximization
and from efficiency.
Kang et al. (2000) look into the influence of the main bank on abnormal return of bidder
companies in mergers. They find for the companies affiliated with a main bank a
significant positive mean abnormal return of 1.2% for the period [-1,0]. For companies that
are not affiliated with a main bank the mean is insignificant at 0.5% and the two groups are
not significantly distinguishable from each other. Based on these findings Kang et al.
(2000) argue that “[A]nnouncement returns display a strong positive association with the
strength of acquirer’s relationships with banks” (p.2197).
Keiretsu - Pettway and Yamada (1986) look into the influence of keiretsu groups in
Japanese domestic mergers by testing the effect of shareholdings on the abnormal return of
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bidder companies. They distinguish mergers between affiliated companies (shareholdings
of more than 50% in the target company), related companies (shareholdings between 20%-
50% in target), and unrelated. A merger with an unrelated company has a significant
positive effect on abnormal return at the announcement date.
9-3 Shareholder wealth of bidder companies
R Bidder companies show a positive abnormal return around the announcement date of
approximately 1.4%.
R We do not find an association between announcement returns and the strength of a
bidder company’s relationship with a main bank.
R Announcement returns are related to the presence of a common shareholder holding
shares in both the bidder and the target company and whether the deal took place after
1997.
In this section we examine the impact of a merger on shareholder wealth of bidder
companies. We also investigate volume data in our analysis to determine whether
shareholders consider the announcement as an information event. Although the bidder
company’s share price may not move around the announcement date, increased trading
volume could. In particular, we examine the following:
Firstly, we investigate the importance of the bidder company’s relationship to its main
bank. As described in the previous chapters, the importance of the main bank is argued to
have diminished in recent years. Our dataset contains 136 merger cases that took place in
the period 1993-2003 and allows us to test this hypothesis. Kang et al. (2000) find a
significant positive association of the main bank with announcement returns for the period
1977-1993.
Secondly, we investigate the influence of keiretsu relations. We look into the horizontal
keiretsu groups and shareholdings. We examine the influence on the stock price of a
bidder’s shareholding percentage in the target prior to the merger. In case a bidder already
owns a controlling stake in a target company, the final acquisition is less likely to have a
significant effect. We also look into the influence of a common shareholder that holds
shares in both the bidder company and the target company.
Thirdly, we examine how other profitability drivers affect bidder companies’
shareholder wealth. We study the influence of the relative size of the target company, the
difference between listed and unlisted targets, industry-relatedness, a ‘rescue motive’
merger, and the financial structure and size of the bidder. We exclude mergers in the
financial industry and regulated industries such as utilities and telecommunications. In
general, we include very detailed information on listed as well as unlisted targets in our
analysis, which to our knowledge has never been done before.
9-3-1 Data-set
We look into domestic mergers between non-financial companies in the 11-year period
from 1 January 1993 until 31 December 2003. Our sample consists of bidder companies
listed on the First Section or the Second Section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE),
acquiring either a listed or an unlisted Japanese target company. We investigate all press
articles from 1993 to 2003 related to mergers in Japan from the Nihon Keizai Shimbun
(Japan Economic Journal), Nikkei Sangyǀ Shimbun (Industrial Journal), Nikkei Ryǌtǌ
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Shimbun (Distribution Journal) and Nikkei Kinyǌ Shimbun (Finance Journal). From these
press articles we collect the initial public Announcement Date (AD) and the Effective Date
(ED) of the merger. The AD is defined as the day the merger announcement appears in the
press for the first time.
To eliminate cases in which the bidder company already has full ownership of the target
before the announcement date, we examine various issues of Nikkei Kaisha Jǀhǀ (Nikkei
Company Information) and Kigyǀ Keiretsu Soran to collect data on the biggest 10
shareholders for listed companies. For unlisted companies we refer to the publication
Nikkei Kaisha Sokan (Nikkei; Annual Corporation Reports (Unlisted)) that shows data on
the company’s largest shareholders and accounting information. We only include unlisted
companies for which information on shareholders in the year of the merger or the year
prior to the merger is available. If target companies are fully owned by the bidder, they are
dropped from the sample.
Table 9-1 indicates that our final sample consists of 136 merger cases, in which
Japanese bidder companies merged with 69 listed targets and 67 unlisted target companies.
The percentage of deals between a listed bidder and unlisted target company in our sample
is lower than in other research. The sample of Kang et al. (2000), for example, consists for
70% of mergers with an unlisted target. One reason for this difference may be our
requirement of publicly available information on shareholder data for unlisted companies.
Table 9-1 Descriptive statistics
Cases % total LB&LT LB&UT Total B in T T in B Cross All > 5%
1993 11 8% 6 5 7 7 0 0 5 3
1994 10 7% 3 7 5 5 0 0 3 1
1995 4 3% 1 3 3 3 0 0 1 1
1996 11 8% 4 7 3 2 0 1 4 2
1997 9 7% 6 3 5 5 0 0 3 2
1998 18 13% 10 8 8 4 1 3 5 4
1999 20 15% 13 7 11 11 0 0 8 3
2000 15 11% 9 6 6 6 0 0 9 7
2001 9 7% 2 7 2 1 0 1 4 3
2002 14 10% 9 5 4 4 0 0 7 3
2003 15 11% 6 9 5 5 0 0 5 5
Total 136 100% 69 67 59 53 1 5 54 34
% total 51% 49% 43% 39% 1% 4% 40% 25%
Period
1993-1997 Cases 45 20 25 23 22 0 1 16 13
1998-2003 Cases 91 49 42 36 31 1 4 38 21
1993-1997 % total 33% 15% 18% 17% 16% 0% 1% 12% 10%
1998-2003 % total 67% 36% 31% 26% 23% 1% 3% 28% 15%
Common SHHYear
Total Company Shareholdings
Notes The sample consists of 136 Japanese bidders listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange for which the announcement date of the
merger is between 1 January 1993 and 31 December 2003. The AD is defined as the day that the merger announcement appears in
the press for the first time. The merger is included in the sample if sufficient accounting information can be retrieved on unlisted
target companies. For 'Company': LB = Listed Bidder, LT = Listed Target, UT = Unlisted Target. For 'Shareholdings': B = Bidder,
T= Target, Cross = Cross Shareholdings.
Sources Shareholder information: Nikkei Kaisha Jǀhǀ (Nikkei Company Information) and Kigyǀ Keiretsu Soran is used for listed
companies. Nikkei Kaisha Sokan (Nikkei; Annual Corporation Reports (Unlisted)) is referred to for unlisted companies.
Table 9-1 shows the number of merger cases in each year of our sample period, and
confirms the general trend in M&A activity in Japan with a considerable increase after
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1997. We find the highest percentage, at 15% of all merger cases, in 1999. Between the
years 1993 and 1997 our sample contains nine observations annually and this number
increases to fifteen in the period 1998-2003. In the latter period the number of mergers
with a listed target is slightly higher.
The number of transactions in which there were shareholdings between the bidder
company and the target company at AD is also given in table 9-1. We find shareholdings
among the merging companies in 59 cases of our total sample (43%). Most important in
these shareholdings is ownership of the target company by the bidder company. Including
cross-shareholdings, the bidder company has shareholdings in 58 target companies, which
is 42.6% of all mergers. Shareholdings by the target company in the bidder are small with
only six merger cases, and the number of mergers with cross-shareholdings is only 4% of
the total sample. We find that in 54 mergers there is a common shareholder with
shareholdings in both merging companies. In 34 merger cases this common shareholder
has ownership in both companies of more than over 5%, the percentage that needs to be
reported according the Securities and Exchange Law.
Panel A of table 9-2 summarizes transaction-specific details and shows that the bidder
companies’ average shareholding in target companies was 16.1% for the total sample.
Focusing only on bidder companies with shareholdings in the target company, this
percentage increases to 37.8%, indicating a strong relationship with the target company for
these bidders. The common shareholder has an average ownership in the bidder company
and the target company of respectively 25.2% and 29.7%. 75 When we only look at
shareholdings of more than 5% in the bidder and target, these shareholdings increase to
35.5% in the bidder and 42.4% in the target company. In our examination of the influence
of the vertical groups, we focus on bidder company’s shareholdings in the target, and the
shareholdings of the common shareholder with more than 5% ownership in the merging
companies. In its role as parent company, the common shareholder may exert a strong
influence over the merging decision of the bidder company and target company.
We next examine the main bank system and define a main bank as the company’s most
important lender that belongs to the company’s largest five shareholders. Following Aoki
et al. (1994), who argues that “having the largest share of short-term loans, rather than the
size of the overall loan share, is thought to be the hallmark of the main bank” (p.8), we
look for the bank that is the largest lender of short-term loans. We take the largest loan
provider as the most important lender (similar to Kang et al. 2000), if the company does
not have short-term loans with a financial institution. We could identify a most important
lender based on short-term loans for 106 bidder companies and for another 10 bidder
companies based on total loans. This gives a total of most important lender relations for
116 bidder companies (85% of our total sample). To investigate the strength of the
relationship, we look into the shareholding characteristic of the main bank system. We find
that in 116 bidder companies with a most important lender, there is no shareholding
relationship in 27 cases. The most important lender belongs to the largest six to ten
shareholders in fourteen cases, with an average shareholding of 1.76%. Shareholdings of
the main bank in the company can have an important influence on mergers of Japanese
companies. We define a bank as a company’s main bank when it is the company’s most
important lender and belongs to the company’s largest five shareholders. For 75 bidder
75 This includes the 20 merger cases in which the large common shareholder has shareholdings lower than 5% in
both companies.
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companies the most important lender was one of the largest five shareholders (55.1% of
the sample) with shareholdings at a mean of 4.18% and median of 4.5%.
Following Nakatani (1984) and Kang et al. (2000), we use various issues of Keiretsu no
Kenkyǌ to investigate whether a bidder company is part of one of the six horizontal
keiretsu, Mitsubishi, Mitsui, Sumitomo, DKB, Fuji and Sanwa.76 We identify 68 bidder
companies that are related to one of these groups (50% of our sample). Only 48 of the 75
bidder companies with a main bank (64%) are part of a horizontal keiretsu. Hence, the
percentage of bidder companies with a main bank is for members of a horizontal keiretsu
71%, and for independent bidder companies 40%. This is an interesting finding because an
often-used characteristic for Japanese corporate governance is that, although a Japanese
company might be independent of a horizontal keiretsu, it is likely to have relations with a
main bank. In our sample we find that the reverse is also true: members of a horizontal
keiretsu do not always have a main bank.
Based on the merger motives given during the press conference at AD, we investigate
whether a merger was made by the bidder with a rescue-motive. This should, however, be
interpreted with care because the reasons put forward during a press conference might not
reflect the real motivation for a merger. The actual number of rescue-mergers is likely to be
higher than the 11 merger cases identified (8.1% of total sample). In all rescue merger
cases the bidder company has a main bank and in seven cases the bidder company belongs
to a horizontal keiretsu. These findings suggest that being part of a horizontal keiretsu or
having a main bank, has an influence on a bidder company for engaging in a rescue merger.
We further find that most rescue mergers took place in the first part of our sample period,
with ten in or before 1998 and one in 2000.
Panel B of table 9-2 provides some financial data of the bidder and the target companies
in our sample. The mean of total assets and total sales is for bidder companies 295 billion
yen and 445 billion yen, respectively. This is considerably higher than target companies
with mean total assets of 68 billion yen and mean total sales of 89 billion yen. The panel
indicates there is a large difference in size between listed and unlisted target companies.
Total assets and total turnover of listed targets and unlisted targets are respectively 32%
and 10% of the bidders. When looking at the amount of total debt, these percentages are
slightly higher but similar. The leverage ratio, measured as total debt to total assets, is
approximately the same for the bidder company and the listed target company at 46.8%
and 52.8% respectively. The unlisted target, on the other hand, shows an extremely high
leverage ratio of 75.2%, which raises the average leverage percentage for target companies
to 62.4%. Leverage, measured as total debt divided by the sum of the book value of debt
and market value of equity, results in a mean and median for bidder companies at
respectively 41.2% and 42.4%. The leverage-ratio for total loans is 22.2% and shows that
bidder companies use loans for about half of their total debt. For bidder companies with a
main bank we also measure leverage as main bank loans divided by the sum of the book
value debt and market value equity, and find a ratio of 6.8%. So, a relative large
percentage of outstanding loans is from the main bank.
76 Since Keiretsu no Kenkyuu was published up to 2000, we used this latest issue to classify the horizontal
keiretsu in the subsequent three years.
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Table 9-2 Summary Merger Specific and Company Specific Statistics
Variable Mean Median St.Dev.
Fraction bidders with main bank 0.551
Fraction bidders part of keiretsu 0.500
Fraction of privately held targets 0.493
Fraction of intra-industry mergers 0.713
Fraction of rescue mergers 0.081
Target total assets / bidder total assets 0.521 0.314 0.654
Bidder shareholdings in target (%):
All bidders (n=136) 16.1 0.0 23.9
Bidders with shareholdings (n=58) 37.8 37.1 22.7
Common shareholder shareholdings (%):
Shareholdings in bidder (n=54) 25.2 22.3 19.9
Shareholdings in target (n=54) 29.7 20.1 28.7
Common shareholder shareholdings of 5% (*) (%):
Shareholdings in bidder (n=34) 35.5 33.7 17.5
Shareholdings in target (n=34) 42.4 37.6 28.2
Variable Mean Median St.Dev. Mean Median St.Dev.
Total assets (billions of yen) 295 51 620 All 68 19 130
Listed 98 36 153
Unlisted 35 10 86
Total sales (billions of yen) 445 103 1,016 All 89 26 155
Listed 139 77 196
Unlisted 37 15 65
Total debt (billions of yen) 171 17 334 All 48 9 102
Listed 62 14 110
Unlisted 30 7 88
Total loans (billions of yen) 56 9 106
Market value listed companies (bln yen) 216 38 612 60 17 145
Relative market cap 0.484 0.333 0.670
Leverage:
Total debt/Total Assets 0.468 0.521 0.304 All 0.624 0.680 0.320
Listed 0.528 0.509 0.350
Unlisted 0.752 0.757 0.224
Total debt/(bv debt + mv equity) 0.412 0.424 0.275 Listed 0.496 0.476 0.275
Total loans/(bv debt + mv equity) 0.222 0.165 0.220
Main bank loan/(bv debt + mv equity) 0.068 0.042 0.079
Panel A : Merger Specific
Panel B : Company Specific
Bidder Target
Notes Common shareholder has shareholdings of 5% or higher in bidder and target company. The sample consists of 136 Japanese
bidders listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange for which the announcement date of the merger is between 1 January 1993 and 31
December 2003. The AD is defined as the day that the merger announcement appears in the press for the first time. The merger is
included in the sample if sufficient accounting information can be retrieved on unlisted target companies. Shareholder
information: Nikkei Kaisha Jouhǀ (Nikkei Company Information) and Kigyǀ Keiretsu Soran is used for listed companies. Nikkei
Kaisha Sokan (Nikkei; Annual Corporation Reports (Unlisted)) is referred to for unlisted companies. The main bank is defined as
a company’s most important lender which belongs to the company’s largest 5 shareholders. Keiretsu no Kenkyǌ is used to
investigate whether a bidder company is part of one of the six horizontal keiretsu. Accounting data is retrieved from the Nikkei
Needs Tapes.
Following Odagiri and Hase (1989), we make an inter-industry matrix based on the Nikkei
Needs industry classification. Figure 9-2 shows the concentration of mergers on the
diagonal line, which indicates that most mergers in our sample are between companies in
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the same industry. Intra-industry merger cases total 97 cases (71.3%) and inter-industry
total 39 cases (28.7%). Bidder companies are most active in the trading sector (20 mergers),
construction industry (fourteen mergers) and miscellaneous services industry (thirteen
mergers). Resulting from the primacy of intra-industry mergers, we see that most
companies were also taken over in the trading sector, construction industry, and
miscellaneous services industry with respectively 26, twelve and fifteen mergers. Bidder
companies that merged with target companies from other industries are primarily from the
machinery industry (five mergers) and the trading sector (four mergers). Target companies
taken over by bidder companies from other industries are concentrated in the trading sector
(ten mergers) and the transportation equipments and real estate industry (five mergers).
Target 1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35 37 41 43 45 52 53 55 57 59 61 63 65 67 69 71 Total
1 5 5
3 1 1
5 3 1 4
7 1 6 1 1 9
9 1 1 2
11 2 2
13 1 1 2
15 9 9
17 1 1
19 1 1 4 1 7
21 1 1 7 9
23 3 3
25 0
27 2 2
29 1 1 1 1 1 5
31 1 1
33 1 2 1 4
35 0
37 0
41 12 12
43 1 4 2 1 16 1 1 26
45 7 7
52 0
53 1 1 3 5
55 0
57 1 1
59 3 3
61 0
63 0
65 1 1
67 0
69 0
71 1 1 2 11 15
Total 5 3 3 10 2 2 2 9 4 6 12 6 0 4 0 2 3 0 0 14 20 8 0 0 3 0 3 0 1 1 0 0 13 136
Bidder
Figure 9-2 Inter-industry vs. intra-industry deals
Notes The sample consists of 136 Japanese bidders listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange for which the announcement date of the
merger is between 1 January 1993 and 31 December 2003. The AD is defined as the day that the merger announcement appears in
the press for the first time. The merger is included in the sample if sufficient accounting information can be retrieved on unlisted
target companies. The table presents an inter-industry matrix based on the Nikkei Needs industry classification. For the unlisted
companies we also used the classification given by Nikkei Needs in the respective publication.
9-3-2 Results
Univariate Analysis - Abnormal returns are computed using the event-study methodology,
following Dodd and Warner (1983) 77 . Our test period starts 20 days prior to the
announcement date and stops 90 days after. We determine normal returns by calculating
betas using daily return data over the 200 trading days preceding the test period, using the
TOPIX index as our benchmark. The daily abnormal return is compounded over various
time intervals to get the cumulative average abnormal return (CAR). We use standard t-
77 Please refer to Appendix I of this chapter.
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statistics to test the hypothesis that the average CARs are equal to zero.
To determine 'normal trading volume', we take the average of the ratio between daily
trading volume in the bidder's stock and the total daily trading volume in all TOPIX stocks
over the 200 days until 20 days before the announcement. We define 'abnormal volume'
during the test period as the difference between the ratio of actual daily trading volume in
the stock and all TOPIX stocks on the one hand, and the normal volume on the other.
Figure 9-3a shows the effect of the announcement on bidder's stock prices. The stock
price starts rising 2 days before the deal is announced and peaks on the announcement day.
Thereafter, the price quickly falls and the overall CAR becomes statistically insignificant.
This finding indicates significant slippage before the announcement is made. Trading
volume does not rise until the actual announcement day and stays high until three days
after the announcement. It returns to pre-announcement levels after five to seven days.
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Figure 9-3a CARs Japanese bidders Figure 9-3b Excess trading volume Japanese bidders
Notes The sample consists of 136 Japanese bidders listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange for which the announcement date of the
merger is between 1 January 1993 and 31 December 2003. The AD is defined as the day that the merger announcement appears in
the press for the first time. The merger is included in the sample if sufficient accounting information can be retrieved on unlisted
target companies. Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) are computed from a market model estimated from days -220 to -20
relative to the announcement. Excess trading volume is determined by taking the average of the ratio of daily trading volume in
each stock and daily trading volume in the TOPIX index over the period from -220 to -20 days before the announcement. The
actual trading volume over the test period is divided by this 'normal' ratio. P-values indicate whether average excess trading
volume ratio differs significantly from 1.
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Table 9-3 CARs and Excess Volume for Japanese bidders
Interval # obs. Mean CAR Median CAR
1.37% 0.46%
(0.01) (0.08)
0.57% -0.01%
(0.45) (1.00)
0.87% 0.00%
(0.33) (1.00)
4.61% 3.82%
(0.03) (0.03)
-0.36% 0.00%
(0.43) (0.64)
Interval # obs. Mean EV Median EV
2.51 1.45
(0.00) (0.00)
AD-1 to AD
AD-1 to AD+1
AD-5 to AD+5
AD-5 to AD+90
Panel A: CARs around the announcement date
Panel B: Excess Volume around the announcement date
AD to AD+1
136
136
136
106
136
127
ED-1 to ED
Notes The sample consists of 136 Japanese bidders listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange for which the announcement date of the
merger is between 1 January 1993 and 31 December 2003. The AD is defined as the day that the merger announcement appears in
the press for the first time. The merger is included in the sample if sufficient accounting information can be retrieved on unlisted
target companies. Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) are computed from a market model estimated from days -220 to -20
relative to the announcement. ED denotes the effective date of the merger. P-values for t-tests are reported in parentheses below
the mean, and p-values from sign-rank tests are reported in parentheses below the median. The sample in Panel B consists of 127
Japanese bidders. Excess Volume (EV) is calculated by taking the ratio between actual trading volume and ‘normal trading
volume’. To determine 'normal trading volume', we take the average of the ratio between daily trading volume in the bidder's
stock and the total daily trading volume in all TOPIX stocks over the 200 days until 20 days before the announcement. P-values
for t-tests, whether values differ significantly from 1, are reported in parentheses below the mean, and p-values from sign-rank
tests are reported in parentheses below the median.
Panel A of table 9-3 shows the mean and median CARs around the announcement date
(AD) and the effective date (ED) for the 136 bidder companies in our sample. The mean
CAR [-1,0] is 1.37 % and significant at the 0.01 level. The sign-rank test indicates that the
median CAR [-1,0] is significantly different from zero at the 0.10 level. When we expand
the test-window to [-1,+1] and [-5,+5], the CAR remains positive but is not significantly
different from zero. For the longer time-window of CAR [-5,+90] the mean is 4.61% and
statistically significant. This indicates a positive development in abnormal returns during
the period after the merger announcement. At the effective date, on the other hand, the
CAR [ED-1,ED] is negative. Our overall results indicate a positive market valuation on the
merger announcement of bidder companies around AD and are in line with previous
research on Japan. Our findings of the expanded windows support the earlier findings of a
positive development by Kang et al. (2000) and Pettway and Yamada (1986).
Panel B in table 9-3 shows that Excess Volume (EV) increases sharply on the
announcement date and remains high on the day after. Overall, trading volume is on
average 2.51 times (median: 1.45 times) the ‘normal’ level on the announcement and
following day. The number of companies in the sample falls to 127, because no trading
volume was registered for nine companies around the announcement date. In the following
tests, we take the average EV of the announcement day and the day after that [0,+1].
Main bank and keiretsu linkages
Table 9-4 categorizes the sample according to some key characteristics of the bidder
company and the transaction, and compares CAR [-1,0] across these characteristics.
We first look into the importance of the main bank in explaining abnormal returns. We
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consider the main bank’s shareholding of a company and its provision of loans to the
company. In short, we find no evidence that having relations with a main bank has a
significantly more positive influence on shareholder value.
We first separate bidder companies according to whether or not having a main bank
defined as the largest lender that belongs to the largest 5 shareholders. The mean CAR for
bidders unrelated to a main bank is 1.95% and statistically significant at the 0.01 level. The
75 bidders that are related to a main bank have a CAR of 0.90%, insignificantly different
from zero. We do not find noticeable differences between the two groups.
Bidder companies with below median main bank leverage, measured as main bank loans
divided by the sum of book value debt and market value equity, have statistically
significant mean and median CARs at respectively 2.08% and 0.83%. Bidder companies
with main bank leverage above the median have a mean CAR at 0.66% and median CAR
at 0.12%, both being insignificant. The medians of the two groups are distinguishable at a
0.10 level. Panel A of table 9-5 shows that the presence of a main bank does not have any
effect on excess trading volume either. In other words, the stock market clearly views the
announcement as information, but whether a bidder has an affiliation with a main bank or
not, does not have any influence.
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Table 9-4 CAR [-1, 0] for Japanese bidders categorized by characteristics of bidder and transaction
Mean CAR Median CAR T-Test Mann-Whitney
(p-value) (p-value) (p-value) (p-value)
All Cases 136 1.37% 0.46%
(0.011) (0.085)
Panel A : Main Bank and keiretsu linkages
Bidder is affiliated with main bank 75 0.90% 0.15% -0.982
(0.236) (0.489) (0.328)
61 1.95% 0.82% -1.144
(0.010) (0.093) (0.253)
68 0.66% 0.12% -1.335
(0.412) (0.545) (0.184)
68 2.08% 0.83% -1.519
(0.004) (0.086) (0.129)
68 1.00% 0.42% -0.693
(0.197) (0.114) (0.490)
68 1.74% 0.46% -0.453
(0.021) (0.464) (0.651)
Panel B : Other factors
68 0.71% -0.05% -1.244
(0.412) (0.904) (0.216)
68 2.03% 1.26% -2.194
(0.002) (0.007) (0.028)
68 0.83% 0.10% -1.027
(0.232) (0.904) (0.307)
68 1.92% 0.55% -1.375
(0.021) (0.027) (0.169)
Bidder has shareholding in target 58 0.52% 0.09% -1.382
(0.499) (0.896) (0.169)
78 2.00% 0.92% -1.575
(0.007) (0.040) (0.115)
29 0.24% 0.20% -1.114
(0.728) (0.711) (0.267)
107 1.68% 0.48% -0.417
(0.011) (0.098) (0.677)
54 2.21% 0.13% 1.282
(0.030) (0.684) (0.202)
82 0.82% 0.47% 0.062
(0.167) (0.075) (0.950)
34 3.32% 1.70% 2.146
(0.024) (0.392) (0.034)
102 0.72% 0.44% 1.216
(0.170) (0.163) (0.224)
Common shh with 5% or more in bidder
and target
Common shh without 5% or more in
bidder and target
Bidder’s main bank loan ratio is below
sample median
Bidder independent of horizontal keiretsu
Bidder belongs to horizontal keiretsu
Bidder is unaffiliated with main bank
Bidder’s bank loan ratio is above sample
median
Bidder’s bank loan ratio is below sample
median
Number
of obs
Bidder’s main bank loan ratio is above
sample median
Bidder and target have common
shareholder
Bidder and target do not have common
shareholder
Bidder does not have shareholding in
target
Bidder’s leverage ratio is above sample
median
Bidder’s leverage ratio is below sample
median
Bidder's shareholding in target is above
median (*)
Bidder's shareholding in target is below
median (*)
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Table 9-4 continued
Mean CAR Median CAR T-Test Mann-Whitney
(p-value) (p-value) (p-value) (p-value)
65 2.63% 0.60% 2.330
(0.007) (0.103) (0.021)
65 0.17% 0.20% 1.572
(0.722) (0.457) (0.116)
11 -2.45% -0.63% -2.164
(0.032) (0.549) (0.032)
125 1.71% 0.49% -1.999
(0.002) (0.038) (0.046)
Merger in period 1993-1997 45 -0.03% 0.04% -1.874
(0.964) (1.000) (0.063)
Merger in period 1998-2003 91 2.07% 0.54% -1.482
(0.005) (0.045) (0.138)
68 1.05% 0.54% -0.610
(0.118) (0.114) (0.543)
68 1.70% 0.44% 0.113
(0.046) (0.464) (0.910)
Target is listed 70 1.17% 0.19% -0.395
(0.129) (0.550) (0.694)
Target is unlisted 66 1.59% 0.52% -0.980
(0.037) (0.082) (0.327)
97 1.44% 0.49% 0.211
(0.014) (0.125) (0.833)
39 1.19% 0.20% 0.431
(0.320) (0.522) (0.667)
Relative size above sample median
Bidder and target are in same industry
Bidder and target in different industries
Number
of obs
Acquisition motivated by rescue purposes
Acquisition not motivated by rescue
purposes
Large bidders (market cap is above sample
median)
Small bidders (market cap is below sample
median)
Relative size below sample median
Notes The sample consists of 136 Japanese bidders listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange for which the announcement date of the
merger is between 1 January 1993 and 31 December 2003. AD denotes the initial announcement date, i.e. the first day on which
the information related to the announcement was public before the end of the trading day. The AD is defined as the day that the
merger announcement appears in the press for the first time. The merger is included in the sample if sufficient information can be
retrieved on unlisted target companies. Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) are computed from a market model estimated from
days -220 to -20 relative to the announcement. Leverage ratio is computed as the ratio of the book value of total debt to the sum of
the book value of debt and the market value of equity. Bank loan ratio is computed as the ratio of the book value of debt from
financial institutions to the sum of the book value of debt and the market value of equity. Main bank loan ratio is computed as the
ratio of the book value of debt from the main bank to the sum of the book value of debt and the market value of equity. P-values
for t-tests are reported in parentheses below the mean, and p-values from sign-rank tests are reported in parentheses below the
median.
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Table 9-5 EV [0, +1] for Japanese bidders categorized by characteristics of bidder and transaction
Mean CAR Median CAR T-Test Mann-Whitney
(p-value) (p-value) (p-value) (p-value)
All Cases 127 2.514 1.450
(0.000) (0.001)
Panel A : Main Bank and keiretsu linkages
73 2.554 1.420 0.182
(0.000) (0.101) (0.856)
54 2.460 1.585 -1.095
(0.000) (0.002) (0.274)
66 2.605 1.445 0.376
(0.000) (0.175) (0.707)
61 2.415 1.450 -1.071
(0.000) (0.001) (0.284)
67 1.800 1.290 -3.088
(0.000) (0.268) (0.003)
60 3.311 1.820 -2.465
(0.000) (0.000) (0.014)
Panel B : Other factors
61 2.074 1.540 -1.689
(0.000) (0.004) (0.094)
66 2.921 1.335 0.376
(0.000) (0.082) (0.707)
64 2.143 1.495 -1.489
(0.000) (0.023) (0.139)
63 2.891 1.360 -0.366
(0.000) (0.023) (0.714)
55 2.178 1.440 -1.164
(0.000) (0.177) (0.247)
72 2.770 1.495 -1.253
(0.000) (0.002) (0.210)
28 1.744 1.335 -1.634
(0.017) (0.345) (0.105)
99 2.732 1.510 -1.361
(0.000) (0.002) (0.174)
52 2.634 1.345 0.395
(0.000) (0.262) (0.693)
75 2.431 1.540 -0.439
(0.000) (0.001) (0.661)
37 3.066 1.440 1.408
(0.000) (0.405) (0.162)
90 2.287 1.460 0.470
(0.000) (0.001) (0.639)
58 3.359 1.740 3.276
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
63 1.705 1.320 2.719
(0.001) (0.450) (0.007)
11 3.128 2.160 0.749
(0.060) (0.227) (0.456)
116 2.456 1.440 1.140
(0.000) (0.003) (0.254)
Bidder's shareholding in target is above
median (*)
Bidder's shareholding in target is below
median (*)
Bidder and target have common
shareholder
Bidder and target do not have common
shareholder
Bidder’s leverage ratio is above sample
median
Bidder’s leverage ratio is below sample
median
Bidder has shareholding in target
Bidder does not have shareholding in
Target
Number
of obs
Bidder’s main bank loan ratio is above
sample median
Bidder’s main bank loan ratio is below
sample median
Bidder is affiliated with main bank
Bidder is unaffiliated with main bank
Bidder belongs to horizontal keiretsu
Bidder independent of horizontal keiretsu
Bidder’s bank loan ratio is above sample
median
Bidder’s bank loan ratio is below sample
median
Common shareholder has shareholdings of
5% or more in bidder and target
Common shareholder does not have
shareholdings of 5% or more in bidder and
Relative size above sample median
Relative size below sample median
Acquisition motivated by rescue purposes
Acquisition not motivated by rescue
purposes
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Table 9-5 continued
Mean CAR Median CAR T-Test Mann-Whitney
(p-value) (p-value) (p-value) (p-value)
Merger in period 1993-1997 65 2.619 1.440 0.426
(0.000) (0.033) (0.671)
Merger in period 1998-2003 62 2.404 1.460 0.135
(0.000) (0.015) (0.893)
67 2.322 1.440 -0.803
(0.000) (0.086) (0.423)
60 2.728 1.510 -0.734
(0.000) (0.004) (0.463)
Target is listed 65 2.394 1.330 -0.483
(0.000) (0.169) (0.630)
Target is unlisted 62 2.639 1.545 -0.736
(0.000) (0.001) (0.462)
89 2.533 1.440 0.116
(0.000) (0.014) (0.908)
38 2.469 1.600 -0.461
(0.000) (0.034) (0.645)
Number
of obs
Small bidders (market cap is below sample
median)
Bidder and target are in same industry
Bidder and target in different industries
Large bidders (market cap is above sample
median)
Notes The sample consists of 136 Japanese bidders listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange for which the announcement date of the
merger is between 1 January 1993 and 31 December 2003. Because no trading volume was registered for 9 companies around the
announcement date, the sample for Excess Volume falls to 127. AD denotes the initial announcement date, i.e. the first day on
which the information related to the announcement was public before the end of the trading day. The AD is defined as the day that
the merger announcement appears in the press for the first time. Excess trading volume is determined by taking the average of the
ratio of daily trading volume in each stock and daily trading volume in the TOPIX index over the period from -220 to -20 days
before the announcement. The actual trading volume over the test period is divided by this 'normal' ratio. P-values indicate
whether average excess trading volume ratio differs significantly from 1. Leverage ratio is computed as the ratio of the book value
of total debt to the sum of the book value of debt and the market value of equity. Bank loan ratio is computed as the ratio of the
book value of debt from financial institutions to the sum of the book value of debt and the market value of equity. Main bank loan
ratio is computed as the ratio of the book value of debt from the main bank to the sum of the book value of debt and the market
value of equity. P-values for t-tests, whether values differ significantly from 1, are reported in parentheses below the mean, and p-
values from sign-rank tests are reported in parentheses below the median.
Other factors
Looking further into the influence of leverage on CARs, we find significant mean CARs
for bidders with below median total leverage at 1.92% and below median bank loan
leverage at 2.03%. Bidders with above median leverage do not have CARs significantly
different from zero, implying that bank loans do not increase value at the time of a
transaction announcement. Again, this is in contrast to the findings by Kang et al. (2000).
The influence of leverage on trading volume is limited. We only find a significantly lower
average trading volume for bidder companies with a bank loan ratio above the sample
median.
Pettway and Yamada (1986) find that not having shareholdings in the target by the
bidder company has a positive effect on abnormal returns. We examine the shareholdings
of the bidder in the target company and also the shareholdings of a common shareholder.
In our tests on the influence of the bidder company’s shareholdings in the target company,
the results confirm the findings by Pettway and Yamada (1986). The mean CAR for bidder
companies without shareholdings are 2.00% and significant at the 0.01 level. This is,
however, statistically indistinguishable from the 0.52% mean CAR of bidder companies
that do own shares of the target. In an additional test we compare two groups based on the
median of the bidder companies with shareholdings and find similar results.
The common shareholder has a stronger influence on CAR. Bidder companies with a
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common shareholder have a mean CAR of 2.21%. It remains positive for the merger cases
without a common shareholder but the CAR is lower and insignificant at 0.82%. If we take
out the influence of smaller shareholdings, we find that in mergers with a common
shareholder owning more than 5% of both companies, the CAR increases strongly to
3.32% at a p-level of 0.05. The CAR for bidder companies without a common shareholder
decreases slightly to 0.72%, and the two groups are statistically different from each other.
Hence, the influence of a parent company with shareholdings in the bidder and the target
appears to be more important than the shareholdings of the bidder in the target company.
While in U.S. research evidence is found that a larger target has a more positive effect on
abnormal returns than smaller targets, Pettway and Yamada (1986) find the opposite for
Japanese takeovers. The influence of the size of the target is measured by dividing the
target companies’ total assets by the bidder companies’ total assets and separating the
sample into groups above and below the median. We find a statistically significant CAR of
2.63% for large target transactions, which is significantly different at the 0.05 level from
the CAR of small target transactions with an insignificant CAR of 0.17%. So, in contrast to
Pettway and Yamada and in line with U.S. research, we find a positive influence of the
target’s size on the bidder’s CAR. The effect on trading volume appears to be consistent
with this finding; when the deal is large relative to the size of the bidder, excess trading
volume is higher.
We continue by investigating the influence of the ‘rescue’-motive given by the bidder
company at the announcement date. This announcement results in a large negative CAR of
-2.45%, compared to a significant CAR of 1.71% when it is not termed as a rescue-merger
by the bidder. This difference is statistically significant.
The latter half of the 1990s, when the legislative and accounting changes were
announced and implemented, appears to have a strong positive influence over CAR. We
compare various periods in our sample and find significant differences in CARs between
the periods 1993-97 and 1998-2003, 1993-98 and 1999-2003, and 1993-99 and 2000-2003.
The bidder companies’ mean CAR for the period 1998-2003 is 2.07% and significant at the
0.01 level. It is significantly different from the insignificant mean CAR of -0.03% in the
period 1993-1997. The most important difference between the mergers in these periods is
that the percentage of bidder companies affiliated with a main bank, which is considerably
lower in the latter half of the 1990s (45% compared to 76% in 1993-97). We further find
that in the latter period the average shareholdings of the common shareholder are higher
and the number of mergers with a rescue motive is lower (3% versus 18% in period 1993-
97).
We examine the influence of the bidder company’s size on CARs by dividing the sample
into groups with the bidder’s market capitalization being above and below the median. We
find a significant 1.70% mean CAR for smaller bidders, which is indistinguishable from
the above median group of 1.05%.
We also investigate whether, as Chang (1998) and Faccio et al. (2004) find, there is a
positive influence on CAR when unlisted target companies are acquired. We find a
significant CAR of 1.59% for unlisted targets, compared to an insignificant CAR of 1.17%
for listed targets. The two groups are indistinguishable from each other, confirming the
findings by Kang et al. (2000).
Lastly, we look into the influence of the intra-industry and inter-industry mergers on
CAR. In line with Kang et al. (2000), we find a significant and positive CAR for intra-
industry mergers, but there is no difference between CARs of intra-industry and inter-
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industry mergers.
Company and deal characteristics: CARs for mergers in progress
We investigate the development of the abnormal returns in the 4.5 months after the
announcement date as well. We examine the CAR [-5,+90], which incorporates the
announcement effect as well as the stock market response to a merger bid in progress.
Changes in the abnormal return after the announcement date indicate that new information
becomes available and reflects the uncertainty at the announcement date and whether the
merger was evaluated correctly. In order to avoid the influence of confounding events, we
excluded cases where the effective date of the merger took place within 95 business days
after the announcement date. This reduced our sample to 106 merger cases. The mean
CAR [-5,+90] is 4.61% and significant at the 0.05 level. The sign-rank test indicates that
the median of 3.82% is also significantly different from zero at the 0.05 level. However,
because of the length of this period, returns may be affected by events unrelated to the
merger announcement. We decided to exclude the 20 mergers with the largest fluctuation
in abnormal returns. Both the mean and median of CAR [-5,+90] become insignificant in
this smaller sample, at respectively 2.23% and 2.14%.
Appendix II of this chapter shows the categorization of the smaller sample according the
key characteristics of the bidder and the transaction conform table 9-4 for CAR [-1,0].
Although we only look at the 86 bidder companies, for comparison with the CAR [-1,0]
results, the characteristics are based on the total sample (if for example the median is
examined, we make a categorization based on the median of the total sample). Of all
characteristics, only one significant difference between groups is found. The bidder’s
average CAR for mergers in the period 1998-2003 is 5.03% and significant at the 0.1 level.
It is statistically distinguishable from the CAR of -2.48% for mergers in the period 1993-
1997.
This low number of significant differences can be attributed to the length of the period
in which other information on the company becomes available, unrelated to the merger. Or,
additional information related to the merger becomes available but is not in line with
earlier market expectations. This paper does not allow us to examine this subject in detail,
but we can conclude that for our sample no significant consistent additional information
becomes available to the market in the 90 days after the announcement date.
Regression analysis CAR - Table 9-6 presents regressions with the cumulative abnormal
returns CAR [-1,0] and the volume effect EV [-1,0] as dependent variables. Although we
look into the total sample, for 6 target companies the total assets is not available, and the
number of observations for CAR and volume effect is respectively 130 and 121 merger
cases. The regressions control for the bidder company's size, the relative size of the
transaction, bidder company’s ownership of the target company and the number of days
between the announcement date and the effective date. We include a dummy variable that
equals one if (i) the target company is listed, (ii) the bidder company belongs to a
horizontal keiretsu, (iii) the merger has a rescue motive, (iv) it is an intra-industry merger,
and (v) it takes place in or after 1998.
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Table 9-6 Regression analysis CARs and Excess Volume
Explanatory variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
-0.002 0.006 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.013 0.038
(0.595) (0.384) (0.636) (0.596) (0.689) (0.748) (0.951) (0.903)
0.008 0.033 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 1.002 2.291
(0.372) (0.055) (0.373) (0.376) (0.389) (0.398) (0.047) (0.008)
Target is listed (dummy) 0.372 -0.037 0.002 0.002 -0.001 0.003 -0.296 -1.622
(0.877) (0.046) (0.889) (0.879) (0.966) (0.785) (0.615) (0.071)
Rescue merger (dummy) -0.033 -0.060 -0.034 -0.034 -0.034 -0.033 1.178 0.563
(0.109) (0.031) (0.106) (0.110) (0.100) (0.104) (0.218) (0.673)
-0.003 -0.013 -0.004 -0.004 -0.003 -0.001 -0.019 0.261
(0.782) (0.415) (0.769) (0.782) (0.805) (0.914) (0.975) (0.743)
Bidder's ownership in target -0.006 0.001 -0.005 -0.006 -0.007 0.003 -0.510 -0.410
(0.827) (0.985) (0.842) (0.829) (0.792) (0.901) (0.671) (0.809)
0.019 0.049 0.019 0.019 0.186 0.927
(0.158) (0.020) (0.155) (0.163) (0.776) (0.353)
0.065
(0.058)
0.066
(0.011)
-0.005 -0.011 -0.005 -0.005 -0.006 -0.009 -1.625 -2.967
(0.711) (0.554) (0.705) (0.716) (0.660) (0.511) (0.008) (0.002)
-0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.001 0.002 0.829
(0.827) (0.792) (0.827) (0.907) (0.849) (0.163)
0.109 -9.919
(0.337) (0.075)
Bidder's bank loan ratio -0.010
(0.432)
0.001 0.005 0.004
(0.981) (0.808) (0.857)
-0.010 -0.003 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.009 -0.687 -1.087
(0.402) (0.834) (0.432) (0.411) (0.421) (0.481) (0.236) (0.166)
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.013
(0.531) (0.193) (0.522) (0.533) (0.461) (0.485) (0.972) (0.072)
Adjusted R2 0.024 0.142 0.017 0.016 0.030 0.054 0.082 0.197
Number of observations 130 73 130 130 130 130 121 71
Number of days between AD and
ED
Intra-industry transaction
(dummy)
Relative size of the transaction
Bidder size (log of bidder total
assets)
Period (before 1998 and after)
Bidder's main bank loan ratio
Bidder is affiliated with main
bank (dummy)
Leverage ratio (D/(D+Market cap
equity))
Common shh ownership in target
Common shh ownership in
bidder
CAR EV
Bidder and target have common
shh ( > 5%)
Bidder is member of horizontal
keiretsu (dummy)
Notes The sample used for this table consists of 136 companies (127 in the case of EV) listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange for
which the announcement date of the merger is between 1 January 1993 and 31 December 2003. AD denotes the initial
announcement date, i.e. the first day on which the information related to the announcement was public before the end of the
trading day. The AD is defined as the day that the merger announcement appears in the press for the first time. For 6 target
companies the total assets is not available and the number of observations for CAR and EV is respectively 130 and 121 merger
cases. A straightforward linear regression analysis was performed with a number of explanatory variables.
As a further investigation of the influence of the main bank system, we use a dummy
variable in the regression that equals one if the bidder company is affiliated with a main
bank. We also examine the importance of the percentage of main bank loans in the bidder
company’s total assets. Leverage is investigated as the percentage of total loans and total
debt in the bidder company’s total assets.
Because the univariate analysis showed a strong influence on CAR for shareholdings of
a common shareholder, we look into this characteristic in detail in the regression analysis
as well. This is done with a dummy variable that equals one if there is a common
shareholder with shareholdings of over 5% in the bidder and/or target. The ownership
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percentages of the common shareholder in the bidder and the target are also examined
separately.
In models (1) and (2) of table 9-6, we first examine the influence of the main bank. In
model (1) we categorize the affiliation with a main bank by using the dummy variable. In
model (2) we use the outstanding loan percentage with the main bank, qualifying
companies without main bank loans as having no observation. So, in model (2) we only
look at the CAR of bidder companies with a main bank and focus on the influence of the
main bank loan percentage. In model (1) we do not find any significant relations between
the explanatory variables and the dependent variable. For the main bank companies we see
that a merger with a larger target is positively associated with CAR at a significance level
of 0.1, confirming our univariate findings. In line with Chang (1998) and Faccio et al.
(2004), we also find that a merger with a listed target company results in a bidder’s CAR to
be lower than an unlisted target by 3.7%. Our previous findings for the negative influence
of a rescue merger are also confirmed in the regression of the main bank companies. The
presence of a common shareholder has a positive influence on the CAR at a significance
level of 0.5. We execute additional tests with model (1) by increasing the limit of the
shareholding percentage of the common shareholder. We find a significant relation of 2.3%
when the common shareholder has shareholdings of 10% or more in the bidder and/or
target. Thus, common shareholder’s shareholding above a certain threshold increases
shareholder wealth.
In models (3) and (4) we turn to the results on leverage by looking into the bidder
company’s bank loan ratio and leverage ratio. The ratios of these two measures of leverage
do not appear to be perceived differently at the announcement date, suggesting that the
overall positive CARs cannot be attributed to leverage. As in model (1) we do not find a
significant relationship for the common shareholder with shareholdings at 5%. When
looking at shareholdings of 10% or more in bidder and/or target, we find that the
coefficient of the large common shareholder is positive and significant at the 0.1 level.
These results imply that bidder’s CARs for mergers with a large common shareholder are
2.3% greater than for mergers without a common shareholder.
In models (5) and (6) we examine the relation between the CAR and the common
shareholder’s ownership percentages in the bidder and target separately. For the ownership
in the bidder company we find a coefficient of 0.063, which is significant at a 0.1 level.
Evaluating this at the mean suggests that an increase in the ownership by one standard
deviation is associated with a 1.11% increase in the average CAR. The common
shareholder’s ownership in the target company also has a significant positive relation with
CAR at a 0.05 level. Evaluating the coefficient, we find that an increase in the ownership
by one standard deviation is associated with a 1.54% increase in the average CAR. These
results confirm that the common shareholder’s ownership relates positively to CAR and
that ownership in the target has a more positive influence than ownership in the bidder
company. In model (5) we also find a significant coefficient of -0.034 for rescue mergers,
confirming our earlier findings of the negative influence on abnormal return.
Overall we find that CARs do not vary according affiliation with a main bank and the
level of leverage in our regression results, which is in contrast to Kang et al. (2000). The
regression shows that the existence of a common shareholder has an important influence
on CAR.
198
Chapter 9 Merger activity
186
Regression analysis: Volume Level
In table 9-6, the regression results on excess volume level are shown in models (7) and (8).
We only report the Excess Volume-variant of the CAR test models (1) and (2) because the
other tests show similar results.
Model (7) confirms the results from the univariate analysis. For all companies the excess
volume is positively influenced by the relative size of the transaction at a significance level
of 0.05. Being a member of a horizontal keiretsu results in a lower trading volume than an
independent company. This is an interesting finding because it suggests that the cross-
shareholding structures have not been replaced yet. In our other tests, however, we have
seen that it does not have a positive or negative effect on the stock price at the
announcement date.
In model (8) we examine the trading volume of bidder companies affiliated with a main
bank, based on outstanding main bank loan percentage. We get the same results as model
(7) with reference to the transaction size and membership of a horizontal keiretsu. For
these bidder companies, use of main bank loans and a merger with a listed target company
result in a lower trading volume.
9-3-3 Conclusions
M&A activity in Japan has been low relative to other countries, which was attributed to the
influence of industrial groups and the main bank system. Main banks as well as group
membership guaranteed a certain level of corporate monitoring and stable and cross-
shareholdings, which substituted the market for corporate control. After the collapse of the
bubble in the 1990s, the subsequent economic recession, and major legislative and
accounting changes, Japanese companies were forced to question the efficiency of the
traditional Japanese system of corporate governance. Consequently, Japanese companies
started to engage in restructuring and M&A activities.
This study supports the hypothesis that Japanese corporate control has evolved over the
past decade. The presence of main banks or membership of a keiretsu industrial group do
not appear to affect the market’s reaction to the announcement of a merger, in contrast to
studies done over earlier time periods.
On average, bidders show a positive abnormal return around the announcement date of
about 1.4%. The largest abnormal return is realized in the 2 days before the announcement
but gains are quickly lost thereafter. Interestingly, trading volume appears to increase only
after the announcement is made. Insiders appear to be able to profit from superior
knowledge on the imminent merger announcement, while the rest of the market is too late.
Factors other than affiliation with a main bank or keiretsu membership do appear to
have a positive association with announcement returns, such as the presence of a common
shareholder holding shares in both the bidder and the target company and the period in
which the merger took place (in/after 1998). For the volume effect we find an association
with the size of the target company relative to the bidder company.
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9-4 Shareholder wealth of bidder and target companies
R When the main bank is the same for the bidder and target company, its involvement
does not create shareholder wealth but is motivated to protect its own interests as
creditor: same main bank mergers are not between two weak companies, but at least
one of the merging companies is financially strong.
R Bidder and target companies accrue positive pre-announcement returns, with bidder
companies capturing approximately half the gains that accrue to target companies.
R We find differential shareholder wealth effects in the bubble period (1982-1989), the
early 1990s (1990-1996) and the late 1990s (1997-2003).
In chapter 2 and section 9-1 we explained that the second merger wave occurred after the
stock and land price bubbles burst. In the preceding high-growth period companies had
made a lot of investments, and these companies faced financial difficulties in the 1990s. A
main bank, being interested in payment of interest and repayment of loans, will not be
concerned in a period of high economic growth, but this attitude will change in times of
economic recession. In this latter situation, companies with falling profitability or in
financial distress are likely to be restructured by the main bank.
In this section we examine whether rescue mergers occurred in Japan and how the
strong relationship of a main bank with the merging companies influences merger activity.
Morck and Nakamura (1999) show that main banks act in the interest of creditors in stead
of shareholders. Bankers are appointed to the board of directors of companies with poor
performance and low liquidity. Their evidence supports the “bank power hypothesis”.
When we relate the bank power hypothesis to mergers, we can assume that the main bank
of a company in financial distress will attempt to arrange a merger of a weak company
with a stronger company. The merger will protect the main bank’s interests as a creditor
and will not necessarily be intended to increase shareholder wealth. In contrast, Kang et al.
(2000) find significant positive abnormal returns for bidder companies that are affiliated
with a main bank; they conclude that the main bank enhances shareholder wealth.
In previous research and in our own research in section 9-3, the influence of the main
bank is examined by focusing on the bidder company. Kang et al. (2000) only mention the
influence of the target company’s main bank with reference to the fact that the bidder is
unlikely to overpay for the target as it can take advantage of the information of the main
bank (p.2209). As we did not find significant results in tests on performance and the main
bank in our research in section 9-3, we argue that the main bank of the target company
should be most important in the analysis of the bank power hypothesis. When failing
companies are involved in mergers, these are most likely the target companies in the
transaction. The main bank of the failing company is therefore most concerned about its
interests, most active in finding a way to secure these, and its role can only be deduced
from the actions towards the failing company. We further argue that only when the
merging companies have the same main bank, it is possible to maintain that the main bank
engages in activities to protect its own interests. The same main bank will gain by
arranging a merger of a company in financial distress with a financially strong company,
as it can herewith secure its interests. Also, a same main bank that is concerned with its
own interests will not coordinate mergers between two failing companies. In summary, if
the main bank has a role in mergers in Japan, we can only find this in periods of economic
recession and when the merging companies have the same main bank.
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This section reviews the results of section 9-3 and of Kang et al. (2000) by investigating
91 mergers between listed companies in the period 1982-2003. We examine whether the
main bank enhances shareholder wealth (Kang et al. 2000) or acts in its own interest as
creditor (Morck and Nakamura 1999). In our analysis we pay special attention to mergers
in which a failing company is involved and to the specific macro-economic conditions,
such as the business cycle and changes in the regulatory structure, as they can influence the
type of mergers that companies engage in. In particular, we examine the following:
First, we look into the sub-periods: (i) the period 1982-1989 (“1980s”), (ii) the period
1990-1996 (“Early 90s”), and (iii) the period 1997-2003 (“Late 90s”). The 1980s is
characterized by a growing economy at an average annual GNP growth of 5.5% in which
companies made a lot of investments in machinery and real estate. The investments led to
increasing prices in the stock market and of land prices in the late 1980s. The stock market
bubble burst at the end of 1989 and the land prices bubble in 1991. During the second
period, Early 90s, the Japanese economic growth slowed down considerably and GNP-
growth dropped to an annual average of 1.5%. A lot of companies faced financial
difficulties and a lot of banks coped with non-performing loans. The third period, Late 90s,
is typified by the aggravation of the financial difficulties and various amendments to laws
related to M&A and ownership, such as the lifting of the ban on pure holding companies.
In 1997 the severity of the non-performing loan problems of Japanese financial institutions
became evident with bankruptcies of some large financial institutions.
Second, we investigate the influence of the main bank. Previous research argues that the
main bank relationships have started to weaken in recent years. The length of our sample
period allows a good examination if and how the main bank’s influence changed in recent
years. In particular, we focus on the influence of the main bank when it is the same for the
merging companies.
Third, we investigate the influence of profitability and liquidity on shareholder wealth
and on the role of the main bank.
9-4-1 Data
We look into domestic mergers between non-financial companies in the 22-year period
from 1 January 1982 until 31 December 2003. Our sample consists of bidder and target
companies listed on either the First Section or Second Section of the Tokyo Stock
Exchange (TSE). To obtain our data-set we first collect information on all companies that
were delisted from TSE during the sample period. Next, we investigate whether the
delisted companies were engaged in a merger by examining all press articles related to
mergers in the period 1982 to 2003. The press articles are from the Nihon Keizai Shimbun
(Japan Economic Journal), Nikkei Sangyǀ Shimbun (Industrial Journal), Nikkei Ryǌtǌ
Shimbun (Distribution Journal) and Nikkei Kinyǌ Shimbun (Finance Journal). If the
company was engaged in a merger, we collect the initial public Announcement Date (AD)
and the Effective Date (ED) of the merger from the press articles. The AD is defined as the
day that the merger announcement appears in the press for the first time. We next look for
the accounting data and stock price data of the merging companies.
Our final sample contains 91 separate mergers over the period 1982-2003. Figure 9-4
shows the distribution of mergers over the sampling period. Two characteristics are
evident, half of all merger transactions occur between 1998 and 2003 and the mergers
occur counter-cyclical to the stock market. This appears to indicate that in Japan, rather
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than shareholders, fixed claimants such as creditors and employees are most important in
mergers.
Figure 9-4 Merger activity and Nikkei Index in the period 1981-2003
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Notes On the left vertical axis the number of mergers is given and on the right vertical axis the Nikkei Index is plotted, measured
at year-end value. The sample consists of 91 mergers between Japanese bidder and target companies listed on the Tokyo Stock
Exchange for which the announcement date of the merger is between 1 January 1982 and 31 December 2003. Information on all
companies that were delisted from TSE during the sample period was collected. Next, it was investigated whether the delisted
companies were engaged in a merger by investigating all press articles related to mergers in the period 1982 to 2003.
As explained above, we pay special attention to three sub-periods in the sample period.
Table 9-7 shows that 19 mergers of the total sample occur in the 1980s, 21 mergers in the
early 90s, and 51 mergers in the late 90s.
We examine the main bank defined as a bank that is the company’s most important
lender and belongs to the company’s largest 5 shareholders, as indicated in the publication
keiretsu no kenkyǌ for the year of the announcement. Table 9-7 shows that target
companies with a main bank amount to 67% of all mergers, and bidder companies with a
main bank to 65%. In 31% of the merger cases the target and bidder company have the
same main bank. Mergers in which the merging companies have a main bank are
concentrated in the early 90s with 95% for bidder companies and 76% for target
companies. In this period more than half of all mergers is between companies with the
same main bank. The financial difficulties after the bubble period appear to have
stimulated main banks to arrange mergers between related companies. In the periods 1980s
and Late 90s the percentage of target companies with a main bank slightly exceeds bidder
companies. Mergers involving companies with the same main bank are at 29% in the
1980s and 22% in the Late 90s.
We define financial distress following Hoshi, Kashap and Scharfstein (1990) and select
companies that experience a cash-flow crisis. We examine whether the company’s interest
expense exceeds its operating income in (i) the last fiscal year prior to the merger or (ii) in
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two of the four years before the merger. Mergers involving a distressed bidder are most
frequent in the 1980s with 58%. Mergers with a distressed target are at the same level in
the 1980s and Early 90s with respectively 63% and 67% of the cases. Mergers involving
two distressed companies are most frequent in the 1980s at 47%. Overall, one third of the
mergers involve a distressed bidder and in half of all merger cases a distressed target is
involved. The percentage of mergers involving two distressed companies is highest in the
1980s and lowest in the late 90s.
Based on the Nikkei Needs industry classification we investigate whether the mergers
are intra- or inter-industry mergers. In the 1980s most inter-industry mergers take place
with 37% (seven out of the 19 merger cases). The percentage decreased to 24% in Early
90s and 10% in late 90s. This indicates that whereas the mergers in the 1980s were
motivated by product extension or speculation, the 1990s are primarily aimed at increasing
efficiency and cutting costs.
Table 9-7 Characteristics by period
All 1980s Early 90s Late 90s
Number of mergers 91 19 21 51
Bidder main bank 65% 53% 95% 57%
Target main bank 67% 58% 76% 67%
Same main bank 31% 29% 52% 22%
Bidder distressed 35% 58% 33% 27%
Target distressed 51% 63% 67% 39%
Both distressed 27% 47% 29% 20%
Inter-industry 19% 37% 24% 10%
Notes The sample consists of 91 mergers between Japanese bidder and target companies listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange for
which the announcement date of the merger is between 1 January 1982 and 31 December 2003. Information on all companies that
were delisted from TSE during the sample period was collected. Next, it was investigated whether the delisted companies were
engaged in a merger by investigating all press articles related to mergers in the period 1982 to 2003. A main bank is defined as a
bank that is a company’s most important lender and belongs to the company’s largest 5 shareholders, as indicated in keiretsu no
kenkyǌ for the year of the announcement. A company is qualified as being in financial distress when interest expense exceeds its
operating income in the last fiscal year prior to the merger, or in two of the four years prior to the merger. Based on the listing on
the TSE we determine whether it is an inter-industry or intra-industry merger.
Table 9-8 shows descriptive statistics of the companies in the sample. Target companies
have assets at a mean of 151 billion yen and median of 51 billion yen. The mean and
median of bidders’ total assets are considerably higher at 690 billion yen and 199 billion
yen. In confirmation of our findings in chapter 2, the merging companies were largest in
size during the Early 90s. The means of total assets are 1,079 billion yen for the bidder
companies and 208 billion yen for target companies. The size of the target company
relative to the bidder company, on the other hand, is highest in the Late 1990s with a mean
of 41.7%. This confirms our findings on intra-industry mergers in this period as being
aimed at cutting costs. The diversification mergers in the 1980s, on the other hand, were
predominantly with small targets.
For target and bidder companies with a main bank we measure leverage as main bank
loans divided by total debt and find means at respectively 7.3% and 4.5%. These main
bank loan ratios are for both target companies and bidder companies highest in the 1980s.
The increasing stock market and growing economy resulted in a lot of corporate
investments partly financed by loans from the main bank. The ratio of bidder companies
exceeds that of target companies in the 1980s, but in the other periods the ratio of targets is
more than double that of bidder companies, increasing their bankruptcy costs. In Late 90s
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the target companies’ mean is 8% compared to 3.1% for bidder companies. The main bank
shareholdings are also highest in the 1980s with 6.0% in target companies and 5.3% in
bidder companies. In the 1990s the ownership percentages of main banks are between 4%
and 5% for the merging companies.
Regarding the influence of common financial institutions, target companies have the
highest shareholding ratio of 11.8% in the Early 90s, and bidder companies in the 1980s at
12.9%. We can see a strong decline in the Late 90s when the unwinding of stable
shareholdings started. Mergers in which the bidder owns shares of the target fall from 63%
in the 1980s to 40% in the Late 90s. Of the 41 mergers in the total sample, bidder
companies have ownership of target companies at an average percentage of 31.1%. This
ratio is stable over the entire sample period. The percentage of merger cases involving a
common corporate shareholder increases from 21% in the 1980s to 37% in the Late 90s.
The average ownership percentage of the common corporate shareholder was 30.1% for
targets and 27.1% for bidders in the Late 90s. A large corporate shareholder is a large
shareholder with ownership exceeding 10% in only one of the merging companies. A large
corporate shareholder in a target company does not belong to the top ten shareholders of a
bidder company, and vice versa. Target companies have a large corporate shareholder in 27
merger cases at an average shareholding of 22.8%, and bidder companies in 25 mergers at
26.6%. In the 1980s both the number of mergers involving a corporate shareholder and the
ownership percentage is lowest.
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Table 9-8 Descriptive statistics of sample (in million yen)
Mean Median Mean Median
Total Assets
All 91 151,609 51,448 690,302 199,709
1980s 19 141,863 15,895 473,691 122,176
Early 90s 21 208,165 114,680 1,078,900 701,222
Late 90s 51 131,952 55,933 610,989 152,572
Total Assets Target / Total Assets Bidder
All 91 0.453 0.343
1980s 19 0.396 0.138
Early 90s 21 0.412 0.278
Late 90s 51 0.492 0.417
Total Debt / Total Assets
All 91 0.705 0.703 0.679 0.711
1980s 19 0.734 0.758 0.690 0.704
Early 90s 21 0.713 0.710 0.724 0.771
Late 90s 51 0.691 0.698 0.657 0.707
Main Bank Loans / Debt
All 63 0.073 0.030 59 0.045 0.011
1980s 11 0.088 0.054 10 0.131 0.042
Early 90s 16 0.047 0.028 20 0.022 0.006
Late 90s 36 0.080 0.026 29 0.031 0.010
Main Bank Shareholding (ownership %)
All 63 4.3 4.7 59 4.3 4.5
1980s 11 6.0 4.8 10 5.3 5.1
Early 90s 16 4.5 4.8 20 3.8 4.0
Late 90s 36 3.7 4.3 29 4.2 4.5
Common Financial Institution Shareholders' loans / Debt
All 69 0.078 0.047 0.064 0.042
1980s 15 0.036 0.029 0.048 0.039
Early 90s 20 0.071 0.062 0.086 0.044
Late 90s 34 0.101 0.045 0.058 0.038
Common Financial Institution Shareholders (Ownership %)
All 69 9.8 7.8 10.7 10.0
1980s 15 11.6 8.9 12.9 13.9
Early 90s 20 11.8 10.3 11.8 11.7
Late 90s 34 7.8 7.1 9.0 7.8
Bidder ownership of Target (Ownership %)
All 41 31.1 32.7
1980s 12 31.8 32.7
Early 90s 9 28.2 28.4
Late 90s 20 31.9 31.4
Common Corporate Shareholder (Ownership %)
All 28 24.9 24.9 24.0 21.5
1980s 4 17.4 20.1 19.0 11.9
Early 90s 5 11.1 4.8 16.6 3.5
Late 90s 19 30.1 28.6 27.1 22.5
Large Corporate Shareholder (Ownership %)
All 27 22.8 18.6 25 26.6 22.7
1980s 4 19.8 17.8 4 21.9 19.6
Early 90s 7 19.4 18.2 3 30.4 28.4
Late 90s 16 25.0 18.9 18 27.0 22.3
BidderTargetVariable
Notes The sample consists of 91 mergers between Japanese bidder and target companies listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange for
which the announcement date of the merger is between 1 January 1982 and 31 December 2003. Information on all companies that
were delisted from TSE during the sample period was collected. Next, it was investigated whether the delisted companies were
engaged in a merger by investigating all press articles related to mergers in the period 1982 to 2003. Accounting data is derived
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from the Nikkei Needs Tapes. Data on shareholders of the bidder and target companies is retrieved from the publication keiretsu
no kenkyǌ. A main bank is defined as a bank that is a company’s most important lender and belongs to the company’s largest 5
shareholders, as indicated in keiretsu no kenkyǌ for the year of the announcement.
Table 9-9 shows the return on assets (“ROA”) of the bidder and target companies for the
entire period and by sub-period. The ROA of all bidder companies and target companies
falls in the three years prior to the merger. After the merger the new company shows an
increase in its ROA in the third year. The table also shows the ROA for the three sub-
periods and we find strong differences between the profitability of the merged company.
In the 1980s the ROA of bidder companies is high and falling slightly before the merger.
It increases from 6.5% in year -3 to 7.3% in the year -2, but then falls to 5.5% in the year
prior to the merger. The ROA of the target companies declines strongly from 4.8% in the
year -3 to 1.7% in the year -1, but remains positive. The ROA in the year following the
merger is lower than that of the bidder companies. It increases the following year but
thereafter it falls. The sample of 19 mergers in this period consists for 47% of mergers
between companies that are both in financial distress and for 29% of mergers in which
both have the same main bank. The merger does not result in higher profitability after the
merger for the new company.
In the Early 1990s the bidder companies’ ROA falls slightly from 3.5% in year -3 to
2.8% in the year -1. The ROA of target companies is very low and turns negative in the
year prior to the merger at -0.06%. The new company shows a ROA of 2.2% that increases
slightly the following years. In the early 1990s we see that bidder companies have a
reasonable profitability but that target companies’ profitability declines and turns negative
in the year prior to the merger. In 52% of the mergers the companies have the same main
bank, in 29% both companies are in financial distress and in 67% of the mergers the target
company is in financial distress. The merger results in lower profitability for bidder
companies in the year of the merger, but profitability increases thereafter.
In the Late 1990s, the ROA of the bidder companies remains relatively stable and target
companies show the highest ROA in the year prior to the merger (highest of the three years
prior to the merger and compared to the preceding two periods). This leads the new
company to have a ROA of 3.3% in the year of the merger, similar to the bidder
companies’ ROA in the year before the merger. The following two years the ROA is at a
lower level of 2.7%, but it increases to 3.8% in the third year after the merger. In the late
1990s both the target and bidder companies have good profitability and the profitability
after the merger increases the third year. Mergers involving companies with the same main
bank or between companies in financial distress are low at about 20% of all mergers.
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Table 9-9 ROAdata of bidders and targets
ROA n -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
All Bidder 91 Mean 0.042 0.042 0.036 0.032 0.030 0.029 0.034
Median 0.035 0.034 0.032 0.028 0.030 0.028 0.035
Target Mean 0.024 0.018 0.015
Median 0.026 0.020 0.017
1980s Bidder 19 Mean 0.065 0.073 0.055 0.039 0.042 0.036 0.034
Median 0.054 0.055 0.052 0.046 0.044 0.053 0.045
Target Mean 0.048 0.035 0.017
Median 0.049 0.030 0.013
Early 90s Bidder 21 Mean 0.035 0.032 0.028 0.022 0.024 0.026 0.027
Median 0.036 0.034 0.032 0.024 0.030 0.023 0.027
Target Mean 0.012 0.004 -0.006
Median 0.026 0.012 0.010
Late 90s Bidder 51 Mean 0.036 0.035 0.033 0.033 0.027 0.027 0.038
Median 0.031 0.031 0.026 0.028 0.020 0.022 0.036
Target Mean 0.020 0.018 0.024
Median 0.023 0.019 0.022
Notes The sample consists of 91 mergers between Japanese bidder and target companies listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange for
which the announcement date of the merger is between 1 January 1982 and 31 December 2003. Information on all companies that
were delisted from TSE during the sample period was collected. Next, it was investigated whether the delisted companies were
engaged in a merger by investigating all press articles related to mergers in the period 1982 to 2003. ROA is calculated as
operating profit divided by total assets. The accounting data is retrieved from the Nikkei Needs Tapes.
9-4-2 Results
Abnormal returns are computed using the event-study methodology, following Dodd and
Warner (1983). Our test period starts 50 days prior to the announcement date and stops 50
days after. We calculate abnormal returns in three ways. First, similar to Section 9-3,
compared to normal returns that are determined by calculating betas using daily return data
over the 200 trading days preceding the test period, using the TOPIX index as our
benchmark. Second, similar as the first calculation but the betas are at a weighted average.
Third, we calculate abnormal returns as raw returns. We get similar results for each method
of calculation and the calculations below are based on the third method. The daily
abnormal return is compounded over various time intervals to get the cumulative average
abnormal return (CAR). We use standard t-statistics to test the hypothesis that the average
CARs are equal to zero. Table 9-10 shows several windows of abnormal price returns
around the announcement date.
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Table 9-10 CARs for Japanese targets and bidders in the period 1982-2003
Bidder Target Bidder Target
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Mean Mean Mean
[-50, 0] 0.109 0.098 0.039 0.014 -0.038 0.166 0.073 0.083
(0.000) (0.001) (0.034) (0.098) (0.170) (0.005) (0.001) (0.014)
[-5, 0] 0.047 0.031 0.018 0.016 0.004 0.089 0.024 0.028
(0.000) (0.001) (0.023) (0.044) (0.789) (0.002) (0.011) (0.048)
[-2, 0] 0.024 0.008 0.011 0.006 0.002 0.046 0.015 0.014
(0.031) (0.036) (0.074) (0.058) (0.849) (0.032) (0.041) (0.280)
[-1, 0] 0.014 0.002 0.004 0.002 -0.012 0.041 0.011 0.002
(0.145) (0.115) (0.515) (0.554) (0.228) (0.020) (0.124) (0.834)
[-1, +1] -0.010 0.000 -0.012 -0.012 -0.044 0.025 0.002 -0.026
(0.466) (0.446) (0.110) (0.087) (0.006) (0.296) (0.803) (0.131)
[0, +2] -0.037 -0.041 -0.013 -0.011 -0.031 -0.015 -0.006 -0.046
(0.039) (0.010) (0.084) (0.033) (0.029) (0.639) (0.530) (0.031)
[0, +5] -0.064 -0.066 -0.020 -0.022 -0.034 -0.051 -0.014 -0.069
(0.003) (0.001) (0.031) (0.020) (0.037) (0.144) (0.221) (0.009)
[0, +50] -0.046 -0.031 -0.017 -0.019 -0.019 -0.079 -0.016 -0.031
(0.063) (0.058) (0.315) (0.194) (0.482) (0.095) (0.452) (0.281)
[-2, +2] -0.020 -0.007 -0.006 -0.006 -0.023 0.012 0.002 -0.034
(0.260) (0.153) (0.503) (0.293) (0.138) (0.679) (0.845) (0.116)
[-5, +5] -0.024 -0.034 -0.006 -0.007 -0.025 0.019 0.002 -0.043
(0.264) (0.286) (0.566) (0.432) (0.151) (0.612) (0.867) (0.098)
[-50, +50] 0.056 0.081 0.019 -0.009 -0.051 0.068 0.049 0.050
(0.074) (0.122) (0.406) (0.786) (0.082) (0.250) (0.093) (0.175)
All Companies (n = 91)
Target CAR Bidder CAR
(n = 63)(n = 28)
CAR Main Bank CAR Not Main Bank
Notes The sample consists of 91 mergers between Japanese bidder and target companies listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange for
which the announcement date of the merger is between 1 January 1982 and 31 December 2003. Information on all companies that
were delisted from TSE during the sample period was collected. Next, it was investigated whether the delisted companies were
engaged in a merger by investigating all press articles related to mergers in the period 1982 to 2003. The initial announcement
date, i.e. the first day on which the information related to the announcement was public before the end of the trading day, is
defined as the day that the merger announcement appears in the press for the first time. The press articles from the Nihon Keizai
Shimbun (Japan Economic Journal), Nikkei Sangyǀ Shimbun (Industrial Journal), Nikkei Ryǌtǌ Shimbun (Distribution Journal),
and Nikkei Kinyǌ Shimbun (Finance Journal) are investigated.
Total Sample
We find that the stock price of the target company starts to rise as early as 50 days before
the announcement. The total increase (adjusted for the market) from day –50 to day 0 is
10.9%, of which approximately half occurs in the five days preceding the announcement of
the merger (4.7%). By the end of day +5, the gain for target companies is down to 4.5%
(cumulative gain from day –50 to day +5). By the end of day +50, target shares recover
somewhat to show an average cumulative gain of 5.6%. In contrast to the U.S. evidence,
we find that bidder companies in Japan enjoy positive gains in the period leading up to the
announcement of the merger. The bidder companies’ CAR from day –50 to day 0 is 3.9%.
Immediately after the merger announcement, the bidder share price falls (as was the case
with the target). The cumulative return from day –50 to day +5 is 1.9% for the bidder,
identical to that of the target company during the same interval. There appears to be no
recovery in bidder share prices in the following days – the cumulative bidder return from
day +5 to day +50 is insignificant. Based on the data of all companies, we are unable to
explain the loss in target share value immediately following the merger announcement –
cancelled mergers are very rare, in fact, non-existent in our sample. The separation of
mergers by presence and absence of a same main bank provides us more information on
the negative CARs at/after the announcement date.
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Regarding the CARs for merging companies that have the same main bank, we do not
find any significant changes in the share price prior to the announcement for either the
bidder or target company. At and after the announcement date, on the other hand, the
CARs of both merging companies turn negative at a significant level. The involvement of
the main bank has a strong negative effect on shareholder wealth. Over the period day 0 to
day +5 the CAR for target companies is at -11% and for bidder companies at -3.4%. In
contrast, the CARs of companies in mergers without the influence of a same bank show
significant positive gains in the period leading up to the announcement of the merger.
During the announcement period the gains are insignificantly different from zero, and the
overall effect of the absence of a same main bank is positive for both bidder and target
companies.
Next we examine how characteristics of the merging companies influence the abnormal
returns for the period [-1,+1] (table 9-11 and table 9-12). We measure total bank loan
leverage as total loans divided by total assets and find that bidder companies with a ratio
above the median have a mean CAR at -2.4% and a median CAR at -1.6%, both significant
at the 0.05 level. These CARs are not significantly different from companies with leverage
below the median, and the other CARs related to leverage are all insignificantly different
from zero. Ownership of a bidder company in the target company, and by a common
shareholder in the target company and the bidder company does not have an important
influence over CARs. Presence of a large corporate shareholder and being member of the
same keiretsu has a minor negative influence on the bidder’s abnormal returns; the median
CAR of bidder companies with a large corporate shareholder is significantly negative and
distinguishable from the median of companies that do not have a large corporate
shareholder. Inter-industry mergers are significantly negative for target companies. The
mean is negative at -6.8% and the median at -4.7%, both distinguishable from the
insignificant CARs of target companies in intra-industry mergers.
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Table 9-11 CAR [-1, +1] for Japanese bidders and targets categorized by characteristics of the merging
companies
Mean Median t-test Wilcoxon Mean Median t-test Wilcoxon
All 91 -0.010 0.000 -0.012 -0.012
(0.466) (0.446) (0.110) (0.087)
46 -0.017 0.000 0.483 -0.024 -0.016 1.606
(0.259) (0.368) (0.630) (0.035) (0.033) (0.112)
45 -0.003 0.000 0.373 0.000 0.000 1.353
(0.888) (0.803) (0.709) (0.998) (0.804) (0.176)
28 0.010 0.003 0.971 -0.007 0.001 0.536
(0.691) (0.747) (0.334) (0.637) (0.542) (0.595)
63 -0.019 -0.001 0.989 -0.014 -0.013 0.557
(0.255) (0.249) (0.323) (0.101) (0.077) (0.577)
26 -0.021 -0.001 0.480 -0.011 0.007 0.126
(0.430) (0.438) (0.632) (0.474) (0.979) (0.900)
65 -0.006 0.000 0.422 -0.013 -0.017 1.208
(0.721) (0.669) (0.673) (0.154) (0.058) (0.227)
16 0.006 0.009 0.534 0.010 0.012 1.359
(0.819) (0.755) (0.594) (0.481) (0.423) (0.178)
75 -0.014 0.000 0.751 -0.017 -0.014 1.632
(0.397) (0.340) (0.453) (0.054) (0.021) (0.103)
44 -0.010 0.000 0.440 -0.005 0.007 0.948
(0.642) (0.577) (0.661) (0.695) (0.960) (0.346)
47 -0.010 0.000 0.359 -0.019 -0.018 1.751
(0.575) (0.588) (0.719) (0.044) (0.012) (0.080)
27 0.021 0.000 1.481 -0.017 -0.022 0.404
(0.241) (0.294) (0.142) (0.324) (0.047) (0.688)
64 -0.023 -0.001 1.499 -0.010 0.002 1.738
(0.200) (0.134) (0.134) (0.216) (0.549) (0.082)
Member of same keiretsu 47 -0.026 0.000 1.196 -0.018 -0.015 0.816
(0.156) (0.296) (0.235) (0.085) (0.214) (0.417)
Not member of same keiretsu 44 0.007 0.000 0.647 -0.006 -0.011 0.171
(0.743) (0.940) (0.517) (0.604) (0.259) (0.864)
Intra-industry merger 74 0.003 0.001 2.035 -0.011 -0.011 0.308
(0.842) (0.739) (0.045) (0.204) (0.156) (0.759)
Inter-industry merger 17 -0.068 -0.047 2.449 -0.017 -0.018 0.270
(0.018) (0.011) (0.014) (0.283) (0.394) (0.787)
Bidder and csh with ownership of
more than 20% in target
Bidder and csh with no or lower
than 20% ownership in target
Bidder and target have common
shareholder
Bidder and target do not have
common shareholder
Bidder and target have csh over
20%
Bidder and target do not have csh
over 20%
Bidder with ownership of more
than 20% in target
Bidder with no or lower than 20%
ownership in target
Big corporate shareholder in
target or bidder
Not big corporate shareholder in
target or bidder
Target CAR [-1,+1] Bidder CAR [-1,+1]
Total bank loan ratio above
sample median
Total bank loan ratio below
sample median
Notes The sample consists of 91 mergers between Japanese bidder and target companies listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange for
which the announcement date of the merger is between 1 January 1982 and 31 December 2003. Information on all companies that
were delisted from TSE during the sample period was collected. Next, it was investigated whether the delisted companies were
engaged in a merger by investigating all press articles related to mergers in the period 1982 to 2003. The initial announcement
date, i.e. the first day on which the information related to the announcement was public before the end of the trading day, is
defined as the day that the merger announcement appears in the press for the first time. The press articles from the Nihon Keizai
Shimbun (Japan Economic Journal), Nikkei Sangyǀ Shimbun (Industrial Journal), Nikkei Ryǌtǌ Shimbun (Distribution Journal),
and Nikkei Kinyǌ Shimbun (Finance Journal) are investigated. A main bank is defined as a bank that is a company’s most
important lender and belongs to the company’s largest 5 shareholders, as indicated in keiretsu no kenkyǌ for the year of the
announcement. A company is qualified as being in financial distress when interest expense exceeds its operating income in the last
fiscal year prior to the merger, or in two of the four years prior to the merger.
Main Bank
Regarding the influence of the companies’ main bank(s) and financial distress on abnormal
return of the merging companies, we first look into the influence of a target with a main
bank on the CARs of target and bidder companies. Subsequently we investigate the
influence of a bidder with a main bank, and finally we relate these to the effect on CARs
when the merging companies have the same main bank. For both bidder and target
companies, the return in same main bank mergers is more negative than in mergers where
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the main bank is different, or only one of the merging companies has a main bank
relationship.
Targets with a main bank - We find that mergers involving target companies with a main
bank result in a negative mean and median CAR for target companies at respectively -
2.8% and -1.0%, with the latter being significant at a 0.1 level. This mean and median
CAR is distinguishable from a target companies’ CAR in mergers involving targets
without a main bank. Target companies’ CAR of mergers involving a target without a
main bank have a mean at 2.6% and median at 0.5%, but both are not significantly
different from zero.
We find a significant negative CAR for bidder companies at a mean of -1.7% and
median of -1.3% in mergers involving a target company with a main bank. These CARs
are not distinguishable from bidder CARs in mergers involving targets without a main
bank. Bidder returns in mergers with targets without a main bank are not significantly
different from zero.
Table 9-12 CAR [-1, +1] for Japanese bidders and targets categorized by main bank and financial distress
Mean Median t-test Wilcoxon Mean Median t-test Wilcoxon
Target with main bank (mb) 61 -0.028 -0.010 1.844 -0.017 -0.013 0.942
(0.122) (0.068) (0.069) (0.094) (0.064) (0.349)
Target without mb 30 0.026 0.005 2.014 -0.002 -0.005 0.663
(0.215) (0.187) (0.044) (0.842) (0.864) (0.507)
Bidder with mb 59 -0.041 -0.010 3.243 -0.025 -0.016 2.517
(0.011) (0.018) (0.002) (0.005) (0.007) (0.014)
Bidder without mb 32 0.048 0.017 2.876 0.013 0.009 1.999
(0.049) (0.047) (0.004) (0.330) (0.537) (0.046)
Target & Bidder same mb 28 -0.068 -0.061 2.927 -0.043 -0.025 2.938
(0.016) (0.026) (0.004) (0.006) (0.010) (0.004)
Target & Bidder not same mb 63 0.016 0.000 2.330 0.002 0.000 2.283
(0.301) (0.472) (0.020) (0.805) (0.886) (0.022)
Target in distress 46 -0.018 -0.001 0.593 -0.030 -0.029 2.474
(0.299) (0.296) (0.555) (0.002) (0.001) (0.015)
Target not in distress 45 -0.002 0.000 0.635 0.006 0.009 3.401
(0.934) (0.990) (0.525) (0.589) (0.245) (0.001)
Bidder in distress 32 -0.023 -0.001 0.693 -0.024 -0.025 1.206
(0.309) (0.332) (0.490) (0.033) (0.060) (0.231)
Bidder not in distress 59 -0.003 0.000 0.748 -0.005 0.000 1.425
(0.863) (0.890) (0.454) (0.583) (0.496) (0.154)
Target and bidder in distress 25 -0.009 0.000 0.029 -0.030 -0.029 1.482
(0.729) (0.809) (0.977) (0.016) (0.021) (0.142)
Target and bidder not in distress 66 -0.010 0.000 0.049 -0.005 0.000 1.872
(0.524) (0.520) (0.961) (0.569) (0.591) (0.061)
Bidder CAR [-1,+1]Target CAR [-1,+1]
Notes The sample consists of 91 mergers between Japanese bidder and target companies listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange for
which the announcement date of the merger is between 1 January 1982 and 31 December 2003. Information on all companies that
were delisted from TSE during the sample period was collected. Next, it was investigated whether the delisted companies were
engaged in a merger by investigating all press articles related to mergers in the period 1982 to 2003. The initial announcement
date, i.e. the first day on which the information related to the announcement was public before the end of the trading day, is
defined as the day that the merger announcement appears in the press for the first time. The press articles from the Nihon Keizai
Shimbun (Japan Economic Journal), Nikkei Sangyǀ Shimbun (Industrial Journal), Nikkei Ryǌtǌ Shimbun (Distribution Journal),
and Nikkei Kinyǌ Shimbun (Finance Journal) are investigated. A main bank is defined as a bank that is a company’s most
important lender and belongs to the company’s largest 5 shareholders, as indicated in keiretsu no kenkyǌ for the year of the
announcement. A company is qualified as being in financial distress when interest expense exceeds its operating income in the last
fiscal year prior to the merger, or in two of the four years prior to the merger.
211
Section 9-4 Shareholder wealth of bidder and target companies
199
Bidders with a main bank - The target companies’ CAR in mergers involving bidder
companies with a main bank is significantly negative at a 0.05 level, with a mean of -4.1%
and a median of -1.0%. This CAR is distinguishable from the CAR involving bidder
companies without a main bank at a 0.01 level. Target companies’ CAR in mergers with
bidder companies without a main bank is significant at 4.8% (mean) and 1.7% (median).
Bidder companies with a main bank have a significant negative CAR at a mean and
median of respectively -2.5% and -1.6%. The CAR is significantly different from the CAR
of bidder companies without a main bank and the latter is not significant.
Same main bank – In mergers where target companies and bidder companies have the
same main bank, the CAR of target companies is significantly negative at a mean of -6.8%
and median of -6.1%. These returns are also significantly different from returns of target
companies in mergers in which the bidder company and target company do not have the
same main bank. The mean and median of a target companies’ CAR in this latter group is
not significantly different from zero.
Bidder companies have a mean and median of respectively -4.3% and -2.5% in same
main bank mergers. These returns are significantly different from those of mergers in
which the merging companies do not have the same main bank.
Financial distress
Table 9-12 shows the results of our tests to examine the influence of financial distress of
the merging companies as well. Similar to the main bank, we look into the influence of
financial distress of target and bidder companies individually and when both are in
financial distress. Our discussion of the results is slightly different as we describe the effect
of the three types of financial distress on CAR. We first look into the CAR of target
companies and then turn to the CAR of bidder companies.
Target CAR - The table shows that the financial condition of the target and/or the bidder
company does not have any significant influence over the CARs of target companies. The
CAR for target companies is not significantly different from zero when target companies
are in financial distress, or when they are not in financial distress. A similar pattern is
visible in case the bidder company is in financial distress, or both companies are in
financial distress.
Bidder CAR - The abnormal returns of bidder companies are significantly negative for
all merger cases in which a company in financial distress is involved. In mergers in which
the target or both companies is/are in financial distress, the mean and median CAR is -
3.0% and -2.9% respectively. In merger cases involving a target in financial distress, the
means and the medians of the returns are distinguishable from mergers with targets not in
financial distress at a 0.05 level. In case the bidder company itself is in financial distress,
the mean is -2.4% and the median is -2.5%. Mergers not involving companies in financial
distress result in means and medians of bidder returns that are not significantly different
from zero.
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Additional tests
Above we described that the CAR of the target and bidder companies is, in particular,
negatively influenced in mergers where the merging companies have the same main bank.
A significant negative impact on the returns of bidder companies is also found in mergers
involving a target in financial distress. To examine these results in more detail, we conduct
various tests for groups of target and bidder companies according to the following two
characteristics: (i) merger cases in which the merging companies have the same main bank
and (ii) merger cases with a target in financial distress. For these merger cases we
investigate what influences the abnormal returns of the target and bidder companies. We
perform tests on the following characteristics, of which we discuss only those with
significant results below: (i) target with a main bank, (ii) bidder with a main bank, (iii)
merging companies with the same main bank, (iv) distressed target, (v) distressed bidder,
(vi) both merging companies distressed, (vii) industry related merger, (viii) keiretsu related,
(ix) total debt/total assets ratio, (x) corporate common shareholder, and (xi) sub-periods.
Same main bank : sub-sample
In our tests for the 28 mergers involving merging companies with the same main bank, we
only find significant differences between the three sub-periods. The results of our tests for
the 1980s, Early 90s and Late 90s are shown in table 9-13. Before we discuss how the sub-
periods influence the CARs of bidder and target companies with the same main bank, we
look briefly into the total sample regarding the sub-periods.
Panel A of Table 9-13 indicates that target companies’ CAR is not significantly different
from zero in any of the sub-periods. The returns of the target companies in the periods are
not distinguishable from each other as well. The bidder CAR has a mean of -3.1% and
median of -3.9% in the Early 90s, which are significant at a 0.01 level. In the other two
periods the bidder returns are not significantly different from zero. In the comparison of
Early 90s with Late 90s, only the median is distinguishable at a 0.05 level. These results
indicate that when we examine the total sample, we cannot find significant differences
between the sub-periods. We will next turn to the influence of the same main bank in the
sub-periods. Thereafter, we also look into the returns in the sub-periods for mergers
between companies that do not have the same main bank.
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Table 9-13 CAR [-1, +1] for Japanese bidders and targets by period and main bank
Mean Median t-test Wilcoxon Mean Median t-test Wilcoxon
Panel A: Examination by period
1980s 19 -0.046 -0.004 -0.016 0.003
(0.161) (0.207) (0.266) (0.457)
Early 90s (1990-1996) 20 -0.022 0.000 -0.031 -0.039
(0.271) (0.486) (0.000) (0.001)
Late 90s (1997-2003) 51 0.008 0.000 -0.003 0.000
(0.682) (0.796) (0.809) (0.921)
Comparison 1980s - Early 90s 0.646 0.826 1.027 1.273
(0.522) (0.409) (0.311) (0.203)
Comparison Early 90s- Late 90s 0.909 0.830 1.468 2.416
(0.367) (0.407) (0.147) (0.016)
Comparison 1980s - Late 90s 1.426 1.347 0.604 0.806
(0.158) (0.178) (0.548) (0.421)
Panel B : Main Bank
Bidder and target with same main bank
1980s 6 -0.051 -0.038 0.024 0.016
(0.604) (1.000) (0.155) (0.219)
Early 90s (1990-1996) 11 -0.030 0.001 -0.027 -0.029
(0.306) (0.549) (0.008) (0.065)
Late 90s (1997-2003) 11 -0.116 -0.082 -0.096 -0.122
(0.010) (0.022) (0.007) (0.065)
Comparison 1980s - Early 90s 0.280 0.050 3.348 2.462
(0.784) (0.960) (0.004) (0.014)
Comparison Early 90s- Late 90s 1.885 1.773 2.336 1.839
(0.074) (0.076) (0.030) (0.066)
Comparison 1980s - Late 90s 0.779 0.452 2.971 2.563
(0.448) (0.651) (0.010) (0.010)
Bidder and target not same main bank
1980s 13 -0.043 -0.004 -0.034 -0.029
(0.076) (0.126) (0.067) (0.108)
Early 90s (1990-1996) 10 -0.014 0.000 -0.035 -0.044
(0.643) (0.554) (0.013) (0.033)
Late 90s (1997-2003) 40 0.042 0.018 0.023 0.012
(0.045) (0.073) (0.024) (0.038)
Comparison 1980s - Early 90s 0.802 0.930 0.047 0.217
(0.431) (0.352) (0.963) (0.828)
Comparison Early 90s- Late 90s 1.297 1.285 2.845 2.923
(0.201) (0.199) (0.007) (0.004)
Comparison 1980s - Late 90s 2.245 2.253 2.906 2.636
(0.029) (0.024) (0.005) (0.008)
Target CAR [-1,+1] Bidder CAR [-1,+1]
Notes The sample consists of 91 mergers between Japanese bidder and target companies listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange for
which the announcement date of the merger is between 1 January 1982 and 31 December 2003. Information on all companies that
were delisted from TSE during the sample period was collected. Next, it was investigated whether the delisted companies were
engaged in a merger by investigating all press articles related to mergers in the period 1982 to 2003. The initial announcement
date, i.e. the first day on which the information related to the announcement was public before the end of the trading day, is
defined as the day that the merger announcement appears in the press for the first time. The press articles from the Nihon Keizai
Shimbun (Japan Economic Journal), Nikkei Sangyǀ Shimbun (Industrial Journal), Nikkei Ryǌtǌ Shimbun (Distribution Journal),
and Nikkei Kinyǌ Shimbun (Finance Journal) are investigated. A main bank is defined as a bank that is a company’s most
important lender and belongs to the company’s largest 5 shareholders, as indicated in keiretsu no kenkyǌ for the year of the
announcement.
Sub-periods: same main bank - Target companies have negative returns in the periods
1980s and Early 90s but these are not significantly different from zero. In the Late 90s we
find a significant negative mean of -11.6% and median of -8.2% at a 0.05 level. The
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returns between the Early 90s and the Late 90s are significantly distinguishable from each
other. Bidder companies have positive but insignificant returns in the 1980s. The abnormal
returns are significantly negative in the Early 90s and Late 90s, with means at respectively
-2.7% and -9.6%. The comparisons of the bidders’ returns between the sub-periods are all
significant.
We can conclude that same main bank mergers resulted in significant negative returns
for target companies in only the Late 90s. Returns of bidders in these mergers were
significantly negative in Early 90s, significantly different from the 1980s, and deteriorated
even more in the Late 90s. Same main bank mergers during the 1980s did not result in
abnormal returns, these mergers resulted in negative abnormal returns for bidder
companies during the Early 90s, and for both merging companies in the Late 90s.
Sub-periods: not same main bank - When we turn to the companies in mergers without a
same main bank, we see that the targets’ returns had a significant negative mean in the
1980s at -4.3%. In the Early 90s the returns are insignificant, but in the Late 90s the returns
turn positive. In the Late 90s, the mean and median of target companies are respectively
4.2% and 1.8%, significant at a 0.1 level. The returns of the 1980s and Late 90s are
significantly distinguishable from each other. For bidder companies we find a mean of -
3.4% for returns in the 1980s, significant at a 0.1 level. The returns in the Early 90s are
significantly negative at a mean of -3.5% and median of -4.4%. In the Late 90s the returns
turn positive and have an average of 2.3%. The Late 90s are distinguishable from the
returns in the 1980s and the Early 90s at a 0.01 level.
In contrast to same main bank mergers, we find for not same main bank mergers
significant negative returns for the merging companies in the 1980s. In the Early 90s we
find similar results for merging companies with and without the same main bank;
insignificant returns for the target companies and significant negative returns for the bidder
companies. This also explains that only in this period the total returns in Panel A of table 9-
13 are significant for bidder companies. In the Late 90s we find a significant positive
abnormal return for not same main bank companies, an important difference with the
significant negative abnormal returns for same main bank mergers.
Overall, we find that in the 1980s mergers between companies with the same main bank
resulted in insignificant positive returns for the bidder companies and insignificant
negative returns for target companies. In mergers between companies without a same main
bank, the merging companies had significant negative CARs, for target companies at -
4.3% and bidder companies at -3.4%. Table 9-14 indicates the financial health of the
merging companies by period and presence of a same main bank. The table shows that in
this period of economic growth, the main bank was primarily involved in mergers between
strong companies. Mergers without a same main bank were for 62% between two weak
companies. Most interesting in this period is that, whereas in not same main bank mergers
two weak companies were combined as an attempt to survive, the same main bank did not
engage in these activities as it would not secure its interests as creditor.
In the Early 90s we find a negative abnormal return for bidder companies irrespective of
being related to a main bank or not. The CARs of bidder companies in same main bank
mergers are slightly less negative than in not same main bank mergers. The main
difference is that in the main bank mergers, the mergers were predominantly (45%)
between a strong bidder company and weak target company. With the merger, the same
main bank tries to secure its own interests at the weak target company. The merging
companies in not same main bank were both weak in 40% of the cases and, similar to the
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1980s, appear to be an attempt to improve profitability by combining two failing
companies.
Table 9-14 Classification of merging companies by financial health
Strong
Bidder
Weak
Bidder
Strong
Bidder
Weak
Bidder
Strong
Bidder
Weak
Bidder
ALL Strong Target 42% 8% 43% 11% 41% 6%
Weak Target 23% 27% 29% 18% 21% 32%
1980s Strong Target 26% 11% 67% 17% 8% 8%
Weak Target 16% 47% 0% 17% 23% 62%
Early 90s Strong Target 29% 5% 27% 9% 30% 0%
Weak Target 38% 29% 45% 18% 30% 40%
Late 90s Strong Target 53% 8% 45% 9% 55% 8%
Weak Target 20% 20% 27% 18% 18% 20%
ALL Same Main Bank Not Same MB
Notes A strong company is not in financial distress, a weak company is in financial distress. We define companies as being in
financial distress when interest expense exceeds operating income, the interest coverage ratio is lower than 1, in (i) the last fiscal
year prior to the merger, or (ii) in two of the four years before the merger.
In the Late 90s the same main bank mergers have a strong negative effect on abnormal
return of both the target and bidder companies. We see a strategy of the main bank that is
slightly different from the Early 90s; mergers between a strong bidder and weak target at
27% and occur between two strong companies at 45%. Regarding the strong company
mergers, in combination with the fact that they do not create shareholder wealth, we
assume that the increasing amount of banks’ non-performing loans have encouraged the
same main banks to arrange mergers of strong(er) companies to prevent more financial
problems. Similar to the preceding periods, the main bank is not involved in mergers
contrary to its own interests. In the not same main bank mergers we see that the fact that
both merging companies are strong is reflected in the CARs of the target and bidder
companies.
Target in financial distress: sub-sample
For the 46 mergers involving a target company in financial distress, we only find
significant differences for the factors (i) bidders with a main bank and (ii) intra- and inter-
industry mergers.
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Bidders with main bank - Our sample consists of 29 bidder companies with a main bank
that merge with a target company in financial distress78. The mean abnormal return of a
distressed target company is significantly negative at -4.1% when the bidder company is
affiliated with a main bank. In mergers with a bidder company not affiliated with a main
bank the mean is not significantly different from zero. The means of the abnormal returns
of target companies that merge with main bank bidders and non-main bank bidders, are
distinguishable at a 0.1 level.
The bidder companies with a main bank that merge with a target company in financial
distress have a significantly negative mean abnormal return at -4.3%. The mean and
median of the abnormal return of bidder companies without a main bank is not
significantly different from zero. The means of the abnormal returns of main bank bidders
and non-main bank bidders merging a target in financial distress are distinguishable at a
0.1 level.
Table 9-15 Target in financial distress
Mean Median t-test Wilcoxon Mean Median t-test Wilcoxon
Bidder with mb 29 -0.041 -0.010 1.734 -0.043 -0.032 1.911
(0.046) (0.442) (0.090) (0.000) (0.008) (0.063)
Bidder without mb 17 0.020 0.009 1.593 -0.007 -0.018 1.274
(0.534) (0.804) (0.111) (0.676) (0.332) (0.203)
Intra-industry 35 0.004 0.000 2.419 -0.029 -0.028 0.229
(0.826) (0.597) (0.020) (0.011) (0.017) (0.820)
Inter-industry 11 -0.089 -0.065 2.369 -0.034 -0.043 0.155
(0.030) (0.065) (0.018) (0.118) (0.227) (0.877)
Target CAR [-1,+1] Bidder CAR [-1,+1]
Notes The sample consists of 91 mergers between Japanese bidder and target companies listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange for
which the announcement date of the merger is between 1 January 1982 and 31 December 2003. Information on all companies that
were delisted from TSE during the sample period was collected. Next, it was investigated whether the delisted companies were
engaged in a merger by investigating all press articles related to mergers in the period 1982 to 2003. The initial announcement
date, i.e. the first day on which the information related to the announcement was public before the end of the trading day, is
defined as the day that the merger announcement appears in the press for the first time. The press articles from the Nihon Keizai
Shimbun (Japan Economic Journal), Nikkei Sangyǀ Shimbun (Industrial Journal), Nikkei Ryǌtǌ Shimbun (Distribution Journal),
and Nikkei Kinyǌ Shimbun (Finance Journal) are investigated. A company is qualified as being in financial distress when interest
expense exceeds its operating income in the last fiscal year prior to the merger, or in two of the four years prior to the merger. A
main bank is defined as a bank that is a company’s most important lender and belongs to the company’s largest 5 shareholders, as
indicated in keiretsu no kenkyǌ for the year of the announcement. Based on the listing on the TSE we determine whether it is an
inter-industry or intra-industry merger.
Intra- and inter-industry mergers - Mergers involving targets in financial distress are intra-
industry in 35 cases and inter-industry in 11. In inter-industry merger cases the returns of
target companies are significantly negative at a mean of -8.9% and median of -6.5%. The
cumulative abnormal returns in intra-industry mergers are not significantly different from
zero, but the returns are distinguishable from inter-industry mergers at a 0.05 level.
Bidder companies show a significantly negative return for intra-industry mergers with
targets in financial distress at a mean of -2.9% and a median of -2.8%. Inter-industry
mergers do not have a significant effect on bidders’ abnormal returns, and are not
distinguishable from returns in intra-industry mergers.
78 The bidder companies with a main bank were distributed in the three sub-periods as follows: 1980s in 4
mergers (of 12), early 90s in 14 mergers (of 14), and in late 90s 11 mergers (of 20).
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9-4-3 Conclusions
The market for corporate control in Japan behaves very different from that in the
U.S. Using a sample of 91 mergers in the period 1982-2003, we document several
distinctive features of this market in Japan. First, we show that in stark contrast to the pro-
cyclical U.S. merger waves, mergers in Japan tend to be counter-cyclical, both with respect
to the general economy as well as with respect to stock market valuations. Second, and
again in contrast to the U.S. experience, we find that a significant fraction of Japanese
mergers are orchestrated by the main banks; in such cases, a striking pattern
emerges. When the main bank is the same for the bidder and target company, its
involvement does not create shareholder wealth. The performance of at least one of the
merging companies is strong, indicating that the same main bank is primarily motivated to
protect its own interests as creditor. This was especially evident in the period after the
stock price bubble burst, when the same main bank arranged mergers of weak borrowers
with a financially strong buyer. In the entire period the same main bank’s involvement in
mergers between two weak companies is low.
Other distinctive features of Japanese mergers are the positive pre-announcement returns
accruing to both bidders and targets, with bidders capturing approximately half the gains
that accrue to target companies. The involvement of the same main bank has a strong
negative effect on shareholder wealth at the announcement date, whereas in not same main
bank mergers the merging companies show significant gains in the period leading up to the
announcement. We also find differential shareholder wealth effects in the bubble period
(1982-1989), the early 1990s, and the post-financial regulation regime (1997-
2003). Overall, our results point to a market for corporate control that is distinctly less
shareholder-centred than that in the U.S. and one where creditors play an important,
perhaps dominant, role.
9-5 Conclusion
In the first section of this chapter we related the M&A activity, as discussed in chapter 2,
to merger motives and drivers for merger wave. In the pre-war period we did not find
merger waves. Mergers were motivated by synergy in the electricity sector and the
adaptive motive appears to be most important in other sectors. A lot of companies fell in
financial distress during the 1920s and the mergers appear to have been aimed at rescuing
failing companies. In the 1960s, during the first merger wave, mergers were aimed at
preventing excessive competition and achieving economies of scale in order to be able to
compete with foreign companies (synergy motive). The first period of the second wave is
dominated by mergers between companies in trouble due to the economic business cycle
(adaptive motive). In the second period of the scond merger wave we find that companies
also engaged in mergers for strategic purposes. With previous research we show that the
main bank plays an important role in monitoring companies. The strong relationship
between the main bank and the company allows the bank to intervene quickly when the
company faces financial difficulty. Previous research shows considerable positive
abnormal returns for U.S. target companies at the announcement date, but for Japanese
target companies negative results (or only slightly positive) are found.
In our own empirical research of sections 9-3 and 9-4 we investigate the role of the main
bank in mergers with two event studies. In our first study we investigate whether the main
bank increases shareholder wealth of bidder companies as a result of its knowledge and
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good relations with the company. We do not find significant relations between the main
bank and the abnormal return in our sample period 1993-2003. In contrast, Kang et al.
(2000) find significant positive abnormal returns for the period 1977-1993 and conclude
that the main bank enhances shareholder wealth. Comparison of our findings with Kang et
al. (2000) indicates that the influence of the main bank on mergers of Japanese companies
appears to have changed due to the liberalization of the financial markets and dissolution
of cross-shareholdings.
In our second research we extend our sample period to 1982-2003 in order to examine
whether the role of the main bank has indeed changed in recent years. In particular, we
investigate whether the main bank enhances shareholder wealth or acts in its own interest
as creditor. In this analysis we focus on the adaptive motive, mergers in which the target
company is in financial distress. According to the bank power hypothesis, we can assume
that a main bank of a target company with high outstanding debts and facing financial
distress will be inclined to arrange a solution in this situation to protect its own interests. In
relation to mergers, we assume that it will arrange a merger with a strong company to
protect its own interests. As such, the main bank will not be concerned with increasing
shareholder wealth. We find support for this hypothesis: when the main bank is the same
for the merging companies, the merger does not create shareholder wealth. The merger is
motivated by the main bank in order to protect its own interests as creditor. Generally,
same main bank mergers are not between two weak companies, but at least one of the
merging companies is financially strong. We find different shareholder wealth effects in
the bubble period (1982-1989), the early 1990s, and the post-financial regulation regime
(1997-2003). This finding indicates that the influence of external shocks is also very
important in Japan.
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Appendix I - Event study Methodology
Cumulative Abnormal Return - The abnormal returns for a company can be calculated
using the standard event-study methodology, following Dodd and Warner (1983). First
parameters are estimated in the base period; these parameters are subsequently used in the
test period to calculate residuals/abnormal returns.
In this explanation we will use a base period beginning 210 days before and ending 31
days before the announcement date. The daily return data (change in share price) during
this 180-day base period are used to estimate the parameters of the standard market model:
(Base period = AD – 210 to AD – 31)
itmtiiit eRR  ED
where Rit is the daily return at time t of either the bidder or target company I and Rmt is the
daily return at time t of the market index, the Tokyo Stock Exchange’s Stock Price Index.
Alfa and beta are the parameters that will be estimated and e is the error term.
If we would like to know the residuals of each bidder and target company for a 3-day
test period from one day before to one day after the announcement date. The residuals for
each firm, uit, are calculated by using the estimated alfa and beta as follows:
(Test period = AD - 1 to AD + 1)
 mtiiitit RRu ED ÖÖ  
Average returns, Art, for the N firms on a common date t relative to the centring dates, AD
and/or ED, were calculated as
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Appendix II
Table 9-16 CAR [-5, +90] for Japanese bidders categorized by characteristics of bidder and transaction
Panel A : Main Bank and keiretsu linkages
Mean CAR Median CAR T-Test Mann-Whitney
(p-value) (p-value) (p-value) (p-value)
All Cases 86 2.23% 2.14%
(0.282) (0.161)
Panel A : Main Bank and keiretsu linkages
Bidder is affiliated with main bank 47 2.73% 2.85% 0.265
(0.300) (0.243) (0.792)
Bidder is unaffiliated with main bank 39 1.63% 2.06% -0.004
(0.626) (0.522) (0.997)
42 3.39% 2.47% 0.547
(0.228) (0.280) (0.586)
44 1.13% 2.13% 0.130
(0.715) (0.451) (0.897)
Bidder belongs to horizontal keiretsu 46 3.92% 3.39% 0.873
(0.149) (0.302) (0.385)
Bidder independent of horizontal keiretsu 40 0.30% 1.34% 0.619
(0.926) (0.430) (0.536)
Panel B : Other factors
39 0.99% 1.64% -0.546
(0.743) (0.522) (0.587)
47 3.26% 4.40% -0.620
(0.258) (0.243) (0.535)
44 3.33% 2.14% 0.541
(0.195) (0.291) (0.590)
42 1.09% 1.74% 0.281
(0.745) (0.441) (0.779)
34 1.31% 4.49% -0.361
(0.717) (0.392) (0.719)
52 2.83% 1.49% 0.097
(0.263) (0.332) (0.923)
17 2.46% 5.19% 0.054
(0.602) (1.000) (0.957)
69 2.18% 2.08% -0.222
(0.351) (0.148) (0.824)
34 2.56% 4.49% 0.126
(0.440) (0.058) (0.900)
52 2.02% 0.25% 0.711
(0.454) (0.890) (0.477)
20 4.26% 7.05% 0.537
(0.418) (0.012) (0.592)
66 1.62% 0.25% 1.441
(0.466) (0.902) (0.150)
Number
of obs
Bidder’s main bank loan ratio is above
sample median
Bidder’s main bank loan ratio is below
sample median
Common shareholder has shareholdings
of 5% or more in bidder and target
Common shareholder does not have
shareholdings of 5% or more in bidder
Bidder’s bank loan ratio is above sample
median
Bidder’s bank loan ratio is below sample
median
Bidder does not have shareholding in
target
Bidder has shareholding in target
Bidder’s leverage ratio is above sample
median
Bidder’s leverage ratio is below sample
median
Bidder and target have common
shareholder
Bidder and target do not have common
shareholder
Bidder's shareholding in target is above
median (*)
Bidder's shareholding in target is below
median (*)
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Table 9-16 continued
Mean CAR Median CAR T-Test Mann-Whitney
(p-value) (p-value) (p-value) (p-value)
41 1.59% 2.85% -0.197
(0.644) (0.211) (0.844)
42 2.43% 1.86% -0.073
(0.349) (0.644) (0.942)
9 -5.49% -8.65% -1.286
(0.260) (1.000) (0.202)
77 3.14% 2.96% -1.615
(0.163) (0.110) (0.106)
Merger in period 1993-1997 32 -2.48% -3.02% -1.782
(0.458) (0.860) (0.078)
Merger in period 1998-2003 54 5.03% 3.83% -1.845
(0.057) (0.040) (0.065)
50 3.67% 4.11% 0.820
(0.143) (0.203) (0.415)
36 0.24% 1.34% 0.512
(0.947) (0.618) (0.609)
Target is listed 51 0.47% 2.08% -1.036
(0.872) (0.262) (0.303)
Target is unlisted 35 4.81% 2.20% -0.782
(0.099) (0.500) (0.434)
Bidder and target are in same industry 61 0.77% 2.06% -1.110
(0.762) (0.200) (0.270)
Bidder and target in different industries 36 5.81% 4.40% -0.884
(0.105) (0.690) (0.376)
Large bidders (market cap is above
sample median)
Small bidders (market cap is below
sample median)
Number
of obs
Relative size (total assets target divided
by total assets bidder) is above sample
Relative size (total assets target divided
by total assets bidder) is below sample
Acquisition not motivated by rescue
purposes
Acquisition motivated by rescue purposes
Notes The sample consists of 136 Japanese bidders listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange for which the announcement date of the
merger is between 1 January 1993 and 31 December 2003. For CAR (AD-5, AD+90) we excluded cases where the effective date
of the merger took place within 95 days after the announcement date, in order to avoid the influence of confounding events. We
further eliminated the 20 mergers with the largest fluctuations in abnormal returns and obtained a final sample of 86 merger cases.
Excess trading volume is determined by taking the average of the ratio of daily trading volume in each stock and daily trading
volume in the TOPIX index over the period from -220 to -20 days before the announcement. The actual trading volume over the
test period is divided by this 'normal' ratio. P-values indicate whether average excess trading volume ratio differs significantly
from 1. Leverage ratio is computed as the ratio of the book value of total debt to the sum of the book value of debt and the market
value of equity. Bank loan ratio is computed as the ratio of the book value of debt from financial institutions to the sum of the
book value of debt and the market value of equity. Main bank loan ratio is computed as the ratio of the book value of debt from
the main bank to the sum of the book value of debt and the market value of equity. P-values for t-tests, whether values differ
significantly from 1, are reported in parentheses below the mean, and p-values from sign-rank tests are reported in parentheses
below the median.
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Summary and conclusions
This thesis examines M&A activity in Japan before and after the Second World War
(“WWII”). The research aims to provide an overview of the developments related to M&A
in Japan during these two periods. A full understanding provides us tools to interpret and
understand the developments currently taking place in Japanese M&A activity. We provide
information on mergers and acquisitions by listed companies in the pre-war period and a
detailed examination of merger and hostile takeover activity in the post-war period.
10-1 Summary
Chapter 1 introduces the research question and the structure of the thesis; it shows the
thesis is divided into 4 parts and consists of 10 chapters. Chapter 2 provides a description
of M&A activity in Japan over time. Chapters 3 through 5, Part II, give background
information for interpretation of M&A activity. In these chapters we look into informal
institutions, formal institutions, and political and economic development in the pre-war
and post-war periods. We also discuss companies’ financing decision, ownership structure,
corporate governance structure, and group structures. Chapters 6 and 7 of Part III primarily
look into hostile takeovers in Japan. Chapter 6 introduces our institutional model for M&A
that we use to analyze hostile takeovers in chapter 7. In chapter 8 we explain merger
motives and drivers for merger waves, and we also discuss other types of M&A activity.
Chapter 9 discusses merger activity in Japan. We look at the merger motives and drivers
for merger waves in Japan, and discuss results from previous studies on mergers and the
monitoring role of the main bank. Next, we execute two event studies and examine
whether shareholder wealth is created around the announcement date of a merger
In Chapter 2 we investigate merger and hostile takeover activity in Japan during the
pre-war and post-war periods. For the pre-war period we find that M&A activity was low,
not exceeding an annual total of 41 merger cases. We did not find evidence for merger
waves in the pre-war period and zaibatsu companies were not more active in M&A than
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non-zaibatsu companies. Merger activity was concentrated in the 1920s. In the electricity
sector these were aimed at attaining economies of scale (synergy); other mergers
predominantly appear to have a rescue motive.
In the post-war period we find two merger waves, the first in the period 1963-72 and the
second from 1991 to present. The first merger wave coincides with removal of controls on
capital transactions in 1964 and appears to be partly influenced by administrative guidance
of the Japanese bureaucracy. The main aim of the mergers is to prevent excessive
competition and increase the scale of domestic companies in order to become competitive
with foreign companies. The largest mergers are concentrated in the Steel, Transportation
and Automotive sectors.
The second merger wave starts after the collapse of the bubble economy and is related to
industrial restructuring as the economic recession resulted in bad performance and
difficulty to repay loans. In the early 1990s the largest mergers occur in the Paper,
Chemical and Banking industries; mergers aimed at rescuing failing companies were also
important. After the regulatory changes in the latter half of the 1990s the number and size
of M&A activity increases considerably, although the number of mergers remains stable in
the period 1999-2006. In this period companies initiate mergers for strategic purposes.
We find a lot of hostile takeover activity in the post-war period, starting immediately
after WWII. Only in 1999 the first hostile tender offer occurs, and in the period 1999 to
July 2007 thirteen hostile tender offer attempts were launched. Two hostile tender offers
were successful, but their “hostility” can be questioned, as the bidder company and target
company had a long-standing relationship.
Chapter 3 discusses informal institutions, political development, and formal institutions
in Japan. Informal institutions originate from Shinto, Buddhism, and Confucianism.
Important virtues related to mergers and hostile takeovers are harmony, tolerance, modesty,
importance of the group, and trust. Other important social informal institutions in Japan are
the ie and dǀzoku systems, which represent the relationship between individuals and
companies in a group.
In the pre-war period Japan was determined to catch up with the West and to amend the
unequal treaties. This had an important influence on the formal institutions in Japan; a
modern banking system, stock market and bond market were set up and functioned
effectively up to 1937 when Japan turned into a military state. A constitution was
promulgated that changed the political system into a centralized bureaucratic state. After
the war, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers’ policies were aimed at demilitarizing
and democratizing Japan and setting up a regulatory environment for a safe and stable
financial system. A new constitution was enacted and changed Japan into a democratic
country. The stock market and the bond market are characterized by deregulation in the
1980s and 1990s.
The change in laws related to ownership was most important for the ownership structure,
governance structure, and M&A activity after the war. Prior to WWII the general
shareholders’ meeting had unlimited authority in all financial and managerial matters.
After WWII, the general shareholders’ meeting lost this power and the minority
shareholders gained in influence. Authority on managerial matters was transferred to the
board of directors. Other important changes after WWII were the ban on establishment of
pure holding companies and prohibition of shareholdings between companies of the same
pre-war zaibatsu group. This latter law was abandoned after the peace treaty was signed in
1952, and the pure holding company is permitted again as of 1997. Various laws directly
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related to M&A were implemented in the late 1990s, resulting in simplified merger
procedures, merger currency flexibility, and easier notification procedures for tender offers.
As of 2001 it is possible for companies to buyback their own shares and cancel or hold
them as treasury stock.
Chapter 4 examines the influence of informal and formal institutions on the financing
decision, ownership structure, and governance structure in the pre-war and post-war
periods. In this chapter we investigate aggregate data, and in chapter 5 we look into a case
study of Mitsubishi groups. To complement the discussion on political development and
formal institutions, a brief overview of the economic development in Japan as of 1868, the
start of the Meiji period (1868-1912), is given. The government took the initiative in
industrial development and established companies in various industrial sectors. The
government feared to become colonized by Western countries and realized that individual
businessmen did not have sufficient wealth to make the necessary investments. In the
1880s the government sold its companies to businessmen with political relations (seishǀ)
and ability to build strong and internationally competitive companies. These businessmen
became the leaders of the pre-war zaibatsu groups, conglomerates of various companies,
organized in pyramid form, owned by rich families and/or a family-owned holding
company. In the post-war period government involvement changed into administrative
guidance of companies. New laws prevented establishment of pure holding companies, and
new corporate structures developed in the post-war period: the vertical keiretsu and
horizontal keiretsu. Corporate governance in the post-war period is characterized by the
main bank system. We find that in both the pre-war and the post-war period the trade
association played an important role. Companies in the same industrial sector worked
closely together, discussed strategies, shared technical information, protected members’
privileges, and established trade rules.
The most important method of financing in the pre-war period was internal finance, but
in the 1930s external finance increased in importance. We show that only a gradual decline
in equity finance started as of 1942. In the post-war period the stock and bond markets
were not efficient and expensive for capital procurement. This led companies to rely to a
high degree on bank loans for financing. We look into the developments of share-
ownership in the 1950s and show that individuals were unable to purchase new shares; this
finding is in contrast to the commonly used argument that individual shareholders sold
their shares during this period.
Deregulation of financial markets in the 1980s has resulted in more financing
opportunities for companies and a weakening position for the main bank. The recession in
the 1990s and the banking crisis of 1997 also resulted in unwinding of shareholdings in the
horizontal keiretsu.
Chapter 5 analyzes the corporate groups that were discussed in Chapter 4 for the
Mitsubishi group. For the pre-war period we look into the Mitsubishi zaibatsu. Before the
war the Mitsubishi holding company and Iwasaki Family were the most important
shareholders, owning in most cases more than 90% of the shares in the main group
companies. During the 1930s the zaibatsu families started to change the ownership
structure due to anti-zaibatsu pressures, and the first group shareholdings emerged.
Mitsubishi Bank and Mitsubishi Trust Bank were relatively unimportant shareholders.
During the war period 1937-45, when loan financing increased, banks did not develop into
important shareholders of zaibatsu companies as well.
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In the post-war period the following corporate groups developed: Mitsubishi horizontal
keiretsu, the main bank system with the Mitsubishi Bank at the apex, and the Mitsubishi
vertical keiretsu. Financial institutions play an important role in loan provision and share
ownership of group companies in the first two groups. The number of cross-shareholdings
between companies in horizontal keiretsu is very low and concentrated in six companies.
We term the six companies as the ‘Mitsubishi keiretsu diamond’ companies, and these
have close relations with financial institutions through cross-shareholdings. The keiretsu
diamond companies and financial institutions have extensive ownership in other (important)
group companies. The diamond companies and the four financial institutions are all direct
subsidiaries of the pre-war Mitsubishi holding company and Iwasaki family. This indicates
that the pre-war apex companies remain important as apex companies in the post-war
period.
Companies in the horizontal keiretsu are in most cases also the core company in a
vertical keiretsu, but some companies in the horizontal keiretsu are part of the vertical
keiretsu of another horizontal keiretsu company. We argue that it is possible that findings
in previous research on the horizontal keiretsu are biased due to the influence of the
relations between a parent company and a subsidiary in a vertical keiretsu.
Chapter 6 presents the institutional model we developed to analyze M&A activity in
Japan. The model is inspired on the Williamson 4-level model (Williamson 1998),
Williamson 3-level model (Williamson 1996), and insights from North (1990, 2005) and
Greif (2006). The model emphasizes the importance of motivation of actors and the
historical and context-specific background of institutional elements.
The four levels of the model are as follows: informal institutions at level one, formal
institutions at level two, governance structure and M&A activity at level three, and
individual actors at level four. The informal institutions constrain all other levels, and
formal institutions constrain governance structure, M&A activity, and individual actors.
M&A activity, governance structure, and individual actors are linked with bi-directional
solid arrows; they influence, and are influenced by, each other. M&A activity results from
(strategic) considerations of individual actors, such as, for example, a company’s
management, its shareholders, or a hostile raider. The governance structure of a company
will have an important impact on these considerations and wether they will succeed. At the
same time, M&A activity affects the governance structure, and can have an impact on the
behaviour of individual actors in relation to stock ownership and M&A activity. Level
three is the outcome of the dynamic interactions between economic development, (foreign)
competition, and changes in informal and formal institutions that govern motivation and
behaviour of individual actors.
The neoclassical black boxes of governance structure and individual actors are opened;
they are influenced by each other, by M&A activity, and by informal and formal
institutions. Governance structure consists of two layers: the company and corporate
groups. The box of individual actors is made up of three layers: (i) shared cognition, (ii)
individual mental maps and shared mental maps, and (iii) motivation. In our model,
institutional change is a historical process and needs to incorporate historical development
of institutions and motivation of actors.
Chapter 7 analyzes hostile takeovers in Japan. We first discuss arguments from
previous research and then provide our own interpretation based on our institutional model
for M&A. In previous research the horizontal keiretsu is argued to be formed as a result of
hostile takeovers in the 1950s; this corporate group has subsequently prevented hostile
227
Section 10-1 Summary
215
takeovers in the entire post-war period. Another argument is that hostile takeovers do not
fit in with the Japanese culture. According to transaction cost economics, hybrid structures
without contractual safeguards can be sustained in Japan because of a high level of trust,
importance of reputation, and financial hostages.
With our institutional model, we examine post-war hostile takeover activity in Japan.
First, we look into the concept of trust and the historical development of corporate groups.
The Japanese society is characterized by high particularistic trust and low general trust.
The horizontal keiretsu is an example of the ie system and has its origins in the pre-war
zaibatsu, as a result of the new formal institutions implemented after WWII. The vertical
keiretsu developed after WWII and is characterized by a relationship in which the parent
company and the subsidiary are mutually dependent. Trade associations originate from
1092AD and have been very important in disseminating new technology and information
to companies in the same business sector and in influencing government policy. In section
10-2 we will explain their influence on hostile takeovers according to our institutional
model for M&A.
Chapter 8 provides an overview of the various types of M&A activity and distinguishes
activities into those related to (i) diversification or expansion, and (ii) restructuring. The
main focus of the thesis is diversification or expansion activities structured as mergers and
acquisitions (in particular hostile takeovers). Regarding hostile takeovers, in the form of
tender offers, the chapter gives some examples of available defensive measures such as the
poison pill, white knight, white squire, and green mail. The most important merger motives
for companies are synergy, adaptive, managerial empire building, and hubris. Merger
motives refer to individual M&A transactions, drivers for merger waves to more general
aspects that induce a lot of companies to engage in M&A activity in a particular period.
Two important drivers for merger waves are external shocks and overvaluation of stocks.
Both the drivers for merger waves and merger motives were different for the five merger
waves that occurred in the United States. The first wave (1900) was aimed at increasing
market power, the second wave focused on restructuring industrial sectors. The third wave
in the 1960s was aimed at diversification and creation of large conglomerates, whereas the
fourth wave was dominated by mergers between large companies and hostile takeovers.
The fifth wave had strategic motives.
Chapter 9 discusses our findings on M&A activity from chapter 2, results from
previous research on M&A in Japan, and our own empirical research. In the first section of
this chapter, we relate M&A activity in Japan to merger motives and drivers for merger
waves. In the pre-war period we did not find merger waves. Pre-war mergers in the
electricity sector appear to be motivated by synergy; and in other sectors the adaptive
motive seems to be prevalent; a lot of companies fell in financial distress during the 1920s,
and mergers appear to have been aimed at rescuing failing companies. Similar to the post-
war period, mergers were arranged by the target company or a third party, such as a bank.
In the 1960s, during the first merger wave, mergers were aimed at preventing excessive
competition and achieving economies of scale in order to be able to compete with foreign
companies (synergy motive). The first period of the second wave (1991-1996) is
dominated by mergers between companies in financial difficulty due to the economic
business cycle (adaptive motive). In the second period, as of 1997, we see that companies
are engaging in mergers for strategic purposes.
Next, we discuss previous research on (i) main bank monitoring, (ii) abnormal returns at
the announcement of mergers in Japan and the U.S., and (iii) profitability drivers of
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mergers. Subsequently we perform two empirical event studies that examine the stock
market reaction around the announcement date of a merger.
In the first empirical study we look into the abnormal return of bidder companies
between 1993 and 2003 in 136 domestic mergers between non-financial companies in
Japan. The sample includes listed as well as unlisted target companies. We do not find a
positive association of affiliation with a main bank or keiretsu membership with the
announcement returns. On the other hand, the presence of a common shareholder holding
shares in both the bidder and the target company, and the period in which the merger took
place (in/after 1998), have a positive influence.
In the second empirical study we examine the abnormal return of listed bidder
companies and listed target companies in 91 mergers between non-financial companies in
the period 1981 to 2003. In this research we look in more detail into the relation of the
merging companies’ abnormal return, their affiliation with the same main bank, whether
they are in financial distress, and their profitability. We find that the companies with the
same main bank had high profitability in the 1980s, but that the main bank arranged bail-
outs for failing target companies in the 1990s.
10-2 Conclusions
In this section we come back to our central question and sub-questions. We first discuss
the determinants of M&A activity in Japan, in particular merger motives and the role of the
main bank, and then look into hostile takeovers.
Central question:
What are the determinants of M&A activity in Japan over time?
Sub-question I
Is hostility in M&A activity increasing, and which actors initiate hostile takeover activities?
Sub-question II
What motivates Japanese companies to engage in mergers, which actors play a role, what
are the profitability drivers, and is shareholder wealth created?
Determinants of M&A activity in Japan
This thesis shows that for an analysis of M&A activity in Japan, it is necessary to include
the influence of various elements, starting with political and economic development and
informal and formal institutions. These institutions have an important impact on actors and
governance structures of companies. Informal and formal institutions influence companies’
ownership structure, governance structure, and M&A activity. The impact of these
institutions is through the behaviour of actors. Formal institutions, constrained by informal
institutions, affect merger activity through the actors as well. The informal and formal
institutions need to be considered in relation to the motivation of actors to follow particular
rules. This argument also applies with reference to the financing decision and available
methods to procure funds.
The ownership and governance structure of a company have a direct influence on M&A
activity. The management’s financing decision and a company’s ownership structure and
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corporate governance structure determine the relative influence of shareholders and
creditors on M&A decisions. Merger activity is also influenced by various elements such
as (international) competitiveness, government regulations, changing domestic and
international political-economic conditions, and industrial policies.
In order to understand behaviour of actors and governance structures, it is indispensable
to reflect on the historical and context-specific background. The resulting behaviour of
actors and/or governance structure following a change in, for example, formal institutions,
can only be understood when the historical background is taken into account. The
behaviour of actors is the result of the interactions of an actor’s (i) shared cognition, (ii)
individual mental maps and shared mental maps, and (iii) motivation. The behaviour of the
actors, constrained by the informal and formal institutions, results in the governance
structure and M&A activity. This is exemplified by our finding that the horizontal keiretsu
that developed after WWII was the consequence of the new company law, rather than
caused by the threat of hostile takeovers. Or, to put it differently, the origin of the hostile
takeovers threat lies in the new company law that significantly changed the authority
distribution of shareholders.
Behaviour of managers can also be seen in the merger motives of M&A activity. There
are various motives for mergers, such as synergy, adaptive, managerial empire building,
and hubris. The merger motive refers to an individual M&A transaction, whereas merger
wave drivers represent more general aspects that induce a lot of companies to engage in
M&A activity, such as external shocks and overvaluation of stocks. In our analysis of
M&A activity in the pre-war and post-war periods, we found that in both periods the main
motives for mergers were the synergy and adaptive motives. As a result of the informal
institutions, Japanese managers do not appear to engage in mergers with a managerial
empire building or hubris motive. We also find that corporate groups have an important
influence on M&A activity. As we will show below in our discussion on hostile takeovers,
the vertical keiretsu and trade association appear to have an important influence in Japan.
Regarding mergers we look into the main bank system, as the main bank is argued to
have an important monitoring role over Japanese companies. We relate this to the adaptive
motive of mergers and examine what kind of rescue mergers occurs in Japan - and whether
the relationship of a main bank influences merger activity. We assume that the main bank
of a company in financial distress will attempt to arrange a merger of a weak company
with a stronger company. The merger will protect the main bank’s interests as a creditor
and not necessarily be intended to increase shareholder wealth. In mergers between
companies with the same main bank, we find that shareholder wealth is not created, and
that the main bank acts to protect its own interests as creditor.
Hostile takeovers
Previous research argues that the low level of hostile takeover activity in Japan is primarily
caused by two institutional elements in the Japanese society. The first is the horizontal
keiretsu, which is argued to have prevented hostile takeovers through stable and cross-
shareholdings between companies. The second is the specific Japanese culture that is said
to be characterized by the pursuit of harmony. This thesis provides evidence that the trade
association and the vertical keiretsu might play an important role in hostile takeovers. We
conclude that assumptions made on the influence of the other two Japanese characteristics
might need to be reconsidered. Our main contribution to the academic discussion on M&A
in Japan is that we show that institutional elements need to be looked at from a broad and
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historical perspective. An institutional element can only be understood if perceived in
relation to other institutional elements and taking into account its dynamic development
over time, rather than in isolation and at one particular point in time.
We show that the horizontal keiretsu, as the most important prevention measure against
hostile takeovers needs further exploration. Based on our analysis, we conclude that in the
post-war period all hostile takeovers need to be interpreted as greenmail attempts. New
laws implemented after WWII created the possibility to engage in greenmail. As
companies could not repurchase their own shares before 2001, companies that were part of
a horizontal keiretsu were targeted. Rather than preventing hostile takeovers, the horizontal
keiretsu appear to have caused greenmail in the post-war period.
The argument that the Japanese, as a people, put high emphasis on harmony and trust,
implies that they will not undertake hostile actions. We show that there are two types of
trust: general trust and particularistic trust. General trust is trust between individuals that
do not have a particular relationship, and particularistic trust refers to trust in groups of
mutually dependent individuals. The Japanese society is characterized by low general trust
and high particularistic trust. The low general trust can be seen in the greenmail practices
towards companies, the high particularistic trust in, for example, trade associations.
Trade associations are formed by companies in the same industrial sector: information is
exchanged and relationships are built. We show that because of the strong relations in these
groups, companies build a high level of particularistic trust, preventing these companies
from engaging in hostile takeovers vis-à-vis each other.
The vertical keiretsu is another important impediment to hostile takeovers, functioning
in three ways. The first characteristic is that a large Japanese company is not the same as a
large U.S. company. Whereas U.S. companies tend to produce most products in-house,
Japanese companies deploy a wide subcontracting system that makes it a difficult target for
a hostile takeover. The second characteristic of the vertical keiretsu is that supply from the
subsidiaries is indispensable in the production process of the parent company. The majority
of its important subsidiaries is already fully owned, but if a hostile takeover is attempted
on an important, partially owned subsidiary, the parent company will intervene to secure its
own production process. The third aspect is the question whether it would be beneficial for
a hostile bidder to try and takeover an unwilling subsidiary company. Even if the hostile
bidder would succeed, it is very likely that it will lose the subsidiary’s suppliers and
customers in the process. These factors may have limited hostile takeover attempts to a
high degree.
Regarding our sub-question whether hostility in Japanese M&A is increasing, we do not
believe this is the case. Since WWII, Japanese companies have had to cope with a lot of
hostilities from outside the company, and only the approach of the raider appears to be
changing. Although there seems to be an increase in hostility in Japan, this is primarily
caused by the fact that hostilities are engaged in by respectable investment companies and
deals are publicly announced. This is different from the silent greenmail by shite groups,
but the motivation appears to be the same. This, combined with the fact the attempts
remain at a very low level, leads us to question the generally accepted explanations and the
influence of the unwinding of cross-shareholdings and changes in Japanese cultural
characteristics. With our model we therefore propose the vertical keiretsu and trade
association as explanations why Japanese blue-chip companies do not initiate hostile
tender offers.
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We think it is only possible to argue that hostility has increased, if and when Japanese
blue-chip companies start launching hostile tender offers on companies on a regular basis.
To our opinion, a different hostile takeover market in Japan can only result from the
weakening of relations within the vertical keiretsu and trade association. As this will not
occur in the near future, we expect that only (foreign) investment funds will be active
players. Resulting from the above-mentioned institutional elements, however, they will not
be able to gain operational control of a company or use the target for asset-stripping. As
hostile tender offers will be prevented by a company’s buyback of shares, poison pills or
mergers and/or acquisitions by friendly (related) companies, the funds will be able to
achieve significant financial gains.
Institutional model for M&A revisited
Our model indicates that a lot of different aspects have influenced, and still influence,
M&A activity in Japan. The question we need to ask; will the model be useful in the future?
We think it will, primarily as it includes the important element of the historical and
context-specific background. So, by definition it will be applicable for future studies. On
the other hand, as previous studies never included the vertical keiretsu and trade
association in the discussion of hostile takeovers in Japan, there might be elements that are
not included in our model that have an important influence on hostile takeovers. For
example, we did not look into the decision-making process related to new M&A
regulations. The sudden extension of implementation of the triangular mergers from May
2006 to May 2007, indicates that important processes occur between managers and law-
makers. Also, the role of foreign investors might need to be looked into in more detail to
understand their influence in the future. We think that the new elements of our model are
indispensable in any discussion of hostile takeovers in Japan, but, depending on new
insights in the future, new elements may have to be added.
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Dutch summary
In dit proefschrift worden fusies en overnames (M&A) in Japan onderzocht, waarbij de
nadruk ligt op (i) de rol van de ‘main bank’ in fusies en (ii) greenmail en vijandige
overnames in de naoorlogse periode. In Japan is het aantal fusies tussen grote bedrijven
laag en zijn vijandige overnames zeldzaam. Sinds de tweede helft van de jaren ‘90 stijgen
het aantal en de totale waarde waarde van M&A transacties. In overeenstemming met de
trend in de totale activiteiten op het gebied van M&A komen vijandige tender offers ook
vaker voor: in de naoorlogse periode tot 1999 waren er geen vijandige tender offer
pogingen, maar in de periode van 1999 tot juli 2007 waren er dertien. Het knappen van de
zeepbeleconomie en de daaropvolgende recessie in de jaren ‘90 zetten Japanse
ondernemingen aan na te denken over de efficiëntie van het traditionele Japanse systeem
van corporate governance. Ook reduceerde de deregulering van de financiële markten de
invloed van de main bank en resulteerden de crisis in de financiële sector en de nieuwe
financiële verslaggevingsregels in de tweede helft van de jaren ‘90 in het tot ontwikkeling
komen van stabiel en wederzijds aandelenbezit van ondernemingen. Specifieke Japanse
culturele karakteristieken die zijn gebruikt ter verklaring van het lage aantal M&A
transacties, zijn ook veranderd en dit leidde tot herstructurering van bedrijven. Dit
proefschrift onderzoekt hoe en waarom M&A activiteit in Japan is veranderd.
Wij bouwen een uniek gegevensbestand op over M&A activiteit in het vooroorlogse en
naoorlogse Japan. De analyse van de vooroorlogse periode betreft 537 ondernemingen die
genoteerd zijn aan de effectenbeurs van Tokyo (TSE). Wij tonen dat M&A activiteit erg
laag is in de periode 1906-37 en dat er geen bewijs is voor veel vijandige overnames. Ook
geven wij aan dat bedrijven gerelateerd aan een zaibatsu groep niet actiever in M&A
waren dan bedrijven zonder een dergelijke relatie. In de naoorlogse periode vinden wij
twee fusiegolven: de eerste golf in de periode 1963-1972 en een tweede golf die begint in
1990 en tot op heden voortduurt. De eerste golf werd veroorzaakt door de
handelsliberalisering en de opheffing van restricties op kapitaaltransacties in 1964. Deze
fusies waren gericht op het voorkomen van hevige concurrentie tussen Japanse bedrijven
en het versterken van hun mondiale concurrentiepositie. De tweede golf begint na het
knappen van de zeepbeleconomie en is gerelateerd aan bedrijfsherstructurering. Na de
wijzigingen in de wetgeving in de jaren ‘90 nemen het aantal en de grootte van M&A
transacties toe, maar het aantal fusies blijft relatief laag en stabiel gedurende de periode
1999-2006. In tegenstelling tot de Amerikaanse fusiegolven, zijn de golven in Japan
anticyclisch, met betrekking tot zowel de algemene economie als de aandelenkoersen.
Om vijandige overnames te onderzoeken, bouwen wij een institutioneel model voor
M&A activiteit waarin wij institutionele elementen zoals cultuur, wetten, aandelenbezit en
groepsstructuren van ondernemingen integreren. Eerder onderzoek stelt dat het lage aantal
vijandige overnames in Japan is veroorzaakt door twee institutionele elementen in Japan.
De eerste is de horizontale keiretsu: vijandige overnames zouden worden voorkomen door
stabiel en wederzijds aandelenbezit tussen ondernemingen. De tweede is de specifieke
Japanse cultuur, met als een van de belangrijkste kenmerken het nastreven van harmonie
en vertrouwen. Wij tonen met ons model aan dat de bewering dat de horizontale keiretsu
de belangrijkste factor is geweest ter voorkoming van vijandige overnames, twijfelachtig is.
Op basis van onze analyse concluderen wij dat alle vijandige overnames in de naoorlogse
234
Dutch summary
222
period als greenmail moeten worden beschouwd. Nieuwe wetten in de naoorlogse periode
creërden de mogelijkheid tot greenmail. Voor 2001 was het voor Japanse ondernemingen
niet mogelijk om hun eigen aandelen in te kopen en dit leidde tot greenmail gericht op
bedrijven die deel uitmaakten van een horizontale keiretsu. Wij zijn van mening dat
horizontale keiretsu niet zozeer vijandige overnames hebben voorkomen, als wel greenmail
hebben veroorzaakt.
Het argument dat Japanners erg veel waarde hechten aan harmonie en vertrouwen,
impliceert dat Japanners geen vijandige acties zullen initiëren. Wij tonen aan dat
‘vertrouwen’ moet worden opgesplitst in algemeen vertrouwen en specifiek vertrouwen.
Algemeen vertrouwen is het vertrouwen tussen individuen die geen specifieke relatie met
elkaar hebben; specifiek vertrouwen duidt op het vertrouwen binnen groepen individuen
die van elkaar afhankelijk zijn. De Japanse samenleving wordt gekarakteriseerd door een
laag algemeen en een hoog specifiek vertrouwen. Het lage algemeen vertrouwen
manifesteert zich in de greenmail van ondernemingen, het hoge specifiek vertrouwen in
bijvoorbeeld de bedrijfsorganisatie.
Wij concluderen uit ons model dat bedrijfsorganisaties en verticale keiretsu wellicht een
belangrijke rol spelen met betrekking tot vijandige overnames. Een bedrijfsorganisatie
wordt gevormd door ondernemingen uit dezelfde industriële sector; er wordt informatie
uitgewisseld en er worden relaties opgebouwd. Wij tonen aan dat ondernemingen door de
sterke relaties binnen deze groepen een hoog niveau van specifiek vertrouwen opbouwen,
waarmee voorkomen wordt dat ondernemingen vijandige overnames tegen elkaar initiëren.
De verticale keiretsu is een andere invloedrijke factor bij vijandige overnames. Deze
functioneert op drie manieren. Op de eerste plaats is een grote Japanse onderneming niet
hetzelfde als een grote Amerikaanse onderneming. In een Amerikaanse onderneming
worden de meeste producten binnen de onderneming zelf gemaakt, maar een Japanse
onderneming besteedt haar productie op grote schaal uit. Dit maakt een Japanse
onderneming een moeilijk object voor een vijandige overname. Het tweede kenmerk van
de verticale keiretsu is dat de producten van de onderaannemers onmisbaar zijn in het
productieproces van de moedermaatschappij. De meerderheid van de onderaannemers is al
volledig in bezit van de moedermaatschappij. Indien er echter een poging tot vijandige
overname van een gedeeltelijk in bezit zijnde onderaannemer wordt gedaan, zal de
moedermaatschappij ter bescherming van haar eigen productieproces actie nemen om dit te
voorkomen. Het derde aspect is de vraag of het gunstig is voor een vijandige aspirant-
overnemer om te proberen een onderaannemer over te nemen als deze er onwillend
tegenover staat. Zelfs als de vijandige aspirant-overnemer in zijn opzet zou slagen, is het
zeer waarschijnlijk dat hij in de loop van het vijandige overnameproces de leveranciers en
klanten van de overgenomen onderneming zal verliezen. Deze factoren hebben vijandige
overnames in hoge mate beperkt. Wij zijn van mening dat alleen verzwakking van de
relaties in de verticale keiretsu en bedrijfsorganisaties zal resulteren in veranderingen in
vijandige overnames in Japan.
De fusies die plaatsvinden gedurende de tweede fusiegolf creëren geen
aandeelhouderswaarde. Wij voeren twee eventstudies uit en onderzoeken de invloed van
Japanse kararakteristieken zoals de main bank, horizontale keiretsu en de aanwezigheid
van een moedermaatschappij. Ook kijken wij naar bedrijfsgerelateerde gegevens als
bijvoorbeeld de winstgevendheid en liquiditeitsproblemen. Op de dag van de aankondiging
van een fusie vinden wij geen positieve correlatie tussen de koers die een aspirant
overnemende partij biedt en de relatie die deze partij heeft met een main bank of
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horizontale keiretsu. Als de aspirant overnemende partij (bieder) en de overnamekandidaat
dezelfde main bank hebben, creërt de betrokkenheid van de main bank geen
aandeelhouderswaarde maar is haar eigen belang als crediteur de motivatie: fusies waarbij
een main bank een rol speelt, vinden niet plaats tussen twee zwakke bedrijven, maar tussen
bedrijven waarvan tenminste één bedrijf financieel sterk is. Begin jaren ‘90 vonden de
meeste fusies plaats tussen een zwakke overnamekandidaat en een sterke bieder.
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AN ANALYSIS OF MERGER WAVES AND HOSTILE TAKEOVERS
The number of mergers between large companies has been low, and hostile takeover
cases have been rare in post-war Japan. Since the 1990s, however, total M&A activity has
been increasing in number of cases and in value. Coinciding with this trend, hostile tender
offer attempts are also more frequent. Previous research argues that the low level of
merger and hostile takeover activity is caused by three institutional elements within the
Japanese society: the main bank system, the horizontal keiretsu, and the specific Japanese
culture.
With reference to hostile takeovers we show that it is important to make a distinction
between greenmail and hostile tender offers. We build an institutional model that
emphasizes the necessity to consider institutional elements from a historical and context-
specific perspective. Our model indicates that the vertical keiretsu and the trade association
have an important impact on hostile tender offers in Japan. 
Regarding mergers, we examine whether the main bank system influences merger
activity of companies. By using two event studies we show that involvement of a main
bank does not create shareholder wealth in mergers. The main bank appears to act in
order to protect its own interests as creditor.
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